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With its long coastUne and small population, Australia could not hope to defend 
Itself against external attack. It has always felt the need for a "great and powerful 
fnend" capable of protecting it. During the nineteenth century, British protection 
seemed assured. The colonial and then the federal governments became critical of 
both the form of that defence and the procedures for formulating foreign policy 
Federation was partly the result of the development of Australian nationalism, a 
nationalism demanding a greater voice in policy making and more responsibility for 
defence at a time when British power was nearing its peak and the Empire develop-
ing into a Commonwealth. 
With the shift in the world balance of power, Australia began to establish closer 
relations with the United States. During the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, relations between Washington and the several parts of Australia were confined 
to consular, largely commercial contacts. After 1914, the Empire changed in power 
and structure as its members became autonomous; the colonies became dominions 
and sought direct contacts with a State Department a little puzzled by the changing 
Commonwealth context. Australia had ceased by 1939 to live in a tranquil corner of 
the globe. Pearl Harbor emphasized the need for a new great and powerful fi-iend. 
The wartime alliance between AustraUa and the United States developed into the 
ANZUS Treaty, which finally became the focal point in relations between the two 
countries. It did, however, revive the old problem of the relationship between junior 
and senior partners in the alliance: Did it involve effective independence or did the 
junior partner tend to become a satellite? 
The quest for security against attack, with Japan as the potential or actual danger, 
hnked the policies of Deakin with those of Menzies and Whitlam. But as Whitlani 
pointed out in 1973, ANZUS was "only one aspect of the wide range of interests and 
obligations linking us with the United States". 
Aware of this, I have been compelled in this book for reasons of time and space to 
exclude many such "interests" - culture contacts, investment, defence, and with 
one exception economic relations. In working and publishing in the field for over a 
quarter of a century, I have found it necessary to specialize and to adopt a narrow 
rather than a broad construction of these relations. This is, therefore, a study pri-
marily of the diplomatic relations between Australia and the United States. I have 
dealt with some of the other interests elsewhere. 
X PREFACE 
Any scholar writing on the period 1900-75 appreciates the important contributions 
of his predecessors: Raymond A. Esthus, R. N. Rosecrance, Margaret George, and 
Roger Bell. Much archival material, especially for the years 1941-51, has been releas-
ed since they wrote, and this justifies a re-examination of the evidence. For the last 
quarter of a century it has been possible to rely only on published material, official 
and private, and to revise views formulated closer to the events. A most important 
source during this period is the analysis of the AustraUan documents on Vietnam 
made by Professor R. G. Neale for the Whitlam government. It was tabled as an 
anonymous report in the House of Representatives but not printed in the Parlia-
mentary Papers. 
"No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part 
of the main." No academic could survive without that "main" which contains a 
multitude of friendly and vital librarians and archivists. After thirty years of firiend-
ship, it would be impossible to record them all: the large team at the Public Record 
Office in London, the quiet specialists at the Houghton Library at Harvard, the 
Library of Congress in Washington, the Hoover collection at Stanford, the Truman 
Library at Independence, Missouri, and the Eisenhower Library at Abilene, Kansas. 
A special debt is due to Ronald Swerczek and Kathy Nicastro of the United States 
National Archives, and to Mike Miller of the Washington National Records Centre 
at Suitland in Maryland; to Robert Parker of the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, 
New York; to Alf Erlandsson and Loh Keng Ain of the United Nations Archives in 
New York; I appreciate the valuable assistance given by Tony Street, then minister 
for Foreign Affairs, and Ian Wilson, minister for Home Affairs, in speeding up access 
to Indonesian documents for the period 1947-49. 
I am deeply indebted to Professor Neale, the director-general, and to Joy Wheatley 
of Australian Archives for their constant help (they face the difficult problem of 
assisting researchers with a lack of trained staff; to W.J . Hudson and James Stokes 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and to many librarians in the manuscript room 
of the National Library of Australia. Nance Dickins of the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs has made a major contribution to my research. 
Documents can be greatly illuminated by the comments of witnesses who took 
part in shaping events and policy. I have been helped by discussions with W. Mac-
mahon Ball over a good many hours. Sir Paul Hasluck, Sir John Latham, Sir Peter 
Heydon, Sir Patrick Shaw, Hugh Gaitskell, Patrick Gordon Walker, and a number 
of Australian and American diplomats who for obvious reasons must remain 
anonymous. 
This study would have been much more difficult without a three-year grant from 
the Australian Research Grants Committee; I am greatly indebted to the committee 
for that assistance and for its patience after throwing bread upon the waters. The 
History Department of the University of Melbourne has been very generous in its 
support; so too, has the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Lesley Dempster 
Mary Marazzita, and Sheila Macdonald have succeeded admirably in navigating their 
way through my microscopic handwriting to produce clear typescript. 
Norman Harper 
Parti 
The Adolescent Nations 
1900-1931 

1 The Great White Fleet 
In November 1900 the Sydney Daily Telegraph suggested that a special invitation to 
Austraha's Federation ceremonies should be sent to the United States. "No nation in 
the world better knows the value of the step that Australia is now taking than the 
great Republic of America," the paper remarked.' The Brooklyn, Commodore 
Schley's flagship during the battle of Santiago Bay, was sent to Sydney to mark the 
occasion. When the first Commonwealth ParHament was opened on 9 May 1901, 
the six Australian colonies had a population of 3,773,801, which was comparable to 
3,929,214 Americans who hved through the inauguration of the federal government 
of the United States. The new pohtical entity was born in an industrial age with pro-
blems akin to, but different from, those of the frail republic that came into being in 
1776. That republic by 1901 dwarfed in population, resources, and economic 
development the new Australian Commonwealth. 
Much of Austraha's interest in closer relations with the United States stemmed 
from the common federal systems of the two countries. Ever since the early discus-
sions in 1889, American precedents were studied carefully by the leading Australian 
federalists. As John La Nauze has pointed out, James Bryce's The American Common-
wealth (1888) had been the bible for the framers of the Australian federal constitu-
tion. Alfred Deakin considered their debt to it was "almost incalculable". Inglis 
Clark stressed the primacy of American precedents in his draft proposal of 1891. 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States by Story, Kent, and Walker, 
and Burgess's Political Science and Constitutional Law also helped to shape the thinking 
of the Australian founding fathers, men like Deakin, Barton, Higgins, Griffiths, 
O'Connor, Symons, and Wise, as well as Quick and Garran. But these men were in 
a minority. "Only a few of the delegates seem to have had anything like a profound 
knowledge or understanding of America," Erling M. Hunt notes in American 
Precedents in Australian Federation. "None had any first hand knowledge of American 
government worth calling such."^ Deakin had visited the United States as a tourist 
in 1885, yet neither his letters nor his diaries show more than a superficial interest in 
American politics. His knowledge, like that of his colleagues, was largely bookish.' 
Isaac Isaacs borrowed from the Melbourne Public Library all its books on the 
American constitution. As Hunt points out, "a large number of the delegates 
displayed almost no knowledge of America or American government, although they 
were in general, followers of leaders who did possess such knowledge". One 
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frustrated delegate to the 1897-98 convention angrily shouted: "We have heard too 
much about the example of the United States all through the meetings of this 
Convention."* 
Australia's interest in closer relations with the United States also stemmed from a 
perceived threat of danger to a small isolated country. The turn of the century 
brought Australia and the United States closer together at a time when Australia's 
new nationalism and federalism reflected a growing awareness of external threats. 
One of the important pressures leading to federation had been the fear of foreign ag-
gression as European imperialism penetrated the southern and western Pacific into 
what could be regarded as Australia's regional waters. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith's an-
nexation of New Guinea in April 1883 was almost immediately repudiated by 
Whitehall. But the formation of the German New Guinea Company in May 1884 
led Britain to declare a protectorate over the southern coast and the adjacent islands 
on 6 November. A month later Germany annexed the northern half of New Guinea 
and the north-eastern islands known as the Bismarck Archipelago. The shocked 
Australian colonies pressed unsuccessfully for a transfer of British New Guinea to 
Australia. Australian concern at German activities in Samoa and the extension of the 
Hamburg shipping lines into the Pacific was partly allayed by the tripartite arrange-
ments made over Samoa between Britain, Germany, and the United States between 
1877 and 1889.' 
Australian uneasiness about its own security also arose out of the changing balance 
of power in East Asia and the western Pacific. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 
and the subsequent completion of foreign spheres of influence in China increased 
Australian apprehension over possible threats to Australian security. There was a 
growing fear that Austrahan interests might be ignored by Great Britain in its global 
concern with naval bases; others feared that Great Britain might be more concerned 
with a global horse-deal for real estate. The Melbourne Argus in 1895 foreshadowed 
the Evatt position during the Second World War: "No treaty developments in the 
Pacific should be allowed to take place without our claim to participation in it being 
allowed."* 
The outbreak of the Spanish-American War in April 1898 aroused considerable 
interest in AustraHa, and almost immediately a number of AustraHans volunteered 
for service with the American army. Feeling in Australia was overwhelmingly in 
favour of the United States, and many felt that the "present duel" was "our war". 
"Madame Melba singing Rossini's 'II Barbiere' in San Francisco compromised by 
singing the 'Star Spangled Banner' during the lesson scene in her costume of a 
Spanish senorita, with 'amazing effect'." She hoped that her action would work for 
"a pleasanter state of affairs for both countries in the far-off future".' 
The future of Spanish possessions in the Far East aroused some interest in the 
Australian colonies. Sir George Turner, the Victorian premier, declared, "It is most 
important on strategical grounds that the Philippine Islands, which dominate the 
Australian trade route to the East, should be in the possession of a friendly power " 
His proposal to other colonial premiers and New Zealand that representations be 
made to Great Britain to ensure this, met with an apathetic response. Only Tasman" 
and New Zealand were prepared to support him: the other premiers felt such a mov 
was premature. Annexation by the United States removed the danger at a time wh 
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Japan seemed to pose a major threat to stability in East Asia and even to Australian 
security. Some Australians feared that Japan might force a way into Australia for 
Japanese settlers. Australian military authorities pointed out to colonial governments 
that the emergence of Japan as a first-class power made more urgent the re-
examination of Austrahan defence plans. "The annual military exercises in 1895 took 
the form of repelling a fictitious attempt by Japanese war vessels to enter Sydney har-
bor and much significance was attached by some Australians to the Japanese occupa-
tion of Formosa."' The most important thing from an Australian point of view was 
the emergence of America as a major element in a new power balance in the Far East. 
Shortly after the destruction of the Spanish fleet by George Dewey in Manila Bay, 
the Sydney Morning Herald succinctly summed up the change: "Whatever else may 
happen, it is clear that the States are now an international force that must be reckon-
ed with, not only at sea, but by Europe. . . . Now that the United States have burst 
the fictitious swathes of the Monroe Doctrine it is apparent that no great question 
can be settled in future without reckoning on an active American interference as a 
factor in the situation. All this works good for England and for British interests at 
home and abroad."' The United States was emerging as a first-class power, one of 
the leading nations of the world in terms of population, wealth, and political power. 
The changing balance of power in China and Japanese expansion led to the growth 
of interest in a rapprochement between Britain and the United States and hopes that a 
great Anglo-Saxon alliance might be concluded. The Ballarat Courier declared: "We 
have had here in Ballarat, raptures of anticipatory joy over the prospect of union, of 
the larger than our own Australian federation, which shall weld together all the 
English speaking races. We have sung 'Yankee Doodle' and 'Hail Columbia' and 
'God Save The Queen' all in one unbroken strain of the bigger patriotism which in-
cludes the whole composite race in the same grand aspiration after a family compact 
of peace."'" Despite a thaw in relations between London and Washington and some 
interest when Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury hinted at the possibility of an 
alliance during their visit to the United States, the project never really got off the 
ground. There was considerable scepticism in England and the United States: a 
substantial proportion of American citizens had no Anglo-Saxon background, and 
the Foreign Office differed from the State Department on many issues." Australian 
enthusiasm for a great Anglo-Saxon power bloc was not matched in the two greatest 
Anglo-Saxon countries. 
On 6 September 1901, a Polish anarchist attempted to assassinate President 
McKinley. After the death of the mortally wounded president, Theodore Roosevelt 
succeeded him. The death of McKinley shocked Australia, and there was a tremen-
dous outpouring of public sympathy. "The assassination touched into new and sud-
den consciousness the sense of kinship with the American people, and nowhere 
throughout the civilised world has the sense of sympathy with the great American 
Republic in the tragic calamity which has overtaken it, been keener than in 
Austrahan and New Zealand."" 
Theodore Roosevelt's accession to the presidency was greeted with enthusiasm in 
Australia, where his Rough Riders in the Spanish-American war had captured the 
Australian imagination and his dynamic personality increased Australian enthusiasm. 
Also, he had sent a congratulatory message to the new Australian federal govern-
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ment: "All men who are awake to the great movements of our time must wa c 
with keen interest the assembUng of the first ParHament of the giant young 
Commonwealth of the South Seas whose statesmen have given so many lessons o 
those elsewhere engaged in governing democracies, and whose soldiers have snown 
such sterling valor and efficiency. For America the interest is not only keen, but or 
the friendliest type and we wish God speed to Australia in the career now opening 
for her ."" He promised to continue McKinley's foreign policies when he entered 
the White House: an isthmian canal, a Pacific cable, and commercial reciproaty. His 
moderate and mature formulation of American policy in his message to Congress in 
December 1901 reassured Australians who may have feared a bellicose statement. 
Despite the warmth of Australian feeling for the new president of the United 
States and his foreign policy, Austrahan political leaders were still faced by the in-
creasing fear of Japan. The whole international pohtical scene in the Pacific was in a 
state of flux with the emergence of Japan and the United States as two new elements 
in the balance of power. The sudden shift in the power balance between 1895 and 
1901 meant that Australia felt itself to be in a vulnerable position with the possibility 
of an attack, perhaps even invasion, from the newly dominant power in Asia — 
Japan. Australia was faced with the problem of formulating a defence and foreign 
policy to deal with a belief that the greatest menace to Australian security came firom 
Japan. This remained a persistent theme with minor variations for the next forty 
years. 
The problem for Australia was complicated by the fact that her external interests 
had to be formally conducted through the Foreign Office in London and so were 
subject to British priorities in formulating policy. There was an increasing Australian 
distrust of "the comforting assurances of security emanating fi-om the British Col-
onial Defence Committee and the Committee of Imperial Defence"; this led to the 
belief that it was necessary "to adopt a distinctive scenario of their own which 
betokened a time of crisis for the Commonwealth".'* 
In 1902, Great Britain concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan, largely because of 
its growing fear of isolation in Europe following the difficulties of the Boer War. 
The significant thing for Australia was that although a Pacific member of the 
British Empire and so directly affected by it, Australia was in no way consulted 
about the aUiance." This was a matter of imperial policy, and the Foreign Office and 
Colonial Office felt that Australia could be safely ignored. In many ways the treaty 
increased Australian security. The central part of the treaty provided that should 
either party be involved in a war with another power, the other party would remain 
neutral. Only if a fourth power joined the enemy would Japan and Britain join 
forces. The treaty relieved Britain from Russian pressure in the Pacific and in the 
Balkans, as well as decreasing German pressure in the Pacific. It also temporarily 
relieved Australian fears about the Japanese menace. Britain's task was to hold the 
ring while Japan challenged Russia. 
The situation changed dramatically with the sudden defeat of Russia in the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-5. Count Sergei Witte, the Russian minister, had declared 
"The more inert countries in Asia will fall prey to the powerful invaders and will be 
divided up between them. . . . the problem of each country is to obtain as lare-e a 
share as possible in the inheritance of the outlived oriental states, especially of tb 
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Chinese Colossus. Russia, both geographically and historically, has the undisputed 
right to the hon's share of the expected prey. . . . The absorption by Russia of a con-
siderable portion of the Chinese Empire is only a question of t ime."" Russia's 
refusal to evacuate Manchuria or to guarantee the independence of China led to a sur-
prise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in 1904 and a formal declaration of 
war two days later. The Russian Baltic fleet was sent halfway round the world in a 
desperate attempt to remedy the situation. Twenty-one vessels left Europe in 
October 1904 and sailed to the Far East via the Cape of Good Hope rather than Suez 
for fear that the British might close the Suez Canal. In May 1905 Admiral Togo 
almost completely destroyed the Baltic fleet in the Tsushima Straits: only two 
ships survived. As one Russian naval officer remarked, "The Japanese had disabled 
our squadron . . . without themselves sustaining any more damage that if they have 
been engaged on target practice."" President Roosevelt acted as a mediator and in-
duced Japan to accept a less harsh peace treaty. 
The Treaty of Portsmouth sounded the death knell to Russian ambitions to con-
trol the Yellow Sea and to play a major role in the dissolution of the Chinese Empire. 
Russia's defeat by Japan came as a rude shock to Europe and AustraHa. News of a 
defeat of a major white power by Asian armies and navies "reverberated like a 
thunderclap through all the whispering galleries of the East". In Australia, fears of 
Japan were revived, especially when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed in 
August 1905 for a period of three years. Deakin quickly grasped the significance of 
the battle of Tsushima Straits: Japan had become the greatest naval power in the Far 
East. ' 'What we have to estimate for the future,'' he said, ' 'is that instead of the two 
fleets in the China seas belonging to separate — even opposing — powers we shall 
now have one fleet, only it will be as strong as the two former fleets, and will 
operate under one flag. . . . Australia could no longer depend on its isolation for 
security."" Deakin had at first felt that there was little danger to Australia and that 
Japan would find her hands full in maintaining her new position on the mainland. 
But Tshushima forced a drastic revision of his views. On 12 June he stressed the need 
to re-examine Australia's position in the world and her defence needs. The new 
revised version scrapped fears of Russian or French expansion, "relegated the 
German threat to a secondary status and concentrated their attention on Japan's role 
in the Pacific". Cabinet minister Allen McLean elaborated on Deakin's warning: 
"The stupendous struggle in the East must awaken the people of Australia to the 
fact that we have been living in a fool's paradise when we assumed that our great 
distance from the military nations gave us immunity from foreign invasion. . . . 
Japan has astonished the world. . . . We now find one of the great naval and 
mihtary powers within a very short distance of our shores. That puts us in a very dif-
ferent position from that which we considered we occupied before." Senator George 
Pearce viewed the Anglo-Japanese alliance with caution and suggested that it should 
not be regarded as "a guarantee for all time. . . . Is there any other country that 
offers such a temptation to Japan as Australia does?"" 
The Japanese victory led to some proposals for concessions to Japan over immigra-
tion, and in 1905 the Immigration Restriction Act was amended so that the dictation 
test could be applied in "any prescribed language" rather than a European language. 
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But the main result was to compel AustraHans to re-examine their defence an 
security policies. 
There was growing concern in Australia about the ability of Great Britain o 
defend Australia in the event of a Pacific war. The Queensland naval commandant. 
Captain W . R . CressweU, in a memorandum for Deakin to use in London, pointed 
out that "combination against England between a European power and Japan (or 
China) would make the defence of the Commonwealth a matter of extreme ditncul-
ty, or, it may be frankly admitted, impossibility, unless we earnestly profit by the 
interim years of shelter and safety to develop our powers of resistance. . . • Attack 
from main bases in the North Pacific is a new factor. . . . It must gradually enter 
more and more into our defence calculations."^" The Cresswell memorandum was 
part of the Australian campaign for a separate Australian naval squadron. The new 
defence policy formulated by Deakin in 1906 was reluctantly accepted by the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence and the Admiralty. Point was given to the Australian 
argument by the growing tension between the United States and Japan over the 
treatment of Japanese settlers in California and the level of emigration from Japan to 
the west coast of the United States. The mounting racial tension was inevitably 
related in Australian minds to known Japanese antipathy to the White Australia 
policy Australians increasingly doubted. 
Roosevelt was in 1906-7 examining American naval policy; this included the abili-
ty or willingness of Britain to provide naval protection for Australia. British foreign 
secretary Sir Edward Grey thought that there was " t o o much tendency here to slob-
ber over the Colonies", that their governments were " t o o much given to spit at 
u s " , and that "for Australia it might be put even stronger".^' 
In mid December 1907, Deakin received a letter from a Hobart man (R. Kennedy) 
suggesting that the American fleet extend its Pacific cruise to Australian ports before 
visiting Japan. It is not clear whether Deakin was already contemplating such a visit 
and that Kennedy's letter was the catalyst that prompted action, or whether this 
gave him the idea.^^ His reaction was rapid, and he approached the American consul-
general, J .P. Bray, on Christmas Day 1907 telHng him that the AustraHan govern-
ment would welcome a visit from the American fleet during its world cruise.^' He 
then wrote to the American ambassador to the United Kingdom, Whitelaw Reid, 
telling him that a formal invitation would be sent through the secretary of state for 
the colonies. Deakin was presuming on a casual contact with Reid during the 
Imperial Conference of 1907. He delayed until 24 January before asking the 
governor-general. Lord Northcote, to send a request to the secretary of state for the 
colonies to forward an invitation to the American president. 
In his letter to Whitelaw Reid, Deakin said: 
The appearance in the Pacific of such an Armada is an event in the history not only of the 
United States but of that Ocean. We are naturally deeply interested in its significant 
voyage and anxious to have some opportunity of expressing our sympathy with our 
kinsmen in their timely demonstration of naval power in what may be loosely termed our 
Oceanic neighbourhood. There are two sides to the Pacific and it would be a pity if onlv 
one of them were to be favoured vifith the presence of your Fleet. . . . 
No other Federation in the world possesses as many features of likeness to the Unit rl 
States as the Commonwealth of Australia and I doubt whether any two peoples are to h 
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found who are in nearer touch with each other or likely to benefit more by anything that 
tends to knit their relations more closely." 
Anticipating the majestic consideration that might in due course be given in 
London to his request, and knowing that Northcote's dispatch enclosing his letter of 
invitation would probably be delayed, Deakin cabled a summary of his letter to the 
Colonial Office requesting a speedy reply. He had already written to Wade, a Vic-
torian representative in Washington, asking him to inform the State Department 
that an invitation was in the pipeline. Whitehall was furious at the initiative of the 
Commonwealth government, and at its pressure to secure an immediate reply. 
While London still fumed at colonial impudence, the American government con-
sidered Bray's letter as a formal invitation and accepted. Some of the American 
battleships would be sent to Australia. Secretary of state Elihu Root advised 
Roosevelt, "Sending the fleet to Australia will be good business, no matter where 
they go from there. The time will surely come, although probably after our day, 
when it will be important for the United States to have all ports friendly and all 
causes of sympathy alive in the Pacific."^* Deakin announced the probability of such 
a visit on the following day. The Colonial Office and the Foreign Office, with the 
Admiralty neatly passing the buck to them, had to swallow their pride and accept 
the coup that Deakin had so skilfully carried out. On 14 March Roosevelt's accep-
tance of the invitation was announced. 
Deakin was addressing a public meeting on defence when the news came through. 
He interrupted the chairman's vote of thanks to announce the American decision. A 
reporter declared, "Never before have I seen a man more genuinely triumphant as he 
spoke these last words. His voice rose in a perfect crescendo of triumph." Someone 
called for three times three for the president, and "the electrified audience . . . 
cheered itself hoarse". Three more for the man who sent the invitation. "These 
were given with frantic enthusiasm."^' 
In a draft speech, undated but probably written in September while the American 
fleet was still basking in Australian hospitality, Deakin blandly dislaimed the exis-
tence of any ulterior motives in sending the invitation. "That invitation, being spon-
taneous, was fortunate enough to receive a similar response, for which we can never 
be sufficiently grateful." The American response, one of Deakin's correspondents 
said, was "nothing but the warmth of your communication that induced the accep-
tance of the invitation"; another wrote, "We believe the manner in which Mr. 
Deakin tendered the invitation had more to do with its acceptance than anything 
else."^' It was an innovation for a remote colony to formally invite a naval visit, in 
practice bypassing the British government and only in the last resort working 
through the traditional formal machinery. Whether acceptance was a reward for 
initiative or for a skilful appeal to Anglo-Saxon unity, the diplomatic lesson was not 
understood for a generation. Colonies were in the very early stages of formulating 
independent foreign policies instead of always working through British machinery. 
Few Australians were unaware of Deakin's motives for inviting the American fleet 
to visit Australian capitals. Deakin had been pressing very strongly for an increase in 
Australian defence forces. This came at a time when Britain was facing a challenge to 
her naval power from Germany. Her relative naval strength was declining with the 
German rebuilding programme.'' Deakin had been concerned for some time at the 
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German entry into the Pacific and her acquisition of island territories. Samoa was a 
case in point. With rumours that the United States might rehnquish her base at 
Tutuila in response to domestic isolationist pressure, there was a possibility tnat 
Germany might acquire control of Pago Pago, the only good harbour in the group. 
If the United States retained possession of the island, then there would be no danger 
to Australian defence. But if it were transferred to Germany " i t would be a matter or 
the gravest concern to the people of this country".^ ' While the secretary of state tor 
foreign affairs was looking into the likelihood of the United States parting with 
Tutuila, Deakin recalled his earlier experience with the Foreign Office and Colonial 
Office: "For some time past that imperial poHcy as affecting the Pacific Islands has 
been chiefly before the Australian pubHc in connection with the series of 
postponements and of unsatisfied pleas for expedition and decision. Your excellency 
will no doubt agree that the impression thus conveyed must be undesirable and may 
become difficult to eradicate."'" 
Deakin's grasp of foreign policy extended far beyond Pago Pago and other Pacific 
atolls. He understood the shifting balance of power in Europe with the rise of Ger-
many and the development of the Triple Alliance. On 10 July 1908, before the Great 
White Fleet had arrived in Australian waters, he wrote confidentially to Sir Robert 
Borden, the Canadian prime minister. He began by pointing out that he was very 
conscious of the old French proverb that advises everybody to avoid putting one's 
finger between the bark and the tree — that is, interfering between parties in a self-
governing state. Canada was about to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Ger-
many, and Deakin felt that there were real dangers to the British Empire in the con-
clusion of such a treaty. Five years before, Germany was seen as a serious commercial 
rival but nothing more: there was no possibiHty of a conflict. But the situation had 
now changed dramatically; in 1908, he said, " the moderate man is inclined to believe 
that the German danger is one that every month becomes more menacing' ' 
It has become obvious not only to the German government but to the German nation that 
a strong navy is absolutely necessary before she can fight with France. Now this strong 
navy she is obtaining with phenomenal rapidity and we here feel that a crisis is not so very 
far distant. At any rate, whether right or wrong, the thoughtful man in England, of 
whatever political complexion, feels that Germany is a great and growing danger to 
England. . . . 
The City merchants look upon the possibility of a conflict between England and Ger-
many as something certain, and I think I may say without contradiction that they are 
already taking precautionary measures." 
He proposed to use the London Evening Standard to persuade British investors that 
better investments could be made inside the Empire than outside. 
Deakin's concern at the growing naval strength of Germany, the building of new 
capital ships, and the attempt to acquire overseas naval bases which were of crucial 
importance to ships with a cruising range of some three thousand kilometres beyond 
a coaling station was the opposite side of the coin to his beHef that Japan was a poten-
tial threat to Australian security despite the conclusion of the Anglo-Japansese treaty 
in 1902 and its subsequent extension. The passage by the first Commonwealth 
ParHament of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 had nailed the Whi t 
Australia poHcy to the national mast. The settlement of Japanese in CaHfornia a rl 
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the adoption of discriminatory policies by the United States against orientals led to 
serious friction with Japan. To AustraHa, it meant the adoption of roughly parallel 
policies by Australia and the United States. But Australia had to rely on British sup-
port for its restrictive immigration policies and could not possibly employ a 
Rooseveltian big stick to back up its policies. 
The spectre of a Japanese attack on Australia had haunted Australian political 
leaders for almost a generation. There was a growing fear that Britain was slowly 
contracting out of the Far East, thus increasing the danger to Australian security and 
perhaps pointing the way to the need for an alternative means of bolstering that 
security. In an editorial written during the Russo-Japanese war the Melbourne Age 
declared on 25 February 1905: "We are unfeignedly glad that America has invaded 
the Pacific. It is a move that cannot help but lessen our danger of Asiatic aggression 
and strengthen the grounds of our national security.'' Deakin put the matter bluntly 
in a private letter to the English political scientist, Richard Jebb: "The visit of the 
United States fleet is universally popular here, not so much because of our blood af-
fection for the Americans, though that is sincere, but because of our distrust of the 
Yellow Race in the North Pacific and our recognition of the 'entente cordiale' 
spreading among all white men who realise the Yellow peril to Caucasian civiliza-
tion, creeds and politics."'^ 
This apprehension was clearly realised by Admiral Charles S. Sperry, who com-
manded the visiting American fleet. In a letter to General Horace Porter, he said, 
"You probably know the obvious features of the visit to Australia and Japan, but the 
real inwardness has not been so apparent. In AustraHa and New Zealand, they have 
had a severe case of nerves over the possibility of being swallowed up by Japan and as 
I was called upon to make as many as 13 replies to addresses and formal speeches at 
dinners in one day you can imagine how careful I had to be in view of the Japanese 
visit."-" (After leaving Australia the fleet visited Japan.) Sperry believed implicitly in 
the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon races and the close collaboration between the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. "The rest of the world must 
recognise this alliance as a controlling factor in the Pacific, tending for peace" he told 
Porter, "and from this I never varied except to intersperse a few truisms about the 
additional safeguards of a common language and similar pohtical methods." 
The American fleet of sixteen battleships left San Francisco on July 1908. It had 
been repainted white. Black was the war colour; it had been discovered in 1903 that 
white ships were visible at fourteen thousand yards, seven sea miles, whereas a black 
ship passed a mile and a half from a test point and was not seen. The fleet arrived at 
Sydney heads on 20 August, and met with a tumultuous reception, a reception 
repeated at every port visited until it left Albany on 17 September. The governor-
general described the scene: "Hundreds of thousands of people Hned the shores of 
Port Jackson, while every available vessel in the harbour was crowded with 
sightseers. I am credibly informed that the number of people who took part in the 
welcome constituted the largest gathering at any time in the history of New South 
Wales. The published returns of traffic will furnish an idea of the enormous 
assemblage in Sydney. These show that the tramways alone collected nearly one 
milHon fares during the first day of the Fleet's visit."'* All the major public 
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buildings were illuminated and two pubHc holidays were proclaimed. Hospita i y 
was lavish and overwhelmed all the visitors. 
Deakin cabled to Roosevelt (using the proper diplomatic channels — through the 
governor-general. Lord Northcote, to the British ambassador in Washington, James 
Bryce): "The people of the Commonwealth gratefully appreciate the generous 
response to their invitation by the President and citizens of the great republic and 
rejoice in the opportunity afforded by this demonstration of the might of American 
power to express their sincere admiration of your sailors and their esteem and affec-
tion for the country whose glorious flag they hope to see always floating beside that 
of their motherland." Roosevelt's reply through the British ambassador declared: "I 
am especially grateful to learn of the cordiality shown by the people of Australia and 
the splendid welcome accorded to the Fleet. I desire further to give expression to the 
very high regard in which the American people hold Australia." 
Sperry was impressed. "Never in our experience have we received a heartier and 
truer welcome," he wrote to his wife as he sailed from Albany at the end of the visit. 
"Our visit to these parts has been, from first to last, a monumental success, socially 
and poHtically without one disagreeable incident or anything that could tend to make 
Japan either angry or suspicious."" It was a personal triumph for Sperry, who had 
to make innumerable speeches throughout the visit that he was able to thread his 
way through the numerous political land mines at banquets. Experience with sea 
mines may have helped. 
The Australian press reflected public enthusiasm, although the Melbourne Herald 
commented: "If it commits a fault it is in being over-anxious to demonstrate how 
exceeding rejoiced it is to welcome the American naval flag to these waters." The 
Age claimed: "The whole world is taking careful observation, because all men see 
that it is fraught with significance the extent of which cannot be at present 
measured. . . . We AustraHans, growing into nationhood with our own respon-
sibilities in the great work of national defence, would love to think of ourselves and 
the great American Republic as travelling through the centuries with ever increasing 
cordiality and love for one another."' ' The American press did not see the future 
quite in the same light. A small section of the radical press condemned the visit and 
caUed the Fleet "Uncle Sam's Blood Ships". It declared that true sociaHsts wanted to 
abolish the capitalist system which made such ships possible. 
The excitement led a West Australian poet, "Dryblower" Murphy, to write: 
For Jonathan is visiting the lonely kangaroo 
Lonely by the old Pacific sea. . . . 
We've got a big brother in America, 
Uncle Sam! Uncle Sam! 
The same old blood, the same old speech, 
The same old songs are good enough for each, 
We'll all stand together, boys. 
If the foe wants a flutter or a fuss, 
And we're hanging out a sign 
From the Leeuwin to the Line 
This bit o' the world belongs to us ." 
Deakin was not uninfluenced by the euphoria round the continent and appealerl 
to 
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the need for close friendship with brother Jonathan. "Even the giant strength of ma-
jestic battleships counts far less than the strength of the invisible ties drawing us 
together as states united in affection, in our heritage of freedom and in humane 
ideals," he wrote to Commander Sperry. He went on to emphasize that "the 
Australian invitation springs solely from an earnest desire to deepen our material 
sense of kinship, sympathy and solidarity."" The theme was repeated almost ad 
nauseam at banquets and on other public occasions. It reflected the earlier interest in a 
combination of the Anglo-Saxon powers in a global alliance. 
He was also aware of the growing criticism in AustraHa of the relative decline in 
British naval power in the Pacific and the need to bolster Australian spending on 
defence. The British squadron in Australia had been withdrawn after the conclusion 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Melbourne Herald said that "if by the adverse 
fortune of war the protection of the British navy should ever be insufficient for us, to 
whom should we turn with faith and confidence if not the United States?"*" When 
Sperry arrived in Auckland two months later, the HeraW commented: 
There was a sentiment, somewhat strong a few years ago, that the growth of American 
power in the Pacific might be a challenge, if not a menace to our own flag. That sentiment 
has either died away or is rapidly becoming extinct. If a vestige of it still exists, we doubt 
whether it will survive the enthusiasm aroused by the visit of our distinguished 
neighbour's. The Age declared that '[America's] battleships far from being a menace, stood 
for order, for peace, for a greater sense of security'.*' 
Deakin saw the visit of the fleet as a means of giving a fillip to his demand for an 
Australian navy. In his welcoming speech at the Royal Yacht Club of Victoria at St 
Kilda on 1 September, he declared that Australia should not sit still under the shelter 
of the British navy and that it should not expect defence except at its own hands. 
"The visit of this fleet to Australia means an awakening to us. We must improve 
our harbour and coast defences, and we may in time create a defence force which will 
rank in the defence of the empire."*^ In attempting to induce Prime Minister Borden 
of Canada to resist German trade penetration of Canada and the growth of its 
military power, he had pointed out that Australia could do little in Europe to check 
that expansion. There was no concept of an Australian imperial expeditionary force. 
What Australia could do would be to expand its local defence capabilities and so 
release British forces for Europe. Deakin realized that Australian defences must grow 
gradually; Australia must creep before it could walk, and walk before it could run. 
"In the meantime," he said in his speech at the Royal Yacht Club, "realising the 
riches of natural, national relationships, we look instinctively to you Americans, near-
est to us in blood, in character and in purpose. It is in this spirit and in this hope that 
AustraHa welcomes with open hand and heart the coming of your sailors and of the 
flag which, Hke our own, shelters a new world under the symbol of its vital union." 
Deakin's warm welcome to the American fleet and his emphasis on the similarities 
between Australians and Americans did not involve any serious change of loyalties. 
"It is quite a mistake to suggest that we are not fully aware of the naval power of 
Great Britain," he said. Attlee Hunt, secretary of the Department of External 
Affairs, put the visit into proper perspective for a French journalist, Y.B. Goblet, 
with whom he maintained a long correspondence: "We are proud of our connection 
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with the British Empire and are not at all likely to look to any other country, even to 
the United States, for whom we naturally feel a high regard, for assistance in any 
time of trouble." The visit of the United States Fleet was of great interest, but " t o 
say that we ever dreamed of transferring our own allegiance from our Mother Coun-
try to the United States is to make an assertion that would not be supported by one 
person in a thousand of the Australian people' ' .*' 
At the same time, Deakin was hoping to establish a closer political and security 
relationship with the United States. Although the idea of Anglo-Saxon soHdarity 
was popular with public orators and editors, there was Httle attempt to exert any 
pressure, direct or indirect, on Sperry and his senior officers during the visit. There 
were some veiled references to a possible new Monroe Doctrine in the Pacific. 
Deakin made the point that Australia "welcomed the Fleet not simply as a meeting 
between Americans and AustraHans but as AustraHans representing the whole people 
of the Empire, and a fleet representing the people of the United States".** He was 
moving towards the view, subsequently adopted by H .V . Evatt and put with brutal 
directness on a number of important occasions, that Australia should have a powerful 
voice, even a predominent voice, in Pacific affairs representing the Empire as a 
whole. The idea of a Pacific Monroe Doctrine sent shivers down Colonial Office 
spines. Lord Crewe, the new secretary of state for the colonies, thought " I t would 
be a dangerous analogy to apply to the Pacific a doctrine designed to freeze the status 
quo. W e should not Hke to have to ask leave of the United States before bargaining 
with France for her rights in the New Hebrides supposing their acquisition to be a 
possible factor in a general arrangement at some future t ime. ' '*' 
The United States was most reluctant to take any diplomatic stand that could 
compromise its relations with Japan or any other Asian country. Sperry had been 
carefully briefed by the War College before leaving San Francisco. Wri t ing to 
General Horace Porter in New York shortly after his return, he said: 
England has a magnificent base at Hong Kong controlling the trade route fi-om Suez into 
the Pacific and its vast possessions in Australia and New Zealand and along the shortest and 
securest routes home fi:om there -Wa Vancouver. If they are developed and made self suffic-
ing and made to support also a great commercial traffic to North America, our position 
will be impregnable. On the other side our possessions and the Panama Canal make our 
position impregnable and we can control Japan as long as we three agree. With the United 
Kingdom at Hong Kong, and the United States holding Panama and the west coast as well 
as other possessions between us, the control of the Pacific lies with us as long as we are at 
peace with each other.*' 
Reporting to Roosevelt on his return, he said that the visit of the fleet to 
Australia, while there had been no trace of an attempt to construe it as promising 
armed alliance, had awakened a very strong feeling of a community of material 
interests in the Pacific which was the necessary base for any friendship.*' Walking 
the razor edge of strict neutrality in his public speeches, Sperry had diverted 
Australian interests in security to the expansion of Pacific trade. In a letter to his wife 
from Australia he said, " I told the prime minister of the Commonwealth, a very 
clever man, that every dollar they spent in developing trade in their Pacific islands 
on the route to Vancouver and San Francisco was worth ten put into fortifications 
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because the world would recognise the community of our commercial interests and 
would not dare affront us as long as we hold together."*' 
Before the Great White Fleet left Australia, Deakin realized that there was no pro-
spect of any binding commitment from the United States to bolster Australian 
security. The fleet would probably be withdrawn from the Pacific to the Atlantic by 
December. "Whether or not it goes or stays, America's interests, authority and 
responsibihty cannot be withdrawn."*' As the Fleet left Albany, Deakin asked the 
governor-general to send a cable to the secretary of state for the colonies inviting 
Theodore Roosevelt to visit Australia after he relinquished the presidency. An em-
barrassed British government, feeling the invitation to be "objectionable", had no 
option but to pass it on through the British Embassy in Washington. Roosevelt 
declined, saying that he could not come to Australia after visiting Africa, but he 
hoped that he would be able in the future to visit "the giant young Commonwealth 
of the South Seas upon whose future growth and success so much depends for the 
civilized world".'" 
Deakin was not prone to waste any political asset. While the fleet was still in 
Australian waters, he cabled London suggesting a visit by a British fleet that would 
call at every state capital. It was "very desirable that the fleet should be as impressive 
as possible in size and quality". Should this not be possible immediately, then a visit 
by the Cape Colony squadron would be an acceptable preliminary "although a more 
striking demonstration of naval power would still be sought and it would exercise a 
most beneficial influence on public opinion". The request was followed four days 
later by the invitation to Roosevelt. Fully realizing that Deakin was attempting to 
play off Washington against London in an attempt to increase the British presence in 
the Pacific and bolster up his own naval policy. Lord Crewe stifled his anger and 
blandly declined to send a single British naval vessel to Australia. Such a visit, he 
said, even if practicable, would not be expedient at present. "His Majesty's Govern-
ment think that it would be liable to misunderstanding and might create the impres-
sion, which it is more desirable to avoid, of being intended as a set-off against the 
recent American visit implying that some counter demonstration is thought 
necessary." Deakin abandoned the idea, perhaps as a result of private discussions 
with the governor-general. Lord Dudley." 
What were the long-term effects of the visit of the Great White Fleet? The 
American image in Australia had not been a particularly flattering one in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The dark lines in that image had emphasiz-
ed the boastfulness and tendency towards violence of Americans, who believed that 
they had a constitutional right to carry weapons for self-defence: often it seemed that 
they were trigger-happy in defence of a right that had, in fact, no legal basis. The 
image was also disfigured by the emphasis on American concern with money values 
and the worship of Mammon, which led in turn to the widespread use of corruption 
as a means of resolving political and other issues.'^ 
Australian authorities were worried about reports of the riotous behaviour of 
American sailors coming from San Francisco and during the Fleet's visit to 
Auckland, where clashes occurred between the shore patrols and American seamen 
anxious to remain in New Zealand. Sperry wrote to Roosevelt that the reports 
caused "great alarm amongst people who had made wide appeals to him [the 
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governor-general. Lord Northcote] for extra police pro tec t ion" ." These fears were 
not realized, partly because Northcote used all his influence with the press to calm 
people down. The American authorities were fully aware of the need to improve the 
American image and took appropriate steps. Naval police, who normally earned 
"billies" — wooden truncheons — in American ports, left their weapons on their 
ships when visiting Australian and Japanese ports. In Australia, Japanese stewards 
replaced Negro stewards on the ships in an attempt to avoid inflaming White 
AustraHan opinion. 
Sperry was optimistic about the behaviour of his men, who were "almost all boys, 
clear-headed young Americans, quick-witted, and out to see the world with all the 
interest and ten times the sense of a party of Cook's tourists. They drink hardly at 
all, and when they do it is generally to pay for a place to sit d o w n . " The behaviour 
of the sailors earlier in the year in Rio de Janeiro had been admirable, and the men 
were sober and bursting with fun and enjoyment. After leaving Australia, the sailors 
visiting Japan were men of "special first class conduct" acceptable to the Japanese 
government. No such rigid criteria appear to have been imposed for the AustraHan 
visit. As Sperry said, " O u r men are to my aged mind, a loveable crowd, frank and 
jolly and not in the least infected by the stuff that the press turns out: this is par-
ticularly true because the great body of them are boys from the Middle Wes t . " ' * 
Sperry's optimism was on the whole weU founded, although he forgot that the 
Middle West had produced many of the gun fighters and other heroes of the frontier 
legends. The Australian press was impressed by the behaviour of the fourteen thou-
sand men in the fleet, which they regarded as exemplary. In Sydney at the end of a 
march on a warm day, some of the sailors moved rapidly to the bars, to the alarm of 
the shore patrols. One section fixed bayonets in an attempt to keep thirty sailors 
away from a bar. But Australian police intervened, and a clash was quickly avoided. 
The overwhelming Australian enthusiasm and hospitality inevitably had some effects 
on the young sailors. Many did not keep their leave hours and stayed ashore. The 
Australian press reporting was very restrained, partly perhaps because of Northcote's 
influence. Sperry, an experienced officer, attended seventeen functions — dinners, 
dances, and parties — in one day. It was the American rather than the AustraHan 
press that reported adversely on the parade in Melbourne on 31 August; the 
Melbourne Age and Argus were silent. 
Down the street came the first of sixteen bands. Trumpet notes wavered and broke and 
trombones meandered over history's worst playing of "Columbia the Gem of the Ocean". 
A midshipman marching at the head of the Louisiana's detachment was obviously in trou-
ble. He lost step, stumbled over the trolley tracks, and described an S-maneuver fi:om one 
side of the street to the other. The spectacle was repeated in the companies that followed, 
as bleary-eyed seamen lurched, reeled and collided. Captain Cowles, watching fi-om the 
sidewalk, heard "many remarks from the people along the Hne of the march"." 
DiscipHnary action was taken by the navy, and Roosevelt increased the penalties 
inflicted. The offending midshipman was dismissed from the service. 
How many of the "clean and capable" young sailors stayed in Australia after a 
visit of a "never-to-be-forgotten seven days" is not clear. Some 30 did not return to 
their ships in Sydney and 221 in Melbourne. Most of them subsequently rejoined th 
fleet. Some were discharged in AustraHa at the end of their period of enlistment '6 
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Of the immediate success of the visit, there can be no doubt: it led to a very 
favourable revision of the popular AustraHan image of the United States. How far 
the newer stereotypes of Americans had any serious long-term effect on Australian-
American relations it is impossible to determine. Late in 1908 it was reported in the 
Australian press, and the matter was reported in a letter from the governor-general 
to the secretary of state for the colonies, that a San Francisco judge had sentenced one 
John Griffin "to be exiled to Australia instead of serving ten years for burglary".'' 
Whether or not John Griffin ever reached AustraHa is not clear. Deakin indignantly 
asked the United Kingdom to verify the details and said that, if true, AustraHa must 
protest because of "the objectionable Hght thrown on Australia". He said that if 
Griffin arrived in AustraHa, the government would deal with him under the Im-
migration Restriction Acts. The seven-day wonder of the visit of the American Fleet 
with its quasi-Roman games and pageantry, would seem to have had Httle lasting 
effect. The exuberance of the Australian reaction probably improved the Australian 
image of the United States. 
More important than public opinion, always fickle as reflected in the press, was its 
effect on Downing Street, which still formulated imperial foreign and defence 
policy. Deakin, playing foreign policy close to his chest, said, "The visit of this fleet 
to Australia means an awakening to us. We must improve our harbour and coast 
defences, and we may in time create a defence which shall rank in the defence of the 
Empire."" He had earlier expressed the view that "AustraHa should not sit under 
the shelter of the British navy". The costs of such a defence policy had not yet been 
worked out or even seriously considered by the Australian government. Very little 
had been done to improve Australian defences before the next Imperial Conference 
met. 
The future of Anglo-Saxon solidarity in the Pacific was perhaps less rosy than 
Deakin had conceived it to be on the arrival of the fleet. In his speech announcing the 
American acceptance of the AustraHan invitation, he had said, "It means that our 
existence has been recognized by the other Great White Power of the Pacific, and 
that England, America and Australia will be united to withstand yellow 
aggression."" A few days later he declared: "The prophetic are most of them confi-
dent that all possible misunderstandings between the Empire and the Republic will 
henceforth be impossible. The two peoples are to walk hand in hand in paths of 
peace to which a sense of their joint strength is to confine the unruly nations who 
have no such pleasant recollections. Of course both are to be sensible of the kindness 
of the Australians in bringing about so happy a cHmax."*" Deakin's reference to 
"the strength of invisible ties drawing us together in States united in affection" 
evoked a warm response in the United States and perhaps a more guarded one in the 
United Kingdom, which tended to look over its shoulder in considering Americans 
as more than second rate Anglo-Saxons. 
Theodore Roosevelt was the first American president to have a personal interest in 
Asia. He recognized the economic and strategic importance of the Philippines and 
had mediated between Japan and Russia to end the Russo-Japanese war. His ex-
perience as secretary for the navy made him recognize the importance of the Pacific 
to American defence. "The present miHtary and naval needs in the Pacific are so 
urgent as to force me to ask that consideration be given by the Congress to com-
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pleting as promptly and expeditiously as possible the defensive works on our Paaiic 
coasts, in our insular possession in the Pacific and the providing of docks and other 
facilities which will permit of the maintenance of our battle fleet in the Pacific. 
This predisposed him to a favourable response to the Australian request for a visit by 
the American fleet, although at no stage was there any suggestion that Australia 
might provide any facilities or bases. The Melbourne visit, in fact, did bring home 
the difficulties of providing coal and bunkering for a fleet far from its base. 
Roosevelt realized the increasingly important role of Japan in the changing balance of 
Pacific power. The immigration of Japanese to California had evoked similar reac-
tions to the Australian concern with oriental immigration leading to the adoption of 
a White Australia policy. Solidarity with Britain, Australia, and New Zealand was 
important in checking that immigration and at the same time restraining Japanese 
expansion. Writ ing to King Edward VII on 12 February 1908, he said: 
I feel very strongly that the real interests of the Anglo Saxon people are one, alike in the 
Atlantic and the Pacific, and that while scrupulously careful neither to insult nor injure 
others, we should yet make it evident that we are ready and able to hold our own. In no 
country where the population is of our stock, and where the wage workers, the laborers, 
are of the same blood as the employing classes, will it be possible to introduce a large 
number of workmen of an utterly alien race without the certainty of dangerous friction.'^ 
The Sydney Morning Herald commented: " W h e n the fleet entered the Pacific, we 
remarked that the centre of gravity of sea power had changed. What the future of 
the Pacific is to be only the future can disclose. It may not be an American lake. It 
may not be a Japanese sea. But whatever its fate, the coming of the fleet to Auckland 
is another noteworthy stride towards it, for it points to the cementing of closer ties 
between America and Great Britain. . . . It is likely enough that America may be the 
first line of defence against A s i a . " " Such a comment might have aroused a respon-
sive chord in the mind of an American president anxious to set limits to long-term 
Japanese expansion in Asia and the Pacific. But there was no thought of assuming 
any defence responsibilities in the south-west Pacific comparable to those adopted 
almost half a century later. Roosevelt was anxious to adopt a cautious and friendly 
stance towards Japan in 1908. His instructions to Sperry on his visit to Japan after 
leaving Albany were very clear; 
I wish to impress upon you, what I do not suppose is necessary, to see to it that none of our 
men does anything out of the way while in Japan. If you give the enlisted men leave while 
at Tokio or anywhere else in Japan be careful to choose only those upon whom you can ab-
solutely depend. There must be no suspicion of insolence or rudeness on our part. Of 
course the most important thing is to guard our ships against possible attack by fanatics; 
but next to this in importance is to prevent there being any kind of action by any one of 
our men which would give an excuse for the feeling that we were in any way guilty of 
misconduct. Aside from the loss of a ship, I had far rather that we were insulted than that 
we insult anybody under these peculiar conditions. I firmly believe that the Japanese 
government will use every effort to see that the highest consideration and courtesy are ac-
corded to our people, and you of course will do everything in your power to show the ut-
most consideration and courtesy to the Japanese with whom you are brought into contact 
not only in Japan but elsewhere. We want to take peculiar care in this matter.'•• 
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Sperry certainly walked the tightrope with great skill in Australia. But the difference 
in briefing does reflect the differing relationship between an emerging great power 
and the smaHer states of varying importance. Deakin's hopes of a United States 
guarantee for the defence of Australia were not realized. 
Between 1908 and 1914, Australia continued to be deeply concerned with the pro-
blem of defence, defence primarily against an attack from Japan. The Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance of 1902 had partly allayed AustraHan fears, but only in part. Its great advan-
tage for Britain was a virtual division of labour between the British and Japanese 
navies. Britain withdrew her battleships from the Far East to ensure naval supremacy 
in European waters; this meant that she maintained only a small squadron of five 
cruisers for the defence of British and Dominion interests in the Far East. This reduc-
tion of naval strength meant a de facto recognition of Japanese superiority in the 
north-west Pacific, a position formally accepted later under the Washington treaties 
of 1921-22. With the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 and continued expansion 
into Manchuria, Australia became concerned at the imbalance of naval power in the 
Pacific. With tension continuing between Japan and Australia over the Immigration 
Restriction Act of 1901, and threats of a conflict between the United States and 
Japan over Japanese immigration in California; the importance of defence assumed a 
new dimension for Australia. An improbable scenario, an invasion of AustraHa by 
Japan and the seizure of Australian territory, was the theme of a novel called The 
Australian Crisis published under the pseudonym of Charles H. Kirmess in 1909 (it 
was republished in 1913). 
Britain's naval power was directly under challenge by Germany with the adoption 
of its new naval building programme in 1908 and the building of Dreadnoughts, 
which were more powerful than British battleships. The British rebuilding pro-
gramme of 1909-10 was designed to maintain a margin of superiority in Europe. But 
this involved a further switch in relative British naval power from the Pacific, to the 
alarm of Australia and New Zealand. It strengthened the demand for the creation of 
a separate Australian navy which would help strengthen Pacific defences. The Fisher 
government's programme provided for the building of three cruisers, six destroyers, 
and three submarines suitable for coastal defence. This was followed by a demand in 
Sydney and Melbourne that the Commonwealth offer a Dreadnought to the British 
government. The enthusiasm posed problems of the relationship between an 
Australian local navy and the imperial battle fleet as well as of the composition of an 
effective battle unit. The Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 produced an Admiral-
ty plan for "a remodelling of the squadrons in the Far Eastern waters on the basis of 
establishing a Pacific Fleet". As Colonel J.E.G. Foxton, an honorary AustraHan 
minister, put it: "There is always present with us in Australia . . . the fact that we 
are in close proximity to the teeming milHons of two great Asiatic powers, and 
although at present everything is as one could wish from the Australian and New 
Zealand point of view, we have to look far into the future, and there might be 
possibihties in that connection which is necessary for us to make provision for." 
Ambitious plans to create such a fleet had made little progress by the outbreak of war 
in 1914." 
Deakin, back in power in 1909, slowly adopted the Admiralty view and proposals 
for a Pacific Fleet partly because he felt that Australia might have a second string to 
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its defence bow: an aHiance with the United States. This had been part of the objec-
tive in inviting the American fleet to AustraHa in the previous year. When there 
were rumours of a second world cruise by American ships, he wrote to Lord Crewe 
suggesting "an Agreement for an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to all the coun-
tries around the Pacific Ocean supported by the guarantees of the British Empire, 
Holland, France and China added to that of the United States"." This was really an 
ambitious proposal for a Pacific pact, anticipating J.A. Lyons in 1937, to guarantee 
the territorial status quo in the Pacific. It was directed against Japan or a possible 
aUiance between Japan and Germany, neither of whom were included among the 
original signatories of the pact. 
Neither the Foreign Office nor the Colonial office evinced the slightest enthusiasm 
for Deakin's plan, which they thought to involve meddHng by a colonial poHtician 
in affairs of state which were the preserve of the mother country. Attlee Hunt's com-
ment about Deakin's performance at the Imperial Conference of 1907 was 
remembered by British leaders: "Not only is he infinitely the best speaker but he 
seems to be the only one who has the courage to say exactly what he thinks." But in 
1909 he was still felt to be a precocious upstart, and Crewe read him a brief lecture 
on the Monroe Doctrine: "One had to remember that the so-called principle is really 
only an assertion, which those who advance it are presumably prepared to back by 
force. We acquiesce in it generally because it suits us to do so, but I don't know that 
we should agree to every application which the United States might conceivably 
choose to make of it. You will remember how nearly we came to blows with them 
over the Venezuelan boundary question."" It had long been realized that the 
original Monroe Doctrine had ridden on the broad back of the British navy. Crewe 
was determined that, at the time when British naval power was being challenged, 
there would be no British underwriting of a Pacific Monroe doctrine by a much 
weaker Britain. Washington appears never to have been officially informed or con-
sulted about the proposal. 
The changing balance of power and a new perception of global threats to British 
and Australian security led in 1911 to the extension of the Anglo-Japanese AlHance 
for ten years. The Committee of Imperial Defence in a report for the Imperial Con-
ference of 1911 pointed out: "It is desirable from an educative point of view that the 
Governments of the Dominions should understand to what extent the comparative 
immunity from the danger of attack at present enjoyed by them is due to the ex-
istence of the Anglo-Japanese AlHance and our own close relations with the United 
States." The aHiance precluded attack by Japan on any member of the British Empire 
and specified: "British naval requirements are held to be adequately met if the com-
bined British and Japanese forces in the Pacific are superior to the forces in those 
waters maintained by any reasonably probable combination of naval Powers." Con-
sultation with the dominion prime ministers was minimal, but the agreement to ex-
tend the alHance met with "cordial and unanimous approval"." 
In negotiating the renewal of the alHance, the British government insisted on 
covering the remote but nagging contingency that Britain might be involved in a 
war fighting with Japan against the United States. A major source of friction was the 
problem of Japanese emigration to CaHfornia. Australia and the other dominions had 
already secured an agreement from Japan that the renewal of the alliance in no way 
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impaired their freedom to deal with the immigration question themselves. The 
Japanese foreign minister, Komura, stated categorically on 7 July that Japan "would 
never countenance emigration of her nationals to countries unwilling to receive 
them". Andrew Carnegie, the American steel magnate, had raised with Britain the 
Taft proposal for a wide-ranging Anglo-American arbitration treaty to deal with aU 
questions of dispute between them. Such a proposal impinged upon the renewal of 
the Anglo-Japanese AlHance. Sir Edward Grey told the State Department: "It is pro-
posed to insert a clause in the Japanese treaty so that we shall not be forced to go to 
war with a Power with which we have an agreement for unlimited arbitration." 
Bryce, the British ambassador to Washington, had urged President Taft to speed up 
the negotiations for a general arbitration treaty between Britain and the United 
States. This was done so that the United States Senate could deal with it in July. In 
the final discussions with Japan over the renewal of the alliance, Komura reluctantly 
agreed to accept the British agreement with the United States. Article 3 of the revis-
ed treaty provided: "Should either High Contracting party conclude a treaty of 
general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement 
shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power 
with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force."" 
The clause removed for Australia the haunting spectre of her alignment with Bri-
tain and Japan in a war against the United States. The yellow peril became more 
remote, and Australian security appeared to become more assured. Winston 
ChurchiU, the first lord of the Admiralty (1911-15) pointed out that there was a 
strong bond of material interest between Britain and Japan: "It is this bond that is 
the true and effective protection for the safety of Australia and New Zealand and this 
bond depends entirely on the maintenance of British naval supremacy. . . . if Japan 
chose to indulge in ambitions of empire or colonization in the Southern Pacific, she 
would be no loser so far as the European situation was concerned."'" The redistribu-
tion of British naval forces meant that when war broke out in 1914, the British Far 
Eastern Squadron was only marginally stronger than the German Pacific squadron. 
Japan honoured her obligations under the treaty and provided naval escorts to con-
voy Australian troops to the Middle East and Europe. 
In the negotiation to strengthen Australian security in the Pacific, one point does 
need emphasis. Deakin and his successors were attempting for the first time to for-
mulate an independent Australian defence and foreign policy. But in so doing they 
were attempting to work within the parameters of imperial poHcy. Deakin's invita-
tion to the American fleet to visit Australia and to President Roosevelt to become a 
guest of the Australian government were conveyed to Washington through London. 
In so doing he made certain by his preliminary overtures that the Foreign Office and 
the Colonial Office would have no option but to transmit the Australian invitations 
despite icy disapproval. The State Department adopted the same channels of com-
munication. Australian views about the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were 
conveyed by the prime minister to the British government through the Imperial 
Conference. The signature of the treaty of renewal was a British act on behalf of the 
Empire as a whole and its individual members. The State Department was kept fully 
informed and was provided with a text of the revised treaty some forty-eight hours 
before it was released to the press. What the State Department did not realize was 
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that there were nationalistic stirrings about the formulation of foreign policy that led 
to strong but unsuccessful pressures on the Foreign Office for greater consultation 
with the dominions and perhaps even the formulation of an imperial foreign policy 
after discussion at the Imperial Conference. There was a tremendous acceleration ot 
these pressures after war broke out in 1914. The movement for dominion autonomy 
and the transformation of the British Empire into the British Commonwealth of 
Nations was not fully understood in the State Department, and this led to con-
siderable friction with Australia and the other dominions for a generation to 1941, as 
Australia and other dominions sought to develop their own policies towards the 
United States. 
2 The Versailles Conference 
On the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914, Australian and Japanese forces moved 
rapidly to capture German colonies in the Pacific. On 30 August, New Zealand 
troops occupied Samoa. Two weeks later Australian forces moved into German New 
Guinea and hoisted the British flag. In October, Japanese troops occupied the Ger-
man islands north of the Equator: the Pelew, Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall 
islands. Japan had already invested Kiaochou but did not take it until November. 
The sinking of German ships, especially the Emden, completed the destruction of 
German colonial and naval power in the Pacific. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
renewed in 1911, led to the use of the Japanese fleet for convoy purposes of 
Australian troops to the Middle East and Europe: there could have been no landing at 
Gallipoli in April 1915 had not Australian troops reached the Middle East under 
escort by Japanese warships. 
The destruction of the scattered German empire in the Pacific immediately posed 
the question of its future. The British government had already decided that 
Australian and New Zealand troops should confine their operations to the islands 
south of the Equator: Yap passed into Japanese rather than AustraHan hands. Lewis 
Harcourt, the colonial secretary, wrote to the governor-general of Australia, Sir 
Ronald Munro Ferguson, on 6 December, explaining the British position in thwar-
ting Australian ambitions in the Pacific' The Japanese were in actual occupation of 
the islands, he said; "in view of the great assistance they are rendering to us (at our 
request) with their fleet throughout the whole of the Pacific, it seemed to us 
undesirable that the Australian Expedition should proceed anywhere north of the 
Equator at the present time."^ Harcourt then went on to confess that British fleets 
were fully engaged in the North Sea, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean and in the 
convoy of troops across the Indian Ocean — "so that we could not spare enough to 
deal with the Pacific. We had therefore to caH on Japanese aid." The naval balance of 
power was so precarious, and the stretching of the British fleet was so tight, that the 
Admiralty was considering bringing Japanese battleships into the eastern Mediterra-
nean to reHeve the pressure on the British navy. There was already the suggestion 
that the British quid for the Japanese quo might be the recognition at the end of the 
war of a Japanese claim to the German islands north of the Equator. Harcourt went 
on to say: "Of course we should absolutely refuse at this present time to make any 
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admission of such a claim. Our attitude throughout has been that all these territorial 
questions must be settled in the terms of peace and not before." 
Munro Ferguson had already put out feelers to the Australian cabinet and defence 
circles about the future of the islands north of the Equator. " N o n e of these showed 
much antipathy to the suggestion of Japanese control — though we agreed our frac-
tious U.S.A. coz wouldn' t like it. They aU rather accepted it as an inevitable conse-
quence to the inestimable service rendered by Japan to Australia throughout the 
W a r . " ' Australia later became more concerned about the possible Japanese advance 
into the South Pacific and the threat to a largely empty continent. Prime Minister 
W . M . Hughes reported in April 1916, after his conversation with the new colonial 
secretary, Andrew Bonar Law, and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey: 
As to the Japanese problem . . . all our fears — or conjectures — that Japan was and is 
most keenly interested in Australia are amply borne out by facts. . . . 
I told Grey that Australia would fight to the last ditch rather than allow Japanese to 
enter Australia. Upon this point we were adamant. I told him that as to control of the 
Pacific after the war, we were prepared to consider favourably the Equator as a line of 
demarcation, giving us control of all Islands to the South.* 
The decision was really pre-empted by the Anglo-Japanese understanding of 
February 1917. " O n the occasion of any peace conference Britain'-wiU support 
Japan's claim in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and her 
possessions in the Islands North of the Equator, it being understood that, in the 
eventual peace settlement, the Japanese Government will treat Great Britain's claims 
to the German Islands south of the Equator in the same spir i t ." ' 
The Australian government reluctantly acquiesced under British pressure on 7 
February. It had become clear that this last secret agreement of the First World War 
would force Australia to modify its claims and to seek a cast-iron guarantee for 
security against any Japanese move to expand in the South Pacific. It made Hughes 
the more anxious to ensure adequate Australian representation at the peace con-
ference at the end of war when these territorial issues would be decided. 
In 1914-15 the question of the right of the dominions to representation at any 
conference involving Great Britain had not been resolved. The evolution of the 
British Empire into the British Commonwealth of Nations was still taking place, 
causing misunderstandings both in London and Washington. To AustraHa it became 
extremely important that Australia be represented at the peace table. Hughes was im-
pressed by both the strategic and the economic arguments advanced by his advisers. 
The pre-war formula about consultation adopted by imperial conferences was now 
outdated. The dominions were demanding a share in policy making which would 
recognize the separate identity of the dominions and their right to separate represen-
tation. 
AustraHan influence on imperial policy was usually minimal.* Although Hughes 
secured Australia's right to be represented at war cabinet meetings, geography and 
costs limited AustraHan opportunities to attend them. Lloyd George's decision in 
December 1916 to set up a five-member war cabinet was quickly followed by an in-
vitation to the dominions and India to attend "a series of special and continuous 
meetings of the War Cabinet in order to consider urgent questions affecting the pro-
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secution of the war, the possible conditions on which, in agreement with our allies, 
we could assent to its termination, and the problems which wiH then immediately 
arise". ' Although Hughes was unable to attend many meetings of the new imperial 
war cabinet, he continued to press for adequate representation of dominion view-
points. 
The critical issue from a dominion point of view was direct representation at the 
peace conference. Hughes was adamant on this question, even when Borden of 
Canada and J .C . Smuts of South Africa were prepared to accept membership of the 
British delegation. Borden had at first proposed a panel of dominion leaders from 
which one member of the British delegation could be drawn in rotation. Hughes 
persisted and finally wore down his opponents, who had found Hughes often 
"cranky and unworkable". The question was taken up at a meeting in London on 
2-3 December between Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and V.E. Orlando, 
Italy's chief representative. The dominion prime ministers were present for part of 
the meeting. It was agreed that they should have the same status as the smaller coun-
tries like Belgium. It was also agreed that they should form a panel which could be 
drawn up by Britain when it was felt appropriate. This was a personal victory for 
Hughes. The Australian government had cabled to him that separate representation 
at the conference was "not reasonable and cannot be supported by Cabinet". 
Hughes kept the cable secret.' 
The great obstacle to be overcome was Woodrow Wilson. Hughes had met him 
in the United States and took an immediate dislike to him. He warned the war 
cabinet against his idealism and declared that "if we were not very careful, we should 
find ourselves dragged quite unnecessarily behind the wheels of President Wilson's 
chariot". He was scornful of the League of Nations and felt that it would be 
dangerous to Australian interests if the League issue were given priority on the 
agenda when the peace conference met. 
Speaking for Australia, he wanted to know what Australia was to get for the sacrifices she 
had made. When he had secured what he wanted, the Freedom of the Sea, as we knew it 
and meant to have it, and necessary guarantees for the security and development of the 
Empire and reparations and indemnities, then he would have no objection to handing over 
other matters to a League of Nations. Such a League must, however, be properly con-
stituted and one in which the British Empire occupied a place corresponding to its sacrifices 
in the war and its position in the world. He insisted that in any case we should not commit 
ourselves to the League of Nations until the Conference had completed its labours. . . . 
The League of Nations should be the gilded ball on the dome of the cathedral, and not the 
foundation stone.' 
The major public clashes between Hughes and Wilson had not yet taken place. 
But Wilson was wary of any proposals coming from the Australian prime minister. 
When the Supreme War Council — the Council of Ten — met in Paris on 12 
January 1919, Lloyd George raised the question of the size of the conference and the 
number of delegates from the smaller allied powers, such as Belgium and Serbia. He 
then pressed the case for separate representation of the self-governing dominions and 
India. Wilson's immediate reaction was unfavourable, for reasons of "sentiment and 
psychology". The addition of dominion representation would appear to smaller 
countries to mean a weighting of British influence and voting at the conference. 
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"The Great Powers, to put the matter brutally, would appear to be running the 
Peace Conference." Lloyd George pointed out tersely that "they had won the 
war".'" 
Wilson's hesitation arose because he did not understand the changes that were tak-
ing place within the British Empire during the war. His suspicions of undue 
weighting of British voting power were partly allayed when Lloyd George explained 
that the British dominions were entirely autonomous and that the British govern-
ment could not have induced them to send a single unit without their own consent. 
Wilson still preferred either to make members of the British delegation inter-
changeable or adopt a panel system as Borden and Smuts had suggested. A deadlock 
developed when Wilson would concede only one delegate each, and Lloyd George 
secured the suspension of the discussion until the following day. 
Wilson was in a more conciliatory mood when the discussion was resumed. 
However, he was still concerned that the other smaller states would be jealous of 
increased dominion representation. He finally conceded when he was reminded that 
the dominions "had not even received the same representation as had been granted to 
Belgium and Serbia, though they had supplied a larger number of troops and their 
losses had been greater": this was true of both Canada and Australia. Finally, 
Wilson asked Lloyd George whether he would be satisfied if Canada, South Africa, 
and Australia were each to have two representatives. New Zealand one, and British 
India and the native states of India to each have one, a total of nine. This fully met 
the dominion request, and to avoid any embarrassment to Great Britain, Wilson 
agreed to submit the proposal himself. His apprehensions were partly correct, 
because the dominions were also able to serve as British delegates and so exert a 
greater influence than the smaller states. The prime ministers were in constant touch 
with most committees and commissions of the conference." 
The Versailles Conference was, without question, the largest and most prestigious 
conference held in Europe since 1815. It opened on 18 January 1919, nearly three 
months after Germany surrendered. Seventy diplomats from thirty-two countries at-
tended the conference, and they brought large numbers of alternates and hundreds of 
experts and officials. Hughes came to VersaiHes with a relatively smaU group of 
advisers: Sir Joseph Cook, Frederic W. Eggleston, John Latham, and Sir Robert 
Garran. Hughes arrived in Paris with the strongest of views about Wilson, having 
already crossed swords with him in Washington in the weeks preceding the con-
ference. He distrusted Wilson's ideas. Hughes was fundamentally a pragmatic poHti-
cian with an essential grasp of the political processes and a tremendous capacity for 
seeing the realities of the pohtical arena. He was unable to grasp the essential ideas of 
an academic like Wilson. The astute trade union leader belonged to the other side of 
the tracks and distrusted a Virginian patrician less accustomed to the hurly-burly of 
politics. "Between ourselves, he is rather a stick when it comes down to the facts of 
Hfe," Hughes wrote to Munro Ferguson. "He is great on great principles. As to 
their application he is so much Hke Alice in Wonderland that I suspect him of being 
set in a former incarnation for that dear old Lady by Lewis CarroH.'''^ He felt that 
Wilson was a man "firm on nothing that really counts". All he wanted was a 
League of Nations. "He shall have his toy. What shape it is to assume, I ask? No 
one knows, he least of aH. This is the literal truth. He does not know, he is indeed 
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incapable of reducing this idea of his to any shape or apply it to the actual cir-
cumstances of mankind?" He accepted uncritically Theodore Roosevelt's opinion 
that Wilson came "from the only old Virginia family that did not fight on either 
side during the Civil W a r " . " 
Hughes himself dominated the Australian delegation and was its enfant terrible. 
Cook, his fellow parliamentarian and minister for the navy, played a very secondary 
role. As early as 2 September 1918, W.A. Watt, the deputy Prime Minister, warned 
him of the problems he would have to face with the prime minister: "You ought to 
insist on knowing what Mr. Hughes is doing in relation to Australian matters and 
you ought to confer with him frequently. He is dealing with all sorts of important 
subjects and it is your right and duty to be associated with him in the decisions 
made." He pointed out that Cook had had only a few hours before he left AustraHa 
to discuss matters of poHcy and warned him that he could find himself in a very dif-
ficult position after his return to Australia. "I suggest to you that you write to him 
and put upon him the responsibility of failing to make it possible for you to meet 
him regularly."'* But Cook was no match for the wily Welshman and exerted only 
a minimal influence on his policy and decisions. Eggleston said that Cook was "a 
pale and ineffectual shadow, despised by Hughes and without the guts to react". 
"He does nothing, is of no use to anybody, has no ideas. Anybody with the slightest 
spirit should have compelled Hughes to speak to him about all that he does and 
discuss matters with him. But he lets matters slide."" Hughes was extremely an-
noyed when his private secretary, Percy Deane, let Cook see a cable. 
Hughes's two key officials, Latham and Garran, were middle-class men as remov-
ed as Wilson was from the rough and tumble of Australian Labor Party politics. 
Latham had a wartime naval background following his graduation in law. He 
drafted many of the background documents for Hughes on colonial issues and par-
ticularly the problem of the German colonies. His loyalty to Hughes was impeccable, 
although he worked under him with some reluctance. Garran, one of the founding 
fathers of the Constitution, had worked closely with Hughes when he had been 
attorney-general and had no difficulty in collaborating with him on legal matters and 
particularly on the difficult problem of reparations from Germany. He shared 
Hughes's distrust of Woodrow Wilson as a self-deluded idealist and had no time for 
Lloyd George with his Machiavellian Welsh politics. The third adviser, Eggleston, 
became an inveterate critic. Admirably equipped as a lawyer and a profound student 
of international affairs, he could not stomach the coarse vitality of Hughes, whom he 
regarded as a superificial second-rater and a cat's-paw for the gross reactionary 
elements. "I have never had much respect for Hughes," he wrote. Part of his dislike 
stemmed from the fact that Hughes often ignored his long and carefully drafted 
memoranda. Woodrow Wilson on the other hand was "one of my heroes"." 
From time to time Hughes made use of the "journalistic talents" of Keith Mur-
doch. Murdoch had been an active reporter from time to time with the AustraHan ar-
my and on occasion had clashed with the British high command, especially General 
Birdwood. He acted as an investigative journaHst looking into pohtical matters and 
reporting on internal army problems to Hughes himself. Birdwood bitterly resented 
these activities and summed him up: 
Murdoch is a man of undoubted character and it is hard to reahse exactly what his position 
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is He should, I presume, be a journahst pure and simple, but I gather he is more of a 
private agent and interviews the Prime Minister and others. . . . Murdoch with aU his 
qualities, is one of those curious people who think that the interests of Austraha can be 
safeguarded only by blatant aggressiveness, and he is always wishing me or others to be up 
on our hind legs with the Commander-in-Chief or the War Office to represent what he 
considers the want of recognition of the AustraHan forces, their hardships, moves, etc." 
Murdoch was "a busybody with a finger in every p ie" who hoped to "dictate to the 
man in London". He did offer Hughes the use of the columns of a Paris newspaper 
as a weapon in his fight against Wilson. Hughes was always in control of Murdoch, 
even when shriUest, but made Httle use of him as the conference got under way. 
Hughes reminisced to Munro Ferguson at the end of the conference. 
Some day of course the story -will be written — I mean the true story — of the solemn farce 
of the Plenary Conference, the meanderings and amazing adventures of the Council of the 
Ten, its rise, and fall, what it did and perhaps why it did it, what it did not do and may be 
why it fell short. 
And some day too perchance the story of the Council of the Four. Its abrupt appearance, 
its vagaries, the frightful cyclonic storm that shook it to the very centre of its soul — this is 
mere poetic licence for one thing is certain, the Big Four never had a soul. Some there be 
indeed rude scoffers who deny it not only soul but Mind! — how on several occasions it 
nearly became resolved into its constituent atoms — THE GREAT ONE cabling for the 
"George Washington" to come and take him home to Kentucky — and the bluff falling 
flat stayed on." 
But there seem to have been far too many diversions and complicated manoeuvres 
even for the mind of a Hughes. 
Despite the breadth and diversity of the conference discussions, Australia played 
only a minor part. There were three major areas in which Australia took part: the 
disposition of the German colonies, racial equality, and reparations. Of these, the 
most important, and temporarily stealing some of the limelight, was the disposition 
of the German colonies. 
After the occupation of the German Pacific Island colonies, Australia had expected 
to achieve the annexation of those islands adjacent to Australia. " W e in Australia 
expect some little additions to our territorial possessions in the Pacific," Cook an-
nounced in 1915. Early in 1917 news of the secret agreement between Great Britain 
and Japan about the disposal of the German islands north of the Equator leaked out. 
A destroyer for bases deal, it provided for the strengthening of British naval power in 
the East Mediterranean through Japanese fleet reinforcements in return for support 
for the Japanese claim to the Caroline, Marshall, and Ladrone islands and the Shan-
tung peninsula. This caused consternation in Australia and New Zealand. John 
Latham carried out an examination of the importance of the islands to Australia. He 
recognized that the peace settlement would probably be influenced by humanitarian 
ideas and "by considerations which might be described as sentimental, as well as by 
direct and obvious European in teres ts" ." He urged that a survey of native opinion 
be taken to secure support for British control after the war. 
Australian opinion was adamant in opposing the return of the colonies to 
Germany. British opinion steadily moved towards the rejection of post-war German 
control but not in favour of direct annexation. Lloyd George invited the dominions 
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to consult with the indigenous people of the islands about their future. He was con-
cerned at the strengthening American view against post-war territorial claims by the 
Allies and the growing interest in self-determination. In his statement of war aims 
on 4 January 1919 he announced that the basis for territorial settlements must be the 
consent of the people. This was followed on 8 January by Wilson's Fourteen Points 
for a peace settlement. The fifth point declared that there must be no annexations 
and that " the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with 
the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be considered". His views 
hardened during the year, and he accepted the Lippmann view that " a colonial 
power acts not as owner of its colonies but as trustee for the natives and for the 
interests of the society of nations and the peace conference may, therefore, write a 
code of colonial conduct binding upon all colonial powers".^" 
The problem of self-determination inevitably became entangled with national 
security. The colonial secretary, Walter Long, pointed out to Munro Ferguson: 
There is a ridiculous idea in many quarters that this [the retention of the German colonies 
and possessions] means territorial acquisition and therefore ought in the spirit of self-denial 
to be abjured by us. In my judgment, it has nothing to do with territorial acquisition but 
solely with the question of how we are to establish a permanent peace and to make certain 
of the security of the British Empire in the future. . . . Subject to any difficulty we may 
have -mth President Wilson, there is no doubt that in the interests of the peace of the 
world they must not be returned to Germany.^' 
On his way to London on 1 June 1918, Hughes had stated that Australia had a 
Monroe Doctrine in the Pacific and that Australia had a vital security interest in New 
Guinea: "Whoever controls the island within the Australian waters also controls 
Australia." Lloyd George's tentative dipping of the British toe in Pacific waters had 
already produced a derisive reply from the Australian government. Later in the year, 
just after the armistice, Lloyd George told Hughes that at the Peace Conference the 
British government were "determined to exert all their influence to secure for the 
Dominions those former German colonies to which they [were] justly entitled on the 
grounds of their future security". " I have already intimated to our Allies that such is 
our determination," he said. This firm declaration led to a marked improvement in 
Hughes's temper ." 
The central problem then came to be how to come to terms with President 
Wilson. Opinion in the United States was crystallizing around concepts of trustee-
ship and mandates: the international responsibility of government controlling former 
enemy colonies. G.L. Beer, the American economic historian, and Walter Lipp-
mann, the journaHst, who was secretary of the US organization preparing data for 
the conference, were rapidly moving towards some form of international accoun-
tability under the auspices of a League of Nations. Smuts of South Africa also was 
examining the idea of League of Nations mandates in a less absolute form. He con-
cluded on 28 November that the unconditional annexation of the German colonies 
should be pressed for " t o the ut termost" . Outlining British tactics in Paris, he said: 
"In case that contention should fail we should continue to hold them subject to the 
control of the League of Nations in regard to certain specified subjects (liquor, arms, 
mhtary training, fortifications, etc. . .). You wiU see that there is here nothing left 
about joint control, and a small concession is made about the League of Nations 
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which might have the effect of securing the support of the United States to our 
holding on to these colonies if our other lines of argument fail. Our Delegates vvill, 
of course, not make this concession until it becomes necessary to carry President 
Wilson with t h e m . " " Smuts might propose but it was Wilson who firmly 
disposed. . , , 
On the eve of the important meeting by the dominion prime ministers with the 
Council of Ten on 23 January, Smuts noted: " H e [Wilson] is entirely opposed to 
our annexing a little German colony here and there which pains me deeply and will 
move Billy Hughes to great explosions of righteous wrath."2* Hughes himself told 
Munro Ferguson, the governor-general, that he hoped to convince Wilson. " H e 
regards the League of Nations as the great Charter of the World that is to be and sees 
himself through the roseate cloud of dreams officiating as the High Priest in the 
Temple in which the Sarcophagus or Ark containing the body or ashes of this amaz-
ing gift to Mankind is to rest in majestic seclusion for aU time. Give him a League of 
Nations and he wiH give us aU the r e s t . " " Unfortunately for Hughes, by conference 
timetables the discussion of the German colonies issue preceded any decision about a 
League of Nations. Wilson himself would have preferred to defer the colonial ques-
tion until the League of Nations had been established. This would have then made 
possible League of Nations control over the position and future status of the disputed 
German colonies in Africa and the Pacific. Reluctantly he accepted the procedures 
proposal by Lloyd George and Clemenceau, and so Clemenceau told Lloyd George 
to bring his "savages" to the next meeting.^' 
The discussions in the Council of Ten have been dealt with at length by W.J . 
Hudson in Billy Hughes in Paris and by L.F. Fitzhardinge, first in his article " W . M . 
Hughes and the Treaty of Versailles, 1919" and later in the second volume — The 
Little Digger: 1914-1952 — of his definitive political biography of Hughes. Armed 
with a large wall map, Hughes opened the Australian case on 24 January. He used 
two arguments: security and the quality of AustraHan administration in Papua, as the 
report of Council of Ten records: 
The Pacific was not only greater than any other sea, it was a world in itself, to which the 
construction of the Panama Canal had given added importance. Strategically the Pacific 
Islands encompassed Australia like fortresses. New Guinea was the largest island in the 
whole world, save AustraHa itself, and was only 82 miles from the mainland. South-east of 
it was a string of islands suitable for coaHng and submarine bases, from which AustraUa 
could be attacked. The value of the islands in themselves he made no mention of. Australia 
had land enough not merely for its present population but for 100,000,000 men. It was 
obvious that the 5 million people could not hold, against powerful enemies, a country 
larger than the United States, with a coastline as long as the distance between Australia and 
England. If there were at the very door of Australia a potential or actual enemy, AustraUa 
could not feel safe. The islands were as necessary to Australia as water to a city. If they 
were in the hands of a superior power there would be no peace for AustraUa.^' 
He pointed out that " the policies of nations were liable to change and history 
showed that friends in one war were not always friends in the nex t " , and that 
AustraHa posed no threat to any other power. " N o state would suffer if AustraHa 
were safe. AustraHa alone would suffer if she were not. AustraHa had suffered 90,000 
casualties in this war and lost 60,000 killed. Her troops everywhere had fought well. 
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Her war debt alone amounted to £300,000,000 sterling inclusive of another 
£100,000,000 for repatriation and pensioning of her troops. AustraHa did not wish 
to be left to stagger under this load and not to feel safe." Hughes v/as followed by 
Smuts of South Africa and Massey of New Zealand. 
Hughes had attacked the heart of President Wilson's position by arguing that in-
ternationalization should not be applied to this particular case and suggesting that an 
outside mandatory power could exert an undue influence on Australia. It would 
overshadow AustraHa, and Australia would see in it "a potential enemy". Wilson 
began the attack by agreeing to the South African case for the ultimate absorption of 
South-West Africa and expressed the hope that, should South Africa receive a man-
date, they should make their administration so attractive that South-West Africa 
would speedily see the advantages of union. He rejected Hughes's argument and up-
braided him for his fundamental lack of faith in the League of Nations. His reluctant 
suggestion that Australia might be awarded the mandate for New Guinea aroused 
Hughes to fury. He attacked Wilson in a semi-coherent speech, arguing that the 
mandatory principle was not applicable to all colonial areas. Reiterating his view that 
Australia would never tolerate the ill-treatment of other peoples, he passionately re-
jected Wilson's proposal. He readily admitted that the mandatory system would be 
appHcable to other parts; but it could never apply to New Guinea. Lloyd George 
quickly moved an adjournment. 
While tension was mounting, behind-the-scenes negotiations were taking place to 
find a mutually acceptable formula. Britain had already accepted the principle of 
mandates, while reserving the case for the dominions. Smuts had been working on 
the mandates concept for some time, trying to think through the proposal and to 
bring it down to earth. Discussions with Sir Maurice Hankey and Latham produced 
a compromise scheme for a special class of mandate. This C class mandate would 
"apply to South-West Africa and 'certain of the Pacific Islands' which 'owing to the 
sparseness of their population or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres 
of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory State', would best 
be administered 'under the laws of the mandatory State as integral portions thereof, 
subject to the same safeguards for the native populations as in the case of the other 
mandates"." Hughes dug in his toes, and an exasperated Lloyd George told him 
that he had fought his battles for three days but he "would not quarrel with the 
United States for the Solomon Islands". After a fiery exchange in Welsh between 
the two prime ministers, the discussion was adjourned. 
Hughes had received a cable from Melbourne instructing him not to agree to 
anything except direct control over Papua New Guinea. While he was again con-
sulting Melbourne by cable, Hankey induced him to agree to the C class mandate, 
assuring him that this would be equivalent to a 999-year lease. Meanwhile, the 
Australian cabinet debated the issue in Melbourne. At the meeting the next day, 
Hughes reluctantly accepted the compromise, because Australia "fully recognised 
that grave interests or involving the fate of humanity were at stake, and, therefore, 
he did not feel justified in opposing the views of President Wilson and those of Mr 
Lloyd George beyond the point which would reasonably safeguard the interests of 
Australia". However, the final AustraHan decision would have to be taken in 
Melbourne rather than Paris.^' 
32 THE ADOLESCENT NATIONS: 1900-1931 
Hughes almost wrecked the agreement by apparently leaking information about 
the preceding day's discussions to the Paris edition of the Daily Mail, using Keith 
Murdoch for the purpose. Wilson threatened to return home if any further leaks 
took place. He proposed, however, to defer the specific mandates until a preHminary 
peace treaty, including the League of Nations as an integral part, could be com-
pleted. Hughes and other delegates bitterly opposed Wilson's plan for postpone-
ment. Tempers flared, and Hughes became more obdurate in his opposition to 
Wilson. Wilson then decided to "clean up the situation" and cut Hughes down to 
size: "Australia and New Zealand with 6,000,000 people between them could not 
hold up a conference in which, including China, some 1,200,000 milHon people 
were represented." Massey indicated that he would accept the compromise if Wilson 
would clearly accept the C class mandates. 
Then followed one of the fiercest and most direct confrontations in Australian 
diplomatic history: "President Wilson asked if Messrs Massey and Hughes were lay-
ing down an ultimatum to the conference. Mr Hughes was deaf and had a telephone 
fastened to his ear. He had his face turned from the President, so did not hear the 
question. Someone nudged him and interrupted his speech. He asked that the ques-
tion be repeated. 'Are you laying down an ultimatum to the conferences?' he was 
asked. 'Yes', he replied, 'It's about that.' " L.F. Fitzhardinge suggests that Hughes 
was fiddling with his hearing aid, which had stuck and did not hear the question 
even when it was repeated. With a bland smile he repHed that "That's about the size 
of it, Mr President. That puts it very weU."'" 
South African prime minister Louis Botha and Lloyd George successfully poured 
oil on troubled waters, although Wilson did not appreciate Hughes's reply to Lloyd 
George's question: Would Australia, if given control of New Guinea, allow free 
access to missionaries? "Of course," said Hughes. "I understand that these poor 
people are very short of food, and for some time past they have not had enough 
missionaries."" 
Wilson and Hughes both calmed down, partly because each realized that the C 
class mandate formula went as far as possible to meet the essential requirements of 
both countries. Wilson, faced with the fact of the secret agreement between Britain 
and Japan (that the German islands north of the Equator should be transferred to 
Japan), found that the A and B class mandates went a long way to meet his main 
criteria. They did prevent Japanese fortification of the islands south of the Equator, 
islands which posed a potential threat to American communications west of 
Honolulu. Hughes, with almost absolute control over the main island of New 
Guinea, and with the inclusion of the adjacent islands in the proposed mandate, had 
strengthened Australian security very greatly for a generation. The dangers he had 
foreseen for AustraHan defence were minimized by advancing Australia's northern 
frontiers as far north as possible. 
There was, however, a long wrangle over the allocation of the mandate to 
Australia. Hughes wanted the allocation made by the peace conference and the 
Council of Ten before the setting up of the League of Nations. Wilson's assurance 
that Australia would receive the mandate was finally given on 7 May. The League of 
Nations Council accepted it on 15 January 1921. As a small bonus, AustraHa gained 
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partial control over the phosphate-rich island of Nauru, sharing its control as a man-
dated territory with New Zealand and Great Britain. 
Despite great personal unpopularity among British Empire and American 
diplomats, Hughes had met with signal success in winning what the overwhelming 
majority of Australians regarded as the "closed door" in Austraha's outer ring of 
defence. He was tough and obstinate, utterly unscrupulous in his methods of 
fighting Wilson and Lloyd George, and often behaving as a larrikin. He surrep-
titiously used the press to exert pressure on Wilson. With his experience as a 
tenacious trade union secretary, he made use of the industrial negotiator's tactic of 
making extravagant demands and claims to force his opponents into a compromise. 
He sometimes risked the danger of outrageously overplaying his hand but carried it 
off with great panache and success. 
Behind Hughes's insistence that AustraHa should have a "closed door" in Papua 
New Guinea was the general Australian fear of Japan. A Japanese face stared over 
Hughes's shoulder throughout the debate on the German colonies. For two decades 
the fear of Japan had been central to Australian thinking on defence and security. In 
all the scenarios about Australian defence planning, Japan occupied a central place. 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been welcomed primarily for this reason, and its 
periodical renewal was important for a dominion whose foreign policy and defence 
were in British hands. The visit of the Great White Fleet was seen as further in-
surance. Australia's policy embodied in the Immigration Restriction Act of 1902 
was the other side of the coin. Adopted as a matter of faith for economic and social 
reasons, Australian immigration policy was one of the immutables in Australian 
politics. Hughes knew that it would be politial suicide for him to adopt any stance 
that might in any way weaken it. 
Racial equality had been an unresolved problem since the conclusion of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance in 1902. It had produced considerable friction in the administration 
of Australian immigration policy. It had also been the centre of the controversy in 
California over Japanese settlers and immigrants that led to the Root-Takahira agree-
ment, which provided for self-restraint by the Japanese government so that only 
selected immigrants in defined categories would be given immigrant visas. 
Japan did not raise the issue of racial equality until the Versailles conference had 
begun in 1919. An increasing Japanese pride at a time of military victory led the 
Japanese Diet and press to discuss the matter. When envoys were finally selected for 
the conference, they were instructed: "If the League of Nations proposal seems to be 
taking practical shape, try to find a suitable means for guaranteeing racial equality.'' 
The initial approach was to be an indirect one by ambassadors Makino and Chinda 
discussing the matters with Colonel E. M. House, a member of the American 
delegation, and the following day submitted two written drafts. The first of these, 
reflecting fully Japanese thinking, said: "The equaHty of nations being a basic princi-
ple of the League, the High Contracting Parties agree that concerning the treatment 
and rights to be accorded to aliens in their territories they will not discriminate, 
either in law or in fact, against any person or persons on account of his or their race 
or nationality."'^ Wilson rejected this draft but, after amending some phrases of a 
second less precise draft, was prepared to accept the new revised one. A further revis-
ed draft was submitted to the League of Nations Commission of the Conference. It 
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was allowed to lapse after Lord Cecil had pointed out the difficulties the resolution 
proposed for the multiracial and multifarious British Empire. The Japanese reserved 
the right to raise it again later. 
Hughes was implacably opposed to it, declaring that "sooner than agree to it I 
would walk into the Seine — or the Folies Bergeres with my clothes off"." There 
was little danger of either happening because he had the staunch support of the 
Australian cabinet. As Munro Ferguson warned the colonial secretary in London on 
10 February, "all parties were unanimous in excluding Asiatics from Australia, and, 
although not as outspoken as Mr. Hughes, most politicians are anxious that the 
Southward Expansion of the Japanese should be combated".'* Hughes proved com-
pletely intractable. The Japanese delegates visited Hughes himself on 14 March in an 
attempt to find a formula. The discussion was lengthy and abortive and Hughes 
avoided further meetings on the pretext of journey or illnesses. 
A meeting with the dominion prime ministers on 25 March was no less successful. 
Hughes rejected completely a compromise draft prepared by Borden. The Japanese 
delegates reported: "Hughes alone persisted along his stubborn soHtary path: he was 
not unsympathetic to the Japanese stand; however as representing Australian pubHc 
opinion he had no alternative but to express his opposition — root and branch; it 
was not a problem of drafting, ninety-five out of every hundred Australians would 
unite in rejecting the idea which underlay our proposal. The other Prime Ministers 
were free to do as they liked — he would do what his duty demanded. So saying he 
left the meeting."" 
Japan persisted, and several meetings with Borden, Lord Robert Cecil, the British 
representative, and Smuts took place with Hughes and Garran. "Hughes became 
even more difficult and although at one point seemed inclined to accept [a com-
promise draft], ultimately required that the right of immigration should be excluded 
by express wording." Makino and Chinda faced a blank wall. Under further intense 
pressure, Hughes dehvered yet another ultimatum on Australia's behalf. "Hughes 
insists that nothing shaH go in, no matter how mild and inoffensive. If anything is 
attempted, his purpose is to make a speech at the Plenary Conference and to raise a 
storm of protest not only in the Dominions but in the western part of the United 
States."" This he was quite prepared to do in consultation with Keith Murdoch. 
The tactic was one he had used in battles vdth pohtical opponents in Australia and 
one that he had used against Wilson on the German colonies issue. 
The issue was resolved suddenly after weeks of behind-the-scenes negotiations. 
The Japanese, against the advice of many delegates, persisted in their determination 
to bring the matter before the League Commission, gambling on the belief that 
Hughes's shriU opposition to the idea would have alienated many delegates. On 11 
April, at its last meeting to settle the revised draft of the Covenant of the League, 
Makino moved a carefully phrased amendment to the preamble to the Covenant to 
provide for the "endorsement of the principle of the equaHty of nations and the just 
treatment of their nationals"." It omitted the inflammable word race. Wilson ac-
cepted the amendment reluctantly and allowed discussion without a vote. The 
Japanese delegation pressed for a vote that could be reported in the press. Before 
Wilson could put it to the vote. Colonel House passed over a short note: "The trou-
ble is that if the Commission should pass it, it would surely raise the race issue 
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throughout the w o r l d . " " Wilson immediately heard " the firebeU in the n ight" and 
made a speech trying to quell the fire, a fire that might break out in California if 
Hughes deemed it necessary as a last desperate throw: 
We here have no choice as to the part that is to be played by others of our colleagues of the 
Conference of Peace in the discussion of matters of this sort. It is not only in this room, but 
elsewhere, that attention has been drawn to this and similar suggestions, and those very 
suggestions have set burning flames of prejudice, which it would be very unwise to aUow 
to flare out in the public view in the Plenary Conference. . . . How can you treat on its 
merits in this quiet room a question which will not be treated on its merits when it gets 
out of this room?" 
He then took the vote: eleven of the seventeen members supported the Japanese 
amendment. Wilson immediately declared the vote lost because it was not 
unanimous.*" 
The defeat of the amendment was unquestionably the result of the war of attrition 
carried out by Hughes. He was virtually a one-man band on the question, but 
because of his granitic qualities, the Japanese gamble did not come off. He earned 
considerable hostility in Japan but emerged with a good deal of electoral kudos in 
Australia. Japan had pressed the racial equality clause as a secondary issue rather than 
a primary one. Shantung was a much more important prize for the Japanese, and 
they were prepared to be patient. Hughes did not put Japan on the knife-edge over 
the question of membership. The Japanese prime minister, Takashi Hara, said, 
"There was no prospect of this draft being approved in accordance with our pro-
posals; but it is not a subject which merits withdrawal from the League of Nations; 
even though we have not attained the desired result, it is satisfactory that we could 
maintain the present position."*' The controversy did have a long-term effect on 
Anglo-Japanese-Australian relations, and the British took the blame for much of 
Japan's lack of success. The Japanese, however, had no more insight than the 
Americans in their understanding of the British Empire and Commonwealth. That 
Britain "had not attempted to discipline her dominions or lay down a common 
policy for them came as a staggering revelation to the Japanese."*^ House had to 
carefully edit the press releases and documentation on the important session. One 
British delegate commented that " the President had, by the skin of his teeth, been 
rescued by Mr. Hughes of Australia".*' 
These highly publicized and dramatic clashes between Hughes and Wilson oc-
cupied only a small part of the time of the Versailles Conference, although they did 
represent to Hughes what he regarded as vital Australian interests. His major assign-
ment as ! member of the British Empire delegation was reparations, an issue on 
which he used his imperial position to promote Australian interests as much as possi-
ble. This was, from the point of view of the conference as a whole, and perhaps of 
Australia itself, a much more important international issue than the nine-day wonder 
of Papua New Guinea and racial equality. 
Hughes was chairman of the reparations committee and came to it as a strong 
critic of Wilson's Fourteen Points, largely because he objected to the exclusion of 
war costs from reparations. Sir George Foster, Canadian minister of finance, describ-
ed the reparations committee as " the oddest committee I ever served upon" . 
Hughes, to quote Fitzhardinge, "appears in the shorthand report at his worst — 
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dogmatic, hectoring, impatient of evidence and scornful of logic". Foster noted in 
his diary, "It is all personal impression and desire — evidence there is none. . . . The 
committee did not search for much evidence No documents were examined. 
The business members simply translated their desires and impressions into the 
report. . . . Hughes did most of the talking and Hewins [former director of the 
London School of Economics] assumed absolute knowledge of Germany's present 
power to produce and pay and scouted aU evidence to the contrary."*' Hughes was a 
strong supporter of a Carthaginian peace which would give Australia £300 millions 
to cover its war debt. The Hughes committee came up with the impossible total 
figure of £24,000 million with an annual interest of £l,200 million. When asked 
how he arrived at this astronomic figure. Lord Cunliffe (until recently the governor 
of the Bank of England) repHed, " It came to me in church." ** 
Such an estimate was opposed to the views of the British Empire delegations, 
which agreed to endeavour to secure from Germany the greatest possible indemnity 
she could pay "consistent with the economic well-being of the British Empire and 
the peace of the world, and without involving an army of occupation". Hughes had 
been appointed by Lloyd George as one of the three British Empire representatives on 
the Committee of Indemnity (Reparations) set up by the Council of Ten on 25 
January. Its purpose was to determine how much Germany should and could pay and 
how the money was to be collected. 
Hughes put an essentially punitive case on behalf of Australia, based on the need 
both for restoration and compensation: "Australia has lost nearly 60,000 men killed 
and many more maimed for life. She has incurred a war debt of some £300,000,000 
— a crushing burden for 5,000,000 people. And what is true of Australia is true, 
mutatis mutandis, of the other Dominions and people of the British Empire. In the 
way of the destruction of civilian life and property, they may have suffered little. Yet 
the sacrifice they have made, and the damage they have suffered, have not been less." 
He summed up his argument succinctly when he declared that Germany "must 
purge herself of her iniquity and atone for her crime. So far as is humanly possible she 
must repair the damage she has caused and put the allied nations back where they 
stood in 1914."*' 
This was an argument totally unacceptable to President Wilson and to the young 
John Foster Dulles, who argued the American case at the sixteen sessions of the 
Reparations Commission. He gradually wore down the members of the committee 
by his persistent logical approach and his refusal to use the emotional appeals which 
were the usual methods of the volatile Hughes. He slowly won over the commission 
and succeeded in having the question of reparations referred back to the Council of 
Ten. Hughes was described by one of the Americans as "one of a galaxy of reac-
tionaries" in the British delegation. Thomas Lamont, an economic adviser to the 
American delegation, reported: "The AustraHan premier . . . at times bitterly assail-
ed the American delegation for their contention that costs of war could not properly 
be included in reparation. . . . In one of his arguments, I remember, turning around 
and shaking his finger at the American delegation, he shouted: 'Some people in this 
war have not been so near the fire as we British have, and, therefore, being unburn-
ed, they have a cold, detached view of the situation.' "*' 
Hughes fought to the last ditch on the question, in face of opposition from Smuts 
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and other members of the British Empire delegation. An impatient, harassed, and 
finally vacillating Lloyd George finally described the Hughes position as "Heads I 
win, tails you lose". Hankey said, "Yesterday was another of my terrific days, as I 
had a 4 hour conference in the morning, beginning at breakfast! The trouble was 
Hughes, who refuses to agree to the Prime Minister's 'reparations' scheme. He ob-
viously means to reap all the benefit he can from it, and then to damn it in pubHc. I 
spent an hour or two after the meeting trying for an accommodation, but could get 
nothing from Hughes that Ll.G. would take."*' 
At this stage, Hughes was fighting a losing battle, as he found himself completely 
isolated in the British Empire delegation and outmanoeuvred by Dulles. Dulles con-
tributed largely to the final decision not to adopt an impossibly punitive peace but 
supported the passage of the separate clause declaring Germany's guilt, the notorious 
and unfortunate " W a r Guilt Clause". On many details he was blazing a trail for his 
generous peace treaty with Japan in 1951. Hughes had suffered a resounding defeat. 
The reparation commission's discussions dragged on for more than a decade. When 
the final payments were made in 1931, AustraHa had received £5,571,720, largely in 
ships seized in Australian ports in 1914 and German property expropriated in New 
Guinea.*' 
Australia played a very minor role at Versailles in discussions over Wilson's plan 
for founding a League of Nations. The idea had grown in Wilson's mind in 1918 
and 1919, and he brought to Paris with him a number of academics and a paper by 
the frontier historian Frederick Jackson Turner. The formulation of an Australian 
view was largely left in the hands of Hughes. Much of his venom about Wilson 
centred on his idealistic plans for founding the League of Nations. Hughes had never 
been a Utopian, either as a trade union leader or as a member of the Australian Labor 
Party. His approach to problems was primarily pragmatic, political, and nationalist. 
A critical observer and cynic, he played no constructive part in the framing of the 
charter of the League of Nations: he was often a destructive critic. One of his most 
effective speeches in Paris was his diatribe against Wilson's ideas when Wilson 
refused to consider the possibility of the annexation of New Guinea by Australia. 
It was intolerable . . . for President Wilson to dictate to us how the world was to be 
governed. If the saving of civilisation had depended on the United States, it would have 
been in tears and chains today. As regards the League of Nations, Mr. Hughes considered 
that a League of Nations which was to endure and weather the storms of time would have 
to be a thing like the British Empire, framed in accordance with historical associations and 
practical needs. President Wilson, however, had no practical scheme at all and no proposals 
that would bear the test of experience. The League of Nations was to him what a toy was 
to a child — he would not be happy till he got it. . . . Such a League must, however, be 
properly constituted and one in which the British Empire occupied a place corresponding to 
its sacrifices in the war and its position in the world. He insisted that in any case we should 
not commit ourselves to the League of Nations until the Conference had completed its 
labours. To start with a League of Nations and continually refer everything to this League 
would mean giving up the substance for the shadow.*' 
When the chips were finally down, Hughes foresook his doubts and reservations. In 
the prevailing climate of world opinion, he had no option but to sign the charter of 
the League of Nations. To have done otherwise would have been to lose considerable 
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electoral support in Australia and perhaps to weaken AustraHa's position as an inter-
national power. 
Paris was in fact an important meeting place for AustraHa and the United States. 
For the first time the dominions had been represented separately at an international 
conference. The Treaty of Versailles was signed by the United Kingdom for the 
British Empire but with the dominions signing as well as the United Kingdom. The 
United States had always assumed that Britain spoke for the Empire as a whole, that 
there was an Empire consensus on matters of foreign policy. Throughout the con-
ference, the public unity of the British Empire delegation was maintained. But what 
was clearly apparent were the sharp divisions within the Empire on particular issues 
and the growing difference between London and Australia. Hughes acted the larrikin 
with great effectiveness within the Empire delegation and in conference committees. 
His battles with Lloyd George and Wilson were largely successful, and the shrill 
Australian voice was heard repeatedly and with considerable effect. 
Australia would not have secured either the special mandate for New Guinea or 
the protection of the White Australia policy without his stubbornness. An inex-
perienced diplomat, Hughes was sufficiently a politician to recognize where power 
ultimately lay. Perhaps with some hindsight, he wrote in 1929: "The Dominions as 
part of the Empire are listened to by foreign nations with interest, for the influence 
of a great world Power lends weight to their lightest word. . . . In themselves, 
although potentially great nations . . . they do not count for much; as part of an 
Empire that has behind it great riches and organised force, the world pays them the 
tribute it always gives to wealth and power."'" 
Wilson was intensely irritated by Hughes's outbursts but tended to accept the 
view that the British Empire spoke with one voice. One of the American delegates to 
the conference noted in May 1919 that "a few days before in a formal meeting of the 
Council of Ten Hughes (Australia) had stated (although it was omitted from the 
record) that the next time Britain went to war 'Australia would go in or stay out — 
as she thought best ' ."" While the president may not have been aware of Flughes's 
comment, the State Department seems to have noted it. Washington was anxious to 
avoid a conflict with the dominions when the size of the British Empire delegation 
was being discussed in London. There was probably a sigh of relief in 1921 when it 
became clear that Hughes would be unable to attend the Washington Conference 
and that Senator Pearce would take his place. The erroneous belief in imperial unity 
on matters of foreign policy persisted in the State Department. As late as 1945, the 
United States minister to Canberra, Nelson Johnson, was able to comment "that 
discussions between Australia and the United States are settled, not in Canberra but 
in consultation at 10 Downing Street."'^ What W.J. Hudson calls "the birth of 
Australian diplomacy" had passed almost unnoticed in some echelons in the State 
Department. 
3 The A nglo-fapanese A lliance and the 
Washington Conference 
For Australia, the Versailles Conference and its ensuing peace treaties meant that the 
European war had been settled and that a series of peace treaties had resolved, at least 
on paper, the issues that led to August 1914. But the war had extended beyond 
Europe and had become a global war: the United States had become a major partici-
pant and had played a dominant role in the final settlement. But Africa, the Pacific, 
and Asia and the Far East had also been involved: Asian, African, and south-west 
Pacific troops had taken part in the final successful war. The mandates system had 
dealt with the future of former German colonies in the Pacific and prevented the ex-
pansion of European empires, an essential element in Wilsonian policies. 
But the peace settlement in Europe brought with it a change in the balance of 
power outside Europe. That settlement meant that Japan had emerged as a new and 
vital element in the Pacific balance of power. The allocation to Japan of the former 
German colonies north of the Equator meant that the mobility and the potential 
striking power of the Japanese fleet had been increased. Japan's position in relation to 
China had been strengthened by its acquisition of the former German bases in China, 
and despite the refusal of the Western powers to accept Japanese claims in China, the 
hard fact was that Japan's position in the Far East had been considerably strengthen-
ed. Germany had disappeared as an element in the Far Eastern balance of power, and 
so too had Russia. Britain's position was being re-evaluated: what power could she 
exert in the Far East in support of the nineteenth-century Asian empire from Suez to 
Hong Kong? The economic costs of 1914-18 war were being felt domestically and 
in terms of foreign policy and defence. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, extend-
ed in 1911, had meant an increasing reliance on Japanese naval power east of Suez and 
especially in the Pacific. 
For Australia the European war had done little to resolve the problem of security. 
This had become, with stark clearness, a regional rather than a global problem, one 
that involved a revision of priorities within the British Empire/Commonwealth 
system. For Australia, the potential threat in the post-war period, as before 1914, 
came from Japan, and the 1918-19 strengthening of Japan's position gave no 
comfort to Australia. 
The Australian prime minister, William Morris Hughes, had no illusions about 
where the main threat to Australian security came from. He had believed for many 
years that a war between Japan and Australia was inevitable. The danger for 
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Australia was that it would be caught unprepared. "In all likelihood the next war 
will be fought in the Pacific," he said, "and it is necessary for us to be prepared. . . . 
So far we have been able to prevent any aggression against AustraHa, but our policy 
in future must be to leave nothing undone to ensure the safety of the country against 
foreign aggression."' Hughes was increasingly concerned after 1919 with Australian 
vulnerability in the Pacific, largely because of his belief in the inability of Britain to 
quickly deploy significant British naval forces in the Pacific to protect members of 
the Commonwealth threatened by Japanese or other foreign aggression. It was what 
Peter Sales has called "this geographical claustrophobia that formed the underlying 
basis of Australian interest in external affairs throughout the early 'twenties".^ 
Given his conclusion that a war with Japan was inevitable, with Australia as a 
junior participant in any major conflict, perhaps a local prize in a Pacific war, the 
defence problem was a twofold one: how to build a coalition of Pacific powers to 
check Japanese expansion and how to strengthen Australia's local defences so that it 
could take part in a defensive coalition against Japan. In a speech at Bendigo a few 
days before he left for the Imperial Conference in London in 1921, he said that the 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese AlHance of 1911 was "a question of life and death for 
the Commonwealth".' The important thing for Australia was to delay the in-
evitable conflict so that Australia would have time to build up its defences and so 
make a significant contribution to a conflict in which the major Allied participants 
would be the United Kingdom and the United States. 
This pessimistic view of Australian-Japanese relations was not shared by E.L. 
Piesse, a former director of the Military Intelligence Branch of the Defence Depart-
ment who had been seconded to the Prime Minister's Department to concentrate on 
Far Eastern and Pacific questions. He immediately became involved in an analysis of 
Japanese economic and foreign policies in 'the Pacific. He realized that the Japanese 
occupation of the Marshall and Caroline islands would constitute "a perpetual and 
very serious menace to Australia''. This would require a doubling of the strength of 
Australian naval and military forces. He was at this stage convinced that Woodrow 
Wilson had announced that the United States would not tolerate further Japanese ag-
gression in China. This would lead to the diversion of Japanese expansion into the 
Pacific: the islands and perhaps AustraHa. 
"The United States had disliked the Anglo-Japanese treaty from the beginning 
because it felt that it 'was primarily responsible for fostering Japanese imperiahstic 
designs. To its existence was attributed the thwarting of a United States scheme for 
the neutralisation of the Manchurian railways in 1910. . . . The AlHance also gave 
Japan an excuse for embarking on the Siberian expedition on the outbreak of the 
Russian Revolution'."* In effect it appeared to provide a British shield for Japanese 
expansive designs in Asia. The alliance made possible a breach of the "open door" 
principles, which were an essential element in American Far Eastern policy. Friction 
over Japanese immigration to California and a belief that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
would require stronger American naval defences and so impede Wilson's moves to 
disarmament made the United States most reluctant to see the alliance renewed 
beyond 1921. The provision in the 1911 agreement between Great Britain and Japan 
that the alliance would not operate in the event of a war between Japan and the 
United States did little to lessen American hostility towards the alHance as a whole. 
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By 1919 and 1920, the United States was insisting that it be abandoned when it was 
due to expire in July 1921.' 
Hughes was fully aware of American hostility to the treaty and was most anxious 
to avoid any confrontation with Washington over its renewal. But he felt that his 
options for Australian foreign and defence policy were very limited. He was anxious 
to become better informed about Japanese policies and ambitions because much of 
Australia's information was filtered through the Foreign Office and the Colonial 
Office. To enlarge Australian sources of information and give it another small win-
dow through which to assess Japan's policies, the Australian government agreed in 
May 1919 to form a Pacific branch of the Prime Minister's Department with E.L. 
Piesse as its director. His function was to acquire and evaluate intelligence informa-
tion about "the affairs of the countries of the Far East and of the Pacific (including 
the United States of America) insofar as these may affect the foreign relations of the 
Commonwealth " . ' 
Piesse found the flow of information from London was sketchy and often out of 
date by the time he received it. His task of evaluating cables was hampered by 
Hughes's unwillingness to work closely with him or to consult him and even at 
times to let him see files promptly and regularly. Hughes had been in Paris when the 
Pacific branch had been set up by Watt, the acting prime minister, and in any case 
always preferred to act with a minimum of advice from subordinates. Shortly after 
his appointment, Piesse made a six-month tour of the Far East so that he could make 
a first-hand assessment of Japanese policy. He was given many courtesies by the 
British Embassy in Japan and was "freely shown papers bearing upon particular 
questions with regard to which he desired information".' But the British charge' 
d'affaires, Beilby Alston, carefully screened the documents made available to Piesse. 
He was refused permission to consult the archives in the British Embassy in Tokyo 
because Alston believed it to be of "doubtful expediency" to allow an Australian 
representative to have access to highly classified information. It was all done with 
great skiU and charm without Piesse being fully aware of what was going on. 
The Piesse report, based on many conversations with British and Japanese officials 
and limited access to key documents, concluded that although Japanese expansion 
would probably continue for economic and defensive reasons, it was "very unHkely" 
that this would be directed against Australia. But he was unable to persuade Hughes 
to change his policy and renounce the alliance. Piesse's view was confirmed on his 
return from the Washington Conference on disarmament and matters concerning 
the Pacific (November 1921 to January 1922), where he saw no evidence that Japan 
wished to revive the 1919 challenge to the White Australia policy or that she had any 
territorial ambitions in AustraHa. "It seem safe to conclude that the danger to 
Australia from Japan is quite remote."' 
British reliance on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for naval power had increased 
greatly during the First World War; after the war, the British presence east of Suez 
had not been again built up to pre-1914 levels. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not 
due to expire until 13 July 1922, when twelve months' notice of abrogation would 
operate: a joint communication by Japan and Britain to the League of Nations in July 
1920 did not constitute a formal renunciation of the treaty but merely brought it in-
to line with League protocol procedures. This gave a longer breathing space to 
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Whitehall for the discussions over renewal. Given Hughes's preoccupation with the 
Japanese threat, it was important that AustraHa be as fully informed as possible about 
British intentions. It was also important for Australian defence policy, because naval 
plans needed to be made two or three years in advance of major political or foreign 
policy changes. The Colonial Office assured Melbourne that the Australian prime 
minister would be kept fully informed of any steps taken in discussions over the 
renewal of the alliance. 
Important Foreign Office confidential memoranda were sent to Australia to help 
the Commonwealth government formulate a policy. What is clear, however, is that 
the secret memoranda were carefully selected. There had always been some selective 
transmission of documents, but it became clear when the archives were opened that 
the process was much more than one of editing information: as D.K. Dignan has 
pointed out, "London not only kept Melbourne uninformed but often misinformed. 
By deceitful and sometimes untruthful misrepresentations it concealed from the 
Australian the full complexion of Anglo-Japanese relations",' including such matters 
as Japanese economic penetration of India and even Japanese involvement in- German-
sponsored revolutionary conspiracies against British rule in India. Both the Admiral-
ty and the Foreign Office agreed that secret intelligence material dealing with these 
topics should not be forwarded to Australia because it was impossible for anything to 
be kept secret for very long. For similar reasons, confidential background reports 
from British ambassadors in Tokyo and Peking were not communicated to Australia. 
In preparation for the Imperial Conference of 1921, the Foreign Office had C.H. 
Bentinck, head of the Far Eastern Department in 1919, draft a careful memorandum 
on the effect of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance upon foreign relationships. Before the 
memorandum was circulated to the dominions, it was revised by Bentinck, who 
"slightly toned down the case against Japan at the beginning of the memo and tried 
to bring out more clearly the fact that Japanese statesmen have endeavoured to play 
the game".'" It left the AustraHan prime minister and his cabinet poorly informed 
about the basic considerations behind British poHcy. It also confirmed Piesse's fears 
that the Foreign Office had been blinded to the realities in the Far East by a preoc-
cupation with European problems. He declared that the Bentinck memorandum 
might "be taken as correcting the impressions given by the speeches of Mr Balfour 
and Lord Robert Cecil that the Foreign Office was not distrustful of Japan"." 
The Anglo-Japanese AHiance and Empire naval defence were the two major items 
for discussions at the Imperial Conference convened for 20 June in London. Hughes 
went to the conference with the detailed studies of Piesse to assist him and to help 
him interpret the Foreign Office material forwarded by the secretary of state for 
foreign affairs. Lord Curzon. Piesse's view was that AustraHa had Httle to gain from 
the renewal of an alliance which had been first concluded almost a generation earlier 
when the Far Eastern balance of power was vastly different. Then Japan was a young 
rising imperial power anxious for protection against Russian and German threats to 
its interests. Britain needed diplomatic support at a rime when the Boer War was 
showing the dangers of isolation and when Britain's Far Eastern trade was very con-
siderable. The danger arose in large measure because of the uncertain position of the 
United States as the latest newcomer on the Far Eastern scene. But by 1920 Japan had 
established itself as a major power, and Britain's relative naval strength in the Far 
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East had declined at the same time as British trade and investments were less secure. 
Piesse, in contrast to Hughes, felt that there were few direct advantages to 
Australia to be gained by a renewal of the treaty other than the guarantee of 
Australian security against a Japanese attack. He realized that the alliance could easily 
be broken if Japan's vital interests appeared to require an attack on AustraHa. " O n 
any such big issue as our national safety then, I doubt if a renewal of the AHiance is of 
much value." Recognizing Japanese anxiety to renew the alliance, largely to avoid 
isolation in the Pacific, Piesse was prepared to consider renewal in the hope that 
Australia might be able to secure commercial and trading concessions as well as, 
perhaps, a reconsideration by Japan of its attitude to Austraha's immigration policy. 
"Austraha's safety . . . is no better secured if the Alliance is renewed than if it were 
terminated, but that we might use the negotiations for renewal as an opportunity of 
settling pending questions, and that with a renewed AlHance the settlement of minor 
questions would probably be much easier."'^ This view, submitted to the AustraHan 
cabinet on 21 April, was largely brushed aside by Hughes. Hughes paid little atten-
tion to his arguments in the two months before the conference met or during the 
conference sessions. 
Hughes went to the conference with his flag nailed to the renewal mast. It was a 
question of Hfe and death for the Commonwealth, he had told the Bendigo audience 
before his departure. He was aware of the need to avoid antagonizing the United 
States, yet he was not fully conscious of the dislike he had incurred through his 
clashes with Woodrow Wilson at Versailles. On 21 June he presented the "attitude 
of Australia" towards the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; the case for renewal was over-
whelming provided the treaty guarded against any suspicion of hostility or un-
friendhness towards America. He felt that its great value lay in the restraints it 
imposed on Japanese expansion, a matter of considerable interest to the United 
States. 
I think that from every point of view it would be well that the Treaty with Japan should be 
renewed. Should we not be in a better position to exercise greater influence over the 
Eastern policy as an ally of that great Eastern Power, than as her potential enemy? Now, if 
Japan is excluded from the family of great Western nations — and mark, to turn our backs 
on the Treaty is certainly to exclude Japan — she will be isolated, her high national pride 
wounded in its most tender spot. To renew this Treaty is to impose on her some of those 
restraints inseparable from Treaties with other civilized nations like ourselves." 
The fireworks at the conference came with the strong opposition of Arthur 
Meighen, the new prime minister of Canada, to the renewal of the treaty in any 
form. He believed that Canada represented the North American viewpoint. He had 
for long been opposed to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, believing it to be the main 
obstacle to close collaboration between the United States and the British Empire to 
maintain post-war peace. A number of prominent Republicans in the United States 
were also anxious to prevent a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. They includ-
ed Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and William Howard Gardiner, a member of the ex-
ecutive committee of the American Navy League and a former president of the 
English Speaking Union. Gardiner actively campaigned on a three-point plan: " T h e 
United States should create an entente of the English-speaking peoples bordering on 
the Pacific to ensure that, under the leadership of the United States, a joint policy 
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would evolve. The abrogadon of the Anglo-Japanese AlHance should be secured by 
using the influence of the dominion and, finally, the attempt should be made to 
reassert the Open Door policy, check Japan, and provide for the security of the 
PhiHppines."'* 
Gardiner's attempts late in 1920 to secure support from AustraHa and New 
Zealand for his three-point plan had been rebuffed, and he had been compelled to fall 
back on Canada as his main potential base for support. He had discussions with a 
number of Canadian leaders in Ottawa and in February 1921 had got Meighen to 
agree to attempt to veto the alliance. Meighen wrote to Lloyd George on 15 
February declaring bluntly that an alternative must be found to renewal because the 
aHiance was obsolete. It was important to promote an understanding with the 
United States, which was moving away from isolation. "There is a danger that a 
special, confidential relationship concerning that region between ourselves and Japan, 
to which she was not a party, would come to be regarded as an unfriendly exclusion 
and as a barrier to an English-speaking accord."" He proposed among other things a 
regional conference of Pacific powers — Britain, the United States, China, Japan — 
to bring about a settlement of Far Eastern differences. But the Meighen approach 
was rebuffed by Curzon and Lloyd George. Proposals were made in Ottawa that 
Canada might attempt to go it alone with the United States and that Borden be sent 
to Washington to begin discussions; London was not privy to these proposals. 
Curzon, Balfour, Neville Chamberlain, and Lloyd George were, on balance, oppos-
ed to terminating the alliance. 
At the Imperial Conference on 29 June, Meighen completely rejected Curzon's 
proposals for renewal of the alliance in a modified form, primarily because it would 
have a detrimental effect on Canadian-American relations; it violated the basic tenet 
of Canada's external policy: the preservation and improvement of amicable relations 
with the United States. In a powerful and well-informed speech, Meighen did his 
best to torpedo the proposal to renew the alliance and to replace it by a closer entente 
with the United States. 
Hughes immediately launched a vituperative attack on Meighen as the voice of 
America. There is no evidence to suggest that Hughes was aware of the Gardiner-
Lodge link with Meighen, but had he known, it could hardly have added anything 
to the force of his attack; he opposed the Canadian case in the most vigorous terms." 
Lloyd George was able to avert a tense debate by pointing out that Meighen would 
like to hear the Hughes indictment but that he had already left for lunch with the 
Prince of Wales. Hughes continued his attack on Canada at the next sessions with in-
creasing support from India and New Zealand. He argued that Australian security, 
not Canadian security, was at stake. Japan was incontrovertably the strongest naval 
power in the Pacific, and it was imperative that Australia and the Empire be on good 
terms with Japan. The alHance was Australia's only insurance against a Japanese 
attack. "If AustraHa were asked whether she would prefer America or Japan as an 
Ally, her choice would be America. But that choice is not offered her. As against the 
substance she is offered the shadow."" He declared that the only condition on which 
he would vote against the renewal of the treaty was that America would give 
Australia "that assurance of safety which our circumstances absolutely demand"." 
On the eve of the conference the Foreign Office received a memorandum from the 
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British consul-general at New York outlining the policy of the new Harding govern-
ment. It had taken the tentative decision "to concentrate its principal naval strength 
in the Pacific, abandoning the traditional and historic plan of maintaining the first-
line naval fighting force in the Atlantic". Harding and his advisers had decided that 
the future interests of the United States lay toward the south and west and not 
toward the east. 
They have decided that henceforth this Government's greatest field of endeavour Ues in 
South America and in Asia and the naval policy of concentration in the Pacific only follows 
this poUcy. . . . military considerations are now and will be in the next few years constant-
ly urging the United States to mass its greatest strength in that part of the world where the 
United States is finding its new opportunities. At the same time it is no longer possible to 
deny that this Government now feels that if a war is to come again to this country, it will 
come from the Pacific and not from the Atlantic side." 
The consul-general pointed out that the new policy was not designed to provoke the 
Japanese or to cause suspicion in other parts of the world. "It cannot be said that this 
Administration is seeking war with Japan. On the contrary it is doing the very thing 
that it hopes wiH lead away from war with Japan. It desires to demonstrate to Japan 
that the United States is ready and willing to conserve and maintain its interests in 
Asia as well as in the rest of the world." Like Theodore Roosevelt, Harding would 
"walk softly and carry a big stick". The new navy would be able to provide 
evidence that the protests of this government were "to be reckoned as more than 
mere statements of opinion". 
The new policy had certain implications both for the United States and for its 
Pacific allies. It meant firstly that the American navy became much more interested 
in naval bases and naval yards for the Pacific squadron, which would become the 
most powerful arm of American naval power. Secondly, it meant that, as Curzon 
pointed out in circulating the memorandum, "Great Britain must acknowledge in 
its turn the naval superiority of the United States in the Pacific. Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada must recognise the ground of common interest with the United 
States and look to this country for protection rather than to Great Britain." In short, 
one of the principal by-products of the tentative Harding naval policy was "the 
formal announcement to the world of a great union of the English-speaking peoples 
of the world bound, not by treaty or convenant, but by common language, common 
institutions and by common customs."^" 
This interesting reassessment of American interests in the Far East had little impact 
on the thinking of members of the imperial cabinet. It does not appear to have been 
circulated as widely as Curzon's other memoranda of early July. In fact, the discus-
sions at the Imperial Conference were held against a background of intense day-to-
day diplomatic activity which sometimes outdated the speeches made by Common-
wealth delegates. Much of the sense of urgency in the debate arose out of the belief 
that the joint Anglo-Japanese note of 8 July 1920 to the League of Nations had re-
nounced the alliance and that the proposal for a three months' renewal was essential 
for reasons of diplomatic protocol as the new League of Nations was coming into be-
ing. Lloyd George had induced Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor, to deliver a pon-
tifial opinion that the alliance had not been renounced and that it would continue 
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until either signatory gave a year's notice of abrogation. This conveniently confirm-
ed the view of the British cabinet expressed earlier that day. 
This opinion gave the conference a breathing space. Proposals were made from 
several quarters for the holding of a conference of interested parties to discuss general 
Pacific problems, one of which would obviously be the Anglo-Japanese AlHance. But 
Hughes was distrustful of a proposal that would defer a decision about the alliance 
until after a conference was held, a conference that included the United States and 
Canada, both of which were opposed to renewal in any form. He continued to argue 
that Japan constituted the only menace to security in the Pacific. Apart from war, the 
only way in which Britain could exert some control or influence on Japanese foreign 
policy was through a treaty. This could ensure the safety of British interests in the 
Pacific for two more decades. Should war break out with Japan, the Empire in the 
Far East and the western Pacific was virtually defenceless. Australia would not even 
have a sporting chance of defending itself. Without the Anglo-Japanese AlHance, 
Britain could not lift a finger to oppose Japan imperialism. He therefore urged the 
conference to "declare unambiguously and in definite terms" that it favoured the 
renewal of the treaty, perhaps in a slightly different form. 
Hughes wrote to Sir Maurice Hankey, the secretary of the conference, that he was 
"seriously alarmed at the prospects of this mountain of a conference being delivered 
of a very small mouse, and a half dead one at tha t " . Although "a whole hearted 
champion of Empire", he was anxious to show Australians that they "were partners 
and not pawns' ' .^ ' 
There is no part of the Empire with so direct and so vital an interest in this treaty as 
Australasia. . . . If it is decided as a definite unalterable policy to renew it, then we know 
where we are and what is more, the United States wiU know where it is. They can have a 
voice in settling the form it will take, we shall not be unwilUng to listen to anything they 
have to say, but as to the actual policy of renewal, well, our interests are so wnrapped up in 
the Pacific with Japan that we cannot break with her. . . . I am in favour of a plain 
straightforward declaration of our intention to renew.^^ 
Faced with a head-on confrontation between Australia and Canada, Curzon pro-
posed a formula to prevent a deadlock. He suggested that an international conference 
be convened to resolve all outstanding questions in the Far East and the Pacific. 
These would include the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Should the con-
ference fail to agree on proposals to modify or renew the treaty, it would then be 
renewed to meet the requirements of the League of Nations. Both Hughes and 
Meighen accepted these proposals, proposals that fell short of the extreme positions 
taken by the two men. Hughes realized that it was important to secure the co-
operation of the United States but felt that in an international conference the alliance 
would be discarded largely because of American opposition. This, of course, is what 
did happen, but the alliance was replaced by a much wider nine-power agreement. 
A second element in Curzon's compromise was that discussion of the alliance at 
the Imperial Conference be adjourned for eight days so that he could open discus-
sions with the other major powers involved. He invited the Japanese ambassador. 
Baron Hayashi, to call on him and discuss very frankly the problems of the alliance 
and of security in the Pacific. He pointed out that the situation since the alliance had 
been renewed in 1911 had changed completely and that a new situation faced both 
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powers. "America, rightly or wrongly, seemed to regard the position and intentions 
of Japan with great suspicion; many foolish things were said about the certainty of a 
conflict between Japan and the United States; a large section of America opinion, in 
spite of the attempts that had been made to remove any fear that the agreement 
might be used to the detriment of the United States, nevertheless persisted in think-
ing that, should this conflict ever unfortunately occur, Britain would, under the 
terms of the agreement, be found helping Japan against America."" He then outlin-
ed to Hayashi the proposal from the Imperial Conference for "a conference on the 
Pacific question between all the powers principally concerned with a view to arriving 
at an agreed solution". The conference could be held on American or Canadian soil 
with Washington issuing invitations; countries invited would include the United 
States, Japan, Great Britain, China, and the British dominions directly concerned. 
France might be added and perhaps even some of the South American states. The 
Japanese ambassador promised his warm support for the proposal and then sounded 
out Curzon about the precise objectives of the conference. Curzon summed these up 
as arrangements for the future peace of the Pacific and the preservation of the integri-
ty and independence of China and the maintenance of the open door. 
Discussions the same afternoon with the Chinese minister were just as satisfactory. 
Curzon's view was that the invitation, if extended to the Chinese, would be regard-
ed as an "enormous compliment" and would have a "very pacifying and solidifying 
influence in China'' .^ * 
With support from Japan and China as well as the British dominions guaranteed, 
Curzon approached the new American ambassador, George Harvey, the following 
day. Hughes had already suggested that Britain try to clarify the enigmatic views of 
Washington about the alliance, since no revision acceptable to the United States 
could be proposed until its precise objections to the existing treaty were known. The 
British ambassador to Washington, Sir Auckland Geddes, then made some informal 
approaches to the State Department. These were not encouraging.^' Geddes reported 
that public opinion was opposed to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 
any form. The Senate was not likely to accept a tripartite agreement between 
America, Britain, and Japan. Private discussions with Harvey before the eight-day 
adjournment of the Imperial Conference were more encouraging, and Curzon 
received "a favourable impression" regarding Washington's likely response. As 
Harvey was a relatively raw diplomat, his judgment was probably unreliable. 
Curzon's second interview with Harvey on 5 July was extremely encouraging. He 
emphasized the moderate views of the Japanese government and the enthusiasm of 
China for such a conference. In these circumstances, Curzon suggested to Harvey 
that President Harding might invite powers concerned with the Far East and the 
Pacific to a conference to discuss the elimination of naval warfare and other related 
political problems. Harvey saw Britain and America as the restraining forces on 
Japan and China respectively. "He warmly agreed with me", Curzon told Geddes, 
"that the sooner we struck in the matter, the better, and he entertained no doubt 
that the psychological effect of the mere announcement that such a conference was 
likely to be held would be immense, and would have a very pacifying influence in the 
East."" 
Harvey delayed reporting to Washington for three days because Curzon had in-
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dicated that the matter was not urgent. Harvey's dispatch crossed with a general 
inquiry from Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to London, Rome, Paris, and 
Tokyo about a conference on disarmament to be held in Washington at a mutually 
convenient date. He welcomed Curzon's proposal, which then developed into a sug-
gestion for a preliminary conference, held perhaps in London, on Far Eastern affairs. 
There then began what Curzon described as a series of very regrettable misunderstan-
dings. Washington was afraid that the conference initiative might pass to London 
and that Lloyd George would attempt to steal the HmeHght." Harding rejected the 
proposal for a preliminary conference, and the only concession that he would make 
was to hold the disarmament conference a few weeks earlier to enable dominion 
prime ministers to attend on their way back from the Imperial Conference.^' 
The Imperial Conference, then, ended without any agreement about the future of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. W.M. Hughes left for Melbourne acutely disappointed 
at the British government for having withdrawn support for a preliminary con-
ference. Washington was more important than Melbourne in the global balance of 
power. Hughes was exasperated by American stubbornness and reluctance to share 
any of the brilliant limelight with others. After the Imperial Conference closed, he 
repeated his opinion. "If a settlement of the Pacific question is humanly possible it 
could have been arrived at at that preliminary Pacific Conference, and I think it is 
obvious that if no settlement could have been arrived at there . . . it is hopeless to 
expect a settlement by the much larger and more unwieldy body which will be 
assembled in Washington"." He was, of course, wrong in his assessment of the 
possibilities of Washington. It was impossible for the Imperial Conference to act in 
isolation in attempting to solve Pacific problems. The British government had no 
real alternative to accepting the American position. Hughes later said, "America 
would neither work with us nor allow us to work without her."'" 
Part of Hughes's disappointment arose from the fact that he would be unable to 
attend a second conference later in the year. He had been absent from Australia for a 
long time, and there were serious rumblings at home in a cabinet almost totally 
uninformed by Hughes about what he had been doing in London. However, he felt 
it essential that Australia be represented at any conference to settle Pacific problems: 
"The question of disarmament is another matter, and Britain could speak for us if 
we could not attend, but as Pacific problems raise two questions both vital to us — 
White Australia and safety of Australia — on which Britain cannot speak for us . . . 
Australia simply must be directly represented."" When Lloyd George was selecting 
the British delegation he was most anxious that Hughes attend. Washington, with 
memories of the Paris clashes in 1919, must have been relieved to know that Hughes 
would not be there. An American journalist reporting Hughes from London com-
mented: "His locker is full of anti-Japanese ammunition. If it should be exploded at 
this time it is believed that chauvinist sentiment in Japan would be so strengthened 
that Japanese acceptance of the Conference conditions, which has been confidently 
expected, would be jeopardised."'^ 
The clash of interests in London over the preliminary conference was transmuted 
into a struggle for dominion representation at the Washington Conference." The 
precedents of the Paris peace conference in 1919 were regarded as vitally important 
by dominion prime ministers, particularly Pacific prime ministers. The dominions 
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had been represented separately within the British Empire delegation and had signed 
the peace treaty separately. Curzon had clear recollections of the dominion point of 
view and told Harvey on 14 July how serious the problem was. Harvey informed the 
secretary of state, " H e earnestly reiterates the necessity of their presence and par-
ticipation in consultation with representatives of the Empire in considering problems 
of the Pacific and thus clearing the road for proposals of limitation of armaments." '* 
The United States was anxious to prevent the conference from becoming too large 
and cumbersome and so preferred small rather than large delegations. The State 
Department was most reluctant to concede separate representation to the British 
dominions for fear of being outvoted. Curzon and Lloyd George were also in favour 
of small delegations of " t w o or at most three ," Harvey reported. "This makes 
possible easy conversation of 12 to 20 authorized delegates sitting at a horse-shoe 
table ."" The official delegations would be assisted by advisers and experts, not 
limited in numbers but having no voting rights. 
Harvey reported that Curzon and Lloyd George would probably represent the 
British Empire. He went on: 
The question of representation of the Dominions did not arise. They consider that a 
family affair and feel quite competent and authorized to speak for the whole Empire. 
Whether they should have representatives of the Dominions among their advisers they 
would regard, as I have been made from time to time aware of their attitude, as a question 
for their own arrangement. In fact they are so sensitive upon this point that I feel sure 
Curzon would have been disposed to resent a suggestion from me along this line. Conse-
quently I considered it inadvisable to raise the point. I did, however, present your tentative 
suggestion of five to six delegates to avoid possibility of future criticism from Dominions 
that might be based upon assumptions that they were barred out of adequate participation 
through any plan or act of yours. Confidentially I feel satisfied that Curzon and Lloyd 
George do not care to have Dominions directly represented by their own delegates upon 
same plane of authority as themselves.-" 
The State Department felt that Curzon's proposal for delegations of two was im-
practicable. The United States needed four to give adequate representation to the dif-
ferent power groups in the Senate. The Curzon plan was also unacceptable to the 
British cabinet, which felt it necessary to send five or six delegates so that the domi-
nions and India could be represented. This proved quite acceptable to Washington, 
which "would be very glad to have as large a delegation as Great Britain wished to 
send and was particularly glad to know that the Dominions would be represented". 
There is no evidence of any "deliberate attempt on the part of the United States to 
exclude the Commonwealth from the conference"." 
W.M. Hughes had argued strongly for AustraHan representation at Washington. 
On this point he had national support. There was an upsurge of public interest in a 
conference deahng with disarmament. " I t was commonly beheved . . . that the 
future destiny of the Commonwealth as a Pacific nation was inseparably bound up 
with the successful outcome of this conference."" Earle Page, the leader of the 
Country Party, told parliament that " the general desire" in Australia was " in the 
direction of disarmament". A substantial majority of the press gave strong support 
to the conference, and there was wide support for disarmament in ecclesiastical and 
pacifist circles. Many public meetings passed resolutions advocating disarmament. 
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The assumption was that AustraHa should be represented in Washington. 
The Imperial Conference had agreed, at its twenty-seventh meeting on 22 July, 
that the British government would speak for the whole Empire on the question of 
disarmament. It was also agreed, after the breakdown of attempts to organize a 
preliminary conference, that the imperial government would also act as the 
spokesman for the dominions on Pacific affairs. But late in September the British 
government began to press for a slightly larger British delegation so that dominion 
representatives might be included in it and it could represent the British Empire on 
matters of particular interest to them. On 3 October Lloyd George sent a cable to 
Hughes pointing out that he was "very anxious that the standpoint of Australia . . . 
should be well represented on the British Empire Delegation". He urged Hughes to 
represent the Commonwealth on the British Empire Delegation; should Hughes be 
unable to leave Melbourne, Massey of New Zealand might represent both Australia 
and New Zealand. Failing this, he suggested Lord Novar (the former governor-
general of Australia Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson) as a suitable delegate." 
It was impossible for Hughes to accept Lloyd George's generous offer (considering 
the violent clashes at Paris in 1919) because of the "inexorable force of cir-
cumstances" — that is, the state of the parties in the House. Hughes may have also 
felt reluctant to attend because Australia had received no invitation from 
Washington. This meant that the 1919 precedent was not being followed and that, 
had he gone, he would have occupied a less important position at the conference. In 
any case, as Robert Thornton has suggested, Hughes had already accomplished most 
of what he desired at the Imperial Conference in London; ' 'it had laid the ground-
work for the wider conference to be held at Washington in November. America had 
been drawn out of her isolationist shell and had agreed to co-operate with the other 
powers in trying to solve the Pacific problem."*" Unable to represent Australia 
himself, Hughes appointed Senator Pearce, minister for Defence, as the AustraHan 
member of the British Empire delegation. As a member of the opposition pointed 
out in the House of Representatives, to send a minister for Defence to a disarmament 
conference was tantamount "to sending a publican to a prohibitionist 
convention".*' Pearce was close to Hughes and had been a member of the Australian 
delegation to the Versailles Conference. On 13 October he left for Washington -with 
E.L. Piesse. It is significant that at no stage was it suggested that AustraHa should 
boycott the conference because of pique at her subordinate status there. 
Although Australia, then, was indirectly represented at the Washington con-
ference, it played only a minor role in the discussions both on disarmament and 
Pacific security. Pearce and Piesse arrived in Washington on 10 November, the day 
before President Harding formally opened the conference. The British Empire 
delegation was led by A.J. Balfour, the former British foreign secretary, in the 
absence of Lloyd George, who had to handle the Irish crisis at home. The work of 
the conference was shared between two major committees. The first committee, 
consisting of the heads of delegations of aU powers represented at the conference, was 
to deal with Pacific and Far Eastern questions, including the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. The second committee, consisting of the heads of delegations of the five 
principal wartime allies, was to discuss the limitation of naval armaments. Balfour 
was a member of both committees, and Pearce was merely one of many advisers who 
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took no direct part in the negotiations. Sir Maurice Hankey, the chief secretary of the 
British Empire delegation, remarked in a letter to Lloyd George shortly after the 
conference opened that Pearce "was not likely to contribute very much wisdom".*2 
He represented the British Empire delegation on one of the subcommittees set up by 
the conference. He rarely intervened in discussions at the twenty-six meetings of the 
British Empire delegation but may have been more active in private and informal 
discussions. 
The Four Power Treaty, the first major achievement of the conference, was 
primarily the work of Balfour. Balfour's draft was prepared on the voyage from 
England to America, and a copy was then sent back to Lloyd George. This secured 
the broad approval of Secretary of State C.E. Hughes.*' Japan produced a further 
draft, amending the Balfour proposals only in minor details. Balfour hoped to 
resolve the deadlock that had faced the Imperial Conference by setting up a new 
tripartite pact to replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Under the new pact, Britain, 
the United States, and Japan would agree to guarantee their respective interests in the 
Pacific and the Far East. It would have the advantage of engaging the United States 
in support of the status quo in the Far East and thus of reassuring Australia and New 
Zealand, who feared that they would isolated and defenceless once the alliance was 
terminated. But Secretary Hughes was adamant on this point: the United States 
"could enter into no alHance or make any commitment to the use of arms which 
would impose any sort of obligation as to its decision on future contingencies". He 
overcame the fear of "an entangling alliance" by suggesting a quadruple agreement 
which would include France.** After Pearce was firmly assured'by Balfour that the 
agreement would in no circumstances affect the White Australia policy, he strongly 
urged Australia to sign the agreement. 
The new Four Power Treaty, which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was 
signed on 13 December 1921. The signatories pledged themselves to preserve "the 
general peace" and to mutually respect their insular possessions and dominions in the 
Pacific. Should a dispute arise over respective rights or sovereignty in the area, the 
four powers pledged themselves to refer the matter to a joint conference of all 
signatories "for consideration and adjustment". Should a fifth power threaten the 
possessions of the four powers, they agreed to discuss "fully and frankly" the most 
effective counter measures. The treaty area covered the islands of the Pacific Ocean 
including all the mandated territories and Australia and New Zealand. The agree-
ment did not cover questions that lay "exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction 
of the respective powers". This protected Australia's immigration policy. 
The United States attached to the Four Power Treaty an explanatory declaration 
that "the Treaty apply to the Mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean; provided, 
however, that the making of the Treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent on the 
part of the United States of America to the mandates and shall not preclude 
agreements between the United States of America and the Mandatory Powers respec-
tively in relation to the mandated islands".*' This reflected the continuing American 
concern over the administration of the League of Nations mandates and the changed 
situation arising out of America's decision not to join the League of Nations. The 
League Covenant stipulated that a mandatory power should "in all cases be bound 
and required to maintain the policy of the open door and equal opportunities in 
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respect of the use and development of the economic resources of people or 
territory". This had been included in the Covenant largely as a result of strong 
pressure by President Wilson. The sharp differences between the Allied Powers at 
the Versailles Conference over the future of German colonies had led to the division 
of mandates into three categories, as discussed in chapter 2; the open door was 
guaranteed only for B class mandates. W.M. Hughes's battle with Wilson over 
Papua New Guinea had led to the creation of C class mandates, which were to be 
"administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory". 
This had been fully understood by American leaders. In a letter to Colonel House in 
May 1919, Hughes had pointed out that the difference between B and C mandates 
was one of "kind not merely of degree".** The C class mandate "looks to its 
ultimate incorporation by the free wiU of its inhabitants". Hughes had stated 
categorically that "there could be no open door in regard to the islands near 
Australia. There should be a barred and closed door — with AustraHa as the guardian 
of the door."*' 
Wilson had acted on the assumption that America would join the League and so 
would have a voice in the allocation of mandates and in their supervision by the 
League. But the Senate veto on membership of the League altered the situation com-
pletely. Secretary Hughes summed up the American position succinctly in consider-
ing the relation between the Four Power Treaty at Washington and the mandates. 
"We are not in the League; the League has granted a mandate to various powers for 
various territories: we did not agree to the aHocation of the mandates; we wish 
simply the same rights as others in these territories, and to be protected against 
discrimination by appropriate conventions."*' 
The United States was concerned with opportunities for free trade and made fre-
quent representations to the mandatory powers to secure the recognition of the "open 
door" principle. A note had been sent to the British foreign secretary in November 
1920 stressing the importance of the open door.*' American interest was intensified 
when the Commonwealth government negotiated a number of agreements with the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company to explore for oil in Papua New Guinea. The British 
government had asked Washington specifically what criticisms the United States 
made against C class mandates; the reply, in August 1921, came just after the Im-
perial Conference had met in London. Washington asked for the admission of 
American missionaries alongside missionaries who were citizens of League members, 
the guarantee of most-favoured-natipn treatment, a prohibition on grants of 
monopolistic concessions or the monopolization of natural resources by the man-
datory itself, and that no change in the status of the C class mandates should be made 
without the approval of the United States. Australia was adamant on the issue and 
declined to reply to the August memorandum. There was to be no open door, and 
Australia intended to impose "whatever restrictions it pleased upon both men and 
goods".'" 
The Four Power Treaty and the American declaration attached to it did not alter 
the legal position in any way. Further negotiations with Britain finally secured in 
1925 a small concession: "that so long as the terms of the C class mandates remain 
unaltered. United States nationals and goods wiU be treated in all respects on a 
footing equal to that enjoyed by the nationals and goods of any state members of the 
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League of Nations with the exception of those within the British Empire", provided 
that this did not violate exisring treaty engagements with third parries. 
Discussions on disarmament in Washington got off to a dramatic start when 
Secretary Hughes announced a drastic reduction in existing capital ships, a ratio bet-
ween the five major naval powers, and a ten-year holiday on new construction. The 
details were worked out in camera by Balfour, Hughes, and Baron Tomosaburo 
Kato of Japan. Pearce played no part in the negoriarions, although he provided a 
memorandum on the British proposal to aboHsh the submarine. This proposal may 
have "gained for Britain, at least for a rime, the moral leadership of the conference 
which up to that time had been held by America"." But British moral leadership 
was short-lived, and leadership again passed to the United States. 
The efficiency and striking power of a fleet depend very largely on the location of 
its bases. Japan proposed that the status quo be maintained in the Pacific region, 
including Hong Kong. There would be no increase in these fortifications and 
naval 
bases. The restricrion would not apply to "the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New 
Zealand and the islands comprising Japan proper, or of course the coasts of the 
United States or Canada, as to which the respective powers retain their entire 
freedom". Attempts to define the status quo by a quadrangle on a map were 
frustrated when the map was leaked to the Japanese press and stirred intense opposi-
tion in Japan. Pearce added an amendment to the final formula which provided that 
"AustraHa and its territories" would be excluded from the freeze on fortifications. 
This meant that AustraHa preserved the right to fortify these territories if it thought 
fit. 
On one important issue of disarmament, the British Empire delegation and the 
British government were diametrically opposed. The naval advisers to the British 
Empire delegation, Admirals Beatty and Chatfield, opposed the proposal for a 
suspension of naval construction unless it was accompanied by a plan for the gradual 
replacement of older British capital ships during the ten-year period. Without such a 
provision the British fleet would become obsolete: both the United States and Japan 
were building new ships and introducing new technologies in firepower. Pearce 
strongly supported the Chatfield argument in discussions on 9 December, in the 
British Empire delegation. The increasing obsolescence of British ships meant that 
the balance against the British Empire was being upset. "This was a situation which 
his Dominion could only view with alarm." On this issue he had the full backing of 
the Australian goveinment." While admitting the harsh facts pointed out by Chat-
field and Beatty, the British cabinet supported the American plan for the reduction in 
the number of capital ships and the ten-year naval holiday on the construction of new 
vessels. Budgetary pressure and the desire to keep taxes as low as possible as well as 
an unwillingness to have a confrontation with public opinion on armament issues 
appear to explain the cabinet's decision. It overrode the strong representations of the 
British Empire delegation and supported the original Balfour-Hughes-Kato draft 
treaty. 
Pearce was also concerned about the proposals for the fortification of islands in the 
Pacific. Kato had proposed that Britain and the United States should maintain the 
status quo for naval bases and fortifications. He even hinted that Japan would accept a 
lower ratio for capital ships if these proposals were accepted. Pearce strongly opposed 
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the Japanese proposals when the British Empire delegation met on 9 January. The 
Jellicoe Report on Australian defence had pointed out the AustraHan naval bases 
were not located at strategic points and had suggested that Australia might build a 
new advanced base in New Guinea. This would considerably enhance Austraha's 
contribution to any imperial defence scheme. Pearce proposed that the status quo 
should apply only to bases and fortifications north of the Equator — that is, to bases 
in the Japanese sphere of influence — or that if the blanket ban on new bases were 
adopted, non-mandated islands and territories under Australian control would be 
excepted. Kato had not the "slightest objection" to the Australian proposal. Agree-
ment on these and other technical details cleared the way for the signature of the Five 
Power Treaty on 6 February." The bases formula excluded the Australian mainland 
and New Zealand, Singapore, and the unmandated islands south of the Equator ad-
ministered by AustraHa and New Zealand but affirmed that Japan would be unable to 
fortify her mandated or other islands north of the Equator. There was, however, no 
provision for any inspection of fortified island bases, and the way was clear for a 
steady Japanese fortification programme in her mandated islands. 
Australia took only a very minor part in the discussions on China that led to the 
signature of the Nine Power Treaty of 6 February. The nine powers — the United 
States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal — undertook "to respect the sovereignty, the in-
dependence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China", to use their 
influence to effectually establish and maintain "the principle of equal opportunity for 
the commerce and industry of aH nations throughout the territory of China; and to 
refrain from taking steps to secure 'special rights or privileges' ".'* Pearce had 
prepared for the delegation a brief memorandum on the granring of tariff autonomy 
on China and the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. He represented the 
Empire in the conference subcommittee dealing with extraterritoriaHty and argued 
persuasively in favour of its being relinquished when pohtical stability had been 
achieved in China. He signed the three treaties separately as a representative of 
AustraHa. 
To Pearce, the Washington treaties went a long way towards establishing peace 
and stability in the Pacific." The Four Power Treaty was a "great accompHshment" 
which resolved the difficulties arising out of the Anglo-Japanese AHiance. The Nine 
Power Treaty's provision for the maintenance of the status quo for naval bases and 
island fortifications indicated that Japan had no expansionist ambition and so posed 
no threat to Australia in the foreseeable future. Piesse, who had been impatient in 
Washington because of the few opportunities given him to use his special knowledge 
of the Pacific, became convinced that the danger to Australia was "quite remote"." 
Japan was not anxious to challenge Australian immigration policies and posed no 
threat to Australia. One result of his conviction of Japan's peaceful intentions and his 
new respect for the British Foreign Office was his recommendation that the indepen-
dent study of Japan that he had been making for Australia for the past two years be 
discontinued. The separate section of the Prime Minister's Department was accor-
dingly disbanded. 
W.M. Hughes presented the three Washington treaties to parliament for rarifica-
tion on 26 July 1922. The settlement at Washington exceeded his most sanguine ex-
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pectations and "cleared away aH these difficulties in the Pacific," which would 
ensure peace for at least ten years." He was careful to point out what was for 
Australia the weak spot in the new security system in the Pacific. The Anglo-
Japanese Alliance had provided for armed assistance in the event of an attack on either 
party. The Four Power Treaty contained no such provision for automatic assistance: 
moral condemnation was no subsritute for gunboats and troops. Australia stiH 
depended on the British fleet for naval protection in the Pacific, and the British 
presence east of Suez was very thin and no match for a Japanese fleet that enjoyed 
local supremacy in Far Eastern waters. A scattered imperial fleet, theoretically 40 per 
cent stronger than the Japanese fleet, was a frail shield for Australia. 
Hughes accepted the Washington treaties as a short-term solution for Pacific pro-
blems — but only a short-term one. He was stiU convinced that war with Japan was 
inevitable and that the Washington treaties merely provided a breathing space during 
which Australia should strengthen her own defences." Japanese economic problems 
resulting from overpopulation and inadequate resources for large-scale industrializa-
tion had not been touched upon. These were the driving forces behind Japanese im-
periaHsm. The decisions of the conference were "not a final solurion of this or any 
problem". Yet there was Httle that Hughes could do to alter the situation. His later 
autobiographical musings reflected changing Japanese policies in the Pacific." 
In a thoughtful article,'" F.W. Eggleston saw naval power as vitally important to 
peace in the Pacific and the deteriorating situation in China as a threat to stability and 
balance. Japanese proximity to China and her substantial military strength would 
enable her to take advantage of the pohtical confusion and bring a large part of China 
under her control. A major conference of interested powers to analyse the problems in 
the interest of China herself and the foreign powers could do much to ensure stability 
and prosperity of the area. Australia's position was a precarious one. Apart from her 
connection with the British Empire, Australia had little or no fleet and so a powerful 
aggressor would have complete freedom. "Our future depends entirely upon the 
course pursued by the Great Powers in the Pacific," Eggleston beHeved. "So far . . . 
from war being inevitable in the Pacific, it is exceedingly unlikely and could only be 
brought about by obvious statesmanship." He was critical of the Washington disar-
mament achievements: "Naval disarmament in the Pacific would, of course, place 
China completely under the heel of Japan for no other Power would have a possible 
chance of protecting her." The new ratios operated very much to the disadvantage of 
Britain and Australia. The role of the United States became crucially important. 
"The British armaments available for the Pacific are not sufficient for the burdens 
that might be cast upon them; and unless the United States of America can be relied 
upon to pull her weight in the same direction as Britain, the whole system may break 
down. Australia as the weakest link in the chain of the Empire, can only watch the 
play of forces upon which her fate depends". 
American interest in the Pacific was reflected in a massive naval visit to Australia in 
the winter of 1925. In July, fifty-six ships and 2,300 men took part in an exercise to 
Sydney and Melbourne. The first squadron went to Melbourne: forty-three ships and 
11,500 men, arriving in the temporary national capital, where parliament was sit-
ting, an hour before the second squadron of thirteen ships and 11,500 men entered 
Sydney harbour. The Melbourne squadron arrived in a driving rain storm and a 
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wharf stoppage that prevented the official welcoming party from reaching the 
American armada. The enthusiastic welcome that had occurred in 1908 was not 
repeated, and several clashes took place between Australians and the American 
sailors, especially over " w h o won the w a r " . " 
There was little direct contact between the two countries during the twenties. 
The number of Americans resident in Australia dropped from 6,604 in 1921 to 6,066 
in 1931. There were few tourists crossing the Pacific in either direction, and the 
American image of Australia was a dim and unfavourable one. Despite a cordial at-
titude to Australians during business hours, privately many Americans indulged in 
"an enHghtening recital of Australia's absolute business methods, obnoxious social 
customs, and general economic instability. A popular toast goes: 'To Australia — 
the land where the flowers have no fragrance, the birds no melody and women no 
virtue.' " '^ 
Part 2 
"Through a Glass Darkly" 
1931-1941 

4 Crossing the Pacific 
One of the contentious issues between the United States and Australia during the 
1930s was passenger shipping across the Pacific. After experiments in the nineteenth 
century, three distinct services across the Pacific to North America had been 
estabhshed. the Canadian-Australasian Line had been established by James Huddart 
in 1893 and provided two ships — the Niagara and the Aorangi — sailing between 
Sydney and Vancouver via Auckland, Suva, and Honolulu. The service proved un-
profitable and was taken over by the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand in 
association with the Canadian Pacific Railway. The Union Steamship Company also 
owned three vessels sailing from Sydney to San Francisco via Wellington, 
Rarotonga, and Tahiti. In 1854 the American sugar company J.D. Spreckles & 
Brothers had joined with the Union Steamship Company to provide a joint service; 
but after the annexation of Hawaii by the United States in 1894, the United States 
applied its coastal navigation laws to foreign shipping operating between mainland 
American ports and Honolulu, and this effectively excluded the Union company 
from carrying passengers or cargo between Honolulu and Los Angeles and San Fran-
cisco. The agreement with Spreckles was terminated, but the Union company con-
tinued a four-weekly service between Australia, New Zealand, and San Francisco via 
island ports using out-of-date vessels. 
The third major company was the American-owned Matson Line, which had 
bought out the Spreckles service. In 1930-31 it had three vessels — the Sonome, the 
Sierra, and the Ventura — sailing between Sydney and San Francisco and calling at 
Fiji and Honolulu.' In July 1931 Melbourne and Auckland were added to the Matson 
Line route, and the company replaced its older vessels with three fast luxury liners, 
the Mariposa, the Monterey, and the Lurline. These 20,000-ton vessels with a speed of 
more than twenty knots provided an extremely attractive alternative passenger 
service between Australia and New Zealand. 
Crew's wages and conditions on the Matson Line were determined by American 
rather than Australian articles. The Matson Line was heavily subsidized. The United 
States government granted the company loans amounting to three quarters of the 
construction costs at a very low rate of interest (up to 2 per cent) and repayable over 
a twenty-year period.^ In addition, a mail subsidy was paid to the company: ten 
dollars a mile run while carrying American mails from Los Angeles to Sydney. The 
two rival companies protested against what they regarded as unfair competition. 
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There was no British equivalent to the American loans for construction, although 
there were mail contracts for the Vancouver-Sydney run. This meant that both the 
Union Steamship Company and the Canadian-Australasian Line began to lose money. 
Exports from Australia and New Zealand to Canada were small, and ships on the 
northern run were rarely fuH. 
Matson ships carried passengers but no cargo between AustraHa and New Zealand. 
During the first fourteen months after the Mariposa caHed at Auckland, only about 
11.2 per cent of the passengers traveHed on the Matson ships; 88.8 per cent of the 
passengers used the two British Hues.' The opening of the new route did offer New 
Zealand an expanded tourist trade but at the same time reduced the profitability of 
the struggHng British lines. The Matson policy was seen as an intrusion into what 
many imperiahsts regarded as a closed Empire market. 
The Melbourne Age, concerned at " the carefully organized American invasion of 
inter-Dominion shipping trade", caHed for "immediate co-operative action in self-
defence by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand".* But local action was 
difficult because of the ambivalent position of Great Britain. Australian Prime 
Minister J.A. Lyons raised the matter of unfair competition at the Ottawa Con-
ference in 1932 but was advised to act cautiously. AustraHa proposed the adoption of 
quotas for passengers and cargo carried by Matson vessels. But what worried the 
British government was that "if this further action took the form of excluding 
United States subsidised ships from trading between New Zealand and Australia, so 
far as Treaty obligations allowed retaliatory action would be taken by the United 
States Government against British shipping generally". British shipping would be 
very vulnerable to retaliatory action by the United States, as the accompanying table 
shows.' 
IVORLD SHIPPING TRADE 1933-34 
(1) Of the whole seaborne trade of the world 
Trade between foreign countries = 46% 
Trade between British Empire and foreign countries = 39% 
Trade purely within the Empire = 15% 
(2) the proportion carried by British shipping 
Of the whole world trade 43% 
Between foreign countries 25% 
Between British empire and foreign countries 60% 
Between United Kingdom and American continent 74% 
Of the purely inter-Empire trade 90% 
To Great Britain, the trans-Tasman trade was minute in volume compared with the 
Atlantic trade. Britain was not anxious to invite retaliation because of dominion 
action. It recognized that there were pressures to increase the American share of its 
trade. Henry Agard Wallace, the American secretary of agriculture, was arguing 
that shipping was as much entitled to protection as industry and agriculture. "If 
foreigners carry them they have more purchasing power to buy American goods." 
He wanted to increase the American share of its carrying trade from 30 to 50 per cent 
by a policy of subsidization. 
In 1935, the British government started to modify its policy of not subsidizing 
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shipping: as a defence measure it began to give small subsidies to tramp steamers. 
The Canadian-Australasian Line planned to build a 24,000-ton Hner to challenge 
Matson. But it required a subsidy and $100,000 a year per vessel from AustraHa, 
New Zealand, and Canada for a ten-year period. The British government was not 
prepared to provide such a sum for a shipping line in which its interest was almost 
wholly sentimental. 
With the Brirish government weakening in its opposition to dominion action, 
Earle Page, the Australian commerce minister, prepared a cabinet submission in 
which he argued that Australia should "devise a long range policy in regard to the 
Pacific. Commercial aspects must be combined with diplomatic and defence con-
siderations." He reaHzed that "Australia must play a part in maintaining the 
prestige of Brirish shipping in the Pacific" and that "the problem is an Empire one 
and should be considered and decided on an Empire basis". Since Britain would not 
act, he proposed that Australia should draft legislation reserving the Australia-New 
Zealand service to British shipping. The legislation would not be submitted to 
parliament if "the United States would be prepared to permit British shipping to 
engage in the trade between Honolulu and U.S.A. ports, or alternatively it would be 
possible to arrange for the Matson vessels to refrain altogether from participation in 
the AustraHa-New Zealand trade".' Action was deferred, and a copy of the Page 
submission was sent to New Zealand. 
The monopoly of the Honolulu-West Coast trade was a very sensitive issue to 
both the State Department and the Department of Trade. The British government 
had not itself attempted to force the issue, but since Australia was not yet represented 
in Washington, the British commercial counsellor was summoned to the State 
Department and told bluntly that Congress would react violently to any restrictive 
legislation and it would immediately retaHate against British shipping.' The warning 
led to the clamping down of AustraHan enthusiasm for the protection of British ship-
ping in the Pacific. Lyons drafted an informal letter to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt setting out the Australian case and asking whether he was prepared to take 
up either of the Earle Page options: admit British shipping to the Honolulu-Califor-
nia trade or arrange for the withdrawal of the Matson vessels from the trans-Tasman 
trade. However, it is not clear whether the letter was sent.' 
Direct discussion between Matson and the other shipping companies in London 
two months earlier had been entirely unproductive. The issue flared up again in 
October 1936 when the New Zealand government, after some quiet prodding from 
Canberra, introduced a bill which excluded from passenger and cargo traffic vessels 
from countries that discriminated against British shipping in favour of their own. 
The act was an enabling one that would not come into operation until it had been 
proclaimed by an Order in Council. If proclaimed, it would exclude the Matson 
ships from the trans-Tasman trade. The Australian government announced a day 
later that it would introduce a similar bill. 
The New Zealand bill was deliberately designed as a bargaining weapon to force 
the United States to admit British shipping to the Honolulu-San Francisco trade by 
securing the removal of restrictions on coastwise shipping. It was also drafted with 
the intention of compelHng a re-examination of the subsidy system. It was estimated 
that the Matson direct subsidies for the Monterey and Mariposa amounted to £203,000 
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and that, taking into account interest saved on loans and cargo and mail subsidies, 
the total subsidy to Matson was £485,321. Interest rates on the loans to cover three-
quarters of the cost of building the Mariposa and Monterey was l'/2 per cent and for 
the Lurline three-eighths of 1 per cent. The mail subsidies bore little relation to the 
amount of mail carried. For fifteen voyages, a subsidy of £234,000 was paid; the 
payment at the usual poundage rates for unsubsidized vessels would have been $680. 
The departmental conclusion was: "The subsidies alone are more than sufficient to 
pay the whole of the interest at 6 per cent upon the proportion of the capital cost 
found by the company (one fourth), plus the interest upon the loan from the 
Government, and to leave each year a sum, which, if devoted to that purpose, would 
be sufficient to wipe out the Government loan in twenty years."' 
The British ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, presented a note to 
the State Department setting out the reasons for New Zealand's new policy the day 
after the legislation was introduced. The American reacrion was swift and predic-
table. On 28 October the secretary of the British Commonwealth section in the State 
Department, John R. Minter, told Secretary of State Cordell HuH, "The New 
Zealand note caHs for only one kind of reply from us, to wit, an expression of disap-
proval of aH the thoughts and principles underlying the note and the legislation to 
which it refers both as to their meaning and motive, and an emphatic statement that 
we are not prepared to negotiate either regarding our coasting trade or the amounts 
of subsidies which any line may be granted."'" This was the normal policy adopted 
on issues of this kind. Repeatedly the AustraHan government was told during the 
trade diversion clash that Washington would not begin negotiations over a trade 
treaty until aH remnants of the trade diversion policy had been dismantled. 
Minter was, however, concerned at the probable effects on American shipping 
interests if details of the New Zealand note became public. Like HuH himself, Minter 
was concerned with stimulating and freeing world trade and was anxious not to give 
any ammunition to the powerful shipping lobby in Congress. He took the unusual 
step of urging Hull to ask Lindsay to withdraw the New Zealand note. Hull had 
invited Lindsay to meet him on 28 October and took Minter's advice. In his bland 
way he pointed out that the note afforded "the makings for possible controversy bet-
ween our two governments; that the matter presented a situation where private ship-
ping interests of both countries were probably expecting to utilize their respective 
governments to start a controversy which could easily spread into retaliation of dif-
ferent kinds, inevitably seriously affecting the shipping interests first of one country 
and then of the other"." He realized that Britain was unhappy about such 
discriminatory policies, since she would be the main loser, and pressed Lindsay about 
general British policy: was London "proposing to embark upon a policy of coastwise 
shipping throughout the Empire and among all of its separate and independent com-
munities to the exclusion of all foreign shipping". Nothing of course was further 
from Lindsay's mind in transmitting the New Zealand note, and he diplomatically 
made this clear to Hull. He was reluctant to withdraw the note and to conduct fur-
ther discussions orally. London agreed a few days later to withdraw the written com-
munication.'^ 
The State Department was deeply concerned with this local issue which could have 
global repercussions. American shipping policy was changing. It was "anxiously 
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watching developments in a bitter Pacific shipping war which threatens to raise new 
obstacles to the flow of world trade."" Much of the heat was taken out of the situa-
tion by the setting up of the United States Maritime Commission and its decision to 
terminate all mail subsidies by 30 June 1937. It revised the basis for granting sub-
sidies to American companies and negoriated new mail contracts for ten-year periods. 
At the same time, the Union Steamship Company decided to terminate its trans-
Pacific service as from December 1936, primarily because it was losing money. 
Discussions between the five governments concerned led to agreement to subsidize 
the Canadian-Australasian Hne. This involved two things: a twenty-year mail sub-
sidy of £30,000 and a loan for building two new ships at a cost of £3,600,000. The 
liabihty for interest and repayment of capital became a charge on the five govern-
ments amounting to £175,000 a year. The agreement in August 1937 came as a great 
reHef to the State Department. The US Maritime Commission had agreed two 
months earHer to contribute $150 million towards the cost of new American ships.'* 
Negotiations between Washington and Canberra and London dragged on for 
some months. There was considerable doubt about the intentions of the New 
Zealand and AustraHan governments. The New Zealand bill had been passed but was 
never proclaimed. The State Department did not appreciate having a sword of 
Damocles dangHng over its head and bluntly asked the British ambassador what the 
intentions of the New Zealand government were. The ambassador doubted whether 
New Zealand government intended to suddenly use the "club she ha[d] in her hand 
which, as to the use of, in his opinion, she would not commit herself in advance; but 
that he felt entirely satisfied there would be no purpose to put this discriminatory 
legislation into operation pending any conference, discussion and consideration by 
the proper governmental agencies looking towards a mutually satisfactory settle-
ment"." The matter was quietly put into cold storage. Keith Officer, the recently 
appointed AustraHan liaison officer at the British Embassy, tried to exert pressure in 
Washington to persuade the Matson Line to withdraw voluntarily from the Tasman 
trade. He said that so much political pressure was building up in AustraHa that the 
government "could not much longer forgo passing the enabling legislation". When 
Jay Pierrepont Moffat, chief of the State Department division handling Common-
wealth affairs, reminded him that the American reaction following the trade diver-
sion policy measures would be "that AustraHa did not mind adopting one 
discrimatory measure after another" against the United States, Officer withdrew the 
suggestion and finally agreed that should the two dominions decide to act on their 
discriminatory legislation, they would give Washington sufficient notice before they 
took final action so that the United States could never claim that it had been 
"caught . . . unaware or faced . . . with ifait accompli without adequate forewarn-
ing"." In fact, no legislation was passed and gradually the issue was decently buried. 
The revision of the American system of subsidizing shipping did a good deal to 
ease the tension and remove the Australian and New Zealand fear of unfair competi-
tion. The building of two new and faster ships for the Canadian-Australasian Line 
made it a keener competitor with Matson, much of whose success had been due to its 
superior service and efficiency." The withdrawal of the Union company meant that 
there was enough traffic for two luxury lines. Wars in Spain and Ethiopia led an in-
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creasing number of passengers to use the Pacific instead of Suez or the duller Cape 
route to reach Australia. New Zealand was more reluctant to risk its tourist trade for 
an increase in trans-Tasman traffic. Finally, the British government had continued to 
adopt a low public profile during the dispute. Fearing American retaliation against 
British shipping should Australia and New Zealand legislation be enforced, Britain 
was careful to point out that this legislation was "not designed to give British shipp-
ing as such any advantage over the United States of America shipping, but to protect 
Australian and New Zealand owned shipping employed between Australia and New 
Zealand against subsidised foreign shipping"." Britain was merely acting as a 
postman for the two dominions on a matter in which her basic interests clashed with 
theirs. Britain was also concerned with delicate trade negotiations with the United 
States and at the same time was moving towards a rapprochement with the United 
States as the international situation became more threatening. 
The dispute over the Matson Line was one smaH facet of the American re-
examination of merchant shipping policy. The new Merchant Marine Act and the 
greatly increased activity of the Maritime Commission reflected a reahzation in 1937 
that 85 per cent of its merchant fleet would be obsolete in five years. A very large 
rebuilding programme was essential, and it was equally important to keep existing 
shipping routes open." The rebuilding plans envisaged the construction of ships that 
could rapidly be converted into auxiliary cruisers on the outbreak of war. In a discus-
sion with the State Department, Keith Officer reported that the Maritime Commis-
sion was planning to build two new vessels for the Matson Line "under pressure 
from the Navy Department who wanted the new vessels built in such a way as to be 
useful as aircraft carriers in time of war".^" The American official may weH have 
been flying a kite to test the Australian reaction. Officer's firm opposition to the 
proposal was effective. The State Department official subsequently rang the British 
embassy to say that "he had been misinformed, that there was no intention of 
building the new ships at present"; in fact, the whole interview should be regarded 
as not having been held. At a party later in the day, Moffat confirmed this 
"complete misunderstanding".^' 
The State Department seems to have been divided on the issue of Pacific shipping. 
Two years earlier the commercial counsellor of the British Embassy had been sum-
moned to the State Department to discuss the Matson Line problem. J.C. Dunn, 
chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, had pointed out the dangers of 
swift congressional reaction against any retaliatory moves by Australia and New 
Zealand. "The intention of United States policy was to maintain American shipping 
in the Pacific and not to drive out British." The reaction of the commercial 
counsellor was to point out to his ambassador: "This communication from the State 
Department is in flat contradiction with all Mr. Hull's principles of resistance to 
economic nationalism; and the communication itself, made orally by the Head of a 
Department, has something of a half hearted character. One may well infer that the 
Department in so acting has yielded to the pressure of politicians re-informed by the 
approach of elections. Nevertheless the menace should be taken by His Majesty's 
Government as very serious."" A Httle puzzHng, but elections were nine months 
away. 
The plans to construct larger passenger vessels on the Pacific run created problems 
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for the AustraHan Naval Board. The dry dock at Cockatoo Island was quite adequate 
for naval requirements in 1938, but the new, larger vessels would need greater ac-
commodation and perhaps alterations to design. A larger dry dock would be essen-
tial, particularly " in the event of certain circumstances ar i s ing" ." 
While the seaways provided the traditional links across the Pacific between 
Australia and the United States, the rapid expansion of aviation and the development 
of new types of aircraft turned the attention of Australian airmen to the possibility of 
flying the Pacific and so drastically reducing the crossing time from approximately 
three weeks by sea to a few days by air. The most ambitious of the Australian pilots 
was C.E. Kingsford Smith, who, after a short stint in the Royal Flying Corps, 
decided to concentrate on civil aviation. In 1928, with C.T.P. Ulm as co-pilot and 
two Americans, H. Lyon and J. Warner, as navigator and radio operator, he made 
the first trans-Pacific flight. 
Our aim was to show the world that the Pacific could be spanned by air, not by any 
desperate struggling to land far from our fixed destination or any eleventh hour snatching 
from disaster, but with a substantial margin of safety. Only a flight carried out with such a 
margin, we felt, would be of any real scientific value to aviation or would adequately deter-
mine what we set out to prove, that a route of communication could be opened across the 
Pacific. To struggle feverishly to perhaps a haphazard landing was not at all the basis of our 
mission. We planned to fly in three hops from Oakland to Brisbane, and any effort that fell 
short of that by losing our course and consuming our gasoline, wpuld to us have been tan-
tamount to failure to our main purpose. If we were to open an airline that would ever be of 
commercial advantage to America or Australia, it had to be a defined airline, as certain as 
the route of a steamship and not a wavering airUne that might end anywhere between 
Brisbane and Cape York Peninsula." 
The Southern Cross left Oakland on 31 May for Honolulu. This leg of the flight, 
3,875 kilometres, took 27 hours and 25 minutes. The most significant section of the 
flight was from Honolulu to Fiji, a distance of 4,990 kilometres. " A t Barking Sands 
[Honolulu] we looked out over a ribbon of surf on to an expanse of ocean that had 
never been conquered by air or that never even had its conquest attempted. Ahead of 
us every mile was to be aerial exploration. W e were indeed on the borders of a new 
air world. Out there over the sea was the thrill and charm of uncertainty." The 
flight of the Fokker F VII from Honolulu to the airport at Suva took 34 hours and 
30 minutes. " W e looked on our air conquest of the Pacific as being complete. W e 
had no qualms about the final and shortest stage to Brisbane."" This 2,427 
kilometres took 20 hours and 16 minutes, but a breakdown of the earth indicator 
compass took them to the coast 177 kilometres from Brisbane. The flying time from 
Barking Sands, San Francisco, to Eagle Farm, Brisbane, was 83 hours 11 minutes. 
This vitally important pioneer flight was an isolated phenomenon in the attempt 
to shrink the ocean between California and Australia. However, Kingsford Smith 
was unable to develop a commercial company to establish a regular scheduled airline. 
His Australian National Airways went out of business in 1931, and it was more than 
a decade before such a service was developed between San Francisco/Los Angeles and 
Sydney. The British Commonwealth Pacific AirHnes did not make its initial flight to 
Vancouver, using a Skymaster, until 1946. 
The key to the development of a commercial airhne across the Pacific was a 
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technical one: how to design a plane capable of carrying passengers and freight for 
the 3,860 kilometres between San Francisco and Honolulu. The solurion to the pro-
blem came largely from pressures from Juan Trippe's Pan American Airways, first 
formed just before the Southern Cross's pioneer flight. As early as 1930 the American 
government decided on a policy of subsidized monopoly for airmail services. Pan 
American quickly became America's foreign airline with a stranglehold on the Latin 
American network. With very substantial mail contracts. Pan American was anxious 
to tap the Far Eastern market. The building of the Martin M. 130 CHpper solved the 
major part of the problem. The first "China Clipper" flew to Manila via Honolulu, 
Midway, Wake, and Guam on 22 November 1935, a six-day journey. 
The link with Australia slowly followed the beginning of a service to Auckland, 
which had been pioneered by a survey flight via Honolulu and Samoa in 1937. The 
service to Auckland was begun on 29 December. A bad crash on the second flight 
delayed a regular service until 12 June 1940, when the aircraft were rerouted through 
Canton Island and New Caledonia.^' 
The extension of the service from Auckland to Sydney was delayed because of the 
refusal of the Australian government to give Pan American landing rights in 
Australia unless the United States was prepared to give reciprocal landing rights to 
British aircraft at Honolulu. At first the American War Department was reluctant to 
assist Pan American. "The national defence interests of the United States would not 
be served by the extension of P.A. Airways lines into this area at the present time 
and the question of forwarding their application should be determined solely by the 
international pohtical considerations."^' During the year the situation in China and 
South-East Asia began to cause complications, and the extension of Pan American 
services became strategically desirable. Prime Minister R.G. Menzies showed no in-
clination to make concessions about landing rights or the opening of a direct radio-
telegraph service between Australia and the United States unless the United States 
was prepared to make concessions to the United Kingdom. 
The State Department was reluctant to press the issue of landing rights in 
Honolulu because the only available landing base at Honolulu was at Pearl Harbor, 
the naval station. Japan had already been refused such rights for strategic reasons. 
There was litle enthusiasm in New Zealand for the moving of the Pan American 
south-west Pacific terminal from Auckland to Sydney; New Zealand feared that 
many flights would by-pass Auckland. Qantas, the Australian airline servicing 
Auckland from Sydney, was reluctant to face American competition on the route. 
R.G. Casey, who had been appointed minister to Washington in 1940, offered the 
United States a direct radio-telegraph link and landing rights for Pan American in 
Sydney in return for reciprocal rights for British aircraft in Honolulu and San Fran-
cisco. This would have enabled Britain to complete its round-the-world air route. 
Washington decHned this proposal." 
The rapidly deteriorating position in the Far East altered perspectives. Britain 
agreed to extend landing rights in Hong Kong and Singapore for American planes 
flying from Manila. But the State Department remained obdurate about reciprocal 
rights in Hawaii and California. It was not until August 1942 that Pan American 
received permission to open a direct service to Sydney for "military purposes only 
and for the duration of the war". AustraHans were to be give some passenger priori-
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ty on the flight east to the United States. The war also resolved the deadlock over a 
radio-telegraph agreement. After Pearl Harbor, Hull told Nelson Johnson in 
Canberra that the telegraphic circuit was "absolutely imperative".^' The AustraHan 
government quickly agreed, and the circuit was opened on 25 December. 
5 Trade Diversion 
One of the perennial sources of friction between AustraHa and the United States has 
been the balance of trade and import restrictions. But it never reached the point of 
what Raymond Esthus has caHed "enmi ty" , even during the difficult period of trade 
diversion after May 1936. 
Australia's post-war policy of "men, markets, and money" had Hfted the country 
out of the 1921 recession and had increased its export potential, primarily in 
agricultural commodities. 
National income peaked in the mid 20s and investment (after tapering for a while) in 
1926-7. . . . All this was associated -with a levelling out of the capacity to import. . . . The 
economy was in some difficulty well before the calamity of 1929-30. . . . The year 1926-7 
provided the turning point. . . . it was notable for a significant drop in London fiinds, 
deterioration of the exchange rate, heavy gold outflow, a peak rate of immigration when 
expansion was spent, and finally a cessation of decUne in the export sector's share of 
employment. In 1928 the rate of unemployment came to resemble that of 1921 when inter-
national recession had prevailed.' ^ 
After that came the deluge: the world depression aggravated every economic difficul-
ty that existed in 1927-28. The slide in the AustraHan economy had begun before the 
depression. 
Very quickly attention began to focus on the adverse balance of trade with the 
United States. Exports feH from £9.9 million in 1925/26 to £5.8 milHon in 1928/29 
while imports declined sHghtly from £37.2 million to £35.3 million.^ The problem 
was partly that a high proportion of Australian exports complemented or competed 
with American farm products and so had to face tariffs imposed by the powerful 
farming lobby. Wool was the strongest Australian competitor. On balance, the 
United States sold to Australia between four and six times what it purchased: im-
ports from America formed about 24 per cent of Australia's total imports, and 
Australia's exports to the United States were about 6 per cent of the AustraHan total. 
Australia appointed Herbert Brookes as its commissioner-general to New York in 
1929. Brookes arrived in July, less than four months before the stockmarket crash in 
October. In his slow progress — taking some two months — from San Francisco to 
New York, he addressed some forty groups of business men and academics, mainly 
in the Middle West. He hammered home the point that America "could not con-
tinue to send AustraHa 220 milHon doHars' worth of goods and take from Australia 
TRADE DIVERSION 69 
only 40 million dollars' worth of her products in return".' He made a detailed study 
of the diminishing quantity of AustraHan exports in specific fields: wool, furs, meat, 
hides, timber, butter, ores, fruits, etc. He accumulated a good deal of evidence of 
deliberate discrimination from friendly businessmen. Speaking in Minneapolis, he 
pointed out: 
There is a political isolationist force in America which is nationally minded and exclu-
sionist. There is another force which is international and outgiving. The first force builds 
America's tariff and hems it on all sides by a barrier seeking to make it too narrowly self-
contained. The other group, with its interests in investing capital abroad and the selling of 
American goods, finds itself restricted and held back by this group of "Little Americans" 
who, by means of internal inflation are in a considerable degree responsible for the present 
world-wide depression.* 
He suggested that reprisals were inevitable when American tariffs shut out 
Australian exports. Despite his great personal popularity, his warnings fell on deaf 
ears during his seventeen months in the United States. 
As the depression deepened, most trading countries tried desperately to "export 
unemployment" through tariffs, quotas, and currency depreciations. The United 
States introduced the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930 in response to pressure from the 
"political isolationist forces" in the United States. It emerged, after intense log-
rolHng and horse-trading by the farm bloc, as "the antithesis of scientific tariff mak-
ing" and aroused bitter protests both in AustraHa and throughout Europe. The 
British Commonwealth, on the other hand, produced in 1932 the Ottawa system of 
preferential tariffs between Commonwealth and Empire countries. It became the bete 
noire of American businessmen and agriculturists, who determined to dismantle it as 
a prelude to the conclusion of bilateral trade treaties. While intra-Empire trade did 
increase over the next four years, it is difficult to determine whether Ottawa played 
any part. Australian gains were being offset by growing European resentment at the 
exclusion of their exports.' 
After eight years of desultory negotiations through the British Embassy in 
Washington, Australian attempts to conclude a trade treaty giving rights of entry 
and residence to Australian businessmen finally broke down. The Australian prime 
minister, J.A. Lyons, made the first serious attempt on 4 June 1934 to secure trade 
concessions from the United States in a letter to the American consul-general in 
Sydney, J.K. CaldweU. The letter was sent without any consultation with Edwin 
Abbott, comptroller-general of trade and customs. It may well have been drafted by 
J.F. Murphy, the new secretary to the Department of Commerce. A day later, S.M. 
Bruce, the AustraHan high commissioner in London, was visiting Washington and 
discussed the Lyons proposals with Francis B. Syme of the State Department. No 
copy of the Lyons letter to Caldwell had yet reached Washington. 
The AustraHan argument was based on the extremely adverse trade balance bet-
ween the two countries: this amounted to £stg220 million over a ten-year period. In 
addition Australia had entered commitments to the United States of another 
£stg2 million to meet each year. Lyons proposed that the United States give im-
mediate concessions to a number of Australian commodities: free entry for a 
reasonable quantity of wool and progressive reduction of existing duties; an increase 
in butter imports of 50,000 tons, either free of duty or at a nominal duty with an 
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allocation to AustraHa of "a reasonable share of that quantity"; free entry of 10,000 
tons each of Australian beef and mutton annually with a relaxation of veterinary 
restrictions to admit entry on similar terms to the United Kingdom; a ban on the ex-
port of American exports of apples to the United Kingdom between 15 March and 
31 August, the main Australia export season; and finally, the regulation of exports of 
dried and canned fruit to minimize competition with Australia. In addition, he sug-
gested that the United States might protect her export trade to Australia by granting 
privileges in her markets to various foreign countries which had passive balances 
with Australia on condition that these countries afforded concessions to Australia in 
their markets. 
Despite disavowals of any serious attempt by Australia to balance its trade with 
most countries, and professions of support for freer international trade, the 
Australian request took the United States by complete surprise, both in its timing 
and by the magnitude of its demands. It arrived during the discussion by Congress of 
Cordell Hull's Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, aimed at a lowering of tariffs and 
at Hberalizing international trade. The bill included the most-favoured-nation princi-
ple in unconditional form. 
F.B. Sayre, the US assistant secretary of state, felt that what AustraHa really 
wanted was "not a tariff reduction in Australia but a sort of barter arrangement with 
the exchange of stipulated quantities of commodities".' He added: "Mr Bruce 
laughingly remarked that he was much afraid that he was not going to find any 
country ready to purchase sizeable quantities of butter, beef and wool at this time 
and added that he did not think we had a great deal to worry about as regards a 
possible loss of trade in Australia." Not Bruce at his best! The Australian request 
was referred to R.L. O'Brien of the Tariff Division of the State Department, who 
commented laconically, "The AustraHans offer absolutely nothing in return." To 
accept the quotas would "completely upset the market conditions that the AAA 
ha[d] been attempting to stabilise". He went on to point out: "The issue is in large 
measure political rather than economic, but political arguments in this instance have 
a very high degree of economic significance." 
Cordell Hull firmly and politely rejected the Australian proposal in toto. Australian 
hopes for a trade deal with Washington crashed in a head-on collision with the new 
HuH trade programme which AustraHa was advised to study. "Instead of diverting 
trade from one country to another, this program has as its chief purpose the opening 
up of world trade by lessening generally the obstacles to trade," Caldwell told 
Lyons. "In this way it is hoped to increase the flow of goods both ways between the 
United States and other countries. It would leave trade balances to be effected in the 
natural roundabout fashion as in the past."' To complete the debacle, he added that 
"it was planned for the United States to begin its program of negotiations with 
countries whose products were not so directly competitive with its own". Sir Henry 
Gullett, minister in charge of trade negotiations, who had disagreed in detail and 
drafting with the Lyons letter, was not surprised by the flat rejection of the proposal 
but was "deeply disappointed that the reply offered no hope of aid to AustraHa or of 
any further negotiations within the foreseeable future". Caldwell added that "Sir 
Henry Gullett gave the impression of being in a rather hopeless posirion" in the mat-
ter of offering concessions to other countries.' 
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The clear American message failed to get through to the Australian government. 
Sayre's comments to Bruce "constituted a definite negadve reply" to the AustraHan 
proposals, and the State Department concluded that "the Australian government 
would be under the impression that negotiations must be postponed indefinitely." 
However, Caldwell told Hull, "Mr Bruce had failed to convey a definite impression 
of our present attitude.'' 
Lyons visited Washington in July 1935 and raised the question of American con-
cessions with both President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull.' It was becoming apparent 
to Canberra that the new American trade policies held out little prospect of wider 
markets for Australian primary products. Lyons argued for the conclusion of a 
mutually profitable and satisfactory trade agreement comprising a few minor items 
(the State Department thought that he might want to open the American market to 
frozen rabbits!). The economic gains would in fact be limited, and even the pohtical 
spin-off to the Country Party at the impending elections would be of minor impor-
tance. Lyons stressed the point that "it would bring our peoples more closely 
together and preserve that personal and friendly relationship existing between both 
EngHshmen and English-speaking peoples."'" 
Roosevelt was charming in his talks with Lyons but would not concede a point. 
Hull, anxious to prevent the development of further opposition to his reciprocal 
trade bill, with its limited life of three years, was not prepared to add the wool lobby 
to his congressional opponents. He treated Lyons with the greatest courtesy and 
blandly explained to him the central purpose behind his trade policy. It was a policy 
requiring multinational co-operation — and Australia was one of the countries in-
volved — to achieve the objective of a great liberalization of world trade. It involved 
the reduction of trade barriers in general, exchange stabilization, and the substitution 
"for the great mass of discriminations, including almost every sort of unfair trade 
method and trade practice, the principle of equality of treatment and opportunity 
and . . . the gradual and certain wiping out of every sort of trouble-breeding trade 
method and practice which in the main were outright discriminations"." He 
forbore to raise the question of the small Australian butter market in the United 
States: 254 tonnes compared with 1,250 tonnes from New Zealand. The difference 
was due to the American countervailing duties on Australian butter to offset the 
Australian butter bounty. The most HuH would offer was most-favoured-nation 
treatment (on a reciprocal basis) in any treaties the United States concluded.' 
Washington had not forgotten the frank warning conveyed by Bruce in his con-
versation with Sayre in June and the Lyons letter to Hull: "that official action to 
divert Australian purchases to other countries would be taken if the United States 
were unable to take some steps to purchase more Australian products". But it did 
not take it very seriously. Cables crossed the Pacific some six to seven months after 
proposals were made. Roosevelt, perhaps more out of affection for Lyons than as a 
counter to Australian official action on trade, replaced J.E. Caldwell by Jay Pierre-
pont Moffat, one of the brightest of the young State Department diplomats. Moffat 
was the son-in-law of Joseph C. Grew, the American ambassador in Tokyo; his 
given names indicate the strength of American tradition in the Moffat family. He 
had been chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, the section dealing with 
the British Commonwealth. After his eighteen months in Australia he returned to 
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this desk for three more years and continued to handle Australian trade problems. 
The Sydney consulate-general replaced the British Embassy in Washington as the 
main channel of communications with Australia. 
In September there were persistent Australian press reports that Gullett and 
Menzies would soon visit the United States "where they would find the ground 
already prepared for the negotiations of a trade agreement".'^ HuH sent a firm 
reminder to the American consulate that he should "drop a hint in the right 
quarters" that an agreement with Australia was not indicated in the near future. 
"You might endeavour at least to prevent the delegation from making a special trip, 
without giving the impression that a stop over visit would be unwelcome." This 
was discreetly done. 
Moffat's first interview with Sir George Pearce, the minister for External Affairs, 
on 3 October 1935 put into context for him the growing trade dispute between the 
two countries. Pearce, "a slow spoken, kindly-eyed elderly gentleman who had the 
gift of saying some pretty bitter things without giving offence,"" came to the point 
very quickly. Moffat noted in his diary: "(a) In matters of politics there was a feehng 
that America was indifferent to Australia's welfare and could not be counted on to 
come to her aid in need, and (b) that in matters of trade there was a real hostility to 
the United States." Pearce went on to trace the decline of the "feeling of com-
radeship and confidence" engendered by the visit of the American Fleet in 1908 
which led AustraHans to believe that Australia had "a big brother in America". The 
late entry of the United States into the First World War and its refusal to join the 
League of Nations came as a great shock to Australia. Pearce recalled the 
Washington conference of 1921 which he had attended and which had given the 
United States parity in cruisers with Britain; this had led to a relative weakening of 
Australian Pacific defences, which depended heavily on Empire cruiser strength. 
Finally, there was America's increasing indifference to her Pacific obligations 
evidenced by her withdrawal from the Philippines. "This had led Australia at large 
to feel that we could not count on American help in case of Japanese attack," Pearce 
said — a feeling he personally did not share "but which none the less existed". One 
result was that Australia, for strategic rather than moral reasons, approved of the 
deepening Japanese involvement in Manchuria since 1931: it lessened the dangers in 
the south-west Pacific. He added that these were views widely held in Australia but 
which most Australians "would be too poHte to explain . . . to me in so many 
words"; however, Moffat noted, Pearce felt that "it was his business to tell it to me 
with all candour".'* 
These blunt comments (which apparently gave no offence to Moffat) were follow-
ed by an equally blunt statement about trade relations between the two countries: 
Every man in the street resented not so much America's favourable trade balance as the fact 
that it was coupled with arbitrary customs practice, and a high tariff that short cut even 
non-competitive products from Australia. For instance (1) the tariff on high-grade 
Australian merino wool did not help American producers: American wool was of a lower 
calibre and cloth made from American wool did not compete with English or foreign 
worsteds; 
(2) with the difference of our seasons there was a time of year when AustraUan fruits could 
be admitted to the United States on a non-competitive basis. . . . Something must be done 
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and done soon to improve our trade balance, or he could tell me frankly that Australia 
would have to take steps to Umit American imports.'* 
Moffat pleaded for time and said that for the first time in his memory there was a 
"disposition in America to do something about tariffs". He emphasized the Hull-
sian philosophy of international trade to Pearce: "The ultimate solution lay along the 
lines of generalisation of concessions and universalising increases in trade and only if a 
country discriminated against us would it fail to get the benefits we gave. I hoped we 
would never have to retaliate against any other country for an unfriendly poHcy." 
Moffat felt that Pearce "thought this reasoning rather theoretical"." 
The American departmental mind, faced with a real problem here, moved at a ma-
jestic pace to deal with it. The Australian wool and apple arguments were strong 
ones but evoked no response from a country that apparently regarded Australia as of 
peripheral importance. In December Gullett told Moffat that if it were not possible 
for his government to negotiate with AustraHa, his government would be compelled 
to take arbitrary action in an attempt to redress the balance. Moffat had already been 
asked to cable Hull to send a negotiator to Australia (or empower Moffat himself to 
negotiate) because of the rapid deterioration in trade relations. Hull declined to do 
so, pinning his hopes on the long-term benefits from his trade programme." There 
was no possibility of increased exports to Australia resulting from a new trade treaty, 
and it was politically impossible for the United States to admit more foreign 
agricultural products when it was compelling American farmers to restrict produc-
tion. Gullett then told Moffat that "AustraHa was compeHed to take action to 
safeguard its position now on grounds of common necessity and out of regard for 
our credit position"." 
On 1 April 1936, GuUett told the House of Representatives that the government 
was taking specific action to redress the unfavourable balance of trade with the 
United States and that a special committee of cabinet had been appointed to deal with 
the problem. Moffat told HuH that "the debate showed great bitterness probably on 
the part of the government and its supporters at the extent of American imports and 
that the government was pretty generally accused of weakness in dealing with the 
United States". He was convinced that the government "was no longer bluffing"." 
The sword of Damocles feH on 23 May 1936. 
The new trade diversion poHcy was aimed "at increasing our exports of primary 
produce, expanding secondary industry, and bringing about a considerable increase 
in rural and industrial employment".2" To do this, the government adopted two 
methods: it instituted a licensing system over a limited range of imports and imposed 
higher duties where this appeared to be a more effective method of control. With the 
exception of motor chassis, all goods of British Empire origin were exempted from 
licensing. In the case of motor chassis, only those from the United Kingdom were 
exempted from licensing: this was designed to prevent the import of vehicles 
manufactured in Canada by American firms or Canadian firms under franchise. The 
intention was to use the import Hcensing system to prohibit or Hmit the imports of 
some eighty-five particular commodities listed in the schedule to the act. "These 
licences", Gullett said, "wiH be freely granted, upon application in respect of aU 
countries with which we have a favourable balance of trade." He hoped that by a 
system of duties on aH imported chassis (including those from Britain) and bounties 
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on the production of local automobile engines, a motor-chassis manufacture valued 
at more than £4 million sterhng would be diverted to Australia and a major boost 
would be given to the growing Australian motor car industry, which was manufac-
turing motor bodies and assembling vehicles.^' 
Why the sudden adoption of the trade diversion policy by the AustraHan govern-
ment? Late in 1935 and in the early months of 1936 there had been some recovery in 
the Australian balance of trade; export prices had risen almost to record heights, and 
Australian overseas loans were being funded at lower interest rates. Bank deposits in 
Australia were rising, and unemployment was slowly decreasing. At the same time, 
trading banks were extending credits through the liberal use of Treasury biUs, thus 
increasing imports to the point where the balance of payments in what seemed likely 
to be a record export year would be adverse to Australia. By the third quarter of 
1936, the economic indicators began to suddenly change direction. 
The explanation of the impending crisis given to Moffat by Gullett on 14 March 
was that Australia's London funds had deteriorated to a dangerously low level. Each 
year, Australia had to meet a foreign interest bill of £26 million sterling and also 
cover dividend payments and invisibles. A surplus of exports was the only way in 
which Australia could meet her overseas commitments. The situation was becoming 
serious and could become desperate, so desperate that Australia might have to default 
on its overseas debts. Hence "a reduction in imports, as an immediate one, not a 
gradual one induced by a rise in interest rates, was an instant necessity. Australia 
would make any necessary sacrifices in matters of trade to avoid financial default. "^^ 
(It was this apparent crisis that led Gullett to suggest that Washington send a man to 
AustraHa immediately to negotiate a trade treaty.) 
This analysis of the crisis is borne out by the extensive correspondence between 
Bruce in London and Casey, the Australian treasurer, often in their own hand-
writing. Since Casey had become treasurer, he had consulted Bruce regularly about 
Treasury policies, and often Bruce's influence seems to have been very considerable.^' 
In February, Casey proposed a cutback in the note issue and a further London loan of 
£5 million sterling. Bruce reported that the governor of the Bank of England, who 
appeared to be a ruthless deflationist, believed that "prohibition of imports by 
legislative action was a most extreme course to pursue and should only be resorted to 
in face of a really critical situation". The onus really fell on the Central Bank in co-
operation with the government to prevent a crisis developing. If it did, reduction of 
imports by legislative action was preferable to further external financial assistance. 
Should the Commonwealth Bank be faced with difficulties, then ' 'either the Gover-
nor will come to Hght with a temporary advance to be repaid out of a loan issued in 
the autumn or we shall tack an amount on to the New South Wales July maturity 
and do an operation somewhere about June" ." 
It becomes difficult to accept the London default argument as a full explanation of 
the trade diversion poHcy when Casey's analysis of 11 May is taken into considera-
tion. "Things are looking much better than they did," he wrote to Bruce, "and in 
fact have practically ceased to cause us real anxiety for this financial year." He enclos-
ed in his letter to Bruce an eighteen-page analysis (made on 16 March) of the balance 
of payments and the economic problems facing the AustraHan government. Export 
prices in March 1936 had risen dramatically from 56.4 to 78.5 (1928 = 100) since 
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March 1935. The favourable trade balance for the first eight months of the financial 
year was £l5.9 miHion sterhng, and export prices were still firming. "It does not 
appear that governmental action — either in the direction of import restriction or ex-
change control — is imperative at the present moment. . . . The period October 
1936 to March 1937 may be regarded as safe." As a precautionary measure he sug-
gested that the Customs Department examine in detail the possibilities of legislative 
action to restrict imports should a crisis develop. Lyons, who had moved slowly to 
support Gullett's policy, told Bruce on 16 May, "Our anxiety for the immediate 
future has recently lessened." He went on to add that unless the new trade measures 
were adopted, Australia would be "subject to a recurrence of annual periods of 
anxiety and threats to exchange rates". Trade diversion seems, then, to have been 
part of a long-term programme to ensure greater stabiHty in the AustraHan balance of 
payments rather than a desperate short-term decision to avert a financial crisis. 
Moffat from the beginning had doubts about the reality of the balance-of-
payments crisis. He told Hull that the inflationary trend in government policy had 
got out of line and that there was a threat to the balance of payments which produc-
ed a "mild panic . . . and a tendency to exaggerate its menace". He suggested that 
there were other measures that the government could take through the Common-
wealth Bank and by Treasury which could correct the imbalance and avert the danger 
of import restrictions. "As a final alternative the cabinet might descend to a 'bold 
half measure' — namely limiting the imports from the one country with which 
Australia had a seriously adverse balance. Such a course would disguise the issue, give 
the government an alibi for its own failures and gain time."^' 
Moffat said categorically in his message to Hull, a month before the restrictions 
were imposed on 23 May; "The alleged reasons behind the Government's attitude 
are not the real reasons; in other words it is primarily a political manoeuvre 
motivated by domestic considerations and as such exceedingly difficult for a foreigner 
to counteract without burning his fingers." With an election coming up, Lyons was 
anxious to reduce criticism of his trade policies by country electors. Moffat believed 
that Gullett was pressing Lyons because of the bankruptcy of his policy of 
negotiating a trade treaty with the United States and that Lyons succumbed because 
of the pressure of "the Victorian cHque, a rather inchoate group which has enormous 
influence with the present Cabinet and is closely affihated with important British 
financial and commercial interests".^' 
It is difficult to identify the "Victorian clique". GuHett would have been a key 
member; Bruce in London, Casey, and T. W. White and others. In Moffat's view 
this group wanted a new loan in London and felt that there was Httle prospect of suc-
cess unless American imports were curtained. Britain had no wish to lend money to 
Australia to pay for American goods. 
A strong British trade commission had visited Australia in March and April 1936. 
It was concerned in large measure with textile imports to Australia and the sharp fall 
in the British share of the market as a result of intense competition from Japanese ar-
tificial fibres. There is Httle doubt that the imposition of import licences for Japanese 
textiles was the result of British pressure. Trade diversion was aimed even more at 
Japan than the United States. But the delegarions' interests ranged beyond textiles. 
One of the main purposes of the trade diversion poHcy was to promote the motor car 
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industry in Australia. Australia had for some years been manufacturing bodies and 
parts (80 per cent of a complete car), but importing chassis mainly from the United 
States and Canada. The licensing system introduced on 23 May would substantially 
assist British car manufacturers. Licences would be freely granted to all countries 
with which Australia had a favourable trade balance or not a large adverse balance. 
There would be a complete prohibition on the import of motor chassis from the 
United States and Canada except with the consent of the minister for Customs. The 
Australian car industry would be financed in part by bounties paid from duties on all 
imported chassis.^' This was what Casey meant when he talked of the defence im-
plications of the new policy. He was probably aware that steps were being taken to 
build aircraft and engines in Australia. A syndicate representing Broken Hill Pro-
prietary, BHP Associate Smelters, General Motors-Holden's, and Imperial Chemical 
Industries had approached the government on 21 February 1936 requesting a letter of 
invitation to the United Kingdom to compensate for any general cutting down of 
other imports from Britain.^' Just before Gullett introduced the new policy, Lyons 
cabled the Canadian prime minister telHng him of Australia's intention of taking im-
mediate action to establish motor chassis construction in Australia.^' 
The evidence suggests, then, that the primary object of the trade diversion policy 
was to protect British markets in AustraHa faced with Japanese and American com-
petition. An undated cabinet memo in 1939 suggests that the motor chassis poHcy 
was considered independent of the scheme of trade diversion although introduced in 
association with it. Although Casey insisted to under-secretary of state Sumner 
WeHes as late as 1 July 1937 that it was "the requirements of his own Department, 
the Treasury", that led to trade diversion, the hopes of expanding trade with Britain 
were foremost in the minds of cabinet. Gullett probably realized that a trade treaty 
with the United States was only a remote possibility and so preferred to rely on 
bilateral negotiation of trade agreements with a large number of trading partners. 
Moffat pointed out to Hull: "It is a game in which Australia does not hold the 
chips, and which may in the long run bankrupt her". Britain provided the main 
alternative: trade diversion would mean "a very substantial increase in this [motor-
chassis] market for British goods and they have been largely taken towards that 
end. . . . we are nevertheless resolved to do everything possible to expand this 
market for British goods." A spin-off could be that it would "greatly strengthen 
your hand in negotiations upon meat, butter and general Ottawa matters."'" It cer-
tainly expanded the British car market: registration of new British cars rose from 20 
per cent in May 1936 to 47 per cent in December 1937. 
Protests against the trade diversion policy came largely from those, particularly 
economists, who were aghast at its Hkely effects on Japanese trade. As Professor 
Frederick C. Benham said, "The first disturbing feature of the new trade policy was 
the absence of any rational principle."" Since the depression, Japan was the second 
best customer for Australian produce; wheat imports from Australia had risen from 
17 to 81 per cent, and wool to between 85 and 95 per cent. Japan was purchasing 
from Australia between two and three times what Japan sold to her before the flood 
of cheap textiles began. 
On the principles of the trade diversion policy, Japan was the very last country 
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which AustraHa should have treated in this way. There was of course, a very substan-
tial imbalance in Austraha's trade with Great Britain.'^ 
One of the surprising things was the estimate of the scale of trade diversion, for 
example, with the United States. The total trade to be diverted by the licence system 
was £2,140,000: of this £1,755.000 would be from the United States and the 
balance from Canada." The main thrust was towards Japan: this alterarion to the 
balance was marginal in terms of Casey's own estimates. It is little wonder that 
GuUett had some misgivings about his policy: "The government is not adopting the 
principle of bilateral balances with individual countries as its trade policy" . . . "The 
government takes these steps with the greatest regret. . . . we are acting in no spirit 
of retaliadon but are unwilHngly driven by very pressing national interest."'* It was 
adopted without consultarion with the Tariff Board and in the face of severe 
criticism from leading economists. 
Japan adopted immediate retaliatory action and in June banned imports of 
Australian wool, wheat, and flour except under licence and then extended the Hcens-
ing system to almost all trade with Australia. Australia had made a grave miscalcula-
tion about Japanese dependence on Australian wool. Japanese buyers quickly moved 
to purchase New Zealand and South African wool, and despite a partial reversal of its 
policy in December, AustraHa did not recover her lost markets in Japan. 
The United States delayed acrion because the volume of trade with AustraHa was 
small and partly because the immediate effects of the licensing system were limited. 
Moffat's estimate was that the prohibited list of imports covered about 20 per cent of 
American trade, valued at £2 million, an estimate very similar to that made to Bruce 
by Lyons. Licences for automobile chassis were fixed at the level of 30 April 1936, 
largely to avoid dislocating production of Australian firms geared to American 
chassis. HuH cabled his protest on 27 May and expressed the hope that the import 
control system would be "applied without discrimination against the United 
States"." In fact the new policy was deliberately discriminatory, despite disavowals 
by Casey on 6 June. When Moffat delivered Hull's protest to Pearce, the AustraHan 
minister for External Affairs, Pearce admitted that "Austraha's new policy was 
drastic, discriminatory and even dangerous". Moffat noted: 
Perhaps it has not been presented to Parliament with due regard to our sensibiUties; but he 
could definitely assure me that the new measure was popular among members of ParUa-
ment, perhaps the most popular measure introduced by the present Government. . . . Ten 
years ago, no Government could have taken similar action which would have injured the 
United States and survived six months. More clearly than anything else, this statement 
showed the degree to which closeness and cordiality between the two countries had 
dropped from warm to lukewarm." 
Pressed by Moffat, Pearce stated bluntly that "despite the door left open in the 
American note for a non-discriminatory application of the Hcensing system, the 
policy would none the less be applied in a discriminatory fashion". 
The secretary to the Australian High Commission in New York, David M. Dow, 
found the State Department extremely upset by what John Minter described as "the 
AustraHan tariff bombsheH". "The Department of State has been busy negotiating 
treaties with some fourteen foreign countries, and it was impossible to carry out our 
desires regarding the wishes of every country at the one time. We feel that Australia 
78 "THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY": 1931-41 
has adopted an unfair attitude." Dow reported that the State Department was being 
inundated with complaints from American exporters, many of whom condemned 
the department "for provoking a situation tending to destroy very lucrative trade 
contacts estabhshed in AustraHa"." Dow had a trying time Hstening to American 
complaints about Australian policy, complaints that he had no authority to discuss. 
Steps were being taken to impose countervailing duties on Australian butter and 
taHow. On 26 June, Roosevelt announced that he had found the treatment of 
American commerce by Australia as discriminatory and that most-favoured-nation 
concessions to Australian products would be withdrawn from 1 August 1936. The 
practical effect was negligible, because few Australian products were affected by 
most-favoured-nation treaties. Australia thus joined Germany on the American black 
Hst. 
Washington attempted to invoke British assistance in securing the revision or 
withdrawal of the trade diversion policy. Recognizing that Australia was indepen-
dent in the conduct of its foreign affairs, Cordell HuH suggested that Australia's 
"defection from a general commercial policy calculated to rehabilitate world trade 
might be of such concern to the British Government as to justify its proffering 
friendly advice to Mr. Lyons"." Anthony Eden did take the matter up, rather reluc-
tantly (he had already declined once before), with the Australian government but 
received merely an explanation of the new tariff policy and no offer of concessions. 
There was little enthusiasm in London about Australian tariff policy when the ques-
tion of a major trade treaty between the United Kingdom and the United States was 
under consideration." When Earle Page hinted to Neville Chamberlain in London 
that Australia's diversion programme should entitle her to more favourable con-
sideration in the Anglo-American trade negotiations, he was directly snubbed. 
On one issue the United States was adamant. Under no circumstances would it 
negotiate a trade agreement/treaty until the Australian Hcensing and tariff system 
was abolished. National pride was stung by the effrontery of a small nation like 
Australia in daring to discriminate against the United States, even though the 
volume of American trade affected was small. Moffat had warned both Lyons and 
Gullett of the dangers of attempting economic blackmail of the United States. The 
consequences were inevitably the placing of AustraHa on the American black list. 
Moffat told Hull "The AustraHan government cannot appreciate the fact that the 
United States could not afford to negotiate with a country that discriminated against 
her."*" His successor as consul-general in Sydney, Thomas M. Wilson, told Lyons 
that Australia's discrimination was "unprecedented and more drastic than action 
taken against American commerce by any other government no matter how strong 
and dictatorially governed".*' 
The political pay-off in Australia was much more short-Hved than Lyons had 
hoped for. The Japanese fiasco had alienated the large wool-growing community, 
and the "impending crisis" in the AustraHan balance of payment was not reached. 
The rise in world prices of wool and wheat and increasing exports of gold led to a 
substantial balance of £35 miHion by the end of 1936, thus removing the ostensible 
ground for diversion of American trade.*^ The United States pressed for the 
withdrawal or drastic revision of the licensing system, but Lyons resisted complete 
withdrawal as political suicide; like Roosevelt, he had pohtical problems with farm-
ing groups. 
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In 1937 the situation began to unfreeze. Casey had become convinced that it was 
essential that the United Kingdom and the United States should resolve their dif-
ferences in face of the growing threat in Europe,*' Menzies, the Austrahan attorney-
general, who had been in London with Earle Page when Gullett introduced his trade 
diversion policy, told Moffat that the government had made a mistake that would 
never have occurred had he been in Canberra.** Menzies was a member of the 
Melbourne group to which Moffat had assigned much of the blame for Gullett's 
decision but was a much shrewder politician than Lyons. 
In March, GuHett's trade negotiations with Canada were strongly attacked in 
cabinet, and he resigned, much to Moffat's deHght. The removal of the "arch-priest 
of bilateral balancing", Moffat felt, "would immeasurably facihtate the ultimate 
solution of our troubles." But he also reaHzed that the negotiations at the forthcom-
ing Imperial Conference in Ottawa and related problems could delay it.*' The con-
clusion of a trade treaty between Britain and Canada in January had upset Cordell 
HuH, who regarded it as another step towards trade restrictions and felt that it 
would have prejudicial effects on international economic rehabilitation, on the cessa-
tion of armament building, and on the cause of world peace. Even an American trade 
agreement with Britain "almost faded into insignificance in comparison with the far 
wider matter of Anglo-American co-operation in all fields where there is work for 
appeasement to be done, and in which the efforts of neither Government alone 
would have then full effect".*' 
Negotiations with a disillusioned Lyons hung fire, largely over the question of 
what restrictions and how many constituted discrimination. In December 1937 there 
were discussions in the State Department about tactics to be employed towards 
Australia. It was widely felt that "any determination by the United States to adhere 
strictly and literally to the letter rather than the principle when arriving at a decision 
which affected AustraHa . . . would arouse deep resentment". Sayre noted: "A 
demand by us that AustraHa should 'toe the line' and perhaps even go further would 
have a serious effect." A few days later, a meeting in Sayre's office (including both 
Moffat and Minter) recommended to the secretary of state that Australia be removed 
from the black Hst as soon as possible and that informal and confidential exploratory 
conversations about a trade agreement should begin immediately.*' On 25 January 
Roosevelt decided to give AustraHan imports most-favoured-nation treatment as 
from 1 February. 
On 1 February 1938, then, trade diversion died and the trade war was over when 
AustraHa was removed from the American black Hst. It is difficult to estimate the 
effect of the trade diversion policy on the Australian economy in so far as it affected 
total trade as well as trade with the United States. It undoubtedly helped develop the 
Australian automobile industry and much more slowly the beginnings of an aviation 
industry. It certainly resulted in the expansion of trade with Great Britain in textiles 
and motor chassis as well as the growth of the British market for Australian primary 
products. Trade with Japan was seriously affected by an insensitive and short-sighted 
treatment of Japanese textile imports to Australia. The balance of trade improved 
considerably, as did also Australian funds in London: there was by 1938 no danger of 
default on interest repayments and debt conversions. 
But the relatively small economic gains were offset by the long-term political 
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effects. The dislocation of Japanese trade with Australia was one of the pressures ap-
pearing to justify further Japanese expansion into China in 1937 with a cumulative 
effect on the decision for war in December 1941. Its economic impact on the United 
States was negligible. Gordon Brown told the House of Representatives: "Honestly 
I do not think our trade diversion policy worried the Americans more than a fly does 
a horse or a flea a dog. . . . A relatively small country Hke this cannot have upon 
America or the British Empire or the rest of the world the effect that some people 
here imagine."*' 
The impact on American thinking about Australia and its willingness to negotiate 
a trade treaty with Australia was much more marked. Cordell Hull had a long 
memory and was ' 'bitterly resentful of Australian perverseness during the past two 
years". Australia had opposed a central part of the trade policy that he firmly believ-
ed would reduce international tension and the danger of war. Hull's views were 
shared by a number of State Department and other officials. Moffat noted: "There 
was a large undercurrent of resentment at what Australia has done."*' They were 
reluctant to turn over a new leaf. There was certainly no feeling that Australian 
policy may have been aggravated by American intransigence. Before Gullett in-
troduced his trade diversion policy, Moffat had reported Gullett's comment: "To be 
brutal, the United States have not been understanding or helpful to us and we shall 
have to help ourselves."'" Sir Frederic Eggleston, later Australian minister to 
Washington, summed up the effects of the trade diversion programme very succinct-
ly when he said it created "a maximum of irritation with a minimum of benefit". 
The restoration to Australia of most-favoured-nation treatment pointed the way 
to the resumption of trade talks." These continued until the middle of 1939, but no 
agreement was reached before Pearl Harbor. They were conducted formally, in 
leisurely and sedate fashion, with little perceptible impression of progress. All that 
was agreed upon in January 1938 was to begin conversations to see whether there 
was any basis for formal negotiations and then to determine a suitable time for the 
opening of formal discussions. The 1937 Australian elections had led to delayed 
moves at the AustraHan end, and the mid-term American elections in 1938 had a 
similar effect on Washington. The slow progress in negotiations led Earle Page at 
one stage to feel that "Australia made a great tactical error in giving up the trade 
diversion measures against the United States". Moffat noted: "He stiU feels that 
Australia had a weapon in hand that would have forced us to negotiate. He further 
thinks that the United States made a moral commitment to negotiate, once the trade 
diversion measures were given up."'^ 
There was no difficulty in beginning unofficial discussions. Lists of possible con-
cessions were exchanged in February. The United States wanted concessions on 
inland freight and quotas for the importation of United States motor chassis, radio 
valves, and films, as well as a reduction or freezing of duties on aeroplanes, aircraft 
parts, and chemicals. The AustraHan shopping Hst was concentrated on primary 
products: a halving of the six cents a pound duty on beef and the opening for a 
market for chiHed and frozen boneless beef; the introduction of a butter quota, and 
the reduction of duties on AustraHan wool." The market for AustraHan wool had 
been declining because of the fall in Japanese and Chinese buying. AustraHa as the main 
producer of merino wool hoped to double its exports to the United States to 200,000 
TRADE DIVERSION 81 
bales with a gain in trade of between £2 milHon and £4 million. Motor cars and 
wool proved to be the main bargaining points, with butter immediately excluded in 
an elecrion year. Wool proved the most difficult commodity, and the battle raged 
over a duty of twenty-two or twenty-four cents a pound. The innocent merino had 
become a symbol of economic nationalism. The wool lobby in the United States 
vigorously opposed any reduction, and Secretary of Agriculture Wallace had his eyes 
fixed on the November 1938 congressional elections. The issue was political, not 
economic.'* 
Negotiations were slowed down partly by the vagueness of requests from both 
sides — for example, a lack of precision in the exact Australian proposals about wool 
duties. There seems to have been a failure to communicate fully, especially on the 
AustraHan side. The new consul-general, Thomas M. Wilson, was concerned about 
the abihty of "the Australian representative in Washington accurately to report to 
his Government details of questions taken up by the Department." He told HuH: "I 
have repeated indications from members of the Government here of vagueness in 
messages received by them from Washington." Wilson felt that Canberra was not 
keeping Officer "completely informed of all phases of the policy of trade diversion", 
and went on to say: "It may become increasingly difficult to handle a situation of 
this kind wherein the representative of a government is not, for one reason or 
another, as completely informed as he should be and, (perhaps because of this?) 
allows points to escape him when reports are made by him to his Government or in 
conversation with the Department."" 
Officer and the AustraHan trade commissioner in New York, L.R. MacGregor, 
were often working at cross purposes. Sayre commented: "We have ascertained 
instances of these two men having submitted to their government conflicting reports 
of matters here and of submitting to us conflicting ideas regarding that in 
AustraHa."" This was probably one of the reasons why Officer was not appointed as 
the first AustraHan minister in Washington. Earle Page was also becoming disen-
chanted with him for other reasons: he felt that he was becoming the mouthpiece of 
Moffat in the State Department. 
The leisurely progress of negotiations over the treaty was also due to the growing 
importance of an Anglo-American trade agreement, with Australian trade a 
peripheral component of an overall agreement. Both Britain and the United States at-
tached the greatest importance to the signature of such a treaty. Casey and Bruce 
were in full agreement with the British government, and it had largely been Bruce's 
pressure on Lyons that had led to the end of trade diversion. "The proposed an-
nouncement is the proper and dignified course and satisfies the question of national 
pride," Bruce told Lyons." It was essential to provide a satisfactory basis for the 
opening of negotiations; an abortive discussion could be disastrous. "Cordell Hull 
has set his mind on securing a trade treaty with the United Kingdom. The success or 
failure of this particular effort will substantially mark the success or failure of his 
policy as a whole." Without promises of real concessions, the United States would 
not take part in negotiations." 
The time factor was felt to be important: late April at the latest, because of the im-
pending congressional elections. In fact, no agreement was concluded until 
November. From the beginning it was essential for Great Britain to consult the 
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dominions, because any agreement would involve a partial dismanthng of the 
Ottawa system. Britain's proposal to place wheat on the free list aroused the worst 
AustraHan suspicions." By cable and at the Imperial Conference, Australia adopted a 
tough horse-trading attitude. The British commercial counsellor in Washington, Sir 
Owen Chalkley, told Moffat that the Australian delegation created "a very unfor-
tunate impression". Moffat himself noted: 
They had kept on insisting, almost as of right, that the United Kingdom continue to allow 
the importation of aU Australian primary products into the British market duty free, 
unhampered by quota and with hea-vy Imperial preference while in return for this AustraUa 
would make no counter sacrifice but insisted on her right to industrialize the Common-
wealth and to this end to use her tariff as she saw fit without any bindings. . . . If we [the 
United States] came to negotiating with Australia we would find it a tough nut to crack. 
The Australians would ask for a 507o slash on every article which they exported to 
America and would offer mighty little in return.'" 
This confirmed the American experience through the trade diversion period, the 
AustraHan negotiators, with few cards in their hand, tried to play bluff poker, in-
evitably with Httle success. The balance of trade position with the United States had 
changed dramatically. In the last six months of 1938, the balance had dropped to 
£549,697 in America's favour and by 30 June 1939 the balance was £1,224,868 in 
Australia's favour." Sayre told Bruce in May, " T h e Australian offers are almost in-
consequential and we could not hope to defend concessions of the kind desired by 
Australia unless we could show really substantial benefits to America's export trade 
to that country." 
The Anglo-American trade treaty was concluded in November. Australia had been 
able to secure some concessions in other Empire markets for losses made through 
British concessions to the United States. The preliminary discussions between 
Canberra and Washington had begun in rather inauspicious circumstances in 
February 1938 with the exchange of possible concessions and the Australian expecta-
tion that an agreement could be reached in four months. Esthus has given a detailed 
analysis of these futile talks.'^ The long delay explains Earle Page's frustration and 
blustering threats to revive trade discussion. His letting off steam eased the tension a 
good deal. His threats convinced CordeH HuH that Australia was serious. Moffat's 
report of his conversation with Page "did more to convince the Secretary that 
despite opposition from Agriculture we must as a self-protective measure go ahead 
and negotiate with Australia after elections than any other one document that could 
have been put before his eyes " . " But Moffat was rather over-optimistic. The 
negotiations begun in February were resumed in November and December. But 
there was no meeting of minds, and they finally bogged down in July 1939. By Pearl 
Harbor, Australia had not replied to the latest American proposals. 
6 Diplomatic Representation: 
Our Man in Washington 
One of the recurrent themes in the discussions between Canberra and Washington 
over the Matson Line, Pan American Airways, and the trade diversion policy and a 
trade treaty was the American suggestion that Australia should appoint a minister to 
Washington to facihtate negotiations.' In a conversation about an exchange of 
ministers on 15 March 1938, the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria 
turned to the Canadian trade commissioner and asked him what good it did to 
Canada to have a minister in Washington. The trade commissioner repHed laconical-
ly, "For one thing, we have a reciprocal trade treaty with the United States." 
The Commonwealth government had lagged behind Victoria and New South 
Wales in appointing representatives in the United States. State trade and immigra-
tion officers in San Francisco had preceded the first Australian commissioner in New 
York appointed in 1918.^ 
During a wartime visit to New York, Prime Minister Hughes had been impressed 
with the need for fuller Australian information from the United States and the need 
"to keep a tab on all that is going on". He suggested appointing a defence expert in 
wartime and a businessman in peace. After long delays, a trade commissioner was ap-
pointed in October 1918. Sir Henry Braddon accepted appointment for a six-month 
term. This was the first quasi diplomatic appointment by AustraHa outside the 
British Empire, although the post was essentially a trade and business one. 
On Braddon's resignation, W.A. Watt, the acting prime minister, cabled 
Hughes from London that cabinet had approved the appointment of a diplomatic 
representative to "act as national representative of Australia in the same way as 
Ambassadors or Consul-Generals representing other countries". His functions 
would be quite different from those of business representatives. "For the present 
however I think that appointment of a diplomatic representative should stand 
over."' Until 1930 the New York post remained at the level of trade commissioner 
with a quasi diplomatic status and was filled by a succession of distinguished 
businessmen, the last of whom was Herbert Brookes. The functions were almost ex-
clusively commercial, although in 1925 the commissioner helped raise a New York 
loan for the Commonwealth. 
The priorities were slightly changed with the appointment of Brookes as 
commissioner-general in 1929. His duties, laid down by Bruce, were: 
(a) to take charge of matters in which the Commonwealth Government is 
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interested in the United States and to furnish reports at regular intervals on any 
matters which are likely to be of interest to the Commonwealth Government, 
(b) to act on behalf of AustraHa in any matters with which the Commonwealth 
may request you to deal.* 
In addition, he was to act as a trade commissioner and an information officer as well 
as to assist the Commonwealth in developing the application of science to industry 
through contacts with the appropriate United States departments. Brookes carried 
out his duties with distinction but resigned on 8 September 1930. No further ap-
pointment was made, and David Dow, the official secretary of the office, carried out 
the duties until 1938. 
The Australian failure to develop a full mission in the United States, despite accep-
tance in principle by cabinet of such an appointment, was due to several reasons.' 
First, there was a reluctance to break out of the Commonwealth circle for fear of 
breaching the "diplomatic unity" of the British Empire. Hughes and Sir Robert 
Borden of Canada repeatedly pressed for independent dominion diplomatic represen-
tation. Canada took the first step in 1924, but it was not until 1927 that the first 
Canadian minister presented his credentials in Washington. There was opposition in 
Canada and strong opposition from the Foreign Office for fear that the Empire 
might appear to be divided. 
S.M. Bruce understood the position better than most of his contemporaries. He 
told parhament on 20 September 1928, "for the sake of our national prestige, 
AustraHan representation in the United States of America is wise, and at this time in 
the world's history when two of our sister dominions have increased the status of 
their representation there the Commonwealth would be ill-advised to discontinue 
the system that has obtained for the last few years."' 
The upsurge of nationalist feeHng in the dominions which had led to the demand 
for separate representation had begun to increase by 1929. Hughes, in opposition, 
denounced separate representation as destructive of imperial unity. 
Failure to take practical advantage of the Balfour formula of 1926 and the Statute 
of Westminster of 1931 was also due to the difficulty of finding qualified represen-
tatives. The commissioners in New York were substantial businessmen who could 
afford to entertain over and above their salaries of £2,000 and allowances of £3,000. 
Bruce saw it as a post for "Australians of wealth and standing" who could go to 
New York for a few years "and represent their country — principally, as I under-
stand, at their own expense".' He felt that it would be a "perfectly needless expense 
for the Australian Government, which did not have anything like the same volume 
of business with the United States as Canada", to set up a legation in the United 
States. Brookes, who arrived in the United States a few months before the WaH 
Street crash in 1929, had been able to estabhsh many important contacts in business 
and academic circles, extending the influence of the commissioner's office far beyond 
New York to the Middle West and CaHfornia. But he doubted the abihty of any 
commissioner-general to help redress the adverse trade balance or promote large 
AustraHan loans in the New York money market. Brookes felt that at a rime of 
financial crisis at home, the Commonwealth should economize by accepting his 
resignation and reducing the status of the office by appointing no successor. Prime 
Minister J.H. ScuHin accepted his resignation and advice, and so David Dow carried 
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out trade dudes unril 1938.' Keith Officer preferred to work through the British 
Embassy for aU diplomatic contacts. As Dow put it realisrically to J.G. Latham in 
1927, "Why should AustraHa incur the expense of a Legarion in Washington when 
the British Ambassador is wilHng to carry out the work for nothing?"' 
The Depression made it poHtically impossible to upgrade the New York office. In 
1932, Bruce, now based in London, suggested a reorganizarion of AustraHan 
representarion. This would mean the seconding of a first-class man to the United 
Kingdom Embassy staff, the conclusion of an arrangement with the Morgan Bank 
for handhng Australian loans, and the transfer of the Australian customs represen-
tative in the British Chamber of Commerce building in New York. ' 
Action on Bruce's recommendations did not come until 1936-37 and then partly 
through the constant pressure from Jay Pierrepont Moffat to upgrade Australian 
representation. Moffat realized that diplomatic relations between the two countries 
had deteriorated, that to quote Pearce's comment to him that "closeness and cor-
diality between the two countries had dropped from warm to lukewarm". Lyons, 
in his affable way, appeared to be convinced in 1935 that it was desirable but neatly 
filed the idea away in a pigeonhole. It was not until the end of 1936, when the trade 
diversion policy reached its peak, that it was decided to appoint Officer as the 
AustraHan liaison officer attached to the British Embassy in Washington. Pearce had 
suggested it in 1922 after the Washington Conference but had lost his enthusiasm 
for it. While the United States remained isolationist and was not prepared to 
negoriate on trade quesrions, he "failed to see adequate reason for representation".'" 
Sir Esme Howard, the Brirish ambassador, had also suggested it in 1927, but there 
had been no follow-up. Casey in 1936 described it "as a gesture to America who 
would welcome it (and this would be the principal reason for doing it) and as pro-
viding direct means of approach to the American Government"." 
The chief advantage, Casey felt, was that the liaison officer would have behind 
him the British Embassy's resources and influence. But this was, in itself, a partial 
disadvantage. In theory the State Department accepted the changed view of the 
status of the dominions within the Commonwealth in matters of foreign policy. But 
it was difficult to associate full independence with a diplomat stationed in the British 
Embassy and usually accompanied on official visits to the State Department by the 
ambassador or a counsellor. The ambassador normally introduced Australian political 
leaders to American officials and frequently presented communications from Bruce in 
London or Australian ministers in Canberra. On occasion, the ambassador withdrew 
after the formal introductions so that a completely free discussion could take place. 
But this appears to have been the exception rather than the rule. Officer, however, 
had constant and direct access to senior officials in the State Department. He was 
very British in manner of speech, outlook, and dress. 
The decision to appoint an Australian representative was largely the result of 
Moffat's continuous pressure, and he was naturally disappointed that a liaison officer 
rather than a minister would serve in Washington. (The appointment of a minister 
would have been the first step to upgrade the consulate-general in Sydney, which had 
become, of necessity, a de facto American ministry.) Australia was not anxious at 
this stage to open a ministry in Tokyo, despite a recommendation by Sir John 
Latham following his good-will mission to Japan. Lyons told Moffat that it would 
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be costly and poHtically difficult to open a post there because of trade friction.'^ 
The appointment of Officer made the conduct of commercial relations easier for a 
short time. But as he pointed out in a confidential letter to Casey, "The present ar-
rangement is sufficient to provide information and to give the Ambassador an 
Australian view. But it does identify us very closely with the British Embassy and 
their point of view. AustraHa is seen as likely to be imbued with the United 
Kingdom point of view." This would merely reinforce the suspicion of the State 
Department that Australian economic poHcies were geared to the Ottawa system, 
the bete noire of many senior American officials, and that on critical issues, such as 
trade diversion, pressure from Britain played a decisive part." 
As the international situation deteriorated, the United States and Britain both 
became more interested in the upgrading of AustraHan representation. Pearce in 
November 1938 had swung round to support the appointment of an Australian am-
bassador, and a month later Lord Halifax urged Australia to establish a post of its 
own in Washington.'* Casey wrote to Officer discussing the international situation 
and said, "We have, I believe, to pawn our shirts to ensure our security. . . . I often 
wonder whether we should not reverse our policy and decide to have a legation in 
Washington." Bruce had already discussed the idea with Casey and probably with 
the British ambassador in Washington. Officer himself, formerly a strong supporter 
of the liaison officer arrangement, began to support the idea of a legation. He posed 
the vital question in reply to Casey's inquiry: "What do we want? Merely informa-
tion, or do we wish to play an important part? If the latter we must have our own 
legation." He believed now that "an AustraHan Legation co-operating closely with 
the British Embassy would be of some use to British prestige and influence in his 
country". He stiH believed that Ottawa was more important than Washington. He 
urged the Australian government to adopt a positive policy and take decisive action. 
The Canadians had established a well-staffed post in Washington, but, he said, 
"They have no policy on any subject except to do nothing or say nothing for fear 
that they may do or say the wrong thing."" What he really seems to have had in 
mind was diplomatic action by AustraHa to bolster Commonwealth unity. 
Menzies wanted to go further. In a broadcast on 26 April 1939 he declared: "In 
the Pacific we have primary responsibility and primary risk. . . . What Great Britain 
calls the Far East is to us the near north. Little given as I am to encouraging the exag-
gerated ideas of Dominion independence and separatism which exist in some minds, 
I have become convinced that in the Pacific Australia must regard herself as a prin-
cipal providing herself with her own information and maintaining her own 
diplomatic contacts with foreign powers." This meant, of course, consultation with 
other members of the British Commonwealth: AustraHa "would not act in the 
Pacific as if we were a completely independent power". But consultation with other 
members of the Empire "must be on the basis that the primary risk in the Pacific is 
borne by New Zealand and ourselves." 
The appointment of a minister was a slow process that did pose some problems. 
The United Kingdom was informed of Australia's intention on 30 March. Menzies 
had resigned from cabinet on 20 March and the decision to appoint a minister was 
taken eight days later at a meeting at which Bruce was present. At one stage it had 
looked as if Lyons himself might be appointed, despite his iH health. But he died on 7 
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April. Menzies, who became prime minister later in the month, would have Hked to 
transfer Bruce to Washington and even considered resigning as prime minister to 
take it himself. Bruce declined, feeling that he would be more valuable in London. 
Casey, as early as January 1926, had asked Bruce to be considered as the next trade 
commissioner to Washington. Bruce felt that he was not weH enough known. In 
1939 Casey was more deeply interested in his political future than appointment to 
Washington but allowed himself to be overruled by Menzies. His appointment was 
made in January 1940, and Casey presented his credenrials on 6 March. 
Casey's appointment was the result of negotiarions with both Menzies and Bruce 
at a time when Casey's poHtical stocks in Canberra had slumped. It was "as much a 
consolation prize to a defeated rival as an exercise in self protect ion" ." An obvious 
possible choice for the position was Keith Officer, who had become restive over the 
long delay in making an appointment and the apparent ignorance in parliament of 
the fact that Australia was already clearly represented. In a bitter comment to John 
Hood of External Affairs on 16 June, he drew attention to the fact that the 9 May 
debate in the House made no reference " t o this little office as a source of informa-
tion. Does this mean that my frequent reports go into the waste paper baske t?"" 
This was on occasion no doubt uncomfortably close to the truth and may explain 
some of the American concern at apparent lack of contact between Officer and 
Canberra. 
Pearce had come to the view that Officer was now little more than the mouthpiece 
for Moffat. Moffat himself was dubious about Officer. In a very frank and confiden-
tial letter to H. A. McClure Smith, editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, he said: 
Keith Officer is a great social success; he has made many friends and is very weU liked, but 
despite his title he is considered a member of the British Embassy and is obviously not in a 
position to speak for Australia; nor is Australia thought of, by and large, as an entity with 
the same degree of self-government as the other Dominions. I doubt if Keith Officer is par-
ticularly anxious to effect the change, perhaps because he is not sure of what his relation-
ship would be with his new chief But as a friend of Australia, I can think of no move that 
could bring back richer dividends (even if they are imponderable) than an exchange of 
diplomatic relations." 
McClure Smith certainly did not keep Moffat's confidence to himself, and Pearce and 
other members of cabinet were doubtless aware of it. Unfortunately, Officer learnt 
of Casey's appointment through the press. 
Officer opened the Australian Legation as charge d'affaires, and Casey arrived on 
19 February 1940. Officer felt that it would be diplomatically difficult for him to 
remain as Casey's charge or counsellor and was transferred shortly afterwards. 
Although in training, appearance, and outlook Casey was in some ways more British 
than Officer, he quickly established his identity as an Australian. He engaged in a 
series of lectures and broadcasts over a large part of the United States. His was an 
Australian argument for American assistance and participation in a war on behalf of 
democracy in which the British Commonwealth was playing a leading role. Moffat, 
observing from Ottawa as United States minister, wrote to Minter: "AustraHa has a 
remarkable press in the United States, and Casey has done a unique job in the United 
States. At times, I think he has tended to overplay his cards, but by and large he has 
put AustraHa on the map."^" 
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In 1942 Casey accepted Churchill's invitation to become UK minister in the 
Middle East. His sudden acceptance posed a problem for Prime Minister John 
Curtin. Churchill strongly suggested that Menzies be appointed to succeed him in 
Washington. Menzies was extremely anxious to go to Washington, but Curtin felt 
that Casey, Eggleston (minister to China), and Latham (minister to Japan) had been 
opposition nominees or sympathizers, as were the Australian representatives in 
Ottawa and London. The appointment of Menzies would mean that all Australia's 
overseas representatives would have been non-Labor men. American diplomats felt 
that Menzies was too politically committed to interpret Curtin's policies in 
Washington. H.V. Evatt was interested, but Curtin preferred to keep his minister 
for External Affairs and attorney-general closer to Canberra where he could be kept 
under tighter control. Sir Owen Dixon, justice of the High Court, reluctantly ac-
cepted nomination.^' Despite his lack of diplomatic experience, he proved an 
outstanding ambassador. He returned to the High Court in 1943. His successor was 
Frederic Eggleston, whose contribution in Chungking had been outstanding. Other 
foreign diplomats climbed the many steps to the Australian residence to discuss pro-
blems with a philosopher-politician whose physical infirmities gave him a Buddha-
like figure and reputation. Evatt attempted to head him off from Washington after 
Dixon returned to Australia, but the attempt failed. 
The United States appointed Clarence Edward Gauss as its first minister to 
Canberra. A career officer since 1966, Gauss had served mainly in the Far East with a 
spell in Paris.^^ He was a popular appointee, the more so as his wife was related to 
the Chaffeys of Murray irrigation fame. His term of office was short: arriving on 17 
July 1940, he left for Peking on 7 March 1941. His first secretary was Moffat's right-
hand man in the State Department, John R. Minter, secretary of the section that 
dealt with Australia. 
Gauss was replaced by Nelson T. Johnson, who resigned from the embassy in Pek-
ing on personal grounds. It meant the exchange of one Far Eastern expert in 
Canberra for another. Later, in December 1942, there were plans to transfer Johnson 
to a more important post. President Roosevelt appointed a Democratic party boss, 
Ed Flynn, as his successor. The nomination came as a complete surprise and quickly 
led the Australian government to indicate informally to the State Department that 
Flynn would be unacceptable. This was the only occasion on which the Australian 
government had taken such action. Flynn was a Democratic party operator who had 
been suggested a few months earlier as the United States ambassador to Mexico. 
There was an immediate outcry about Flynn's qualifications and political record: he 
had used city materials and city labor to construct a "palatial country home 
up-state". An experienced American diplomat commented that his qualifications to 
represent the United States in Australia were "about equal to my qualifications for 
being Pope or for fulfilhng the functions of the Dalai Lama. . . . Ed is something left 
behind after the fashion of the mastodon by a subsiding glacial age of American 
politics. Ed Flynn's political handicap is that he is born thirty years too late."" 
Johnson remained in Canberra until 1945, when he was appointed secretary of the 
Far Eastern Commission. 
7 The Pacific Pact and Japan 
The Washington Conference had done little to allay Australian concern about the 
long-term threat to Australia's security against Japan. The new security ar-
rangements, which ensured peace and perhaps stability for a decade, left Japan as the 
dominant naval power in the western Pacific at the same time as they recognized 
American predominance east of Honolulu. But the treaties left "Great Britain . . . as 
weH as the United States in a worse posirion in the Pacific than formerly obtained", 
and Australia remained exposed to the danger of attack from the sea provided the at-
tacking power had Pacific island bases from which to operate.' 
There was one curious by-product of the Versailles and Washington conferences. 
Hughes had found Woodrow Wilson's attitude towards racial equality puzzling and 
beHeved that he had misread the situation in California. Hughes passionately believed 
in the White Australia policy and felt that California provided a clear illustration of 
the dangers of Asian immigration. Accordingly he invited a young Sydney barrister 
Herbert Vere Evatt, to personally investigate the racial question in California. Evatt 
was about to leave for the United States on his honeymoon. Hughes asked him to 
examine Japanese settlement in California "with particular reference to the light 
thrown on our own problems". At the same time Evatt was to report on the nature 
and strength of anti-British sentiment in America. 
This must have been one of Evatt's most unusual missions, a "mission for which 
he was in no way strongly qualified". P.M. Sales points out that Evatt and his friend 
V. Gordon Childe had been under surveillance during the European conflict. Childe 
was beHeved to have Sinn Fein leanings and was suspect because of his strong pacifist 
views; he was believed to hold "perverted views on the war". Evatt sympathized 
with some of his radical views but kept "his views more to himself".^ He was no 
more than a very amateur and indiscreet investigator. Although his mission pur-
ported to be a confidential one, Evatt spoke openly of his commission from Hughes 
about racial conditions in Hawaii and California. He concluded that Japanese settlers 
on the American west coast had gained a firm commercial grip in many communities 
and that this led to serious racial tension. Attempts by Californian officials to limit 
Japanese influence had merely aggravated the situation and increased diplomatic fric-
tion. "The American lesson appeared to be that a nation which relaxed its immigra-
tion restrictions as a means of avoiding trouble with Tokyo would doubtlessly be in-
volved in more unpleasantries, but with an internal as well as an external 
dimension."' 
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Much more important was Austraha's preoccupation with defence against 
Japanese aggression and the role of the Singapore naval base. Bruce was concerned 
"about the value of Singapore and doubted whether a British fleet of a one power 
standard was capable of containing an enemy, east or west either in turn or at once". 
A feeling was growing in Australian defence circles that "AustraHa would have to 
take the British battle fleet for granted without seeing i t" and that at best the United 
Kingdom could build the base and then the American fleet could move in and use it 
if required and protect Australia and New Zealand against attack.* Sir Cyprian 
White pointed out that "if there was a real alliance between England and the United 
States and the Singapore base was a reality, the Japanese menace would be almost en-
tirely removed". But there was no alliance, and the United States showed no inclina-
tion to become committed to new overseas responsibilities. 
Wishful thinking in Australia led to the unwarranted belief that the United States 
had "a grave responsibility towards the other white nations of the Pacific Httorol. 
Although this uncovenanted commitment lacked diplomatic sanction, navalists 
adopted it as no more than an extension of the traditional United States pre-
occupation with regional stability. The definitive result of this benevolent attitude 
was the massive naval visit to AustraHa during the winter of 1925." From an 
American point of view, the visit was designed to test the capacity of the fleet to 
operate over long distances. The US battle fleet was not yet using Pearl Harbor as its 
main base; "it was important to test the ablHty of the ships to maintain themselves at 
great distances from their bases . . . or what they could carry for 10,000 miles". To 
some Americans and Australians the cruise was regarded as a salutory warning to 
Japanese expansionists. Sections of the Japanese press regarded the visit as pro-
vocative, but the Tokyo government blandly declared that "it saw nothing un-
toward or menacing in the manoeuvres" at a time when Japanese-American relations 
were tense.' 
Like the 1908 visit, the 1925 visit was socially, as a public relations exercise, and 
perhaps from a naval point of view a considerable success. The Hobart Mercury said: 
"The peoples of Britain, Australasia and America feel that they know each other 
because of the circumstances in which both nations have developed have favored the 
evolution of similar characteristics on both sides: marked individuality, self reliance, 
impatience of conventions that merely restrict, and that last but by no means least, a 
joint disposition to appreciate and retain the advantages to be derived from clinging 
to that which is good in the Old Order." The mainland press waxed less eloquent 
but paid lip service to Anglo-Saxon solidarity. In New Zealand the Lyttleton Times 
was much more reahstic: "The Empire hardly counts as a naval power in the Pacific 
just now; this dangerous default increases our gratitude to the other great English 
speaking power for the magnificent display of its strength which the cruise of its fleet 
is now giving to the world." The long-term effects of the visit were very Hmited.' 
The weakening of British naval power in the Pacific and so its capacity to give ef-
fective protection to Australia and New Zealand continued during the next decade. 
The Geneva Conference of 1927 was a failure, and the 1930 London naval conference 
further strengthened Japanese naval predominance in the north-western Pacific. 
There was a sharp conflict of interest between Britain and the United States at both 
conferences. At Geneva, British prime minister Stanley Baldwin unsuccessfully 
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fought for the retention of a larger number of smaller cruisers which were invaluable 
for commerce protection; the United States insisted on parity in cruisers between 
Britain and herself regardless of size. In the view of Sir Joseph Cook, the United 
States was more bent on parity with the Empire in every class of vessel than any real 
disarmament. At the London conference, AustraHa firmly resisted the increase in the 
number of Japanese 8" cruisers from twelve to seventeen, but Prime Minister 
Ramsay MacDonald failed to win American support. Australia was prepared to "act 
as a sriffener in resisting excessive American demands" but admitted that in the end 
"the Commonwealth Government must ulrimately concern with the Brirish 
Government".' United States secretary of state Henry Srimson'^ attempt to do a 
deal with Japan over Singapore to ease tension with Britain and America was firmly 
rejected by London. "The United Kingdom had no intenrion of aHowing the ques-
tion of the Singapore base to be treated as a bargaining factor at the Conference."' 
When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, its naval power was reaching a peak and 
Australia had come to feel very naked from a defence point of view. Sales sums up 
the matter bluntly. "Britain and the United States proved unwilHng to build or 
equip even ships and bases permitted by the Washington Treaties."'Japan had ac-
cepted some self-policing regulations to this point, and it was only subsequently that 
she began secretly to fortify the Marshall and Caroline islands in contempt of the 
Washington limitations. One consequence of AustraHa's feeHng of physical insecuri-
ty was its reluctance to take positive action against Japanese aggression. AustraHa's 
inacrion was also due in part to the ALP view that Australia should not become in-
volved in the imperiahst muddle in the Far East. Appeasement of Japan became an 
important part of AustraHa's foreign policy.'" 
For some years, the AustraHan government had been thinking in terms of regional 
action to maintain stability in the Pacific. As the League of Nations began to lose 
ground and collective security was weakened, Lyons revived the regional security 
proposal. In proposals to reform the League Covenant in 1936, AustraHa suggested 
that it could be reinforced by a series of regional pacts of non-aggression, especially in 
the Pacific. Lyons had already attempted to persuade Roosevelt to join a broad 
security pact that would embrace "aH nations bordering on the Pacific Ocean". In 
his opening address to the Imperial Conference on 22 May 1937, Lyons formally pro-
posed a Pacific Pact. He envisaged it as including all countries in the Pacific; it would 
provide for consultation in the event of tension and would contain non-aggression 
provisions. It was much broader than the Washington Four Power Treaty and ex-
tended non-aggression beyond the insular possession of signatories to the whole of 
the Pacific and Far East." 
The Lyons proposal remained vague and was never presented in a specific form. 
The reaction of the Imperial Conference was polite. After a committee reported, the 
Imperial Conference gave it a blessing and agreed that it was a desirable proposal. 
Anthony Eden reported on 23 June to the House of Commons that all members of 
the Commonwealth "were united in thinking that a Pacific Pact was a desirable ob-
jective".'^ They examined the possibilities in some detail during the conference; they 
considered the various forms which the pact might assume and noted a number of 
difficulties that would have to be overcome. The important thing was to obtain the 
reaction of other governments." 
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These were very mixed. The Chinese ambassador was enthusiastic; the Chinese 
finance minister, Dr Kung, who was in London, told the American ambassador to 
France, WiHiam C. Bullett, that "China would be glad to enter into agreement not 
only for a non-aggression pact in the Pacific but also for treaties of mutual 
assistance". Robert Worth Bingham, the American ambassador in London, remind-
ed Stanley Hornbeck, chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department: 
"We should keep in mind the fact that Premier Lyons is making this subject a 
hobby, and that certain Chinese officials are always enthusiastic over any kind of a 
proposal which bids fair to bring about a commitment on the part of other powers to 
protect China or to give China special assistance." Moscow expressed an interest, 
but the Japanese government believed that such a pact was inopportune. Direct 
discussion with the United States and China would accomplish much more than a 
possibly dangerous conference.'* 
The United States responded very cautiously, despite some strong support from 
Hornbeck. Bingham told Lyons, "It would be impossible to secure any form of 
agreement which would find our government in anything whatever looking toward 
the protection of Australia from attack by Japan." The State Department played it 
very low key, "not adopting an attitude or position with regard to the matter". It 
was essentially a matter in which Great Britain should take the initiative. Gauss, in 
Tokyo, strongly opposed the Lyons plan. The existing machinery for checking ag-
gression had been wrecked, and it would be a mistake to set up a new machine until 
there was a "substantial evidence of a change of heart"." 
London took no initiative, reading the situation very clearly. The lukewarm 
reception to the extremely vague proposal by Lyons convinced Eden that it would 
never get off the ground. The British government had received no hint of the Lyons 
proposal before the Imperial Conference and suspected that he was merely flying a 
poHtical kite with the forthcoming AustraHan federal elections in mind. The im-
minence of the elections was the excuse Lyons gave Bingham for not returning to 
AustraHa by way of Washington and so have further discussions with Hull or the 
president." It could be that he assumed, probably wrongly, that Roosevelt had 
assured him that "if serious trouble arose in the Pacific, the United States would be 
prepared to make common cause with the members of the Commonwealth con-
cerned". This went further than senior officials of the State Department were 
prepared to go; isolationism was srill running high, and the George Washington dic-
tum about avoiding entangling alhances was endorsed by many poHticians and senior 
diplomats. John Curtin, leading the ALP opposition in the Australian parHament, 
was as isolationist as any American senator; the events to which Lyons had referred 
in his speeches were of no concern of AustraHa. In any case, the Lyons proposal was 
killed stone dead by the clash at the Marco Polo bridge on 14 July 1937; a new phase 
in international relations, and in assessment of them by Canberra and Washington, 
was opened by the outbreak of the war in China. Munich in a sense merely muddied 
the waters for Australia even more, especially for the Labor party. Curtin raised the 
question bluntly: were there "any prospective developments in Europe to justify a 
war hysteria in AustraHa out of which war profiteers would reap a harvest? If not in 
Europe, where else did the danger He?" So far as the Pacific was concerned, Australia 
"ought not lightly to engage in provocative acts"." 
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The demise of the Lyons pact and the whole handhng of the incident by the 
AustraHan government made it clear that a commercial secretary in New York could 
not handle international relations: in any case there is no evidence to suggest that 
Dow was ever consulted. The prime minister himself had handled the matter. The 
pressure for fuller AustraHan representation in New York or Washington increased. 
It was obvious that consultarion between Lyons and the Foreign Office/prime 
minister in London was inadequate. Had there been adequate representation and 
fuller diplomatic reporting, Lyons would never have put his toe into the water. The 
inner logic was that Australian diplomatic representation in Washington be upgrad-
ed. Hence the attachment of Keith Officer as the AustraHan Haison officer to the 
British Embassy in Washington. But this was clearly inadequate. In a letter to 
McClure Smith of the Sydney Morning Herald, Lord Lothian, the British ambassador 
to Washington, had pointed out, "There are many things that an Australian or 
Canadian Minister can say and do in Washington which a British Minister 
cannot."" Officer as a Haison officer could not. An AustraHan minister, especially a 
man like Casey, could. Unfortunately he did not reach Washington until after the 
outbreak of the European war." On 18 August, the Australian government ap-
pointed Sir John Latham as its first minister to Japan, "the culmination of the desire 
of Australia and Japan for a more direct and intimate relationship". Australia did not 
establish its third listening post for the Pacific until August 1941, when Sir Frederic 
Eggleston was appointed as first Australian minister to China. Eggleston was both a 
scholar and a legal authority as well as an extremely sagacious politician. 
Lothian had welcomed Casey's appointment as AustraHan minister to 
Washington because it would enable AustraHa to do and say some of the things, to 
take initiatives from time to time, that would have been difficult for a British am-
bassador. Casey's task was rendered more difficult by his close association with 
Lothian and by the parallel or identical representations they made to the State 
Department. Americans reaHzed that AustraHa's independent sources of information 
— Tokyo and Chungking — were limited and that on many questions Casey (and 
the Australian government) had to rely on British intelligence and reporting. The 
American Legation in Canberra had reservations about Bruce, Casey's close cor-
respondent for many years. He was regarded by many as more English than 
AustraHan in outlook. It felt that Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, the United Kingdom high 
commissioner in Canberra, gave the impression that his chief mission was "to induce 
the Commonwealth Government to accept the 'wishes' or orders of London. . . . 
Australia is being consulted about the disposition of Australian forces, but it is not 
being consulted fully regarding the conduct of the war as a whole."" 
Casey was also handicapped by the unfinished business that he had inherited: Pan 
American Airways' landing rights, facilities for a direct radio-telegraph communica-
tion between the two countries, and the persistent dispute over tariffs. As mentioned 
in chapter 4, Australia refused to give Pan American landing rights in Australia 
because the United States, mainly the War Department and Navy Department, 
decHned to give reciprocal landing rights to Britain. "AustraHa can scarcely hope to 
establish its independent position vis-a-vis the United States and at the same time 
expect us to accept her playing the Empire game in such a manner," commented 
Robert B. Stewart of the State Department." He was beginning to adopt a more 
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conciliatory attitude over tariffs, admitting that it was the United States that took 
the lead in imposing excessive duties on Australia's principal exports to the United 
States, leading to heavy Australian retaliation. He argued, unsuccessfully, "The cur-
rent general situation offers an unusual, probably unique opportunity for attempting 
to solve by moderate liberality, a deep rooted conflict which puts a severe strain on 
United States-Australian relations in general, poHtical as well as economic. "^^ 
Washington had few illusions about Australian attitudes to the war and towards 
the United States. Stewart had warned Gauss in a background memo on the Menzies 
government that he "would not find the average Australian naturally friendly to the 
United States but friendly because he wants or expects something from the United 
States".^' Despite the almost delirious reception to the American fleet, the American 
Embassy continued to report that there was a "sullen anti-imperialist sentiment 
growing steadily in the hearts of Labor members" and that "it was not unusual to 
hear an Australian say that Australia is in this war only because it was drawn in by 
loyalty to the empire and particularly to England in Europe and not because of any 
act or desire of Australia".^* This may have been inaccurate reporting, but the con-
tinued doubt about Australian attitudes to the war could have aroused Httle en-
thusiasm in Washington when Casey appealed for American assistance in the Pacific. 
Despite Casey's personal popularity, there was some reservation about Australian 
foreign policy being as independent as it claimed to be. There were few Australian 
initiatives during these two years as AustraHa strongly supported Commonwealth 
and British pressure for a direct American involvement against Japanese expansion in 
the Pacific. Casey was fighting against American isolationism and the growing 
tendency, shared by ChurchiH, to give absolute priority to the war in Europe. In the 
last analysis, Australia's voice was a thin and perhaps peripheral one in the shaping of 
American foreign policy as a whole. 
One aspect of Casey's activities did arouse concern in Washington: his attempts to 
influence American opinion to secure greater co-operation with Britain and 
Australia. This had always been one of the several functions of Australian commis-
sioners like Herbert Brookes, of David Dow, and of Keith Officer. But the British 
Ministry of Information hoped to channel much of its propaganda through Casey 
and his office in Washington. The programme planned a series of visits to Australia 
by politicians, churchmen and press representatives; a similar programme was to be 
organized for Australian visitors to the United States. The plans included a contract 
with an American public relations firm at a cost of $300,000. An approach was made 
to the State Department for permission to open a bureau of information.^' 
These proposed Australian activities aroused increasing hostility and apprehension 
in the State Department and in the American Legation in Canberra. Hull strongly 
opposed the proposal, and Stewart told Alan Watt, Casey's first secretary, that the 
department was prepared to agree to the setting up of a bureau of information pro-
vided that it was not a base for British propaganda in the United States. Gauss 
strongly supported HuH's view, and Roosevelt himself expressed doubts about the 
project. "The publicity from the Casey business disturbs me greatly. . . . It would 
be desirable all round if any way can be found to avoid all further discussion of this 
which, it seems to me to play right into the hands of our enemies. . . . The impor-
tant issue is the basic relationship of AustraHa to Britain. I sense in this country a 
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growing feeHng of impatience at what pubHcly appears to be a rather strained rela-
tionship at this time between the United Kingdom and AustraHa."" Reports from 
Gauss and then Nelson Johnson in Canberra about Australian opinion had not been 
reassuring. 
Strong American criticisms led to a drastic revision of the activities of the 
Australiafi ministry and bureau. Gauss had said bluntly that "there was Httle real at-
tempt by Australia to deal favorably with certain outstanding questions of interest to 
this government".^' Keith Murdoch made a tentative attempt to win American sup-
port in Australia for Australian poHcy and the new press campaign. He withdrew 
from the field after being told that a hastily contrived media campaign would not 
reverse the views of American businessmen aware of the constant barrage of criticism 
of American interests and activities in AustraHa." 
Shortly after Casey arrived in Washington, the "phoney war" ended. Germany 
invaded Denmark and Norway on 9 April, and a month later the German blitzkrieg 
against the Netherlands began. The breakthrough at Sedan on 15 May began the 
political and military disintegration of France. Casey saw Sumner Welles on 30 May 
and, in answer to a direct question whether Germany could destroy British 
resistance, told him that "it was our strong belief that if Germany were prepared to 
lose sufficient men she could overwhelm Britain". They discussed the possibility of a 
successful landing of German troops in Britain. Casey's view was that "such landing 
in force was perfectly possible although the German losses would undoubtedly be 
very great". He felt that the British battle fleet would be virtually powerless to pre-
vent a German landing, since its primary function was warfare at sea. Casey went on 
to point out that it was "undoubtedly the conviction of the British government to-
day that there was no hope of the United States entering the war on our side. . . it 
was impossible for the Government and people in Britain to beheve otherwise." He 
believed that "there was only one person in the world who could save the British, 
French and Dutch Empires and that was the President". A somewhat shaken 
Sumner WeUes promised to see the president at once and added that ' 'in the present 
state and trend of public opinion here, a week or ten days could produce great 
changes".^' 
But a week or ten days made no difference, even although Paris fell on 14 June. 
Casey told Hull on 6 June that he would like the United States to declare war.'" AH 
that Roosevelt was prepared to do was to pledge the material resources of the nation 
to the Allies. This was of some moral but little immediate military value. The 
Australian government and Great Britain began to move towards a policy of appeas-
ing Japan and so informed Hornbeck. On 27 June the British ambassador, Lord 
Lothian, put before Hull the alternative courses of action: a full embargo on exports 
to Japan or the dispatch of American warships to Singapore on the one hand, or a full 
settlement with Japan. Hull consulted Roosevelt and then told Casey and Lothian 
that the United States could not reinforce the Commonwealth fleet at Singapore 
without the risk of war, that the United States was already imposing severe restric-
tions on Japanese trade, and finally that a general Far Eastern settlement was impossi-
ble. This was partly due, as Hull admitted, to the hard fact that the United States 
had no substanrial chips to bargain with. For that matter, neither did London or 
Canberra." A few days later, Lothian was instructed to ask for extensive American 
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material aid "in order to achieve victory at the earliest possible moment". The re-
quest was for planes, munitions, essential raw materials, long-term financing, and a 
revision of the American Neutrality Act to allow American ships to enter the war 
zone. The list of requests ended with proposals to enlist Central and South American 
support for similar economic measures against Germany and Italy.'^ 
A detailed account of Australian activities in Washington is given by Raymond 
Esthus and Roger Bell." Casey's main function was to attempt to secure American 
support for the Commonwealth in general, and Australia in particular, and at the 
same time improve the Australian image in the United States. Roosevelt was slowly 
modifying American policy and quietly weakening the influence of the strong isola-
tionist element in Congress. It was politically a case offestina lente. But the majestic 
movement of the United States towards involvement in the European or a new 
Pacific war was too slow for Casey and Lothian despite their strong support for that 
hardening policy. The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact on 26 September led Casey 
again to raise the question of American Pacific policy, this time with Adolph Berle, 
the assistant secretary of state. He posed the theoretical point: Might it not be assum-
ed that should war result, the "United States would immediately assist by going to 
war with Japan"? After the pact was announced, the AustraHan and British govern-
ments repeatedly attempted to induce the American government to send ships to 
Singapore either as a demonstration of power through the visit of an impressive and 
modern American fleet or, a much preferable but impracticable alternative, to base 
portion of the American Far Eastern fleet there. 
Churchill suggested the fleet visit because it would have "a marked deterrent 
effect upon a Japanese declaration of war upon us over the Burma Road opening". 
"The bigger [the squadron] the better."'* The State Department was stiH reluctant 
to dip American toes in the water, and the navy was divided for strategic reasons. 
On 25 November, Lothian told Hull that British naval experts felt that if the 
American fleet could be largely based on Singapore it would safeguard the entire 
situation in the Orient. But the United States still declined to take part in any such 
demonstration of support for Britain and AustraHa in the Pacific. 
Casey and Lothian could do little more than approve of the gradual hardening of 
American policy in the Pacific and watch as she inched her way towards involve-
ment. Menzies was becoming concerned about the weakening of British naval power 
in the Pacific. In March 1939, Australian defence chiefs had expressed doubts about 
the ability of Great Britain to deploy any capital ships for Australia in the event of a 
European war; without capital ships Singapore would inevitably be lost. To bolster 
AustraHan confidence and so be certain of Australian military support in Europe and 
the Far East, ChurchiH assured Australia on 8 August 1940: "If, however, contrary 
to prudence and self-interest, Japan set about invading AustraHa or New Zealand on a 
large scale, I have the expHcit authority of Cabinet to assure you that we should then 
cut our losses in the Mediterranean and proceed to your aid, sacrificing every interest 
except the defence and feeding of this island on which all depends."" Churchill 
withdrew his promise in March 1941 and admitted that it would be impossible for 
Britain to deploy a substantial force "until after the lapse of a considerable time and 
might not be possible even then". This was why Australia was anxious to involve 
the American fleet at Singapore and to persuade her that the war would not 
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necessarily be won in Europe. Menzies felt that Australia had been too trusting and 
complacent in accepting British estimates of the importance of Singapore assurances 
of British naval support. His view was shared by Australian army leaders about 
British assurances that an adequate fleet would be sent to Singapore at the critical 
time: "We do not doubt that you are sincere in your beliefs but, frankly, we do not 
think that you wiH be able to do i t . " " 
Casey's repeated attempts to involve the United States in the Pacific failed in the 
face of State Department and War Council unwillingness to be committed. The visit 
of a small American squadron — two cruisers and five destroyers — to Sydney and 
Brisbane from March 2 to 27 may have been a small sop to Australian pressure. It 
certainly must have given a little rehef to Menzies, who had just learnt of Churchill's 
withdrawal of his promises of naval support at Singapore. The visit was a resounding 
success, at least from a public relations point of view. The acting prime minister, 
Arthur Fadden, welcomed the fleet. "Nothing in the life of AustraHa has so stirred 
inspired and thriHed the nation as has this visit of part of the great United Navy," he 
said. The American minister, John Minter, told HuH that "the Navy was greeted by 
the AustraHans as if it were their own returning from a great victory". He went on 
to say: "To my mind, while I saw street demonstrations which I did not believe 
possible in AustraHa, the most striking event of the entire visit was the adjournment 
of ParHament and the trek of the entire government to Sydney."" But seven naval 
swallows did not foreshadow a naval summer at Singapore or elsewhere in the 
Pacific. Casey and Lord HaHfax, who had succeeded Lothian as British ambassador, 
tried again on 2 August to obtain an American commitment over the Japanese threat 
to Thailand. Hull at first blandly assured them that Roosevelt had already extended 
his neutralization proposal to Thailand. On 4 August, Welles went a great deal fur-
ther by admitting that the United States could not tolerate a Japanese attack on 
Singapore and the Dutch East Indies: "By this, I said I meant that such a situation in 
my judgment would sooner or later inevitably result in war with Japan. I said that 
Lord Halifax was fully familiar with our constitutional system and that consequently 
no definite commitments or threats to this could officially be made."" 
Menzies failed to obtain assurances of American support in the Pacific despite a 
firm attempt at persuasion during the Atlantic Conference on 9 August. Roosevelt 
was not prepared to treat a Japanese attack on Thailand as a casus belli; however, the 
secretary for dominion affairs gained the impression from Roosevelt that "although 
the United States would not make any satisfactory declaration on the point, there 
was no doubt that in practice we could count on the United States' support if, as a 
result of Japanese aggression, we became involved in war" ." This reassurance to 
Fadden during his forty days in office did little to allay Australian fears; they prefer-
red pieces of paper to gentlemen's understandings or hunches. 
The first significant change in American policy came shortly after the Curtin 
government took office on 7 October. The American War Department was beginn-
ing to modify its strategy after the Far Eastern Command had been formed in July. 
General Douglas MacArthur became convinced that the Philippines could be held in 
the event of a Japanese attack provided he received adequate air support. The decision 
to station new long-range B17 bombers, the Flying Fortresses used so successfully in 
Europe and the Far East, meant that adequate bases were needed to increase their fly-
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ing range. Roosevelt ordered the delivery of the planes "to any territory subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States, to any territory within the Western 
Hemisphere [and] to the Netherlands East Indies and Australia".*" This was foHow-
ed by a order to construct bases. On 17 October, the American minister. Nelson 
Johnson, presented a request to Curtin for the use of Australian air bases at Rabaul, 
Port Moresby, Darwin, and Rockhampton. The bases would be built or upgraded 
by the Australian government at the expense of the United States. Curtin and Evatt 
were deHghted and gave permission with alacrity, promising the "fullest co-
operation possible". This, combined with MacArthur's comment to Page a fort-
night earlier, that Japan could not advance further south without becoming involved 
in war with the United States, gave more confidence to AustraHa about ultimate 
American intentions even although they did not constitute a cast-iron guarantee.*' 
On 25 October Churchill told Curtin that the Prince of Wales would join the Repulse 
in the Indian Ocean and that four R class battleships would follow later. This, he 
hoped, would help to deter Japan. These initiatives came from Washington and 
London and were related to broad strategy; they were not the result of Australian 
pressure. 
In tlie weeks that followed, control of negotiations with Japan rested primarily 
with the United States, with Britain giving what diplomatic support it felt 
necessary. AustraHa was not fully informed of American moves and the state of play 
in negotiations for a Far Eastern settlement. Hull caHed in the British and Chinese 
ambassadors as weH as the Dutch and Australian ministers on 22, 24, and 25 
November to consult them about the Japanese modus vivendi, and largely on their ad-
vice rejected the Japanese proposals. The American war cabinet agreed on 26 
November that the United States "would fight if the British fought". Casey made a 
last-minute bid to avert a conflict by interviewing the Japanese envoy, Kurusu, and 
pointing out, among other things, that Britain, the United States, and Australia 
"would all fight with cohesion and vigour if we had to".*^ Hull made no demur 
when Casey told him what he intended to say to Kurusu but felt that the situation 
had gone beyond that diplomatic stage. What Casey did not know was that the 
Americans had cracked the Japanese codes and were reading the diplomatic and 
military cables and knew that the die had already been cast.*' Casey met both Kurusu 
and Nomura on the evening of 29 November for an hour but made no headway. 
Casey's role in the week before Pearl Harbor is a matter of controversy. He con-
tinued in early December to press Roosevelt for a firm commitment of armed sup-
port should the Japanese attack British, AustraHan, or Dutch territory or Thailand. 
He was acting in close consultation with both Curtin and Churchill. Esthus and Bell 
beheve that Roosevelt gave such a commitment on 5 December. Halifax accepted 
this view and so notified British diplomatic posts in the area. 
Ladislas Farago in The Broken Seal has argued from circumstantial evidence that 
Casey interviewed the president, perhaps in company with Halifax and Hull, on the 
afternoon of 5 December and heard Roosevelt's decision; John Hammond Moore ac-
cepts Farago's reconstruction despite Casey's denial.** There is no entry in the Casey 
diaries to support this argument, and Casey's cables from Washington do not report 
any such interviews on 5-6 December. The Halifax interviews may have pushed 
Roosevelt a little closer to such a guarantee in the belief that he had perhaps suffi-
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ciently educated and cajoled Congress so that his action would be supported and 
American constitutional processes would be observed by a congressional declaration 




"High Noon": 1941-1949 
8 Evatt and the Wartime Crisis, 1941-43 
As Pearl Harbor was attacked on 7 December 1941, Japanese troops landed in 
Thailand and Malaya and then pushed south. On 10 December, three days later, 
HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk by Japanese bombers. All pro-
spects of checking Japanese landing by British naval action disappeared. "The value 
of the Singapore naval base at this stage and all that it meant to Australian security 
and British interests generally in South-East Asia had vanished."' Churchill put it 
graphically: "There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or 
the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbour. . . . Over all this ex-
panse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked. "^ The 
following day, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. On 26 
December, Hong Kong, then an isolated British outpost, was captured. 
The attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December came as a complete surprise to the 
Australian government. There was no element of truth in the story told to the 
American Congress that the Australian government knew before the attack that a 
Japanese fleet was proceeding towards Pearl Harbor. The story was repeated in 1944 
in the Australian House of Representatives: an AustraHan reconnaissance aircraft 
sighted the fleet heading towards Pearl Harbor seventy-two hours before the attack. 
Three warnings were allegedly sent to Walter C. Short, the American commander 
in Honolulu, but were not passed on to him. Curtin declared this to be "pure inven-
tion. Our cables had no data concerning the Japanese fleet."' 
These miHtary disasters put the war into a new perspective for both Australia and 
the United States. Singapore and the British fleet had been the main shield for 
Australia against external attack, and Curtin immediately responded to the sinking 
of the Prince of Wales and Repulse by demanding of Churchill and Roosevelt that 
reinforcements be sent to protect Singapore. AustraHa felt itself to be almost mihtari-
ly naked because its most seasoned troops were serving in the Middle East. On 16 
December Evatt told the House of Representatives that this was AustraHa's war, a 
war that would determine the future of AustraHa. The conflict in Europe had been 
referred to as one that would determine the future of the British Empire, but it was a 
This chapter is concerned primarily with the relations between Canberra and Washington after Pearl 
Harbor. The war and military negotiations are dealt with admirably by Roger J. Bell in Unequal Allies. 
The Pacific War is viewed in a global content by Christopher Thorne in Allies of a Kind. 
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remote war for AustraHa, a totally distinct war from the one that had now come to 
AustraHa's doorstep. AustraHa became preoccupied with its own security in the 
Pacific. 
It is difficult to assess the effect of these early diasasters on AustraHan morale. The 
United Kingdom high commissioner in Canberra wrote to Lord Cranborne, the 
secretary of state for dominion affairs, on 9 January 1942: 
Australia in recent weeks has found itself for the first time in its history faced with crude 
realities. The reaction of the AustraUan people to this emergency has in some respects fallen 
short of that which one would have expected of a people remarkable for their sanity and 
courage. The stupor produced by the shock of the initial misfortunes which befeU those 
whom they regarded as the bulwark of Australia's safety was followed by manifestations of 
grave anxiety — and even jitters — regarding the position of Australia, and a pusillanimous 
blaming of others for iUs to come.* 
Nelson Johnson, the American minister in Canberra, was much more blunt in his 
estimate of the situation: 
These people are with difficulty waking up to the fact that they are going to have to fight 
for their right to live freely in Australia. There is a real danger that the Japanese may be 
able to occupy the whole of the strip of territory extending from Thursday Island to 
Melbourne which really constitutes Australia and this effectively cut us off from any con-
tact with this AustraUa. . . . I find it difficult to understand what they are doing or think-
ing. They are in a state of funk and yelling for help, now, from the United States while 
they cast blame on the British for failures in the past, some of which they should share 
responsibility for.' 
On 5 February he repeated his comment that Australia had been going through "a 
period of blue funk" since the Japanese began to march south. He went on: " I t has 
at times looked as though they were just ready to give up everything. I have felt that 
they would offer not the sHghtest resistance in the face of a Japanese attack. I think, 
however, that they are coming throiigh this n o w . " ' 
Johnson was reporting from Canberra, where morale was very low and where the 
wildest stories were circulating. Hasluck concluded that Canberra "was more badly 
scared than any other part of the continent" and that it was widely expected that 
Canberra would be bombed and perhaps occupied.' Government documents were 
being hastily copied to prevent their loss in air raids, and the chiefs of staff were con-
sidering proposals for a scorched-earth policy in Australia. C .E .W. Bean, the 
Australian war historian, came to a similar conclusion. Morale "was shakiest at the 
t o p " and some ministers and officials in Canberra had been in "a state of j i t te rs" . 
But he felt that most people did not share these fears and were prepared to carry out a 
fierce gueriHa resistance against any Japanese troops that might land. Nelson 
Johnson, writing a little later, had revised his opinion of Australian morale. ' 
Curtin, together with Treasurer J .B. Chifley, External Affairs Minister Evatt, and 
J. A. Beasley, the minister for supply and shipping, did not share the "blue funk" to 
which Johnson referred but worked extremely hard to bolster Australia's defences. 
Private appeals by Curtin to Churchill and Roosevelt for immediate assistance were 
entirely unproductive, and the British war cabinet told him that it would be impossi-
ble to send any battleships or a balanced fleet to assist in the defence of Singapore.' 
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On 26 December, Curtin had told Casey, "The stage of gentle suggestion by 
Australia has now passed. . . . This is the gravest type of emergency and everything 
will depend on a Churchill-Roosevelt decision to meet it in the broadest w a y . " 
A day later, before Casey could see Roosevelt, Curtin made his pubHc appeal to 
the United States for immediate miHtary assistance. Curtin's message was published 
in the Melbourne Herald, and it began by quoting Bernard O 'Dowd: 
That reddish veil which o'er the face 
Of night-haze East is drawn . . . 
Flames new disaster for the race 
Or can it be the Dawn? 
I see 1942 as a year in which we will know the answer. . . . the war -with Japan is not a 
phase of the struggle with the Axis powers, but is a new war. . . . 
We look for a solid and impregnable barrier of the Democracies against the three Axis 
powers, and we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a 
subordinate segment of the general conflict. By that it is not meant that any one of the 
other theatres of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that AustraUa asks for a con-
certed plan evoking the greatest strength at the Democracies' disposal, determined upon 
hurUng Japan back. 
What he feared was that the Anglo-American conference which opened in 
Washington three days earlier would give priority to defeating Hitler first and defen-
ding the Middle East. Both Churchill and Roosevelt attended this conference to con-
sider Allied war strategy. Curtin continued: 
The AustraUan Government therefore regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in 
which the United States and AustraUa must have the fullest say in the direction of the 
Democracies' fighting plan. 
Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that AustraUa looks to 
America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom. 
We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat 
of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength. But we know too that AustraUa 
can go, and Britain still hold on. 
We are therefore determined that AustraUa shall not go, and we shall exert all our 
energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will 
give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle 
swings against the enemy. 
Summed up, Australian external policy will be shaped towards obtaining Russian aid, 
and working out, with the United States as a major factor, a plan of Pacific strategy, along 
with the British, Chinese and Dutch forces. 
The statement was written by Curtin's press secretary, D.K. Rogers, " in 
response to a newspaper request for a statement of the challenge facing Australia in 
the New Year of 1942". Curtin made a few minor changes and added the perora-
tion. It was promoted to the front page when the acting editor and acting news 
editor both realized its provocative tone. 
This was an emotive appeal by a prime minister who was also an experienced jour-
nalist. It was made at a time of crisis in the Pacific when Australian morale was 
beginning to sag and before the surrender at Singapore. It came as a shock to many 
Australian conservatives, whose primary attachment was to Great Britain. Menzies 
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condemned it as a "great blunder", an understandable but odd reaction from a man 
passionately attached to Britain. Yet Menzies told the United Kingdom high com-
missioner in Canberra that at a meeting (undated) of the Advisory War Council, he 
"suggested telegraphing to Mr. Roosevelt and that he outHned the message to be 
sent. His proposal was at first received as audacious, but when he explained that he 
had done such things before, the suggestion met with a ready acceptance."'" 
When Curtin made his appeal, he was obviously unaware of the decision made by 
General Marshall. Marshall had recalled Brigadier Eisenhower to Washington and on 
14 December outlined the Pacific situation to him. He then asked him, " W h a t 
should be our general Hne of action?" Hoping that he was "showing a poker face", 
Eisenhower asked for a few hours to consider his answer. He concluded that the 
Philippines was temporarily lost and that 
Australia was the base nearest to the Philippines that we could hope to estabUsh and main-
tain, and the necessary line of air communications would therefore foUow along the Unes 
intervening between that continent and the PhiUppines. 
If we were to use Australia as a base it was mandatory that we procure a Une of com-
munications leading to it. This meant that we must instantly move to save Hawau, Fiji, 
New Zealand and New Caledonia, and we have to make certain of the safety of Australia 
itself 
He was primarily concerned with the "hapless islands" the Philippines, even if " the 
end result might be no more than postponement of disaster. . . . And we simply had 
to save the air life-line through Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Hawai i ." Marshall 
had apparently come to the same conclusion; he told Eisenhower briefly " I agree 
with you. . . . Do your best to save them." By the 4 January Eisenhower com-
mented, " A t last we are getting some things on the road to Australia." In fact the 
first American convoy, diverted from the Philippines, anchored in Brisbane on 22 
December." 
The reaction in London to Curtin's message was one of shocked surprise, so 
intense that Curtin felt it necessary to clarify his rather blunt statement: "Australia's 
new relationship with the United States is a military alliance made necessary by 
geographical considerations. There is no part of the world so steeped in British in-
stitutions and in the British way of living as Australia. Our loyalty to the King goes 
to the core of our national Hfe. . . . that is the reason why this great continent, 
peopled by his subjects, is, in my view absolutely vital. " '^ He told the prime 
minister's meeting in London in 1944 that "he had not envisaged any breaking of 
these links and that he still continued to think of Britain and the British Empire as 
the abiding foundation of Australian foreign policy". What Curtin was doing was 
to define Australian foreign policy at a particular point of time, emphasizing 
Australia's determination to make its own decisions and not to rely on Britain to 
make them for Australia. Britain was incapable — by its own confession — of giving 
further aid to Australia as Japan moved south; the fall of Singapore underlined the 
point. 
What is difficult to understand is that Curtin's article came as a surprise not only 
to Nelson Johnson (and probably to HuH and Roosevelt) but to AustraHan poHti-
cians. Deakin had been anxious to estabhsh close relations with the United States in 
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1908, and so had Fisher in 1913. A younger ChurchiH had advised Australia that it 
might be necessary to rely on the United States in an emergency, and Menzies had 
expressed similar views. The decision was not, then, a Labor break with tradition. 
While it marked a firm decision by Australia to play a major role in the Pacific, 
Menzies had made the same point in 1939, and it was he who upgraded the 
Washington post when he appointed Casey. On 26 May 1940 Menzies had told 
Roosevelt: 
Without the most prompt assistance from the United States there must be a grave danger 
of a state of affairs developing, more or less quickly, in which the power of Great Britain to 
defend liberty and free institutions is destroyed and we, your English speaking neighbours 
across the Pacific basin, must find our own independence . . . imperilled. There is in 
AustraUa a great beUef in your friendliness and goodwill. We feel that we are fighting for 
immortal things which you value as we do and on behalf of my own people, I beg for your 
earnest consideration and swift action." 
The two important things for Australia at the beginning of 1942 were American 
(and British) military assistance and a more direct voice in strategic policy decisions. 
The United States had quickly responded — on paper — to the declaration of war by 
Australia. "This is now a world war in the true sense. W e are in it with you and 
you will not find us wanting." '* But the practical response was slow. Curtin wrote 
to Roosevelt on 23 December pointing out that " the fall of Singapore would mean 
the isolation of the Philippines, the fall of the Netherlands East Indies and an attempt 
to smother all other bases. This would also sever our communications between the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans. . . . It is in your power to meet the situation. Should the 
government of the United States desire, we would gladly accept an American com-
mander in the Pacific area. The President has said that Australia will be a base of 
increasing importance but in order that it shall remain a base, Singapore must be 
reinforced."" 
Johnson urged Hull to support Curtin's request. Lieutenant-General George H. 
Brett was appointed to command American military forces in the South-West Pacific 
on 28 December. The United States planned to send critical supplies of planes, am-
munition, and men to the South-West Pacific to be used in the Philippines or subse-
quently against Japan in other sectors. These decisions had been taken before 
Curtin's appeal, and Roosevelt does not appear to have replied immediately to it. 
The fall of Singapore on 15 February and the rapid collapse of American power in the 
PhiHppines reinforced the importance of Australia as a major base in the Pacific. 
Johnson told Hornbeck, " I t is to our self-interest to protect Australia and enable it 
to survive as an independent state under Occidental c o n t r o l . " " MacArthur flew to 
Australia on 17 March and American forces on Bataan surrendered (American troops 
at Corregidor held out until 6 May). MacArthur, as commander-in-chief in the 
South-West Pacific, quickly established a rapport and close working relationship 
with Curtin. To avoid friction with Australian troops. General Sir Thomas Blamey 
was appointed as commander-in-chief of Australian military forces on 26 March. 
Australian troops from the Middle East began to arrive in Australia just before 
MacArthur flew in to Darwin. On 6 April, the 41st United States Division landed in 
Australia. 
Shortly after his arrival, MacArthur visited Canberra and spent an hour and a half 
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Hstening to the debate in the House of Representatives — to what the Australian 
journaHst Richard Hughes called "the circus". He Hstened to Rowley James bait 
Harold Holt ' 'with the finesse of a drunk pelting chunks of coal at the Union Club 
windows". The Speaker promptly suspended him. Asked for his impressions, 
MacArthur gravely commented, "If AustraHans fight as weU as they can argue, we 
are certain of victory.''" 
The other major objective of Australian policy was to secure more consultation 
and responsibility for the direction of the Pacific War, to have the fullest say in the 
direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Curtin and Evatt both pressed more 
vigorously than Menzies and Fadden for participation at the war cabinet and chiefs of 
staff level. There was little enthusiasm in either London or Washington for the 
Australian proposal, because both Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to control top 
strategy themselves." Proposals to set up a regional council in Singapore and then a 
Far Eastern Advisory Council in London had failed to satisfy Curtin. The Far 
Eastern Advisory Council would have included Britain, AustraHa, New Zealand, and 
the Netherlands "to try to form and focus a united view amongst the four powers". 
The United States and China were to be excluded. Churchill felt that the four-power 
council "would enable the British Commonwealth to act as a whole". The 
Netherlands must have been surprised to find itself in a British Commonwealth 
group with which it had only geographical affinities and a common interest in the 
defence of the Netherlands East Indies against Japanese aggression. Curtin's main 
interest was to secure Australian representation on a Pacific War Council located in 
Washington rather than London. Evatt was sent to Washington in March 1942 to 
press Australian claims for representation on a Pacific council and for greater military 
and economic aid in the South-West Pacific. 
This was the first direct contact of the American government with Evatt, about 
whom it had considerable curiosity and some reservations. As minister for External 
Affairs until 1949 he was the man who became best known to the State 
Department's top officials, if not to Hull and Roosevelt. As P.G. Edwards has com-
mented, "Running through almost everything written by American diplomats 
about either man [Curtin and Evatt] was an explicit or implicit comparison with the 
other."" Curtin impressed Nelson Johnson by his "sincerity, innate honesty of pur-
pose and earnestness". Johnson felt that he was "completely unable to dramatize 
himself, his cause, or the events with which he has to deal".^" Lord Gowrie, the 
United Kingdom high commissioner in Canberra, on the whole agreed; however, he 
felt that Curtin, in his broadcast appeal to "the men and women" of AustraHa after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, had "failed to make fuH use of the national 
rostrum on Australia's greatest parHamentary occasion in history", although on oc-
casion "the spirit and tone of leadership ran through" a later address.^' Evatt too 
was normally an unimpressive speaker. The State Department normally provided 
biographical sketches of important visitors for the president or secretary of state. One 
such brief, after listing Evatt's poHtical, academic and judicial career, pointed out 
that he was "weO known as an author and lecturer in the fields of law, politics and 
labor matters" and then went on to say: 
Although his intellectual competence is to be admired, his aggressive egocentric manner 
and blunt address in debate and personal relations have prevented him from attaining the 
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popularity of Prime Minister Chifley. He has been accused of self-seeking, and it is not 
always clear whether he is motivated by true patriotism or simply by egotism. He has a 
great self-confidence and determination, is anxious to have a finger in every pie, is slow in 
giving his confidence, and insists on receiving full credit for his achievements. Quick to 
make up his mind, although often forgetful in completing urgent matters, he is highly 
respected for his intellect and political courage.^ ^ 
This was a pen portrait of the mature Evatt rather than the raw diplomat who went 
to Washington in March 1942. His standards of poHtical morality and of decency in 
personal relations were contrasted by American diplomats in Canberra with Curtin's 
"integrity" and "sincerity". 
Before leaving for Washington, Evatt told parliament, "At no point whatever 
does any representative of this country meet any representative of the United States 
of America in any council committee or strategic body directly concerned in the con-
trolling of the AlHed war against Japan, or for that matter, Germany or Italy."" 
Casey had established a network of private contacts in Washington that kept him 
well informed about most political and military developments but without any in-
fluence on decisions. The network included Harry Hopkins, Hull, and Dean 
Acheson, as well as General H.H. Arnold, Admiral Ernest King, and General 
George C. Marshall. But Evatt distrusted Casey, partly because of his politics, partly 
because of his education and family background. "We have a swine in Washington 
named Casey," he told Walter Nash of New Zealand in January 1942. This story did 
not precede him to Washington but flew in after his arrival.^* By then, Casey had 
left to become British minister in the Middle East. Curtin did not share Evatt's 
animosity towards Casey. Shortly after his arrival, Evatt appointed himself as head of 
the AustraHan diplomatic mission so as to enhance his status in dealing with 
Roosevelt and Hull. The State Department entered him in the diplomatic Hst as 
"E.E. and M.P." — Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. 
Curtin had told the secretary of state for dominion affairs in London that he 
wanted to establish in Washington a staff representing the three services to act as 
technical advisers to the official Australian representatives on the Pacific War council 
and who would be associated with the American chiefs of staff as the joint body for 
advice on large issues of Australia and New Zealand.^' The American chiefs of staff 
would not have a bar of this proposal for shared strategic responsibility. Roosevelt 
had no desire to dilute his responsibility for overall direction of the war with anyone 
but ChurchiH and his own chiefs of staff. However, "if it would make anybody 
happy" he would "set up a council with a fancy name". He announced the setting 
up of the Pacific War Council on 30 March; it would hold its first meeting on 1 
April.^' Perhaps it was his sense of humour that led him to select this date for the 
first meeting of what he emphasized was to be a "consultative" body with purely 
advisory functions. 
Evatt and Curtin were both elated that one of the purposes of Evatt's mission had 
been achieved speedily. But neither of the AustraHans was a match for the politically 
mature and wily Roosevelt. At the first meeting in the cabinet room of the Ex-
ecutive Office in the White House, the British ambassador (Halifax), the 
Netherlands minister (London), the New Zealand minister (Nash), the Chinese 
foreign affairs minister (T.V. Soong), the Canadian counsellor (Hume Wrong), 
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Evatt, and Harry Hopkins were present, but the State Department was not 
represented. No formal minutes were kept. Roosevelt outlined the areas of strategic 
responsibihty for the United States and Britain with the Atlantic as the joint respon-
sibility of Britain and the United States. Evatt was surprised by the size of the coun-
cil — the inclusion of China, Canada and the Netheriands — and by the vagueness of 
the discussion. He said that "the security of AustraHa was of the first importance to 
AustraHans and he hoped that the United States would expeditiously re-enforce it at 
the earliest possible date, to such an extent that it [could] resist any attack by the 
Japanese"." At the second meeting, Roosevelt stated firmly his acceptance of the 
"defeat Hitler first strategy". If Germany were defeated, the defeat of Japan would 
almost surely follow, whereas the defeat of Japan would not necessarily ensure Ger-
many's defeat. A frustrated Evatt told the press after the meeting that the president 
would make a statement about the South-West Pacific area that night. Although 
Evatt explained that "the President would understand that he meant no harm", 
Roosevelt did not oblige and it was not until the fifth meeting on 29 April that the 
president expressed the hope that the total number of planes assigned to Australia 
would be raised to a thousand.^' 
Roosevelt presided over all meetings of the Pacific Council, which met weekly in 
1942 and much more infrequently in 1943. The last meeting was held on 11 January 
1944, although occasional informal meetings were held later in the year. Sir Owen 
Dixon, who succeeded Casey as the Australian minister in Washington, listened 
with respect to the president confess that nearly all he had been taught in college 
about economics by the experts had been proved wrong, to which the Canadian 
representative responded, rather incredulously, "You mean that you yourself have 
exploded the theories that were taught you?" When F.D.R. discussed post-war 
policies, Dixon commented, rather acidly, to the secretary of the committee. "If we 
accept the President's thought in this matter, it would seem to be of little impor-
tance who wins the war."^' Frustration at the impotence or ineffectiveness of the 
Pacific War Council led Evatt and Curtin to concentrate, without success, on secur-
ing direct access to the United States chiefs of staff. Evatt finally complained to Hull 
that "the Pacific War Council really was of no particular benefit". He attempted to 
persuade him that the council should be given executive powers.'" 
Evatt's first mission to Washington achieved very Httle; the Pacific War Council 
had been set up to placate a number of the smaller allies and not primarily as a result 
of Evatt's advocacy. Evatt pressed, with moderate success, for additional American 
economic and miHtary aid for Australia. In an interview with Cordell Hull before 
leaving for London, he expressed his dissatisfaction with Churchill's dealings with 
Australia." Evatt repeated his criticisms of Churchill on revisiting Washington on 9 
June on the way back to Australia. He suggested to Hull that the United States 
should "deal more directly with AustraHa in many ways instead of through Great 
Britain". Hull declined to be drawn into an intra-Commonwealth dispute, sug-
gesting that it "would be easier for AustraHa and Great Britain to work out this 
matter [lend-lease] than it is for us to intervene, if we were so disposed".'^ Evatt's 
first overseas visit seems to have paid few dividends other than the education of Evatt 
himself. Lunch with Jack Hickerson and Bob Stewart of the State Department, as 
well as Alan Watt, the AustraHan charge d'affaires, led Stewart to conclude, "One 
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must admire his frankness and directness. . . . On all occasions when we saw Evatt 
he was most friendly and likeable and Jack says that he is genuinely fond of h i m . " 
He did not share Curtin's estimate that Evatt's mission had "achieved our fuHest 
expectations"." 
Roosevelt was anxious to establish closer contacts with dominion prime ministers. 
Whether this was a reaction to Evatt's rather abrasive approach to American leaders 
is not clear. But on 1 July 1942, FDR wrote to Curtin: " I think it would be most 
helpful if we might have a talk on the war situation some time after Evatt has return-
ed to Australia and you have had a chance to discuss his visit. . . . Any time will suit 
me if you can give me about a week's notice." '* He gave similar invitations to Smuts 
of South Africa and Peter Eraser of New Zealand on the same day. Curtin finally 
decHned this invitation to visit Washington because of " the threatening dangers of 
the position in the South West Pacific", and it was not until 24 March 1944 that he 
was able to take up the invitation — Australia's initiative in concluding the 
Australia-New Zealand Agreement and the angry startled reaction made it im-
perative for him to try to pour oil on the troubled waters. For similar reasons, 
neither Smuts nor Eraser were able to accept Roosevelt's invitation. 
On 29 June 1942 Evatt had sent a cable to the Australian minister in Washington: 
"For judge Frankfurter" to be secretly deciphered by a junior Australian diplomat 
named McMiHan. (Eggleston was incensed by Evatt's request that McMiHan deliver 
to Cordell Hull a congratulatory letter on the American elections in 1944 and wrote 
to Evatt on 6 November: " I would Hke you to know that I have given directions 
that all telegrams whether marked in this way or not are to be shown to me. I 
reserve the right to say what is to be done with them. . . . I cannot accept respon-
sibility for the work of the Legation if instructions to the staff are given otherwise 
than through myself" [Evatt Papers].) Evatt's friends and contacts in Washington 
were very few. Justice Felix Frankfurter was, he told Harry Hopkins, probably the 
only person in Washington with whom Evatt has a sense of intimacy and to whom 
he wrote for help with his visit to the president and the secretary of s tate." He had 
known Evatt since September 1939. Frankfurter had written to Evatt on 25 February 
about Casey and his work in the United States: 
It is a pity that you do not know him personally. I appreciate the difficulties of a Foreign 
Minister who does not know his spokesman at the post most important outside his coun-
try, especially when that representative was the appointee of a prior government. . . you 
will forgive me if I speak my mind to you about Casey. . . . I know him intimately and 
have tested him as men are tested only in time of war. I say to you without reservation that 
he deserves the completes! confidence of yourself and your government. He enjoys the 
unstinted confidence of everyone here who matters from the President down. And he does 
so rightly, because of his indefatigable zeal on behalf of Australia, as part of our common 
cause. . . . I know whereof I speak. Hope therefore that you will make him reaUse that he 
does enjoy your complete confidence because lack of personal acquaintance between you 
two may, of course, be a difficulty on both sides. And it is imperative for aU that you and I 
value that he should feel that he is the effective spokesman of his country and his govern-
ment." 
In view of the erratic mails between the United States and Australia it is impossible 
to determine whether Frankfurter's letter reached Evatt before his lamentable com-
ment to Nash on Casey. 
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When Evatt returned to Washington in 1943, he confessed to Hickerson and 
Stewart that a year before he thought Australia had "one month to l ive". i-ne 
Pacific situation improved considerably after that. MacArthur's successful escape 
from the Philippines and his landing in AustraHa strengthened Australian morale and 
made it evident that the United States intended to make AustraHa the major base in 
the Pacific War . The Battle of the Coral Sea on 8 May 1942 checked the southward 
thrust of the Japanese navy and ended the danger of a sea attack on the Australian 
mainland. 
The major issue facing Australia was the building up of its defence capacity and the 
strengthening of all its armed forces. Inevitably there was a clash of interests, of 
global priorities, between Britain and the United States on the one hand and 
Australia on the other. At the Arcadia Conference, just after Pearl Harbor, Churchill 
and Roosevelt had adopted the "beat Hitler first" strategy: "Germany is stiH the 
prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated the col-
lapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow. . . . only the minimum of force 
necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted 
from operations against Germany . ' ' " British and American aid was slow before the 
fall of Singapore, and Curtin insisted on the return of the Sixth and Seventh 
Australian divisions from the Middle East to Australia. This was agreed to by the 
Australian war cabinet on 17 February. Churchill and Roosevelt vigorously opposed 
Curtin, arguing that Australian troops should be diverted to Burma. Curtin 
adamantly refused and the troops were recalled. 
Partly as a result of continuous requests from MacArthur, backed by Curtin, and 
partly as a result of Curtin's persistent cables to London and Washington, American 
reinforcements to MacArthur's command continued through 1942. By the time 
Evatt reached Washington in March 1942 some 80,000 American troops had landed 
in Australia, and the number had increased to 110,000 by December. Curtin told 
Roosevelt that Allied strategy should be directed towards the defeat of Japan first." 
Curtin was evaluating the Pacific strategy after the Battle of the Coral Sea and sent a 
copy of his letter to Evatt in London. But it had Httle eff^ ect on grand strategy. 
Japanese troops landed at Gona and Buna on 22 July and then planned an attack on 
Port Moresby from Kokoda as a base. They were halted at Milne Bay by Australian 
troops, and in the following months the Australians advanced along the Kokoda Trail 
and then recaptured Gona and Buna. 
The war in Papua and New Guinea imposed a great strain on Australian troops 
and morale, although this was grossly exaggerated according to Office of War Infor-
marion reports. P. Frank, of the Office of War Informarion, writing to Washington 
on the eve of the Milne Bay battle, reported: 
There is shocking disunity, there is a fatalistic depression that is almost solid, and if the 
Japanese landed tomorrow, the great majority of AustraUans would just turn over and play 
dead. The atmosphere reminds me of Washington in February 1932. 
After Singapore fell, Australia was in a blue funk. Australia had been a small boy flexinc 
his muscles and chaUenging a big bully, but knowing aU the time that his big brother stood 
between the bully and himself Suddenly big brother coUapses. The kids wants to run but 
he is in a corner and he is in a panic.*" 
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Curtin was anxious for further reinforcements and "the concentration of a 
superior naval force in the Pacific".*' Roosevelt, replying to a further appeal, told 
Curtin firmly that AustraHa had sufficient forces to defend itself against attack. "I 
am confident," he said, "that you appreciate fully the necessity of rigidly pursuing 
our present overall strategy that envisages the early and decisive defeat of Germany in 
order that we can quickly undertake an 'all out' effort in the Pacific."*^ It was more 
important, he felt, to prepare for a European offensive late in 1942 or in April 1943. 
Curtin warned Churchill and Roosevelt of the urgent need for reinforcements in 
Papua New Guinea: troops required for the present order of battle were 56,000 short 
and the army intake of 1,100 eighteen-year-olds a month fell far short of the wastage 
of 7,000 to 8,000 a month. He pressed them to agree to the return of the Ninth 
Division and warned that no further reinforcements could be sent from Australia to 
the Ninth Division. Roosevelt's snap judgment was that the North African opera-
tion must continue in full swing and could not be interrupted "until the whole 
African operation from Algiers to Egypt is definitely settled in our favour and every 
German and every ItaHan is driven out of Africa".*' The return of the Ninth Divi-
sion would only be possible after the completion of the African campaign, and then 
on the decision of the joint chiefs of staff. It was entitled to a rest period after its 
strenuous campaigns in the Egyptian area, he said, "but I think it should be kept in-
tact, fiHed with trained officers and made definitely available to take the offensive 
north from AustraHa". The combined chiefs of staff completely agreed with 
Roosevelt. 
Curtin refused to accept such advice and insisted on recall of the Ninth Division: 
"Battle and disease casualties in New Guinea are considerable. The two together 
may soon place us in what may be a very precarious position. The Japanese have 
shown a degree of stubbornness in the defence of Buna and Gona which would in-
dicate that they are not going to take their reverses in this area without making the 
greatest effort to hold on and to come back later."** Curtin threatened to reduce 
AustraHan forces on New Guinea by another division.*' 
Roosevelt accepted Churchill's recommendation for the transfer of the Australian 
troops on 2 December, but very reluctantly. He wanted the transfer to take place 
only after a "final and decisive victory" over Rommel. Churchill told Curtin that 
shipping would be made available at the end of January; the Ninth Division reached 
AustraHa on 18 February. AustraHa thus successfully resisted aH pressures to retain 
the troops in the Middle East. Curtin acted in the face of opposition not only from 
ChurchHl and Roosevelt but also from Admiral W.D. Leahy and the joint chiefs of 
staff. The offer of the reinforcement of the American troops in Australia by the 
transfer of the US Twenty-fifth Division from Hawaii was withdrawn: the Twenty-
fifth was diverted to Guadalcanal. The Casablanca Conference (14-24 January 1943) 
considered but rejected a proposal by Marshall and King to double the aHocation of 
military resources to the Pacific area. However, a shift away from the older strategy 
of beating Hitler first was being contemplated by the United States. MacArthur was 
given two more divisions and 860 additional aircraft to carry out a limited offensive 
against Japan. 
Curtin was frustrated by Roosevelt's refusal to provide additional planes for the 
Pacific: he had asked for fifteen hundred to two thousand. In a press interview on 24 
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December 1942 he said that "no appeals to Churchill and Roosevelt would do any 
good", because to ChurchiH AustraHa was "the forgotten land" and Roosevelt 
would not send help because of poHtical considerations. His Australia Day address on 
26 January 1943 was "directed to the people of AustraHa and also to the people of 
the United States of America".*' The speech was directly primarily to AustraHans, 
and Curtin was anxious to strengthen his political hand against an opposition strong-
ly attacking his Militia Bill. He knew that ChurchiH and Roosevelt had just met in 
North Africa and that the news of their meeting was about to break. No poHtician 
could resist the temptation of appearing to indicate that he was partly responsible tor 
their decisions. In fact Australia does not appear to have been informed. The 
American minister in Canberra, Nelson Johnson, felt that Curtin wanted "in some 
way to offset in their minds the depressing effect of being told that Australia and 
America would fight a holding war in the Pacific while they delivered a killing blow 
to Hitler in Europe — a blow that it might take a long time to deliver".*' His pro-
posal that Roosevelt renew his invitation to Curtin to visit Washington was not 
taken up. 
Roosevelt refused Curtin's request for massive reinforcement of the Allied air 
force in the Pacific because it involved a departure from the agreed strategy of beating 
Hitler first. He did, however, provide MacArthur with half the number of planes 
requested. Curtin told Roosevelt emphatically that "the strategy was determined 
without reference to the Commonwealth Government". He went on: "The simple 
fact is that we had no voice in the decisions. We were confronted with a fait accompli 
and we had no alternative but to accept the decisions, much as we disliked them."*' 
Evatt flew to Washington in April 1943 to secure additional aircraft for the 
RAAF and so enable it to play a larger part in the Pacific War. This would 
strengthen the Australian demand for a separate voice in deciding the settlement -with 
Japan. He was not accompanied by any member of the Department of External 
Affairs but took instead W.S. Robinson, a senior Broken Hill Proprietary executive, 
and A. V. Smith of the Department of Supply. Robinson was seconded to Evatt as an 
industrial adviser largely on the advice of the Collins House group of companies in 
the hope that he might act as a restraining influence on Evatt. A close friendship 
quickly developed between the two men, and Robinson expressed his appreciation of 
the opportunity the mission gave him of "serving the Man whose efforts meant so 
much to the Empire and AustraHa".*' Evatt called on Hull on 15 April and told him 
that the "Pacific War Council really was of no particular benefit for consultation 
with Australia since it talked about everything except the war situation as it related 
to Australia and other allied countries in that area".'" He said that he was dissarisfied 
with the aid being given to the Allies in the Pacific. The mission was only partly suc-
cessful. Robinson found that there were several hundred Lockheed Lightning type 
planes which had been ordered by France before the collapse. Australia could have 
obtained two hundred with an option on the rest. Unfortunately, the RAAF disHk-
ed the planes for tactical reasons. George C. Kenney, the commander of the AlHed 
air forces in the Pacific, immediately grabbed them. American promises of planes 
were blocked by General Benny Myers, who diverted them to other centres. Evatt 
lost patience and was " 'forced to remonstrate' (. . . this is one of the world's 
greatest understatements)" to the American High Command. Although Myers was 
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demoted, the planes were not delivered. In London, Evatt met Churchill who pro-
mised him two squadrons of Spitfires. When Air Vice-Marshal C. Portal demurred, 
Churchill replied "Portal, one does not begin to give until it hurts ."" 
Two weeks later Evatt lunched with Hickerson and Stewart, together with Alan 
Watt. Although less depressed than during his visit the previous year, he "dwelt at 
length on the now popular theme," that Australia was "the forgotten and neglected 
country". Stewart noted: 
Dr. Evatt feels a particular grievance against this country: the United States has accepted 
military responsibility for the South-west Pacific area and that we are not fulfilUng our 
responsibihty. Dr. Evatt believes he is pleading not for Australia alone, but for the whole 
United Nations. His argument is that if we should turn our total available resources against 
Japan, Japan would be quickly brought to her knees, whereas giving Japan a further six 
months to develop the resources of her conquered areas may prolong the war six years.'^  
He stated that a tremendous lot of ill-feehng against the United States was growing 
up in Australia "on the ground that we have accepted the Australian responsibility 
and have not lived up to i t" . He made the extraordinary suggestion that Australia 
might withdraw into splendid isolation after the war with no special ties with Great 
Britain or the United States. During an animated discussion, Hickerson said he 
hoped that means would be found "to stop the bellyaching of the Australians" even 
if this meant air reinforcements. "The conversation throughout was entirely friend-
ly, if heated at times, and ended on a wholly cordial tone. No china, chairs or tables 
were broken." 
Although no china, chairs, or tables were broken, Evatt came to Washington 
with State Department officials having reservations about the man and his visit. One 
could almost argue that Evatt was a schizophrenic. Nelson Johnson felt that Evatt 
had greatly matured after his first overseas visit and contact with his opposite 
numbers. He was "surprisingly urbane, affable, tolerant and even humorous. . . . 
He seemed a brand new Evatt."" Frankfurter, after being asked to smooth the way 
for his first visit, found him "in a much more equable and composed mood than he 
was a year ago. . . . Last year he was critical of almost everybody, especially 
ChurchiH and our own people, barring the President, except that he thought the 
President was misinformed by his military advisers."'* 
On the other hand, Evatt tended, as he usually did, to play his cards very close to 
his chest. On 27 March, before going to Washington, he met John Minter, now 
first secretary of the American Legation in Canberra, in what was obviously a con-
trived encounter. Evatt asked Minter to send a message to Washington for him: 
"He said that he could use External Affairs and the Australian Legation at 
Washington to deliver such a message but that he did not want the head of his 
Department to know about it nor even the Prime Minister. He said he would like to 
get some hint to the powers-that-be that he would wish a deferment of decisions on 
Australia until he got there. He said that he would Hke it to appear that he had not 
requested a message to be sent, but that it was a voluntary act on our part after a 
casual conversation with h im."" Minter sent the message to Washington with a 
description of the circumstances in which the "casual conversation" took place. 
Hickerson, Stewart, and other members of the State Department realized that 
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Evatt had become a professional politician with his eyes fixed on the forthcoming 
August federal elections. Minter clarified his views in a letter to Stewart on 7 May: 
"I feel that I can safely say to you now what I have felt for more than a year that all 
the howls from out here were for the purchase of aggrandisement tor 
MacArthur's part aggrandisement of MacArthur; for Evatt's aggrandisement of 
Evatt. . . . I think I need not elaborate the statement that Evatt is interested chiefly 
in Evatt. . . . I do not believe I have heard one single person give him credit ior 
sincerity of purpose. Everywhere I go I listen to animated versions on his person and 
character."" Evatt's predilection for secrecy was confirmed on the same day by a 
memorandum on a visit of Alan Watt, the charge d'affaires during Ambassador Sir 
Owen Dixon's absence. Watt found his position "embarrassing and humiliating" 
because he could not keep the State Department informed about Evatt's movements. 
Watt commented that he did not know what was being done by Evatt and did not 
see all the telegrams exchanged with Canberra. Apparently there were sharp dif-
ferences between Evatt and Dixon on matters of policy. 
In these circumstances, what did Evatt achieve on his second mission to 
Washington? His primary function was to persuade Roosevelt and the joint chiefs of 
staff to agree to expand the RAAF to seventy-three squadrons. Roosevelt rejected 
the proposal because it would adversely affect plans in other war theatres. Despite 
Evatt's request to Minter that the president delay any decision on the allocation of 
aircraft to Australia until his arrival in the United States, the decision had already 
been taken after discussions with General Richard K. Sutherland and Kenney of 
MacArthur's staff before Evatt left AustraHa." Evatt scaled down his requests for the 
delivery of 475 planes to 135 during 1943 and the balance in 1944. Roosevelt was 
prepared to agree to his modified programme if some of the aircraft were obsolete 
and not on Evatt's schedule. Evatt's protests were unavailing. Bell's estimate that 
"Evatt's persistent diplomacy achieved qualified success"" needs to be revised: it 
met with very little success and could be described as a diplomatic rebuff by a presi-
dent and chiefs of staff stHl primarily obsessed with the European war. 
The mission in fact accomplished Httle. Curtin rebuffed Evatt's request that he be 
given credit for a successful mission on the eve of his departure for London. A second 
public statement praised Sutherland and Kenney for their part in bolstering Pacific 
defence and offence but failed to mention Evatt's role in Washington. Curtin subse-
quently told the House of Representatives that the Evatt mission had removed any 
possible "cause for doubt or misunderstanding between Australia and its major 
allies"." In a national broadcast on 1 August, Evatt said that his mission had met 
with complete success. He thought that Curtin had read and approved of the speech, 
but whether before or after it was delivered is not clear. There was considerable 
speculation in diplomatic and political circles that Evatt was calculating that the elec-
tion of August 1943 might result in a stalemate and that he might in this political 
crisis become prime minister.'" Evatt appealed to the imperial connection during the 
campaign. He avoided the mud-slinging widely indulged in during the party conflict 
and spoke logically and without malice. "The Empire must not be afraid of offen-
ding other nations by taking an interest in itself"." The election resulted in a land-
slide for Labor, and Curtin obtained a clear majority with forty-nine seats in a House 
of seventy-four. Evatt was defeated in the ballot for the deputy leadership of the 
ALP. 
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One of the interesting offshoots of discussions about the strategy and tactics of the 
Pacific War was the announcement on 27 May 1943 of the award of a knighthood to 
General Douglas MacArthur for services rendered to Australia. This honour — 
Honorary Member of the Military Division of the First Class, or Knight Grand 
Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (GCB) — must have been discuss-
ed with both London and Washington as well as with MacArthur himself. It was 
agreed that it was both legal and proper for MacArthur to accept it. There was some 
discussion whether MacArthur would use the title of "Sir" or whether Mrs MacAr-
thur would become Lady MacArthur. The social and political flutter in the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission was resolved by the decision of the ABC not to 
use the title publicly. The press agreed not to carry the story with headlines. The 
AustraHan pubhc was hardly aware of the honour bestowed on MacArthur by the 
Australian government. The decision must have been primarily because of Curtin's 
close friendship with MacArthur and admiration of his leadership; the discussion had 
been heated at times, and the surprising thing is that there was no prior leak to the 
press.'^ The award was linked with a proposal to make a similar award to General 
Eisenhower. Evatt was in Washington when the announcement was made, and at a 
lunch with Hickerson and Stewart on his forty-ninth birthday told them that he 
thought that "General MacArthur's unpopularity in Washington" played a part in 
"the aHocation of planes and other war materials for the South-West Pacific area"." 
9 Planning for the Post- War Pacific: 
1943-45 
Paul Hasluck has argued that Evatt's speech on 14 October 1943 to the House of 
Representatives on international affairs "gives a clear division between the first and 
second phases of Evatt's work as Minister for External Affairs".' The threat to 
Australian security from Japan had receded, and the Australian war effort had gone 
from the defensive to the offensive. Curtin's electoral victory in August had ensured 
Labor control of Australian policy for another three years, even although it had given 
a setback to Evatt's personal ambitions. Evatt had been abroad from April until July, 
and the Department of External Affairs only began to see him on the eve of the 
federal election. As attorney-general, he had devoted a great deal of time to constitu-
tional questions, pushing foreign policy to one side temporarily at least. The perma-
nent officials of the department had been left to resolve the day-to-day problems with 
virtually no guidance from their minister. 
During his absence, there had been a resurgence of pro-British sentiment as the 
Japanese threat to AustraHa lessened. In 1942, London had begun to try to counter 
American influence in Australia and to overcome anti-British feeling. The Shropshire 
replaced the sunken Canberra, and a squadron of Spitfires was sent to Darv^dn. The 
Lethbridge Military Mission was sent to Australia, but American military officials 
had few opportunities to meet them. In November 1943 the Duke of Gloucester was 
appointed as governor-general in an attempt to strengthen the traditional Hnks.^  A 
senior member of the British Ministry of Information was attached to the office of 
the United Kingdom high commissioner in Canberra to help strengthen the ac-
tivities of a not particularly able high commissioner. Americans felt that the British 
did not intend "to let Australia become too conscious of itself as a nation or to let 
American influence become predominant". Evatt in his conversation with Hickerson 
and Stewart on 30 April 1943 drew their attention to "the tremendous lot of iH feel-
ing against the United States in Australia" because the United States had accepted 
the Australian responsibility and had not lived up to its bargain. "He played up the 
British connection during the August election campaign," Hickerson noted.' 
By October, Evatt was conscious of the British attempt to recover influence in the 
Pacific and of the concern that this was causing in Washington. He had been 
spasmodicaHy interested in post-war problems (other than Australian security) and 
AustraHa's role in shaping a settlement in the Pacific. He had been frustrated by 
AustraHa's inability to influence major policy discussions through the Pacific War 
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Council. He recognized Sir Owen Dixon's view that it at least gave Australia the 
opportunity to state its views even if the vital decisions were taken by Roosevelt and 
his chiefs of staff in consultation with Churchill and the British war cabinet. At the 
Institute of Pacific Relations conference at Mont Tremblant in November-December 
1942, Hasluck, who attended as an official from the External Affairs Department, 
noted the concern of Canadian delegates that one of the toughest elements in the 
diplomacy of reconstruction would be the "Anglo-American power complex", a 
disposition of Britain and the United States to "fix up the world between them and 
to get the other nations to add their signatures".* Hasluck felt that Australia had 
"an opportunity and responsibility to apply her energies through diplomacy for 
peace to minimise the dangers" of United States domination of the post-war settle-
ment even while collaborating. Evatt read Hasluck's report of the conference and 
discussed it with him. ' 
Evatt, then, saw the possibility of playing a part as Australia's minister in the 
post-war settlement. With a domestic political career leading to the prime minister-
ship looking remote, he began to contemplate an international career (which in fact 
culminated in his election as president of the United Nations General Assembly in 
1946-49). His speech of 14 October 1943 was delivered with new horizons in view. 
It owed a lot to Hasluck's ideas and drafting, but the final form was Evatt's. In his 
broad survey of international relations, he identified special AustraHan interests in the 
Pacific islands, Papua New Guinea, and New Zealand. He examined the weaknesses 
of the League of Nations and proposals for a strengthened League. But he said: 
There has recently emerged the notion of a post war settlement carried into effect ex-
clusively as a result of a treaty of alliance between the three great military Powers namely, 
Britain or the British Commonwealth, the United States of America and Soviet Union, to 
which "Big Three" may subsequently be added China. It is contended by these advocating 
such an alliance and rejecting a wider association that, in the former case, decisions can be 
more speedily reached and more effectively enforced. . . . it would be extremely unfor-
tunate if the smaller nations of the world were not brought within the framework of an 
organised family of nations determined to give effect to the declared objectives of the 
United Nations. Australia has retained full membership of the League and is still paying the 
annual subsidy required by the rules.' 
Evatt emphasized Australia's interests in the problems of the Pacific region and 
Papua New Guinea and the welfare of the native peoples of the Pacific. "From the 
point of view of defence, of trade and of transport, most of them [the islands and ter-
ritories] can fairly be described as coming within an extended Australian zone. It is 
certain that we shall be able to find common ground for collaboration so as to bring 
about greater security and mutual benefits in the post war wor ld ." Evatt used with 
skill the material provided by the Department of External Affairs, which had taken 
great care in briefing the minister.' 
Evatt himself was responsible for the proposal to consult with the proper represen-
tatives of the South-West Pacific and especially with New Zealand. WelHngton had 
recently appointed a high commissioner to Canberra, and Evatt planned to 
reciprocate as soon as possible: "As members of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations and as the two largest European communities in the Western Pacific, 
Australia and New Zealand are destined to discharge heavy responsibilities in the 
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area. Today their joint power is very great. It should remain commensurate with 
their new responsibilities. I regard permanent collaboration between Austraha and 
New Zealand as pivotal to a sound post-war Pacific pol icy." ' 
The speech carried further the views expressed by Menzies about Australia s role 
in the Pacific, views developed by Evatt himself shortly after becoming External Af-
fairs minister. The speech also reflected Evatt's new-found confidence after his recent 
visit to the United States and Great Britain. Here was "a brand new Evat t" , as 
Nelson Johnson remarked, who had survived the lack of success in Washington but 
whose confidence was undented. Hasluck felt that Evatt's speech was "consistent 
with and indeed was the foundation of Australian policies, followed in Korea, 
Malaysia and Vietnam, supporting the intervention of non-Pacific nations in main-
taining the peace settlement in Asia and the Pacific, regretting and opposing the 
withdrawal of Britain from a peace-keeping role in the region, and accepting an 
Australian commitment to resist any revision of the Asian settlement by force". ' 
This declaration of Australian policy was immediately followed by preparations 
for the Australia-New Zealand Conference. London and Washington showed Httle 
enthusiasm for or interest in it. This strengthened Evatt's determination that 
Australia play an important part in the post-war settlement in the Pacific. He tried to 
define the nature of international relations in a post-war world and the role of the 
small and middle powers dissatisfied with Great Power dominance. His mature 
views were expressed in his speech to the House of Representatives on 8 September 
1944, which was largely the work of Paul Hasluck. 
The community of nations consists of small and near-great Powers as weU as the Big Three 
or the Big Four. The second part of the problem of world organisation is to ensure that 
these leading Powers wiU pay due regard to the old but still cherished doctrine of equality 
of States. They should allow fair representation to smaller powers on any world organisa-
tion, and so gain their confidence and support. No sovereign State, however small, -will 
wish to think that its destiny has been handed over to another power, however great. Nor 
does history at aU support the view that wisdom is confined to the strongest nations or that 
knowledge is found only at the centre of power. Therefore, a successful world organisation 
requires an enthusiastic contribution from smaller Powers both in counsel and in material 
support. It must be remembered that a so-called small Power may in certain areas and in 
special circumstances possess great, if not decisive, influence.'" 
This was a logical extension of Evatt's frustration with wartime consultation bet-
ween the Allies. By 1944 Australia was not represented in the United States on "any 
Council committee or strategic body directly concerned in the controHing of the 
AHies war against Japan or for that matter, Germany or Italy". The Pacific War 
Council had become little more than an exercise in public relations. Vital poHcy deci-
sions had often been communicated to Australia after delays of up to three months. 
This failure to obtain effective participation in strategic war planning in the Pacific 
made Evatt the more determined that Australia should actively participate in post-
war planning. 
On the same day that he spoke to the House of Representatives on AustraHan 
foreign policy (14 October 1943), Evatt told John Minter that Australia and the 
United States should divide control of the Pacific between them along "a natural lin 
of defence stretching from Timor, through Dutch and Australian New Guinea N 
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Britain, New Ireland, the Solomons, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia and New 
Zealand". This should be an Australian regional sphere of responsibility, a respon-
sibility that might be shared "in collaboration with the Dutch, the French, the New 
Zealanders and the British"." There was no suggestion that the United States 
should be involved, and Evatt envisaged that the American presence in the South 
Pacific would be confined to American Samoa. Despite his statement that existing 
sovereign rights should not be jeopardized, Nelson Johnson was convinced that 
Evatt desired "Australian sovereignty over the entire Fiji, Solomons and Hebrides 
groups". He told CordeH HuH that Evatt's proposal to form a "permanent zone of 
security" in the South-West Pacific was "a very clear statement of what might be 
called the first imperialistic peace terms yet made by any leader among the Allied 
Nations of this war".'^ 
Both Australia and New Zealand knew that American civilian and service planners 
were anxious to secure a string of island bases in the north and south Pacific after the 
war. This would stabilize the post-war Pacific and would be some reward for 
American Lend-Lease assistance. Roosevelt told the Pacific War Council that air and 
naval bases "should be taken over by the powers most capable of exercising effective 
military control"." But he was not thinking of small or middle power control. 
Both Australia and New Zealand were conscious of American ambitions and shared a 
common "concern regarding the future control of bases constructed and occupied by 
U.S. forces in the Pacific".'* 
AustraHan thinking about a post-war settlement was also centred on problems of 
security and full employment. The economic lessons of the Great Depression had 
been indelibly imprinted on Australian Labor Party policy and into Evatt's 
thinking." The fuH employment concept was linked to the international aim of 
"freedom from want" at the Hot Springs Conference in Virginia (18 May-3 June 
1943), a conference that initiated the work that culminated in the estabhshment of 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 1945. Australian 
took part in discussion on post-war economic proposals in London on 21 February 
1944, which emanated from British and American planning committees. At this 
stage every attempt was made by Australia to secure full co-operation with New 
Zealand to ensure that a "common point of view" should be adequately presented. 
Evatt's letter to Peter Eraser of New Zealand on 24 January 1944 defined, for the 
first time, Australia's post-war economic policy." 
Consultation on economic matters and participation in post-war economic plann-
ing were not matched by consultation at the political level, and this acted as a con-
tinual irritant to Evatt. Discussions between Churchill and Roosevelt had taken 
place at Casablanca on 14-26 January 1943 over the global war effort. Their meeting 
at Quebec in August 1943 was concerned in part with the use of Australian forces in 
the counter-offensive and recapture of Singapore. Canada and China took part in 
some of the Quebec discussions, but AustraHa did not. Churchill merely agreed to 
keep Curtin fully informed of the discussion and decisions." The Moscow Con-
ference (19-30 October) considered for the first time the problem of organization for 
post-war peace as well as discussing questions of a settlement of European military 
problems. The tripartite communique recognized "the necessity of establishing at 
the earliest practicable date a general international organisation, based on the princi-
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pie of the sovereign equality of all peace loving states, and open to membership by all 
such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and 
security"." 
At Cairo on 22-26 November, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China 
discussed the strategy to be used to defeat Japan and the allocations of resources to 
the different theatres of war. It agreed that Japan would have to surrender aH ter-
ritories it had seized since 1918. No decisions were made about the aHocation of 
those territories, such as the Japanese mandated islands. The future of these islands 
could affect Australia's post-war security. While there had been informal discussions 
with the United Kingdom before the Moscow Conference, both Australia and New 
Zealand read the terms of the Cairo communique in the press. Writing later, Evatt 
protested that "it was a pronouncement by a selected few and not the result of reason-
ed deliberation by all concerned"." Planning was carried further by the meeting in 
Tehran between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin (28 November-1 December), 
which fiHed out in eloquent phrases those parts of the Moscow Declaration deahng 
with a post-war international body to preserve peace. 
Evatt's reluctance to allow Britain to speak for the dominions at top-level interna-
tional conferences was reflected in his speech to parliament on 14 October when he 
insisted on Australia's right to take part in aH aspects of the post-war settlement. A 
week later, Evatt invited New Zealand's prime minister to Canberra for an exchange 
of views about Pacific problems. The meeting was delayed because of Eraser's iHness, 
and the Canberra Conference did not open until 17 January 1944. An exchange of 
high commissioners had taken place early in 1943; Carl Berendsen became the first 
New Zealand high commissioner in Canberra, and Thomas E. D'Alton was ap-
pointed as Australian high commissioner in Wellington. The Moscow Declaration 
of 30 October and the Cairo Declaration of 26 November merely reinforced Evatt's 
determination to seek greater independence of Washington and London. The 
Canberra Conference, which had been planned before Moscow and Cairo, reflected 
the feeling that consultation by Britain was inadequate. The Australia-New Zealand 
Agreement was designed to "secure the maximum degree of unity in the presenta-
tion, elsewhere, of the views of the two countries"." 
Some part of the diminution in the dialogue between London and Canberra may 
well have been due to the rather devious methods employed on occasion by Evatt in 
communicating with his own missions abroad and so with foreign diplomats. Yet 
much of Evatt's concern was shared by both New Zealand and by Canada. At a 
dinner at Chequers with Mackenzie King in May 1944, Churchill described Canada 
as "the link with America". "That fraternal association must be kept up," he said, 
and we look to you above all to keep the two together. Canada is the interpreter." 
This echoed his description of Canada at a Guildhall lunch on 4 September 1941 as 
"the linch-pin of the English-speaking world". But it quickly became apparent that 
Churchill merely meant that Canada could represent Britain on a regional council in 
the Americas. Disillusioned at the prospect of being "close to a chore bov" 
Mackenzie King said immediately that Canada intended to speak for herself "We 
would wish our own right of representation, if not as one of the Big Three or Four 
at least as one of the middle powers, medium powers, that should be brought into the 
world organisation in some way that power and responsibility go together " Evatt 
PLANNING FOR THE POST-WAR PACIFIC 123 
Eraser, and Mackenzie King were fighting a similar battle to that which engaged 
W.M. Hughes, Massey, and Borden a generation earlier, and which led to their 
representation at the imperial cabinet and conference.^' 
Evatt was inconsistent in deciding to make the Canberra Conference merely a 
bilateral one and in not consulting with Britain or any of the other powers interested 
in Pacific problems, especially as the agenda formally included, among other things, 
the disposition of Pacific islands and the development of Pacific airlines.^^ It was in 
part a gesture of independence and of Australian and New Zealand solidarity as small 
nations. Britain was advised that a conference was being held but received neither an 
invitation nor an agenda and so was not represented. 
The failure to consult Australia about the declaration against Japan adopted at the 
Cairo Conference was seen by the Australian cabinet as a "test case in view of their 
belief that failure to protest now [would] make their position untenable in future 
discussions, and in the decisions to be taken at the peace settlement". A protest was 
dispatched to London. The Cairo Conference appeared to Evatt as irrefutable proof 
that the United States was determined to dictate a post-war settlement in the Pacific 
without any consultation of the small powers.^' Evatt was deeply affronted by what 
appeared to be a deterioration in communications with both London and 
Washington.^* This may have influenced his sudden decision, apparently made after 
the meeting opened in Canberra, to try to convert it from an informal exchange of 
views in depth into a conference to draft a formal treaty between Australia and New 
Zealand. 
When the conference opened on 17 January, Evatt was the only delegate with firm 
views about its purpose. A good deal of preparatory work had been done by W.D. 
Forsyth of the External Affairs Department on the Pacific islands and territories, but 
Evatt himself drafted the agenda which "focused on co-operation between Australia 
and New Zealand on a number of precise topics". These included the objectives and 
scope, specific matters requiring co-operation and the machinery needed for col-
laboration and the exchange of information. He prepared "Notes on the Agenda" 
which then became the "chief working paper of the conference". The detailed agen-
da was given to the New Zealand delegates two days before the meeting began. Cur-
tin and the Australian cabinet seem to have been given little information about the 
conference, although Curtin and Eraser shared the opening speeches. After the com-
mittee on the agenda had completed its work late on the second day, as Evatt was 
walking down the corridor with Hasluck and W-R- Hodgson, the secretary of the 
department, he suddenly said, "Why don't we make an agreement?" (i.e., a formal 
treaty). By next morning the law officers had decided that Australia did have such a 
power, and a treaty was drafted on the nineteenth: No reference to a draft treaty had 
been included in the agenda.^' 
Eraser's immediate reaction was that he had no intention of signing a treaty but 
then agreed to do so "if that was the way AustraHa wanted i t" . However, although 
the agreement was drawn up and signed in treaty form, he came to regard it merely 
as "an inter-governmental agreement, setting out the objectives of the two domi-
nions on questions on which we had a single mind and recording the means which 
we proposed to adopt for future collaboration and co-operation".^' The New 
Zealand cabinet felt that a bilateral pact might lead to criticism in the United States 
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and weaken the spirit of unity among the United Nations. The Evatt proposal also 
surprised members of the Australian delegation. The prime minister, Curtin, had 
little to do with it but accepted it, perhaps "in an excess of enthusiasm".*' 
The Canberra (or Australian-New Zealand) Agreement insisted as "a matter of 
cardinal importance" that the two governments be represented at the highest level 
"not only in the membership but also in the planning and estabUshment" of the 
general international organization envisaged by the Moscow Declaration. AustraUa 
and New Zealand feared that they might be faced with "a more or less cut and dried 
plan in which the two governments had either no voice at all or only a small time 
permitted for adherence".*' The ultimate disposal of enemy territories in the Pacific 
should be effected only with the agreement of Australia and New Zealand as part of a 
general Pacific settlement; their assent was regarded as essential before there could be 
any change in the sovereignty or system of control of any of the Pacific islands 
(Articles 26-27). 
The agreement also dealt specifically with such matters as air trunk routes and con-
trol of immigration and emigration. It set up machinery for collaboration and co-
operation between the two countries with a permanent secretariat in both Canberra 
and Wellington. 
On three other issues, the middle-powermanship of Australia and New Zealand 
clearly emerged. Article 13 stated: "The two governments agree that, within the 
firamework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of defence compris-
ing the South West and South Pacific areas shall be established and that this zone 
should be established on AustraUa and New Zealand, stretching through the arc of 
islands north and north-east of AustraUa, to Western Samoa and Cook Islands". 
Neither New Zealand nor Australia had the military power to estabUsh a regional 
security system, and at best could only consult on developing a local zone of defence. 
New Zealand had its feet on the ground much more securely than AustraUa; it was 
more pragmatic in its approach to Pacific problems than Evatt. 
Article 16 declared: "The two Governments accepted as a recognized principle of 
international practice that the construction and use, in time of war, by any power, of 
naval, military or air installations, in any territory under the sovereignty or control 
of another power, does not, in itself, afford any basis for territorial claims or rights 
of sovereignty or control after the conclusion of hostilities." This was a sensitive 
issue both in the State Department and the Pentagon at a time when the Pacific War 
had not yet been won. Cordell Hull told Fraser that the agreement "almost shocked 
some of us", and compared Evatt's policy to that of the Russians in deaUng with 
Britain over the PoUsh question. His comment to Curtin and Owen Dixon was that 
"we were almost flabbergasted" at certain provisions in the agreement, notably 
those dealing with the disposal of Pacific territories. A New Zealand diplomat at-
tempted to ease tension by explaining that "Australia had not intended to be rude 
. . . but this was merely their way and that it had always been their way of dealing 
with the British and the British just had to take it".*' The State Department politely 
reminded the two governments that "they could deal only with territories under 
their own control and could not affect the rights of other countries to other ter-
ritories". Australian and New Zealand proposals for the early holding of a general 
Pacific conference to deal with territorial changes, suggested for April 1944, were 
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quietly pigeonholed. New Zealand helped pour oil on the troubled waters by induc-
ing Evatt to rephrase his reply to the United States in February 1944 because it was 
"somewhat too forthright in tone to conciliate the Americans. There is a strong 
desire on the part of the New Zealand Government not to allow a situation to arise 
in which there is a deadlock between the views of the United States Government on 
the one hand and ourselves and Australia on the other."'" 
The third sensitive issue, affecting primarily Great Britain but also France and the 
United States, was the section deaHng with dependencies and territories and the 
welfare and advancement of native peoples of the Pacific (Articles 24-31). After 
declaring that there should be no change in the sovereignty or system of control of 
any of the islands of the Pacific without the agreement of both Australia and New 
Zealand, the agreement declared that in applying the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter to the Pacific, the doctrine of trusteeship was "applicable in broad principle 
to all the colonial territories in the Pacific and elsewhere, and that the main purpose 
of the trust is the welfare of the native peoples and their social, economic and 
political development" (Article 28). To promote the welfare of the island peoples, it 
was agreed that as soon as possible a regional organization, tentatively called the 
South Seas Regional Commission, should be established with representatives of 
Great Britain, the United States, and France joining with New Zealand and Australia 
(Article 30)." 
This was a watered-down version of Australian proposals set out in the original 
draft agenda. It was a curious blend of socialist ideaHsm and anti-imperialism with 
perhaps an expansionist interest in British-administered islands in the Pacific. 
Australia was prepared to take over from Britain control of the British Solomon 
Islands and to establish a condominium over the New Hebrides or complete control 
with or without New Zealand. This was virtually a revival of Australian nineteenth-
century colonial interests in adjacent island territories. Australia also proposed that 
under no circumstances would the two powers agree to the establishment of a con-
dominium with the United States over New Ireland, New Britain, the Solomons, 
New Caledonia and the New Hebrides (draft agenda, item 37 [4]).'^ 
These proposals ran counter to fundamental New Zealand policy that "Britain 
should remain in sovereign control of their present territories in the South Pacific"." 
New Zealand in fact desired for sentimental and security reasons to maintain a conti-
nuing British presence in the south-western Pacific. The Evatt draft insisting on a re-
jection of any condominium with the United States over specified island groups was 
also eliminated from the final agreement. The New Zealand delegation did not desire 
a confrontation with either London or Washington over these issues but was 
prepared to accept a bilateral agreement between Britain and Australia over the 
future of the Solomons. Britain expressed an interest in the agreement, poHtely noted 
the views set out on the control of island territories, and expressed a hope that the 
holding of a conference to establish the South Seas Regional Commission might be 
deferred for consultation with other governments and by the next meeting of the 
Commonwealth prime ministers. "You wiH appreciate that this proposal comes as a 
new one to us," the secretary of state for dominion affairs wrote to the New Zealand 
foreign minister, "We have received no private notice from either of the two 
Governments concerned that any public announcement of the kind was to be 
made."'* 
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The question of trusteeship for British colonial territories was pigeonholed. At a 
conference between Australia and New Zealand in Wellington (1-6 November 1944) 
under the Canberra Agreement, the principles of trusteeship were repeated.' The 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference on a General International Organisation had been 
held, and both Australia and New Zealand envisaged the setting up of a counterpart 
of the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission to which colonial 
powers "should undertake to make reports on the administration of their colonial 
territories. This body should be empowered to inspect dependent territories, and to 
pubHsh reports of its deliberations". In a tart cable on 14 November 1944, the 
British secretary of state for dominion affairs expressed his "considerable surprise and 
concern" at the proposal. He reminded the two governments that at the Common-
wealth prime ministers meeting in May, the "United Kingdom Government held 
very strongly the view that such control by a central international body would be 
most undesirable and that its establishment would be contrary to the interests both 
of the dependent peoples and of parent nations and in particular of the British 
Empire". The issue continued to haunt both the Dominions Office and Downing 
Street until the United Nations Charter was drafted at San Francisco. 
How far was the Australia-New Zealand Agreement anti-American in its thrust? 
Evatt told the House of Representatives on 10 February that it "was not aimed against 
the United States"." Unofficially and privately, both Curtin and Evatt admitted 
that it was an explicit attempt to counter American expansion in the post-war 
Pacific. Curtin was not anxious to see any increase of American influence at the ex-
pense of Great Britain. He wanted to limit the extension of American influence to 
the Carolines and Marshalls (and of course American Samoa). AustraHan responsibih-
ty and influence should be dominant in the arc of islands to the north and north-east 
of Australia to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands, with the "area abutting on 
Malaya" marking the southernmost limit of American influence. 
Nelson Johnson told Hull that "fears of American imperialism were gaining 
ground in Australia", and this led Evatt to try to check American expansion to 
Pacific islands used as bases during the war. Hickerson of the State Department told 
Roosevelt that some of the provisions of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement were 
aimed at the United States: "This is especially evident in the declaration that the con-
struction and use of miHtary bases in the Pacific islands does not provide any basis for 
'territorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control'. It is evident also in the 
declaration that 'no change in the sovereignty or the system of control of any of the 
islands of the Pacific should be made' except by agreement of Australia and New 
Zealand."" 
American concern over the agreement arose partly over the feeling that it cut 
across plans for the development of a string of bases in the Pacific, plans formulated 
very generally by the Navy Department which could not conceive of any interference 
with those plans by any other Pacific power. Minter said he told Evatt: "I did not 
know whether any branch of the United States Government had attempted to deter-
mine exactly what bases the United States should operate after the war. it 
would be the United States Naval and Army Chiefs of Staff who would make the 
recommendations as to the bases we need and I added that I did not see how thev 
could do that until it had been decided what their job was to be, and that I felt cer-
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tain that this had not yet been decided."" Minter recognized that the decision 
would have to be made within the context of the charter of the new world organiza-
tion and what it might require of the United States for policy purposes. He in-
dignantly repudiated the suggestion of American imperiahsm. A careful survey of the 
economic potentiaHties of the islands under discussion proved conclusively that " the 
United States would have nothing to gain economically by the acquisition of those 
islands which are suitable as bases. . . . Dr. Evatt said that he reaHsed aH of that, and 
that he knew if the United States acquired any islands or rights therein it would be 
purely for defence purposes with no economic advantage at the expense of anyone 
e l se . "" 
An inevitable gut reaction from London as well as Washington was that Australia 
was attempting to establish a "Monroe Doctr ine" covering most of the Pacific 
islands south of the Equator, what Johnson called a policy of "Anzac imperialism". 
This would, of course, be a revival of Australian Pacific ambitions more than half a 
century earlier. It would involve an attempt to develop "a co-prosperity sphere" in 
the South Pacific and so was "a direct slap at the United States". AustraHan 
ministers would have been shocked at the suggestion that they might be following a 
Japanese policy in a different geographical area.*" 
Johnson had earlier reported a suggestion that the Australia-New Zealand Agree-
ment was not aimed at the United States, but that the real target might be the 
United Kingdom, then the United States.*' Evatt had been smarting at the failure of 
Churchill to respond to his requests for aid and for a revision of priorities in a global 
war. He realized what Curtin had said in his appeal for American aid on 27 
December 1941: that the United Kingdom had in fact abdicated its role as the pro-
tector of Australia from external attack. The British high commissioner in Canberra, 
Sir Ronald Cross, confessed: 
This piece of realism has been brought about by their own military weakness, and even 
more importantly by the prehistory attitude of the United States towards territories in the 
South Pacific. Belatedly recognising that it is beyond the power of the United Kingdom to 
fight major wars on both sides of the world at the same time, the two Dominions have 
sought to make common cause with other countries with interests in the Southern Pacific 
islands in maintaining their own defence in preference to relying primarily on the United 
States.*^ 
While recognizing that it was "understandable that the Governments of Australia 
and New Zealand should wish to reach agreement between themselves on matters of 
common concern and that they should wish to make their views known to other 
governments," Hull reminded Curtin that the agreement was "wholly without pre-
judice to the interests of other countries so far as it undertakes to deal with matters 
affecting territories other than those of Australia and New Zealand".*' The main 
burden of criticism was the proposal " t o call an early conference of powers having 
territorial interests in the South and South-West Pacific to consider the problem of 
regional security and matters related thereto". Both Roosevelt and Hull were 
"disturbed" at the proposal and felt that it was premature to suggest holding a con-
ference of interested powers. The Pacific War was not yet won. Hull felt strongly 
that before "attempting to deal with problems of regional security" it was necessary 
" to agree upon arrangements for a general international security system". They 
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were afraid that the Australia-New Zealand example might be foHowed in other 
regions and that the proliferation of regional security systems would prejudice the 
formation of an international body with global interests in security. The State 
Department refused to budge on this point and used considerable diplomatic in-
fluence to prevent the convening of such a conference before the San Francisco Con-
ference agreed to establish a United Nations. 
The Australian government met these objections squarely and declined to make 
concessions. Proposals about the future of the Pacific islands had been discussed at a 
meeting of the Pacific War Council on 29 September 1943 and again on 12 January 
1944 when Evatt spoke of the possibility of "some arrangements" for their future 
allocation. The suggestion that AustraHa and New Zealand wanted to deal with pro-
blems of regional defence before arrangements had been made for a general interna-
tional security system was based on a misreading of the text. Article 13 referred to a 
regional zone of defence "within the framework of a general world plan of security" 
and Article 14 made it clear that Australia and New Zealand desired "to be associated 
at the planning stages and before any definite proposals are formulated" about the 
international organization referred to in the Moscow Declaration. 
Evatt wanted to be certain that there would be "no misunderstanding of 
Australia's general policy". Consultation with Australia and New Zealand was 
essential before any major decisions were to be made about a Pacific settlement. 
"The purpose of the conference is to ensure that the discussion of these great matters 
is set on foot in good time so as to avert the grave risk of insufficiently considered 
decisions which, through the great pressure of events at or towards the close of 
hostilities, may prejudice the final peace settlement."** He had made the same point 
to the Pacific War Council about decisions on Pacific strategy. He had no desire to 
have a repetition of the Cairo Conference, where decisions were made and pubHcly 
announced without any prior reference to Australia and New Zealand. By implica-
tion he rebuked the American government for its own work in planning for the 
post-war period: "No country has more frequently taken the initiative than has the 
United States of America. . . . in all such matters the United States has received the 
fullest possible support both from Australia and New Zealand. . . . it is gradually 
becoming clear that certain governments, including the United States Government, 
are tending to indicate their policy, though not publicly, on important phases of the 
Pacific settlement".*' Johnson's reply welcomed the suggestion that Curtin might 
discuss the matter at Washington on his way to London for a meeting of the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers in May 1944. 
The Australia-New Zealand Agreement had taken the Department of State and 
President Roosevelt off balance and flat-footed. Roger Bell has argued, quite convin-
cingly, that "underlying these objections . . . was the desire of the State, Navy and 
War Departments to reconcile differences over Pacific bases and trusteeship ar-
rangements before America participated in any international conference. These objec-
tions were also motivated by America's unmodified determination to monopoHse the 
Pacific counter-offensive and post-war occupation and control of Japan "*' In view 
of American opposition to imperialism and its desire to free colonial territories there 
could be little opposition to those clauses of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement 
(Article 11) dealing with trusteeship and the welfare of colonial peoples. 
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The most surprising thing to both London and Washington was that AustraHa 
and New Zealand had taken the bit between their teeth and acted independently in 
defence of their regional interest in the Pacific. To the American minister in 
Canberra, Nelson Johnson, the agreement was "the Anzac Monroe Doctrine". He 
quoted Curtin's final speech: "In substance the two nations have declared a Pacific 
charter of permanent collaboration and co-operation" to which like-minded powers 
might adhere when Australia (not the Australia-New Zealand consortium) calls 
together "representatives of the other governments in the Pacific and the territories 
north of Australia with a view to extending the scope of regional collaboration".*' 
The Netherland charge of the government in exile in London rightly described the 
agreement as "a sort of 'declaration of independence' in foreign affairs by Australia 
and New Zealand" but added that he was "not sure that it was not ultra vires". The 
United States saw an opportunity in the Australian initiative to express its views 
about a South Seas Regional Commission directly to Canberra and Wellington 
without first consulting London. It was beginning to learn that the British 
Commonwealth was changing in character and it no longer spoke only through 
Downing Street. It fitted neatly into the Canadian concept of a changing Common-
wealth. New Zealand's prime minister quoted with approval Mackenzie King's 
comment that "the document was an illuminating example of the flexible and effec-
tive method of co-operation between the countries of the British 
Commonwealth".*' 
The Canberra Agreement was the first serious attempt at middle-powermanship 
by Australia, an exercise in regional consultation. It was essentially an Evatt 
initiative, "a manifesto, . . . a considered statement by Evatt of his views on 
Australian foreign policy at the beginning of 1944 and a map of his good 
intentions".*' New Zealand accepted the concept of a firm and perhaps parallel state-
ment of the separate interests of the two countries in the Pacific region, but not at 
the cost of alienating the United Kingdom or the United States, or both. It agreed 
with Evatt's point that the Cairo Conference had effected a shift of power in the 
Pacific without consulting either AustraHa or New Zealand and that "positions of 
great importance were given away for no consideration and without any special 
regard for the interests of unrepresented countries". New Zealand was not prepared 
to do more than make a quiet protest about it. But the two dominions were agreed 
that regional co-operation, perhaps a formal arrangement, was essential to the securi-
ty of both Australia and New Zealand.'" 
Evatt had put a cat among the pigeons — perhaps a small but determined cat 
among big pigeons — and had caused a temporary flutter in the dovecots. A British 
diplomat in Canberra said that "it was the first time he had heard of two small tails 
trying to wag four large dogs". It was "kindergarten diplomacy". Washington's 
initial reaction was that "it would be bad tactics to take this agreement too serious-
ly"." Roosevelt and Hull, after having suggested private discussions with the two 
prime ministers, were in the happy position of being able to pick them off separately, 
like James 1 of England taking particular and auricular opinions with judges rather 
than consulting the full court about his powers. Hickerson's brief to CordeH HuH 
for his interview with Eraser emphasized America's "shock" at the terms of the 
Australia-New Zealand Agreement and the feeHng in Washington that "certain sec-
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tions of the agreement" seemed aimed at the United States and "reflected a sort of 
fear of the United States" which utterly mystified America. "Surely, unless the 
United States and the members of the British Commonwealth can trust one another 
and co-operate with one another, the outlook for the world is a sad one."'^ 
Hull told Eraser that the Australia-New Zealand Agreement had "almost shocked 
some of us" because it resembled Russian tactics about Poland. Eraser (and the New 
Zealand foreign minister, Walter Nash) agreed that this was the situation. Hull's 
main concern was with the calHng of a conference of the nations with territorial 
interests in the South-West Pacific. Eraser declined to give assurances that such a 
conference would not be held except to deal with defence and security matters in the 
area. Eraser stood his ground but made a general plea for understanding, friendhness, 
and wholehearted co-operation in every important respect. "He seemed to be embar-
rassed no little about this occurrence," Hull noted." 
In a curious interview with Curtin, Roosevelt brushed aside the Australia-New 
Zealand Agreement; his opinion was that it would be best to forget the whole inci-
dent. The background briefing for the Curtin interview on 25 April suggested that 
the agreement was "the work of Evatt and not of Curtin. Frank criticism is 
therefore not Hkely to be taken personally by Mr. Curtin."'* The president told 
Curtin that he thought the prime minister had Httle to do with the drafting but that 
Evatt had done more of the drafting and that the others had merely agreed. Curtin 
agreed and commented that a group in cabinet had discussed "the future of the white 
man in the Pacific". They had strongly disagreed with Britain's policy in India and 
were afraid that China too might turn against the white man. The proposal for an 
agreement between Australia and New Zealand emerged during the discussion and 
"was carried on what may prove to be an excess of enthusiasm"." 
Cordell Hull observed that his government "did not appreciate the attitude of Dr. 
Evatt on this and other matters . . . especially his action in recording in a formal 
statement a private conversation with the President". He was extremely concerned 
about Australian proposals for "the whole question of territorial settlements in the 
Pacific". "This Government has been deliberately refusing to take up with other 
nations territorial questions in Europe or elsewhere until the end of the war". He 
added that "the prime minister then referred to persons with ambitions in a vague 
sort of way" ." 
The long-term result of Curtin's discussions with Hull was the growing feeling in 
the State Department that Evatt was becoming a "megalomaniac" and that greater 
caution was needed in assessing his proposals. Privately they were impressed by his 
ability but had reservations about his reliability and integrity. Minter had experienc-
ed his devious approach to various questions and told Stewart at the State Depart-
ment, "He abounds in duplicity." In a discussion in cabinet over Australian policy 
over Lend-Lease, Evatt was reminded that it had been Australia who "pushed 
Britain over the brink" into Article 7 and that the AustraHan minister in 
Washington had been instructed to teH the State Department that AustraHa had 
committed itself to Article 7. Evatt was reported as replying, "Why should I be 
bound by something I said when I was looking for a lot of airplanes?."57 Minter 
confessed that despite aH this, "We must cajole him along and get his co-operarion 
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to the greatest extent possible by co-operating with him where possible. . . . 1 shall 
try to play the game along these lines. ' ' 
The Canberra Agreement failed to achieve its immediate objective of influencing 
great power policy. 
Curtin's interview with Roosevelt on 23 April did little to resolve the differences 
between Canberra and Washington despite the president's conclusion that it would 
be "best to forget the whole inc ident" ." 
Hasluck suggests that Curtin and Evatt were out of touch with each other. Curtin 
in London did his best to strengthen the ties between Britain and AustraHa as two 
members of the Commonwealth. He recognized that the British government was 
much better informed than Australia about European problems. He partly shared 
Evatt's view that Australia was so close to the Pacific that it felt " i t might be par-
doned for saying experience makes it necessary, if nothing else, for it to know a good 
deal about the problems of the Pacific". But, unhke Evatt, he hoped for a consensus 
in the British Empire. Curtin was clearly thinking back to pre-war discussions about 
Commonwealth agreement on foreign policy. But a great deal of water had flowed 
under the bridge since the Prime Ministers' Conference of 1939. Hasluck states em-
phatically that his views "did not reflect the views held in the Australian Depart-
ment of External Affairs at that time nor did it arise from any analysis by the Depart-
ment of External Affairs of present or prospective world conditions. Nor, as far as 1 
can judge, did it reflect the outlook of the Minister for External Affairs." Evatt's 
views about Australian foreign policy came as a shock to British ministers in London 
who, like Curtin, were conceiving of the 1944 Commonwealth in pre-war terms. 
Curtin ignored Evatt's views while he was in London. 
Evatt was probably aware of Curtin's partial disavowal of his policies when he met 
Roosevelt at Bernard Baruch's estate in Hobcaw, South Carolina. It had little in-
fluence on Evatt's policy. At the International Labour Conference at Philadelphia in 
April 1944, J.A. Beasley (minister for Supply and Shipping) pressed Evatt's views 
about "fuH employment". There was Httle support for the Evatt-Beasley view that 
the domestic policies of the larger powers were the crucial factor in raising living 
standards and the level of trade in the small and developing countries. There was 
Httle support at the Bretton Woods International Monetary Conference in May 
1944, and at San Francisco in 1945 the Australian delegation fought an uphill battle 
to secure the inclusion of "full employment" as one of the general objectives of 
international economic co-operation.'" 
Evatt reiterated his views about the role of Australia (and other small states) in a 
statement to the House of Representatives on 8 September 1944 on the second 
reading of the United Nations Relief and RehabiHtation BiH." After recognizing the 
important role of the Great Powers in developing a post-war security system, he 
went on to emphasize the responsibilities and rights of small powers. The major 
powers must pay 
due regard to the older but still cherished doctrine of equality of States. They should allow 
fair representation to smaller powers on any world organization and so gain their con-
fidence and support. No sovereign State, however sn".all, will wish to think that its destiny 
has been handed over to another power, however great. Nor does history at aU support the 
view that wisdom is confined to the strongest nations or that knowledge is found only at 
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the centre of power. Therefore a successful world organization requires an enthusiastic 
contribution from smaUer powers, both in counsel and in material support. It must be 
remembered that a so called smaU power may in certain areas, and in special circumstances 
possess great, if not decisive influence. Evatt's speech was drafted by Paul Hasluck and the 
Minister scarcely altered any part of my final draft.'^  
Evatt was in fact ignoring Curtin's more cautious approach to Australian policy 
through an Empire consensus. Discussions between Curtin and Evatt after the prime 
minister's return from London have not been recorded. Despite Washington's op-
position to a further meeting between Australia and New Zealand, a conference was 
held in Wellington in November 1944. Evatt was, of course, aware that Australia 
had not been invited to the Dumbarton Oaks conference on the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security. The Wellington conference discussed the conclusions 
of the Canberra meeting, especially the proposals to set up an international organiza-
tion to provide security in the Pacific and other areas. The diverging poHcies of 
Curtin and Evatt were probably reflected in the prime minister's decision that F.M. 
Forde, the minister for the army and deputy prime minister, should attend the con-
ference and so outrank Evatt. 
Eraser's influence on the final draft was much more important than Evatt's, and 
the senior New Zealand public servant J.V. Wilson, who had an encyclopaedic 
knowledge of the League of Nations procedures, helped Hasluck and Forsyth in the 
final draft. Evatt had a severe attack of influenza and remained in isolation. Forde 
made the opening and closing speeches; the final Australian statement was prepared 
by Hasluck in consultation with Evatt, and Forde accepted without any serious reser-
vation the Hasluck-Forsyth draft. Evatt was content with a broadcast in Wellington 
after the conference had concluded." The twelve-point Wellington resolution 
"became the basis of our policy on the world re-organisation" and largely determin-
ed the AustraHa stand at San Francisco. 
Despite these firm statements of policy and their insistence on Great Power con-
sultation of the smaH/middle powers, neither AustraHa nor New Zealand (nor 
several other members of the grand alliance) was invited to the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference on International Organisation (21 August to 7 October 1944) which 
framed the draft charter of the United Nations. There was almost daily informal con-
tact between British delegates and dominion diplomats, but this feH far short of 
Australian and New Zealand demands for consultation.'* There was no consultation 
about the Yalta Agreement or the Potsdam Declaration, both of which dealt with 
the surrender of Japan and the disposal of Japanese territory. Only belatedly, and 
then as a result of continuous pressure on the American Legation in Canberra, were 
they invited to sign as principals the Japanese document of surrender on the US 
Missouri on 2 September 1945. The importance of the Canberra and WeHington 
declarations lay in the notice they gave that both Australia and New Zealand were 
determined to follow independent initiatives in any post-war settlement. Dr Hsu 
Mo, the Chinese minister in Canberra, quickly grasped this. 'It is the first attempt 
by members of the Allied Nations to form a separate bloc for the purpose of joint 
action in connection with the negotiation of the peace."" Nelson Johnson thought 
Evatt might have had second thoughts about his initiative but said, "I believe that 
we must give Australia and New Zealand a place in the Pacific sun, if for no other 
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reason that they have been of vast assistance to us in this war, and we shall doubtless 
need them again. We cannot turn our backs upon the only white folk whose entire 
future and fortune is girted to the Pacific"." It did estabhsh Evatt as an extremely 
ambitious, tough, and enterprising foreign minister and paved the way for the 
leadership he provided for small and middle powers at San Francisco. He could no 
longer be ignored. Over the longer period, the setting up of the South Pacific Com-
mission in 1947 might be regarded as a major positive success of the Canberra 
conference. 
10 Australia and the Post- War International 
Organization 
Perhaps the central issue in Australian foreign policy between 1942 and 1945 was its 
insistence on consultation between Britain and the United States and AustraHa and 
New Zealand on the tactics and strategy of the Pacific War . The same sense of being 
soothed over consultation by the innocuous Pacific War Council, which was an in-
strument of Roosevelt's wartime diplomacy, led to the South-West Pacific demands 
for consultation about a peace settlement with Japan, security in the post-war Pacific, 
and the shape and powers of a world organization which would attempt to preserve 
global peace. The Australian concern was partly a matter of status (with little 
recognition that status was related to power) and partly a matter of national identity 
and a desire to promote quasi-socialist objectives. Full employment and the anti-
imperialistic demand for the development of a trusteeship system with independence 
as the ultimate goal for colonial territories reflected this concern. 
The achievement of these goals, outlined in the Wellington twelve points, involv-
ed an insistence on independence from both London and Washington. At the Com-
monwealth prime ministers' meeting in London in April 1944, Curtin said: 
The strength of Britain has been described as her "alUance potential" when she speaks 
with the united voice and authority of the whole British Commonwealth. This is also true 
of the Dominions, for individually we are weak, but united we are strong. Co-operation in 
regard to our policies should, therefore, be such as to ensure that, mutuaUy, each com-
mands the support of the others. . . . It is as an integral part of the British Commonwealth 
that AustraUa can most influentially express itself in the world organisation.' 
Evatt accepted the view that the Commonwealth provided for a consultation 
among equals and did not mean subordination of Australian interests to those of the 
United Kingdom: "The British Commonwealth must present towards the world 
organisation the spectacle of a unified entity in matters of the highest import. That 
does not mean that we have to integrate our governments, nor does it mean that we 
have to present the spectacle of an absolute Empire bloc against the rest of the world. 
The Dominions, rather than the Motherland, have the largest interest in 
authoritative declarations, whereby a British Prime Minister may speak for the Em-
pire as a whole."^ 
Evatt's wartime experiences with the United States and the United Kingdom 
made him realize that the Big Three would in the last analysis provide the predomi-
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nant military backing for any new international security system. This was an in-
escapable fact of power politics which would not disappear at the end of the war. But 
he was anxious to exert an influence on political and security decisions, both through 
the British Commonwealth adopting a common policy on a number of issues and by 
independent action through the United Nations itself (the twofold approach was 
essential for middle-powermanship). The Canberra Agreement and the WelHngton 
conference showed that there was a wide gulf between a divided London (the Col-
onial Office and Dominions Office disagreed) and the two Dominions on matters 
of trusteeship and colonial policy. The gulf widened in the following months; Chur-
chilHan rhetoric had Httle effect in bridging it. 
Unease at the possibiHty of Great Power domination was deepened by the publica-
tion of the Dumbarton Oaks draft of a charter for the United Nations. Alan Watt 
termed it a "big power" version. Canada's Lester Pearson declared that "no 
organisation for peace should be based entirely on any small group — even of the 
mightiest of powers".' The Wellington resolutions were based largely on the 
studies of the Post-HostiHties Division of the Department of External Affairs. The 
WeUington conference did accept, reluctantly, the exclusion of AustraHa and New 
Zealand from the peace settlements in Europe but reiterated the determination of 
both countries to be active participants in any Pacific settlement. 
On the eve of the San Francisco Conference, Commonwealth representatives met 
in London to exchange views about the Dumbarton Oaks draft charter. Lord Cran-
borne, secretary of state for dominion affairs, pointed out in his opening address that 
the meeting was not an attempt to "gang up" on other powers. It was hoped that a 
wide area of agreement could be reached and common or parallel policies could be 
pursued in these areas. But sharp differences of policy quickly emerged. Britain in 
fact occupied an ambivalent position as one of the Big Three sponsoring powers and 
as the senior member of the Commonwealth. Evatt's rejection of the Yalta voting 
procedure and his insistence that the middle or "security" powers (see below) be 
given a special role in the new organization pointed the way to a conflict at San Fran-
cisco between the greater and lesser powers. There was no real meeting of minds bet-
ween Britain and the Pacific dominions over trusteeship and the future of colonial 
peoples, although some differences were lessened. The British government did not 
see eye to eye with Australia and New Zealand on full employment and a variety of 
social and economic matters. Internal lines of cleavage developed within the Com-
monwealth, and there was little formal collaboration between Commonwealth 
representatives at San Francisco. The precedents of the Paris peace conference in 1919 
were not foHowed: consultation at San Francisco was informal and often tense. 
The London meeting was important for three reasons. Firstly, it provided clear 
evidence that the dominions had policies of their own and were not merely rubber 
stamps for Britain, automatically increasing British voting power at the San Fran-
cisco Conference. Evatt asserted that Britain and the four dominions would "be 
separate, distinct, equal and autonomous" members of the proposed organization. 
Part of the price paid for this was the acceptance of the Soviet demand for multiple 
representation at San Francisco to balance the supposed voting strength of the British 
Commonwealth. Byelorussia and the Ukraine were separately represented, so the 
Soviet Union was always able to command a smaH bloc of three votes.* 
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Secondly, the London conference increased Evatt's awareness of the issues at San 
Francisco and sharpened his own attitudes on tactics as well as principles in his deter-
mination to act as the champion of the small and middle nations. As Hasluck 
commented, 
Even as late as the day of his arrival in London [Evatt] stiU had Uttle detailed knowledge of 
the contents of the Dumbarton Oaks draft. He learned rapidly as he went along, and 
revealed a very great abiUty to grab at the points which were significant and to demand the 
information which was vital to the arguments he began to develop. . . . he made his first 
strong impression . . . pursuing the Une of his thinking in a way that I think revealed even 
to the British people, who had been steeped in this matter for months, some of the flaws of 
the Dumbarton Oaks work. I remember that morning as the beginning of the reputation 
which Dr. Evatt estabUshed for himself later at the San Francisco Conference as a forcefiil 
personality — a leader for those who agreed with him; a most difficult man for those who 
did not.' 
In London, Evatt's ideas about middle-power representation on the Security Council 
appear to have crystalHzed with Australian membership as an important objective. So 
too did his views about regional security arrangements as a second Hne of defence 
should a world security system not be established or fail to function.* 
Thirdly, Evatt's views about the United Nations Charter became clearer and 
sharper as he studied the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and Hstened to the London 
debates. He adopted a moderate posture in London on many of the issues on which 
he adopted an aggressive posture in San Francisco. In an address to Chatham House, 
he emphasized the point that constitutional arrangements for amending the charter 
were "extremely important", largely because of the danger of a Great Power veto. 
In a report to Curtin the same day, he said that in his view "the veto had to be 
retained in principle because the organization could not come into existence without 
i t" . At the same time he suggested that limitations be imposed on its exercise, 
especially on matters of constitutional amendment. As yet he did not seem to have 
grasped the importance of a veto on peaceful settlement of disputes. He accepted 
Eden's view that although Britain was bound by the Yalta Agreement, the veto 
would in practice be limited to particular cases. His views hardened considerably on 
the journey from London to San Francis90, when he had an opportunity to make a 
concentrated study of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The importance of a Great 
Power veto on conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes became much clearer.' 
The San Francisco Conference 
The Australian delegation, led by Forde and Evatt (but dominated by Evatt), went 
to San Francisco to do four things: (1) to whittle down the veto, (2) to enlarge the 
powers of the General Assembly, (3) to extend the system of mandates or 
trusteeship, and (4) to increase the powers of the Economic and Social Council. On 
most of these questions, AustraHa differed from the United States and Great Britain 
as well as from the Soviet Union.' 
The most contentious issue at the San Franciso Conference was the relationship 
between the Great Powers and the middle and smaller states, between the lions and 
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the mice. On 3 May, shortly after the conference opened, Evatt gave a press con-
ference and said that the Australian amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks draft were 
designed to "exclude the veto of the permanent members from all arrangements 
relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes and to confine such veto to decisions 
involving the application of economic and military sanctions . . . to see that the 
Security Council was in fact composed of 'security' powers". This concept of securi-
ty powers was very similar to Mackenzie King's belief that representation on inter-
national bodies should be determined on a functional basis. With these went a deter-
mination to give to the General Assembly "a wider jurisdiction over, and a fuller 
share in, the general work of the Organisation and in particular to vest the Assembly 
with power to prevent situations and disputes from becoming 'frozen' in the Securi-
ty Council, as occurred in the League of Nations in the notorious cases of external 
aggression against China, Ethiopia, and Czechoslovakia".' 
At the first meeting of the United States delegation, on 7 May, Secretary of State 
Edward R. Stettinius, the leader of the delegation, told its members that "the Five 
Powers must avoid the appearance of forcing on the small powers the conclusions of 
the major powers" but at the same time it was important to "keep the conference 
moving".'" Senator Tom Connally, one of the delegation, pointed out a month later 
that "the great powers could preserve the peace of the world if united," but "they 
could not do so if dissension was sowed among them". "Our supreme thesis on this 
question is this: We believe that the Security Council, when united, can preserve 
peace; we fear that if it is not united, it cannot preserve peace. Therefore we are 
voting and did vote for those measures that would contribute to the continued unity 
and harmony among the permanent members of the Security Council, in order that 
their powers and their prestige may be utilized on behalf of peace."" 
The Great Power veto became the central point in a heated debate between the 
larger and the small powers. Australia ceased to be the self-proclaimed champion of 
the smaller powers and became their spokesmen on the veto and many other issues. 
With his shrewd intuition, Evatt realized that principle was a better weapon than 
pragmatism and so led the protest against the larger powers. But although he obtain-
ed many promises of support, he was unable to counter the steady pressure of the 
inner committee of the Big Four, at times in consultation with France. One of the 
curious things were the tactics of Great Britain "in taking the whole burden of 
defending the veto".'^ Two British delegates. Dingle Foot and Miss F. Horsburgh 
rose to support it even though they privately were reluctant to go too far. 
The four sponsoring powers were united and adamant in their refusal to sign a 
charter that did not accept their right of veto. The United States adopted a hard line, 
lagging almost imperceptibly behind the Soviet Union. "In view of the primary 
responsibilities of the permanent members, they could not be expected, in the 
present condition of the world, to assume obligations to act in so serious a matter as 
the maintenance of international peace and security in consequence of a decision in 
which they had not concurred." Britain and the other Great Powers, while agreeing 
perhaps that in theory all powers were equal, also believed that the Great Powers had 
greater rights and responsibilities. Evatt told the delegates that 
should the Committee and Conference accept the voting procedures as proposed by the 
sponsoring governments, his country would accept the verdict of the Conference. While 
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he could not go back to his country and justify the retention of the veto on matters of con-
ciliation, he could tell his people that the United States delegate had said that the veto 
would not be used capriciously and that the Soviet Delegate had said in a speech that the 
five great powers would rarely exercise the veto. Dr. Evatt asked why, if this were the 
case, the veto was retained with respect to conciUation and asked if the statement by the 
sponsoring powers represented their last word." 
The Great Powers exerted intense pressure on the smaller powers to defeat the 
Evatt afnendment. The argument that if the veto were killed then the United Na-
tions itself would be killed persuaded many of them. Others were impressed by 
threats of a stoppage of Lend-Lease or other assistance. Lord Halifax and other 
British representatives thought that Evatt's tactics reinforced the opposition of the 
Big Five to any modification of the veto and that he almost reached the point of 
wrecking the conference by his persistence. Eggleston, whose temperament and 
mental processes were the opposite of Evatt's, said, " I have no doubt that it was-the 
correct tactics to pursue the attack on the veto, even if it were hopeless. It illustrated 
to the world at large what the veto really meant, and brought up the whole issue in a 
most dramatic way ." '* The Soviet Union was quite inflexible and came "with 
blanket instructions for the veto and the whole ve to" . For most of the time there 
was little evidence of American pressure on Moscow, but when the Russians claimed 
that they could veto the introduction before the Security Council of any issue even 
for discussion, Britain and the United States exerted all their influence to successfiiUy 
persuade the Soviet Union to alter its stand. The Australian amendment was defeated 
by twenty-six votes to fifteen, but with twenty-one abstentions. It was a moral 
victory for Evatt. 
Australia's attempt to exclude the veto from conciliation and peaceful settlement 
of disputes also failed despite a personal confrontation with the Big Four at their 
headquarters in the Fairmont Hotel. The Yalta formula was adopted thirty to two 
with fifteen abstentions: Australia and New Zealand finally abstained. Evatt had 
secured a partial concession from the Great Powers on 7 June when they "repudiated 
the assumption that they would use their veto power wilfully to obstruct the opera-
rion of the Counc i l " . " Both the United States and the Soviet Union declared that 
they would not use it capriciously or frequently. Moscow was under private pressure 
from the United States, and Harry Hopkins suggested that the smaller powers might 
refuse to sign the charter. Evatt appeared content with these assurances and hoped 
that this would "demonstrate in practice that the power given to them under the 
Charter wiH be used with restraint and in the interests of the United Nations as a 
w h o l e " . " 
The second vital issue for Australia was the role and powers of the General 
Assembly in relation to the Security Council. If the wings of the Security Coundl 
could be clipped, even slightly, then the work of the General Assembly would 
become more important and with it the influence of the smaHer powers. 
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals defined the powers of the General Assembly as 
follows: 
The General Assembly should have the right to consider the general principles of co-
operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles 
governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; to discuss any questions relating 
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to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member or 
members of the Organisation or by the Security Council, and to make recommendations 
with regard to any such principles or questions. Any such questions on which action is 
necessary should be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before 
or after discussion. The General Assembly should not on its own initiative make recom-
mendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security 
which is being dealt with by the Security Council." 
This draft meant that the General Assembly would be little more than a glorified 
debating forum with its resolutions hamstrung by a powerful Security Council. 
Because of an unfavourable reaction from the smaller nations, concerned with normal 
democratic procedures, the sponsoring powers proposed to extend its competence to 
include the recommendation of "measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situa-
tions, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or 
friendly relations among nations". AustraHa proposed that the General Assembly be 
empowered to make recommendations on "any matter affecting international rela-
tions" except on a security question already being dealt with by the Security 
Coundl." 
Enlargement of the General Assembly's powers was a popular issue among nations 
accepting "the conception of democracy in international affairs" (Anthony Eden). 
Stettinius conceived of the General Assembly as "a table around which the Govern-
ments could discuss anything" and felt that any change in the present text would 
cause great disappointment to the smaller powers. He felt very strongly that it 
would be undesirable to " 'slap down' the smaller powers on the question"." 
Senator Arthur Vandenburg, one of the United States delegation, wanted to call the 
General Assembly "the Town Meeting of the World" but reaHzed that the assembly 
could not make recommendations when a matter affecting peace and security was 
before the Security Council (Article 12): "Imagine that the Town Meeting of Pro-
vidence, Rhode Island, was called together when there was an epidemic of diphtheria 
and were told by Roger Williams [founder of the colony of Rhode Island] that they 
could not deal with it because people were dying of the disease!"^" 
The strongest opposition came from Russia, which feared that an enlargement of 
the General Assembly's powers would limit the activities of the Security Council and 
might lead to interference by lesser powers. America and Britain became as an-
tagonistic as the Russians and "took up the cudgels" on their behalf when they 
reaHzed that the issue might split the Big Five.^' The Russians also felt that the 
AustraHan amendment would emasculate the prohibition of interference in domestic 
affairs provided for in Article 2 (7) of the charter. Australia was a resolute defender of 
this section of the charter: Evatt was "convinced that the prohibition against in-
tervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction overrides all the other powers granted 
to the General Assembly".^^ He believed, however, that the General Assembly, as 
weH as the Security Council, could be trusted not to abuse its powers. 
A compromise was ultimately agreed to by a special committee consisting of 
Andrei Gromyko, Stettinius, and Evatt. After five meetings, often of several sessions 
(one of them with HaHfax present), Gromyko finally accepted on 20 June an Evatt 
draft which included the substance of the original AustraHan amendment. Stettinius 
said that the "splendid conciliatory attitude of the Ambassador and his government 
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. . . made it possible to solve this difficult matter and to bring the Conference to an 
immediate and successful conclusion". The proposal to permit the General Assembly 
to consider and make recommendations on "any matter within the sphere of interna-
tional relations" was finally amended to read "any questions or matters within the 
scope of the present Charter, or relating to the powers and functions of any organs 
provided in the present Charter and, except as provided in 2(7) of this section, to 
make recommendations to the members of the United Nations or to the Security 
Council or both on any such questions or matters". This was felt adequate, in the 
circumstances, to make the General Assembly more effective. "There should be an 
overall clause expressing beyond doubt the wide powers of the General Assembly 
over all matters of real international concern whether relating to security or welfare 
and whether particular or general in character."^' Australia opposed the suggestion 
adopted by some Latin American countries that, except on matters calling for im-
mediate action. Security Council decisions should be subject to review by the General 
Assembly. 
The Evatt proposals to curb Great Power dominance in the Security Coundl and 
to shift more power to the General Assembly were related to his Labor party belief in 
political and social democracy. His distrust of concentrated economic power at the 
domestic level reinforced his pragmatic belief that Great Power domination in inter-
national relations tended to promote instability. Great powers tended to be im-
perialists, and the Australian Labor Party had a deep-rooted distrust of imperialists as 
warmongers. An essential part of the Australian approach to post-war international 
organization was that every attempt should be made to remove the causes of war. 
"When the known causes which led to war have been removed, it can be said that a 
contribution has been made to the peace of the world; but that in itself would not 
constitute a guarantee of peace. Therefore a concert of nations of like minds must be 
maintained." A "concert of nations of like minds" was more Hkely to be found in 
the General Assembly, which would be concerned with economic and social as well 
as poHtical and security questions. What Evatt wanted to do was to enable the 
General Assembly, as a matter of right, to criticize the capricious use of the Great 
Power veto to prevent United Nations action or recommendations on specific issues 
or questions of principle.^* 
The Australian-led battle over the balance of power between the General Assembly 
and the Security CouncH led to some verbal amendments to the United Nations 
Charter designed to protect the interests of the smaller and middle powers. What 
Evatt failed to foresee was the extensive use of the veto by the Soviet Union as war-
time unity gave way to the cold war confrontation. This led to the creation of the 
"Little Assembly" and the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 in an attempt to 
prevent paralysis in United Nations discussion and action. 
The third Australian objective at San Francisco was the addition of a new section 
to the Dumbarton Oaks draft to deal with colonial territories and trusteeship. For 
some years before the San Francisco Conference, discussions had taken place between 
Great Britain and the dominions on the future of colonial dependencies, especially 
those occupied by Japan in the early stages of the Pacific War. There were sharp divi-
sions in Britain over the colonial question. Early wartime disillusionment with 
colonies had produced considerable support for the extension of international super-
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vision to all colonies, with regular inspection and the encouragement of petitions 
from the dependent peoples. But opinion hardened against international control, and 
there was some support for the ChurchilHan concept of "What we have we hold". 
In the swing back towards greater freedom for colonial peoples, there was a need to 
"transform the Empire into a society where the dependencies . . . will feel 
themselves to be willing partners, not slaves or servants".^' This broadening of 
trusteeship into partnership meant regional co-operation. Britain had Httle en-
thusiasm for mandates: the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Na-
tions had no power to initiate or compel colonial powers to introduce welfare 
polides. The doctrine of the "open door" had not necessarily operated to the advan-
tage of colonial peoples. Oliver Stanley, the British colonial secretary, "flew a kite" 
during a visit to New York in January 1945, suggesting that Britain was preparing 
to scrap the mandates system. The speech produced a swift American reaction, and 
shortly afterwards Stanley's proposals were jettisoned. 
Divisions of opinion in London between the Colonial Office and academics were 
responsible for serious clashes with the United States and the dominions at the In-
stitute of Pacific Relations conferences at Mont Tremblant in December 1942 and 
Hot Springs in January 1945. AustraHa and New Zealand had expressed their views 
in the Canberra agreement of 1944, which declared (Article 28): "In applying the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter to the Pacific, the doctrine of 'trusteeship' (already 
applicable in the case of the mandated territories of which the two Governments are 
mandatory powers) is applicable in broad principle to all colonial territories in the 
Pacific and elsewhere, and the main purpose of the trust is the welfare of the native 
peoples and their social, economic and political development." The British reaction 
had been a frosty one. At the London meeting (4-13 April), before the San Francisco 
Conference, Evatt criticized the Dumbarton Oaks draft because it omitted all 
reference to colonial questions; he pressed strongly for changes in British attitudes on 
the colonial question. Britain finally agreed to support trusteeship in some form. 
The United States had become anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, and its views 
were diametrically opposed to those of the United Kingdom. Sumner Welles, who 
had been appointed chairman of a secret presidential committee on post-war 
reconstruction, believed that colonial regimes must end and that "the liberation of 
peoples should be the main principle". Cordell Hull had proposed in March 1943 a 
general declaration on all dependent territories which would provide for a system of 
reporting on administration to an international body and the fixing of target dates 
for the granting of full independence. It would include specific pledges to further 
native welfare and self-government and to develop and market the natural resources 
in the interests of the inhabitants and of the world as a whole." Disagreements bet-
ween Britain and the United States had prevented the inclusion of a chapter on 
trusteeship in the Dumbarton Oaks draft. 
American opinion was divided on the issue. At the Hot Springs Conference, some 
members of the State Department had strongly supported international government 
and others had expressed a preference for immediate independence. Stettinius was 
amused when Eggleston told him this at an interview on 15 February, when deliver-
ing to him a copy of the AustraHa-New Zealand Agreement proposals. Eggleston 
expressed the Australian view that international government was unsatisfactory and 
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that one state must be responsible for administering any trust territory. He also said 
"that the Empires in the Pacific area holding these dependencies were part of the 
strategic structure and that if you terminated them you would Balkanise this area, 
have a lot of smaH states who were unable to stand up for themselves".*' At a 
meeting with Leo Pasvolsky, a special assistant to the secretary of state for handUng 
post-war settlement, and members of the European section of the State Department, 
Eggleston again mentioned the view of many American authorities that immediate 
independence should be given to places like Malaya and Java. Pasvolsky immediately 
replied ' 'in the only definite statement that he did make during the conversation . . . 
that that was academic."" 
The colonial question was being discussed in the State Department, the Dependent 
Territories Department, the secret presidential committee on post-war reconstruc-
tion chaired by Sumner Welles, and also by the chiefs of staff. A conflict of interest 
quickly became apparent between the service chiefs and the dvilians. The navy was 
anxious to retain island bases for purposes of post-war security and so wanted 
annexation. In this they were supported by a number of congressmen who visited 
the South Seas and put forward claims for the Padfic Islands conquered from Japan, 
as weU as bases in French and AustraHan territory. Harold Stassen, one of the 
American delegates at the San Francisco Conference, confessed privately that "the 
case of the Americans for the island was that they had sacrificed blood and treasure 
for them"." A number of senators came to San Frandsco to see that the "ideaHsts" 
did not frustrate the American imperialists. 
When the conference opened in San Frandsco, the American options had been 
reduced. The State Department experts had come down in favour of some kind of 
trusteeship. They had convinced the navy that annexation was impossible but that 
some of the navy requirements could be met through the provision for strategic ter-
ritories. The State Department, in a session with OHver Stanley, had convinced him 
that British suggestions for scrapping the mandate system would get no American 
support. Britain was also prepared to bring all colonies into their scheme for regional 
commissions.'" President Roosevelt had told Eggleston, when he presented his 
credentials, that he was keen on having some form of joint international govern-
ment. Harry Hopkins was aware of this interest. Eggleston did his best to persuade 
all the key advisers he met that international government would be disastrous. 
Halifax reminded him that the president was "given to thinking aloud and his 
remarks must be taken with great quahfications". The State Department was 
strongly opposed to the idea and apparently persuaded the president that a con-
dominium system would be politically unpractical and administratively 
unworkable." 
When the conference met, the amendments proposed by national delegations were 
circulated, including Australian and New Zealand proposals. These gave the General 
Assembly the right to require a colonial power to accept a trusteeship for a depen-
dent territory. A trusteeship committee was formed, but since the Dumbarton Oaks 
draft had omitted any reference to the colonial problem, it was necessary to provide a 
draft paper for discussion. When there was uncertainty among the Big Five, Great 
Britain and the United States attempted an agreed draft, excluding Australia and 
New Zealand from the discussion. "Evatt tried to force his way on the committee 
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drafting the paper," Eggleston noted in his diary. "But he trod on a good many 
toes. Commander Stassen . . . had the goodwill of the Committee and Evatt receiv-
ed a rebuff."'* When Britain and the United States could not resolve their dif-
ferences, it was left to Stassen to draft a working paper. 
Stassen's working paper went through several drafts before it was finally presented 
to Committee II and adopted by the committee as the basis for discussion. A short 
draft prepared for the American delegation before the conference opened had been 
rewritten on the train between Washington and San Francisco. The British paper on 
trusteeship proved quite unacceptable; it was a weaker version than the American, 
and there was no recognition of the distinction between strategic and non-strategic 
areas." 
The paper was a disappointing one to the Australian delegation.'* The mandates 
system of the League of Nations had provided for safeguards to protect the native 
peoples against abuses which had developed in more colonial territories; the Stassen 
draft omitted them. Stassen had followed the navy argument and drew a distinction 
between strategic and non-strategic areas; strategic areas were to be eliminated from 
the trusteeship system. The League Covenant had sought to prevent mandated ter-
ritories and their populations from becoming strategic assets: bases and miHtary 
training were prohibited. The working paper also provided that the administering 
authority must ensure that the territory would play its part in the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security. Volunteer forces would be organized and local 
facihties used for defence purposes. Finally, no provision was made for the placing of 
existing colonial territories under trusteeship or for a system of accounting to the 
United Nations by providing annual reports ." 
AustraHan dissatisfaction with British and American drafts led to the submission 
of more radical proposals to be incorporated in a new chapter on dependent peoples. 
These were summarized by Evatt in Annex 1 of the Australian report on the San 
Francisco Conference. 
Contribution to the new chapter on trusteeship. Seven Australian amendments were 
adopted including a general declaration of trusteeship in relation to all non-self-governing 
countries and the specifying of obUgations of the Trustee including (a) just treatment of the 
peoples concerned, (b) their protection against abuses, (c) the promotion of constructive 
measures of development, (d) encouragement of research, (e) full co-operation with other 
international bodies and, most important, (f) the transmission regularly to the Organiza-
tion of fill! statistical information relating to economic, social and educational conditions of 
the native peoples. 
The changes were included in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. 
The obligations in the first paragraph were to be assumed by all metropolitan 
powers and not merely by those administering trust territories. Evatt and the 
Australian government firmly believed that the advancement of all colonial peoples 
was a matter of international concern on grounds of justice and world security. 
There should be no distinction between the treatment and guarantees provided for 
the inhabitants of territories detached from Germany and Japan and those already ad-
ministered by the victors. 
But the conditions of security in this area will not exist unless the peoples are prepared to 
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co-operate with stronger states. To secure this co-operation it must be made clear that the 
purpose of administration is their welfare and advancement, and their security as well as 
ours. A solemn declaration in this Charter would give meaning to the co-operation of East 
and West in this region. The prindple of trusteeship would thus contribute to security." 
Part 3 of the Australian draft empowered the General Assembly to place a territory 
under trusteeship should a metropolitan power refuse to do so. This could be done 
only after the assembly convened a conference of all the colonial powers. This was an 
attempt to prevent flagrant colonial maladministration; AustraHa hoped that the 
threat of transfer of a colonial territory to trusteeship and so loss of its resources 
should another state be appointed as the new administering authority would afford 
considerable protection to the inhabitants of the territory. It is extremely doubtful 
whether any of the major powers or AustraHa itself would concede such power to the 
General Assembly. Under no circumstances would AustraHa accept any form of in-
ternational control over Papua New Guinea. The proposal that the General Assembly 
might be given the power to transfer a badly administered colony to the trusteeship 
system seems to have been little more than a tactical move to rally the support of 
anti-colonial powers for Australia on other issues. 
Parts 4 and 5 of the AustraHan draft reiterated the safeguards provided under the 
League system for the mandatory powers. N o trusteeship agreement could be 
imposed on the administering authority; there would be no "interference with its 
sovereignty" and no "international supervision". 
Towards the closing stages of the debate on trusteeship, Stettinius read a message 
received from Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes: 
I ask that you advise the United States Delegation that in my opinion it is vastly important 
that the United States sponsor a declaration of general poUcy respecting all dependent ter-
ritories which will be a part of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. Unless we 
do this and unless a declaration is an effective and progressive statement we will prejudice 
our moral and pohtical leadership in the world and particularly with the milUons of depen-
dent peoples of the world who form an increasingly important segment of world opinion 
and power. 
Specifically, the declaration should reiterate historic commitments to the rapid pohtical, 
economic and social advancement of dependent peoples to the objective, first, self rule and 
second, independence, to the assurance of their basic rights and freedom." 
The final declaration of principle in chapter 11 of the Charter ("Declaration 
regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories") put into predse form the objective of 
British colonial policy with self-government rather than independence as the goal. 
This fell short of Ickes's plea. Australia persisted in arguing that the obligations of 
colonial powers be made explidt and detailed." These were set out in Article 73, 
especially paragraph 5 (a) and (d). Australia attempted to insist that all metropolitan 
powers should forward to the United Nations annual reports on the economic, 
social, and political development of their territories. The colonial powers were un-
willing to accept this degree of accountability to the United Nations. In the end, 
Washington and London joined forces against the anti-imperialists. A compromise 
was set out in Article 73(e): the metropolitan powers undertook " t o transmit 
regularly to the Secretary General for information purposes subject to such limita-
tions as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other 
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information relating to economic, sodal, and educational conditions in the territories 
for which they are respectively responsible". This involved a "hands off" policy 
towards colonies which were not former League of Nations mandated territories. No 
metropolitan power was prepared to extend to any of its colonies the new trusteeship 
system. Evatt surely realized that it would have been political suicide for him to have 
placed Australia's " o w n colony of Papua under the trusteeship sys tem" ." 
Evatt had gone to San Francisco eager to fight over trusteeship. But he often ig-
nored his own expert in the field, W . D . Forsyth, and on a number of occasions 
deferred to New Zealand's Peter Eraser on some of the contentious issues. Eraser was 
chairman of the committee on trusteeship and succeeded in securing a large measure 
of agreement on the final draft. Some members of the Australian delegation were 
disappointed by it, largely because it lacked the precision and bite of the League of 
Nations Covenant. One of the surprising things was Australia's considerable accep-
tance of the American demand for strategic areas and the right to use the people and 
resources for defence purposes.*" 
The final major area of conflict between AustraHa and the United States was fuH 
employment and the role of the Economic and Social Council. One of the most 
strenuously pursued objectives of Australia was the conversion of the social and 
economic chapters of the Dumbarton Oaks draft from a "frigid" into a "full 
blooded" document. This involved " the inclusion of a statement of purposes far 
more precise and covering a wider field . . . particularly in the really important field 
of fuH employment; the inclusion of a pledge to carry out these purposes; the inclu-
sion of specific functions of the Economic and Social Council sufficient to enable it to 
carry out the purposes as stated, and to assist Governments in carrying out their 
pledge".*' 
Australia's concern for full employment arose out of the socialist heritage of the 
Australian Labor government and a vague acceptance of the Hobsonian analysis of 
economic imperialism. The Great Depression had left an indelible impression on the 
minds of all Labor politicians; it reinforced their suspicion of overseas financial and 
trading interests. With this went a firm belief in the primacy of economic causes of 
war. 
The Labor government, conscious also of Australia's vulnerable position through 
dependence on export markets, advanced a theory of full employment to prevent 
depression; J. A. Beasley put the argument at the Philadelphia meeting of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization in 1944. 
It is our attitude, and it must be the attitude of every country greatly dependent upon 
overseas trade, that we cannot possibly restrict our freedom of action with regard to 
monetary and commercial policy without some assurance that high levels of employment 
and consumption will be maintained particularly in the main consuming areas. . . . If the 
United States Government is unwilUng to undertake some employment obUgations, we 
must hesitate before entering into discussions on other aspects of international economic 
collaboration, and we could not feel ourselves obUged to undertake any commitments 
which limited our freedom of action to protect our economy against depressed conditions 
overseas.*^ 
Australian fears were strengthened by the obligations of Article 7 of the master 
Lend-Lease agreement. Britain was to provide benefits for the United States in a 
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manner advantageous to world economic relations. To this end there was to be an 
agreed international action aimed at economic expansion, the removal of all forms of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade, and the reduction of tariffs and 
quotas and other barriers to trade. Labor economists during the war were impressed 
by the possibility of a depression starting in the United States after rapid demobiliza-
tion. In such a situation, Australia would have either to devalue its currency or 
restrict imports to prevent unemployment in Australia. International agreements 
likely to be fostered by the United States would hinder AustraHa's freedom to adopt 
these measures and would still fail to attack the problem where it began, in demand. 
Widespread unemployment in the United States would inevitably result in a substan-
tial drop in world demand. 
At the United Nations Food and Agriculture Conference at Hot Springs, 
Virginia, in May 1943, Australia argued powerfully in favour of a full employment 
pledge. The battle over fuH employment was joined at the International Labor Con-
ference at Philadelphia in 1944. Australia proposed a draft international employment, 
agreement binding each signatory "to take all measures in its power" to maintain a 
high level of employment, to collaborate in the exchange of statistical information, 
and to participate in an international conference whenever a serious decHne in 
employment was developing anywhere in the world. The United States refused to go 
further than a declaration "that Governments should maintain high levels of employ-
ment". The AustraHan draft was defeated despite a vigorous and tenacious battle by 
the Australian delegates. It was fully anticipated by the American delegation at San 
Francisco that the Australians would again put up employment proposals and "fight 
tooth and nail to have them adopted".*' 
American opposition to a full-employment pledge arose partly out of increasing 
conservative influence in Congress, particularly in the Senate, where Stassen felt that 
its inclusion might prejudice the passage of the United Nations Charter. Connally 
opposed "overloading the Charter with all these economic and social matters which 
were unattainable dream stuff". Vandenburg agreed and said that "the idea of full 
employment could not be sold to the American people". Much of the opposition 
arose out of anti New Deal pressures in the Democratic party and a knowledge that 
the president was in favour of retaining the words in the charter. Some of the more 
conservative members of the American delegation saw the battle developing as a fun-
damental ideological conflict between communism and the rest of the world.** 
In committee, Australia secured the substitution of "full employment" for the 
American phrase "high and stable levels of employment". Dean GUdersleeve had 
pointed out at a meeting of the American delegation, "There would be a tremen-
dous disappointment in this country unless some constructive step is taken at San 
Francisco in the economic and social fields. . . . some general phrase of a construc-
tive nature should be included in the Charter." But, he added, "at the same time we 
should hold down the pressure which would come from other countries to speH out 
aH these questions in detail". Evatt had promised "not to press for detailed objec-
tives in the economic and social field" if the United Nations were authorized to 
initiate negotiations to create specialized organizations.*' 
The most serious objection to the Australian draft was that it could lead to in-
terference in internal American affairs. Pasvolsky told the American delegates that 
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"it was Dr. Evatt's intention to inject the World Organisation into the internal 
affairs of the member states. This . . . was not conjecture but had been told to him 
face to face by representatives of Australia and New Zealand on several occasions. 
The fuH employment argument . . . was based on the theory that if a nation did not 
maintain full employment it would upset world peace. . . . this was the most 
dangerous theory with which the United States had ever been diplomatically con-
fronted." It seems highly improbable that the Australians or New Zealanders would 
have adopted such a stance because, as Senator Connally pointed out, "the Australian 
delegation was 'insane' concerning the domestic jurisdiction clause and strongly 
favored the safeguards embodied therein".*' 
The United States was on the horns of a dilemma. Much as it disliked the phrase 
"fuH employment", it disliked even more the unpopularity it would incur if it 
openly opposed full employment. Dean Gildersleeve felt that any attempt to change 
the existing phrase would be defeated by forty-eight votes to one. There was con-
siderable support for a full explanation of the American position. American offidals 
secured an insertion in the minutes of a statement that all members were "in fuH 
agreement that nothing contained in Chapter IX of the Charter would be construed 
as giving authority to the Organization to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
member states".*' 
The battle narrowed to the question of implementation, and the gap between the 
two countries was finally bridged through the good offices of the Soviet delegate. 
The contentious draft became Article 56: "All Members pledge themselves to take 
jojnt and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement 
of purposes set forth in Article 55." Article 55 declared: "With a view to the crea-
tion of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and 
friendly relations among nations . . . the United Nations shall promote (a) higher 
standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress 
and development." Chapter 10 of the charter set up the Economic and Social Coun-
cil with powers to carry out the functions for which, at Philadelphia, Australia had 
proposed the estabhshment of an international organization. These included the ex-
change of information and statistics and the summoning of a conference whenever 
unemployment threatened to create a world crisis. 
AustraHa had won a semantic victory in securing the insertion of the full employ-
ment pledge in the United Nations Charter. The pledge was on a matter admitted to 
be essentially within domestic jurisdicrion. Article 2 (7) meant that it was completely 
unenforceable. There was really no significant difference between this and a declara-
tion that "governments shaH maintain high levels of employment". 
The San Francisco Conference was the high point of AustraHan diplomatic 
achievement in the first half of the twentieth century. Evatt's technical achievement 
in influencing the conference was a tour deforce. His volcanic energy, his legal grasp 
of details and of constitution making, and his determination to project the Australian 
and Evatt image estabhshed him as the leader of the smaH and middle powers during 
the conference. His sense of public relations and his direct, almost brutal, approach 
to questions made him one of the impressive and respected leaders of the conference. 
Coming to the United States as a relatively unknown politician (except as a gadfly to 
the State Department), he emerged as one of the dominions figures of the conference. 
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giving an indelible imprint to some sections of the United Nations Charter.*' He 
also emerged as the de facto if not the dejure leader of the Australian delegation, com-
pletely overshadowing his cabinet superior F.M. Forde. The final recognition of his 
very important contribution to the San Frandsco Conference lay in his election as 
president of the General Assembly in September 1948. Australia's election as a 
member of the Security Coundl for 1946-47 was also a tribute to his work. His in-
ternational impact was far greater than that of William Morris Hughes in 1919. 
As champion of the small and middle powers, Evatt tilted constantly at the Great 
Powers, especially the United States and the United Kingdom as well as the Soviet 
Union. He was forced to admit defeat in his battle against the Great Power veto but 
won tactical victories over the relative roles of the General Assembly and the Security 
Council. At San Francisco, "the personal views of the Minister for External Affairs 
were consistently put forward as the foreign policy of AustraHa".*' The minister and 
most senior members of the Department of External Affairs were on the spot. A 
three-page cable to Curtin at the end of the conference was the longest sent from San 
Francisco. 
Evatt's victories were often short-term drafting victories, the work of a briUiant 
lawyer pleading a brief rather than victories on matters of prindple important for in-
ternational relations. His persistence caused friction with the American delegation. 
Under-Secretary of state Joseph Grew concluded that he was "acting like a bull in a 
china shop . . . with obstructionist tactics all along the line". Stettinius reported on 
12 June that Evatt "seemed determined to break up the Conference". Lester 
Pearson, reflecting on the conference years later, recognized his vitality and en-
thusiasm but also a certain lack of judgment. "His refusal to withdraw or accept 
compromise made him a hero to many of the delegations of smaller states. He was 
saved from the snares of his courage (or if you like, from his pig-headedness and vani-
ty) by other delegations including our own."'" He succeeded in much of his tactical 
and strategic success by the fact that, as he said, "We did not belong to any bloc of 
nations."" The French ambassador's wife paid a high tribute to the work of Evatt 
and the AustraHan delegation to San Francisco. "It represented the effort of a nation 
that felt itself free. . . . Nearly everybody else wanted something — one wanted 
wheat, another wanted coal, another wanted finance, but Australia was free, or at 
any rate acted without considerations of this kind."'* Both Washington and London 
realized that Australia was following an independent policy of its own. There was no 
further talk in Washington of Australia as a British colony, and London was fiJly 
aware of the fact that the Commonwealth was becoming multinational with the 
older dominions as mature and independent but friendly states. 
11 Bases and the New Pacific 
A common thread running through AustraHan foreign policy for several decades was 
the search for security. The close relations with Britain and the Commonwealth and 
the Lyons proposals for a broadly based Pacific pact reflected that concern. It had 
long been evident that Australia by itself was incapable of providing that security. 
This necessitated close relations preferably with a "great and powerful friend". 
With the collapse (temporarily, it was hoped) of British naval power south and east 
of Singapore in 1941-42, Curtin turned for support to the United States. This had 
always been a second, perhaps remote option since Deakin had invited the American 
fleet to Australia in 1908. Curtin's emotional appeal on 27 December 1941 meant a 
reorientation of Australia policy towards the United States as the second possible 
"great and powerful friend". Curtin made it clear after his initial speech that he had 
no intention of severing ties with Britain. 
The critical period for Australia ended perhaps with the battles of the Coral Sea 
and Midway; the danger of invasion and miHtary defeat then receded, and AustraHa 
was able to look more carefully at the problems and obligations involved in the close 
relationship forged by two superficially incompatible leaders: John Curtin and 
Douglas MacArthur. The northern thrust towards Japan revealed weaknesses in the 
alliance at a time when Britain began, in 1943-44, to try to salvage something from 
the wreckage of her Far Eastern-South-West Pacific empire. But although there was 
some revival of pro-British and pro-Commonwealth feeling in Australia, most 
Australian realists knew that Britain and the Commonwealth could no longer pro-
vide security for Australia. The Commonwealth has ceased to be a viable or powerful 
strategic unit. 
With growing Australian national consciousness and a determination to play an 
important part in dedding, or at least influencing, its own poHtical future and 
miHtary security, there developed the Evatt insistence on proper consultation bet-
ween the Allies in working out tactics and strategy and priorities in the Pacific War. 
DisiUusionment with the Pacific War Council and the control of miHtary operations 
by Britain and the United States had produced the Evatt pressure and outbursts in 
Washington and London. It also produced the Australia-New Zealand Agreement 
of January 1944, with its statement (Article 13) that "the two governments agree 
that, within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of 
defence comprising the South West and South Pacific areas . . . be established and 
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that this zone should be established on Australia and New Zealand, stretching 
through the arc of islands north and north-east of Australia to Western Samoa and 
Cook Islands". Evatt, before the San Francisco Conference, repeatedly insisted that 
Australia should play a major part in the formation of a global security organization 
which could encompass a member of regional groupings such as that envisaged in the 
Australia-New Zealand Agreement. The central problem from an Australian point 
of view was to establish in the Pacific a security structure that would avert any 
possibility of a new threat to Australia from the renaissance of a rearmed Japan. 
Australian strategic priorities suggested a reliance on a United Nations security 
systems and a multilateral alHance structure in the Padfic. 
In 1944 and 1945, the United States was also examining its strategic needs in the 
post-war period, both in Europe and the Pacific. During 1942-43, Australia had 
been a vital base and staging area in the war against Japan. For the post-war period, 
the American navy began to look at the problem of Padfic bases. As the San Fran-
dsco Conference opened, the navy and the State Department found themselves faced 
with a complex situation. The two departments were trying to "find a satisfactory 
solution to the question of trusteeships", maintaining their strategic bases in the 
Pacific, "and at the same time not being charged with annexation and expansionist 
politics". "It was unthinkable at this time that we give up our bases and protection 
in the Pacific," Joseph Grew noted.' 
The assessment of the navy's strategic needs was complicated by its fear that 
Alaska and Hawaii might be declared trust territories with restrictions on defence 
installations. This nightmare was resolved when the United Nations Charter was 
signed in San Francisco: neither of these territories (in the traditional American sense 
of the term as areas developing towards statehood) were regarded as colonial posses-
sions. But the question of Pacific bases remained. On 6 September, the US assistant 
navy secretary, H. Struve Hensel, held a press conference in Washington where he 
listed nine bases as "those which we intend to maintain and which are susceptible to 
defence". They were Kodiak, Adak, Hawaii, Balboa, Iwo, Okinawa, Manus, the 
Philippines, and the Marianas. On 16 February, Admiral Forrest reported to the 
Senate Naval Affairs Committee "that the US Navy wanted to maintain major naval 
bases in a number of places including the Admiralties". This involved diplomatic 
moves to approach France and Britain, and Australia and New Zealand, about the 
problems involved. London immediately notified the Australian government, which 
told Britain that "Australia must be represented in any international negotiations 
affecting the disposition of territory in the South Pacific."* 
The AustraHan government's stand on the question arose out of Article 16 of the 
1944 Australia-New Zealand Agreement. "The two Governments accept as a 
recognised principle of international practice that the construction and use, in time of 
war, by any power, of naval, miHtary or air instaUations, in any territory under the 
sovereignty or control of another power, does not, in itself, afford any basis for ter-
ritorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control after the conclusion of hostilities." 
CordeH HuH had made the appropriate protests to both Eraser and Curtin. Evatt's 
immediate reaction to the Forrest proposal was that the United States was attemp-
ting to control aH major Pacific bases, leaving none to Australia. He was anxious to 
retain some Australian bases in New Guinea and perhaps New Caledonia and the 
New Hebrides.' 
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The only base in this area in which both the United States and Australia were con-
cerned was Manus Island in the Admiralty group, part of the Australian mandate. 
Manus was some three hundred kilometres north-east of New Guinea and contained 
a large and secure harbour capable of containing a thousand vessels. It had been oc-
cupied by the Japanese in 1942 but had been reconquered by the Americans by March 
1944. Its deep-water anchorage had been developed into one of the major Allied 
bases in the Pacific. The United States had spent at least $156 miHion in developing 
its facihties: airfields, roads, wharves, offices, camps, etc. John Dedman, the 
Australian minister for war organisation of industry and later minister for Defence, 
visited it in mid-1944 and found it "as busy as a large industrial airport".* 
After preliminary discussions with Norman Makin, minister for the navy, in 
Washington in February 1946, the State Department sent its initial proposals to 
Canberra in mid-March. These took the form of two informal working papers 
which were "not to be considered as expressing the final views of the United States 
Government". The first was a preliminary draft of a base agreement covering 
Manus, and the second suggested clauses that could be included in any trusteeship 
agreement covering the Admiralty Islands. New Guinea was a League of Nations 
mandated territory, and the terms of this mandate precluded the building of perma-
nent fortifications. The United States regarded itself "as a state directly concerned in 
the negotiation of any trusteeship agreement . . . covering the mandated territory of 
New Guinea". 
Dedman, as a member of the war cabinet, saw the American proposals and regard-
ed them as "little short of outrageous". He told Chifley, who had become prime 
minister in July 1945, that "they savoured of the kind of 'suggestions' that one 
might expect the USSR to make to one of its satellites but hardly what one would 
expect any self-respecting democracy to receive from another" . ' The State Depart-
ment proposed to transfer to Australia the installations on Manus in exchange for an 
AustraHan undertaking to maintain the installations at its own expense for "99 years 
and for such future time as was agreed upon" . The exchange was subject to four 
conditions. 
First, the United States was to be given joint user rights but was not committed to main-
tain any forces on Manus; secondly, the United States was to be given the right to deny the 
use of the facilities to any third party including British Commonwealth countries; thirdly, 
the United States was to be given the right at any time during the 99 years . . . to assume 
complete control of the base; fourthly, the United States was to be given the right to 
prevent if it so wished, the estabhshment of any other base in the mandated territory.' 
The proposal was a one-sided one, and almost immediately the State Department 
began to modify some of the more objectionable clauses. Hickerson gave verbal 
assurances that " the United States would permit the use of bases by other British 
Commonwealth countries if the United States was not at w a r " . ' This would 
forestall the inevitable reaction of the Australian Defence Committee and of similar 
bodies in other Commonwealth countries. But the assurances were given at " low-
level exploratory discussions with British representatives". 
The American draft was completely unacceptable to the Australian government. 
Apart from the crippHng cost to Australia of maintaining the base and its facihties, it 
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ran counter to Australian post-war policies in the Pacific. Evatt had proposed that 
the United States should take part in a tripartite defence agreement with Australia 
and New Zealand or in a broadly based regional security arrangement reminiscent of 
Lyons's Pacific Pact. This would be a quid pro quo for a long-term agreement about 
Manus. The submission to the Australian cabinet on Pacific bases stressed the need 
for the United States to accept the principle of reciprocity, thus pointing the way to 
proposals for the reciprocal use of American bases by AustraHan forces. Finally the 
American proposals were probably incompatible with the United Nations Charter. 
The American draft, by implication, realized this when it suggested the inclusion of 
certain conditions when a trusteeship agreement was reached for New Guinea with 
Australia as the administering authority. 
Evatt was in fact trying to negotiate from strength at a time when his personal 
prestige was high as a result of the San Francisco Conference. The press was critical 
of the proposal to permit American bases in the South Pacific that could not be 
shared by the Commonwealth. Evatt told Minter in Canberra that there was no 
truth in the idea that Australia was opposing " the idea of the United States having 
bases in this area without including the whole British Commonweal th" . "Australia 
desires to work very closely with the United States," he said, " in developing a 
regional defence arrangement which would include New Zealand." ' At the very 
least there should be developed a framework for defence co-operation which would 
include Australia and New Zealand. 
This the United States flatly refused to do. The American approach was a bilateral 
rather than a multilateral one, and the United States was reluctant to enter into any 
mutual defence pact. American objections were summed up in discussions with New 
Zealand: 
Our base negotiations have to do only -with the continuation of rights and privileges 
which we now enjoy in south-west Pacific positions. 
We are willing to share these rights and privileges with the sovereign upon whose ter-
ritory we wish base rights. 
None of our negotiations will deal -with a general exchange of base rights. 
Since we are not discussing the large question of reciprocal use of bases, our present 
negotiations have no relation whatsoever to a mutual defence arrangement or a regional 
security pact.' 
Evatt and Chifley raised the question of bases at the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Conference in London in April-May. The conference accepted the 
AustraHan analysis in detafl with its objections to the exclusion of Britain from bases 
that could be important to Commonwealth security. New Zealand, and belatedly 
Great Britain, accepted the Australian argument for a Commonwealth regional 
defence arrangement which might be expanded to include the United States.'" It was 
agreed that Britain and New Zealand as weH as AustraHa should approach the United 
States for a conference on regional defence arrangements in the Pacific; the conference 
would also consider the joint use of bases in the area. It was also agreed that Ernest 
Bevin should broach the project with Secretary of State James Byrnes at a meeting in 
Paris early in May. Bevin did so, but Byrnes completely rejected the proposal for a 
four-power conference because the United States was not interested in participating 
in a South Pacific regional defence scheme. 
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The London meeting was important because it became evident that Great Britain 
lacked the power to make a major contribution to Pacific defence. The concept of a 
common Empire defence policy was no longer valid in the post-war world. It con-
firmed Evatt's long-held view that, in the Pacific, AustraHa must take the lead in any 
defence/foreign policy planning on behalf of the Commonwealth. He felt that Bevin 
had bungled the discussions with Byrnes. On his way back to Australia, Evatt met 
Truman and Byrnes. They displayed only an academic interest in his proposal to call 
a conference of all interested powers to discuss Pacific islands and bases. Only a few 
naval men showed more than a flicker of interest in Evatt's ideas about bases. 
The Manus project was effectively kiHed by July 1946, if not as early as April. The 
most important reason was the shift in American perception of its strategic interests 
in the Pacific. The south-west Pacific was becoming a backwater and the north-west 
Pacific the main focus of interest. A later growth of interest in Europe completed 
that shift of interest. The cold war became more intense, and military dangers in the 
Pacific seemed remote. American defence proposals were completely revised in April 
and May; the new defence system included the Ryukyus, the Bonins, the Philip-
pines, the Marianas, and Hawaii. Australia and Manus lay outside or beyond the new 
perimeter. Guam and Honolulu became the key bases, while Manus was primarily of 
academic interest. Byrnes was prepared to station only a few men there. 
The contraction of American interests was also due to a drastic cut in American 
defence appropriations. Expenditure for the United States Navy for the fiscal year 
ended on 30 June 1947 was cut by $650 million. The navy had to completely revise 
its priorities, and the list of desirable bases had to be drastically pruned. Manus was 
one of the casualties. The Navy Department began to dismantle fadhties there. 
Valuable equipment was moved to Guam or Hawaii, and some was sold to the 
Chinese. AustraHa finally bought the unwanted residual assets in 1948 for $1.25 
milhon. Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal told Dedman that the United States 
abandoned Manus because "Congress cut our budget so drastically that we couldn't 
stay there"." 
The failure in Australian policy was partly due to the hard line adopted by both 
Canberra and Washington during the negotiations. The original American 
preliminary draft was being modified almost immediately after it was presented to 
Canberra, and this probably encouraged Evatt to hold out. This was a mistaken 
tactic.'* His insistence on the reciprocal use of American bases was an error. The 
secretary of state had warned dominion prime ministers, "The State Department had 
begged us not to raise the issue, saying that the issue does not strictly arise in view of 
the fact that we established no wartime bases in American-controlled territory and 
they seem to wish us to be content with the belief that we should get these rights if 
an emergency actually arose."" On the other hand, the United States was slow in 
clarifying its priorities and was anxious to keep its options open. Above aH, it had no 
desire to commit itself to any new defence pacts. It was not Evatt who denied the 
United States a presence in Manus, although his diplomacy was often of the bush 
variety; the Americans themselves withdrew for their own reasons. 
Yet Evatt persisted in his attempt to persuade the State Department and the navy 
to remain at Manus. When parliament opened in November 1946, the government 
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repeated its view that it would welcome "joint use of bases in the Padfic on the prin-
ciple of reciprocity''. Evatt said that Australia 
wanted an arrangement that would provide, among other things, for . . . the reciprocal 
use of bases in that area. Under such an arrangement . . . it would be possible for the 
American Navy to use facilities at Manus Island but not control them. In the same way, 
our Navy and Air Force would be able to use fadUties that are controlled directly by the 
United States of America, the matter of finance and of proper places to be selected to be 
determined after the prindple has been agreed upon.'* 
He told the American ambassador, Robert Butler, a few days later that to satisfy 
parliament "Australia must have arrangements for at least token rights for the 
mutual use of facilities in at least one American base"." In a final oft^ er, the State 
Department agreed to include in any agreement for the American use of Manus a 
"provision for similar Australian use of Canton Island and American Samoa"." But 
it declined to accept any finandal responsibility. This would have met Evatt's 
request, but cabinet firmly rejected the offer. 
Butler was recalled to Washington early in 1947 for consultation, presumably on 
the base question and the broader issues of regional security. He was accompanied on 
his return by the commander-in-chief of the United States Padfic Fleet, Admiral 
Louis Denfeld. Denfeld delivered a State Department memorandum to Evatt and 
Chifley which effectively closed the door to further discussions. The US joint chiefs 
of staff had decided to withdraw completely from Manus and not to conclude any 
agreement giving post-war military rights to the United States at Manus. Manus had 
been superseded as a base by the former Japanese mandated islands and Manila, so 
that Manus was now of "slight strategic interest". The memorandum included a 
statement to mollify Australia a little. 
The United States of America and AustraUa both loyally support the United Nations and 
may be depended upon to support action in that organization against an aggressor. 
In view of the identity of interests between the United States and AustraUa, and the ex-
cellent relations between the two countries, it would, of course, be possible to make a 
special arrangement in an emergency at any time in the future that it became necessary. 
The Manus base project was thus decently buried, although it was not for another 
sixteen months that Manus was transferred to AustraHan dvil administration. It was 
not until 1950-51 that negotiations for a security pact were resumed. 
The original American proposal had included some suggestions to protect 
American base rights at Manus should Australia place the mandated territory of New 
Guinea under a trusteeship agreement. These proved unacceptable to the Australian 
government. When a trusteeship agreement was prepared in September 1946, 
Australia again refused to accept amendments proposed by the State Department 
which would have permitted joint use of the Manus base facihties. The Trusteeship 
Committee of the United Nations accepted the Australian draft agreement with the 
approval of John Foster Dulles. Article 7 empowered the administering authority to 
"take all measures in the territory which it considers desirable for the defence of the 
territory and for the maintenance of international peace and security"." It is doubt-
ful whether a joint bases agreement over Manus would have been approved. The 
Denfeld memorandum expressed the hope that Australia would make an agreement 
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with the Security Council under Article 43 setting out the facihties that Australia 
would make available to the Security Council on call for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace. It hoped that Australia would include the Manus fadhties in such an 
agreement. 
The United States was consistent in its refusal to be drawn into any defence ar-
rangement in the south-west Pacific. In January 1947, the United States agreed to 
take part in the setting up of the South Pacific Commission. This was designed by 
the AustraHa-New Zealand Agreement in Canberra in January 1944 to further the 
welfare of the island peoples of the Pacific. In agreeing to join the commission, the 
State Department stipulated that it "should not be empowered to deal with political 
questions or matters of defence or security"." 
Defence co-operation between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States con-
tinued at a low level as the Manus base was run down. In March 1947 an agreement 
was reached for the use of the Queensland air bases at Amberley and Eagle Farm by 
the United States. Under the five-year defence programme introduced by Dedman in 
June 1947, defence research facilities were included. These provided for the setting 
up in central Australia of a guided-missile testing range by Australia and Britain." 
The development of atomic missiles led to collaboration between Britain and 
AustraHa in the study of atomic physics. Australian scientists went to the British ex-
perimental station at Harwell and shared in the flow of classified material provided to 
the United Kingdom by the United States. 
Problems of access to material developed in June 1948 during the visit to 
Washington of Sir Percy Sillitoe, head of Britain's MI5, when the new Australian 
Security Intelligence Organization was being set up. The United States became con-
cerned about the effectiveness of the Australian security service as the long-range 
weapons estabhshment took shape. Some three months later (30 September 1948), 
Arthur Fadden told parliament that the prime minister informed the British cabinet 
that the United States was reluctant to give Australia secret atomic information 
because of distrust of the security of the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR, later the CSIRO). This American concern was shared by some 
British government departments.*" 
This intelligence sharing was "perhaps the most important difference besetting 
the United States-Australian relationship". It was extremely difficult to determine 
how far there were leaks in Australia of classified American scientific information. 
The American suspicions apparently began in 1945 by a "leak caused by a Rhodes 
scholar who was no longer in Australia".*' In any case, the leaked information was 
made pubhc two weeks later. But the suspicion grew and led to the belief that there 
were communists or communist sympathizers in the public service or perhaps even in 
higher levels m the government. These suspicions must be set in the context of 
growing American preoccupation with communism leading to. the McCarthy crisis. 
One American comment on the Australian security system was that it was "very 
good, even better than ours" but with the rider that "it was too much under Dr 
Evatt".** 
When Sir Frederick Shedden, secretary of the Defence Department, was in 
Washington in March 1949, he took the bull by the horns and startled the secretary 
of state and his coHeagues by suggesting that "it was possible that some officers on 
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the United States side might have suspicions concerning the loyalty of members of 
the AustraHan Cabinet and might, for example, entertain the view that Prime 
Minister Chifley was a Communist". This suggestion horrified the Americans and 
led to a "vehement and categorial assurance" that no responsible high ranking 
American offidal "had any such thoughts concerning the Prime Minister, the 
Minister for Defence (Mr. Dedman) the Minister for External Affairs (Dr. Evatt) or 
any other high ranking officials concerned with defence matters".*' American con-
cern was centred on the Australian security system itself rather than on top-ranking 
Australian members of cabinet and civil servants. Increasingly the finger of suspidon 
was pointed to the lower service echelons, the CSIR, and Australian academics. 
Chifley's view was very down-to-earth. Commenting on American ambassador 
Myron M. Cowen's criticism of the release of military information to him at the 
rocket range, he told his successor, Pete Jarman, "If we can't give secrets to the 
American ambassador, who in the bloody hell can we give them to?"** 
Australian concern at the drying up of the flow of scientific information from the 
United States through London to Australia led to Shedden's visit to Washington in 
March 1949. His stay there — twenty-two days — was regarded as too long for a 
review of defence relationships. He was in fact a trouble-shooter but not adequately 
equipped with powers to negotiate with the appropriate American authorities. 
Before he left Canberra, Chifley "spoke at length [to Jarman] of his conviction that 
the United States and Australia, two English speaking democrades, must stand 
together against the Communist menace. He said that there had been no leaks from 
Australia since 1945".*' 
Pressure for the lifting of the American embargo on the release of scientific infor-
mation came primarily from London rather than Canberra, from the British prime 
minister and the British minister for Defence.*' Prime Minister Attlee had pleaded 
"for early reconsideration of the embargo laid down by S.A.N.A.C.C. [State Army, 
Navy, Air Force Co-ordinating Committee] and imposing new elements of strain on 
strong Commonwealth solidarity with the inference that the whole concept of 
Anglo-American defence and welfare is being increasingly undermined." The 
defence minister wrote to Forrestal suggesting that, in the Hght of his visit, the em-
bargo should be reviewed and the United Kingdom should make available to the 
Australian scientists employed in the United Kingdom on guided missiles the 
necessary confidential American information. The invitation to Shedden to visit the 
United States came from a request from Attlee to Truman. 
The Shedden visit led to a partial but not yet complete raising of the ban on releas-
ing scientific information to AustraHa. Shedden made a very substantial impact on 
Washington but, not having fuH power to negotiate, left Washington with only 
limited success. Jarman had some doubts about the accuracy of Shedden's assessment 
of the situation in Australia, mainly because of his own analysis of the Communist 
problem in Australia. He would certainly have read or listened to the debates in the 
House of Representatives in Canberra. The opposition had, on several occasions, 
named a number of people (some in the CSIR) whom they suspected of being 
members of the Communist Party. Only a photographer in the plant section of the 
CSIR was for a time secretary of the Canberra branch of the Communist Party, but 
he would have had no access to any confidential material.*' One of the chief anti-
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communists, Rupert Ryan (MHR, Flinders), had dramatically demanded, "We 
must clear out the Augean stables of the CSIR and other departments where com-
munists are harboured."*' As far as can be ascertained, there had been no leakages 
since the last years of the war, and there was no justification for the reactionary 
witch-hunt on this ground. 
Sir David Rivett, the chairman of the CSIR, was reluctant to impose any Hmita-
tions on sdentific research. He recognized that the discovery of the atomic bomb had 
as an inevitable sequel "the inescapable introduction of secrecy between aH potential 
rivals and even between friends, about all pursuit of knowledge of any kind that 
might conceivably be applied to the purposes of war". He gloried in the free interna-
tional exchange of information for three hundred years that had led to dramatic ad-
vances in scientific progress, but admitted that in war "secrecy becomes essential, 
using that word in its full sense. Secrecy and integrity in sdence could not flourish 
together".*' He argued that in peace, military research should be carried out in 
special laboratories controlled by military authorities. In October 1948, the 
Australian government introduced a bill providing for the transfer of some defence 
research from the CSIR to the Department of Supply and Development. This partly 
met Rivett's point, and it was hoped that it would allay American fears of leakages 
of information from left-wing members of CSIR. 
The State Department did not move immediately for any relaxation of the ban on 
the exchange of classified material. It wanted more time to assess the changes in the 
AustraHan security system, evidence "of more positive and successful action on their 
part than they have so far demonstrated".'" It was agreed that some individual 
United States military services might release selected information up to and including 
material classified as confidential. Whether the American delay was due to some 
disillusionment with general Australian support for their policies is uncertain. A 
senior American diplomat in Canberra observed: "For some time past Australia has 
given us little or no support in connection with the world wide political, military 
and economic burdens the United States is now carrying. The United States is get-
ting practically no co-operation from them in regard to the proposed agreement con-
cerning the Fulbright Program, the avoidance of double taxation, Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation, to civil aviation matters, international trade problems and to 
Japanese and German policies."" It is surprising perhaps that any alliance continued 
to exist. There was no total release of the ban on the exchange of scientific informa-
tion untH some time after the change of government in 1949. 
12 Occupation and Control of Japan 
Australian participation in the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 
1945 and agreement that an Australian contingent form part of the occupation forces 
in Japan were important concessions to Australia and poHtical victories for Evatt. 
After the surrender of Japan, AustraHa was directly concerned with a number of 
specific issues especially in relation to the United States, in three areas of potential 
conflict. The first was the nature of the occupation and the negotiation of a peace 
treaty. These involved close contacts in the Allied Council for Japan and the Far 
Eastern Commission. They culminated in the Japanese Peace Treaty Pact. The 
second area of potential conflict was Indonesia, where Australia and the United 
States were both members of the United Nations Good Offices Committee and of 
the United Nations Commission on Indonesia. In November 1949 Indonesia achiev-
ed independence. The third area of possible conflict was Korea, and this was Hnked 
with Australian anxiety to negotiate a regional pact with the United States. These 
last two issues are dealt with in chapters 14 and 15. 
What Evatt was most concerned about in 1945 was that Australia participate in 
the policy-making machinery following Japan's surrender. He repeatedly insisted 
that Australia, being an active belhgerent, should possess "the right to the status of a 
party principal to every armistice and peace arrangement".' He was most anxious to 
prevent Australia from being presented with zfait accompli by the Great Powers and 
so be frozen out of any settlement with Japan. The Potsdam Declaration setting the 
terms of the Japanese surrender had been announced on 26 July 1945 without any 
consultation with AustraHa. MacArthur had been appointed as the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers by President Truman on 29 August with the approval 
of the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union before the Japanese capitula-
tion; the other Pacific countries approved directly or indirectly after the event. 
An invitation to Australia by the Big Four to become a member of the Far 
Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC), which would formulate AHied policy in 
Japan, partly allayed Australian fears of being left out. But there remained the critical 
questions of the powers and voting procedures of the FEAC. Its relationship to 
SCAP — the supreme commander and his establishment — and its area of authority 
would determine its effectiveness and the role of the smaller nations in framing oc-
cupation policy and a peace settlement. Under-secretary of state Dean Acheson on 
one occasion suggested to Eggleston, the AustraHan minister in Washington, that 
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control might be exercised by a series of orders issued by SCAP on the instructions of 
the president of the United States. Eggleston immediately protested, without con-
sulting Evatt, who would have been shocked by such a chain of command which 
would deprive the smaller powers of any influence on policy.* The idea was quickly 
dropped. On 19 September Washington itself clarified intentions in a directive to 
SCAP. "Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis but on an uncon-
ditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any 
question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope."' The State Department hoped 
that none of the AlHed Powers would contest his authority. 
Evatt disHked the high-handed attitude of the CouncH of Foreign Ministers and 
went to London to "secure a fuH say in matters dealt with by the Council which in 
any way affected the future of Pacific affairs".* He was anxious to remind Churchill 
of his promise of 9 April 1945 to support AustraHa's claims and to exert pressure on 
the Dominions Office. He told the Dominions Office on 9 August that Australia 
wanted "full occupation until such time as a democratic and genuinely popular 
regime is fully established". It was essential to "actively encourage and promote 
democratic and anti-imperial movements and sponsor widespread reform in the 
economic and sodal system designed to break down the domination of the old 
monopoHsts and large estate owners."' AustraHa was afraid that MacArthur might 
adopt a soft policy towards Japan and that the occupation might be a short one. 
Proposals for setting up machinery to enable the small powers to participate in 
poHcy decisions centred on the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission 
in Washington and an Allied Control Council in Tokyo. The composition, powers, 
and voting patterns of both bodies were a matter of intense argument. The Soviet 
Union objected to the setting up of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission unless veto 
rights were given to the Big Four and an Allied Council was formed in Tokyo to 
direct the occupation. Both Australia and the United Kingdom shared the Russian 
view that the FEAC should have wider powers to enable it to have "a real voice in 
formulating Allied policy in controlling directives to MacArthur".' 
The Soviet Union did not attend the first meeting of the FEAC in Washington on 
30 October. AustraHa had been accepted as a member by the United States. The pro-
posed terms of reference for the new commission were drafted by the United States. 
They were unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Evatt tried to insist that any amend-
ments to the proposed terms of reference should be discussed by all members and not 
merely the Big Four. The State Department at first flatly rejected the Australian pro-
posal, but opinion in favour of extending the FEAC's powers was overwhelming, 
and the United States agreed to its becoming a policy-making and not merely "an 
advisory body which might have its recommendations filed but never acted on" . ' 
Evatt became chairman of a committee to consider the general policy of the allied 
occupation on Japan.' The committee used the United States Initial Post-Surrender 
Policy for Japan, the directive issued to MacArthur when he was appointed SCAP, as 
the basis for discussion. Evatt attempted to toughen the draft. 
The United States was reluctant to share responsibility for the occupation and oc-
cupation policy with other powers. But it became clear that the Allies were unwiH-
ing to accept unfettered American control over Japan. Evatt's bete noire, the veto, 
quickly entered into the discussion. He was totally opposed to it but finally accepted 
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it when it became apparent that without it the Soviet Union would conrinue its 
boycott.' Final details were hammered out at the Moscow meeting of foreign 
secretaries in December. On 27 December they issued a communique setting out the 
terms of reference for both the Far Eastern Commission (which would replace the 
Far Eastern Advisory Commission) and the Allied Council for Japan. 
The communique of 27 December represented a compromise, at least on paper. 
The terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) provided that its func-
tion would be to "formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity 
with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender 
may be accomplished, and to review on the request of any member any directive 
issued by SCAP or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving poHcy 
decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission".'" But part 2, section I, of the 
new directive made it clear that the ultimate decision on contentious issues would be 
made by the United States: "Although every effort wiH be made by consultation and 
by the constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the con-
duct of the occupation and control of Japan which will satisfy the principal AlHed 
powers, in the event of any difference of opinion among them, the polides of the 
United States wiH govern."" Voting procedures in the FEC aUowed for less than a 
unanimous vote "provided that action shaH have the concurrence of at least a majori-
ty of all the representatives, including the representatives of the Big Four". 
In a sense, Australia's worst fears were realized: the occupation of Japan was to be 
an American enterprise. Should there be any disagreement in the FEC leading to a 
paralysis of action on a specific issue, major or minor, the United States could issue 
an interim directive to SCAP which would result in immediate executive action. By 
the time the FEC had resolved its deadlock, it would be too late to unscramble 
SCAP's decision. MacArthur could put into effect a policy opposed by a majority of 
member nations. Although the FEC could review directives issued to MacArthur by 
the State Department, in fact only ten out of thirty-two were modified. 
AustraHa had met with only partial success despite Evatt's optimism after the 
FEAC had completed its draft on basic policy and procedures. The important gain 
was the acceptance by the United States of a broad rather than narrow construction 
of the powers of the FEC: it was a policy-making and not merely an advisory body. 
But little had been done to hedge about effective American control of policy in 
Japan. AustraHan hopes that the FEC "should not be restricted to the mere im-
plementation of the terms of the Japanese surrender" never got off the ground. Draft 
instructions to J. Maloney at the FEAC suggested that "this body should become an 
organ for the co-ordination of poHcy in all matters affecting the welfare and security 
of the Pacific area". They reflected a hangover from the AustraHa-New Zealand 
Agreement. But the instructions were never sent. 
The meeting of the foreign ministers in Moscow, then, had papered over the 
cracks. A new Far Eastern Commission had been set up with membership increased 
to nine — AustraHa, Canada, China, France, the Netherlands, the PhiHppines, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States; the Soviet Union became a member after 
the resolution of voting procedures and the setting up of the Allied Council. India 
joined later. 
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The Far Eastern Commission (FEC) 
When SCAP began to function in February 1946, the Allied Coundl had not yet 
met. The FEC became bogged down at its first meeting over status disputes about 
the vice-chairmanship of the commission. AustraHa was most reluctant to see the 
post fiHed by representatives of the Big Four with veto powers. The compromise 
proposal that there be three vice-chairmen serving in rotation would have led to this. 
Nelson Johnson, the former American ambassador to Australia and now the 
secretary-general of the FEC, nominated the delegates from China, the Soviet Union 
and the United Kingdom. Despite Evatt's objections, Johnson's proposal was 
adopted. But it was informaHy agreed that the three posts be not fiHed. 
The FEC became the battleground for dedsions on a number of important 
matters. Disputes developed between the FEC and the Allied Council in Tokyo. The 
most important of these in 1946 was the new Japanese constitution. It involved not 
oply constitutional problems about the status and powers of the Japanese Diet but 
also differences in the assessment of the changes effected in Japan by SCAP. The 
discussion and differences of opinion centred on three points: (1) the nature of the 
constitution and its source, (2) the role of MacArthur in framing the constitution 
and consultation with the Far Eastern Commission, and (3) the timing of the 
introduction of the constitution. 
When MacArthur first reached Japan, he believed, incorrectly, that his original 
directive empowered him to deal with the revision of the Japanese constitution. He 
firmly believed, as he told the Far Eastern Advisory Commission in an interview in 
Tokyo on 30 January 1946, that the reform of the constitution should "be done in 
such a way as to permit the Japanese to look upon the resulting document as a 
Japanese product for he felt that only in this way could it be permanent. . . a con-
stitution forced upon the Japanese by bayonet would last only as long as bayonets 
were present."'* 
When a Japanese cabinet committee under Matsumoto failed to make any basic 
changes, MacArthur dedded that his own headquarters staff should prepare an alter-
native draft, resting his decision on a policy directive issued from Washington early 
in January. He submitted this new draft to the Japanese cabinet as an expression of 
his own opinion. It was interpreted, however, as a formal American proposal and so 
was approved on 6 March. 
The new constitution was "a Japanese translation of the document written in 
Enghsh in G.H.Q." ." It drew heavily on the Declaration of Independence and other 
classics of American poHtical theory. The provision for Japan's renunciation of war 
was transferred from MacArthur's own notes on the constitution. "An American 
columnist reading the English draft was so struck by its obvious origins that he 
remarked, 'Has it been translated into Japanese yet?' " A large section of the 
Japanese press shared the view that the Japanese had little to do with it.'* 
The FEC was taken by surprise. Nelson Johnson forwarded its views to Tokyo, 
and George Atcheson, chairman of the AlHed Council, obviously after consultation 
with MacArthur, defended the constitution vigorously against "the Commission's 
starthng and incomprehensible attitude based on misconceptions and lack of 
knowledge of the situation''." 
162 "HIGH NOON": 1941-49 
The "starthng and incomprehensible attitude" of the FEC developed largely 
because of a growing conflict of jurisdiction between MacArthur and the commis-
sion. The FEC insisted that it had the ultimate authority to determine whether it 
was consistent with the Potsdam Declaration before the constitution was finally ap-
proved by the Diet. The State Department admitted privately that MacArthur 
should not have approved the draft constitution and that his defence of his policy was 
"not to the point". MacArthur declined an invitation to visit Washington to discuss 
his constitutional and other plans. He wrote to General Frank McCoy, the American 
representative on the FEC and its chairman, asking for further support. McCoy saw 
no way out of the impasse but assured MacArthur, "I have constantly in mind the 
interests of the United States and that I wiH always protect your flank and rear."" 
Protecting his "flank and rear" also meant protecting his front. Increasingly this 
meant curtailing the effective power of the FEC. It was gradually emasculated by the 
efforts of MacArthur, McCoy, and the legal officers of the State Department, who 
carried out an interesting exerdse in semantics and legal hair-splitting. 
Australia had specific criticisms of the constitution but did not want to delay its 
implementation unnecessarily. The most important of these were its reservations 
about the position of the emperor. Australia regarded him as a major war criminal 
and had hoped that he might be tried (see below). But there was little support for the 
Australian view in the FEC. Australia would have liked to see the emperor stripped 
of all military power. Its proposal that all military leaders be excluded from cabinet 
and that universal suffrage be specifically written into the constitution were both 
adopted. Australia disliked the wide powers of the upper house and felt that the pro-
visions for establishing an independent judiciary were totally inadequate, the chief 
blot on the constitution." 
The new constitution was premature. The Australian delegate to the AHied Coun-
cil (led by W. Macmahon Ball as the British Commonwealth representative) pressed 
strongly for social and economic changes which would give Japan a better opportuni-
ty to develop a sound basis for democracy (see below). There was Httle time to cany 
out the demilitarization of Japan, to re-educate the people, to remove reactionaries 
from all levels of government, and to carry out the objectives of the occupation. 
It was a different assessment of MacArthur's achievements that made Australian 
representatives on the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council have reserva-
tions about the introduction of a new constitution a Httle more than a year after sur-
render. They found it difficult to accept the view of Atcheson, the Allied Council 
chairman that there were "few instances in history in which a proposed fundamental 
charter of national life received such widespread public discussion and 
consideration"." 
The framing of a new Japanese constitution, then, was an issue on which pro-
cedural lines became tightly drawn and the authority of SCAP was being poHtely but 
directly challenged. But it was a matter that concerned primarily the diplomats, a 
few politicians, and academics. The revival of Japanese whaling expedirions to the 
Antarctic and the extention of fishing rights in the northern Pacific, on the other 
hand, was a question that aroused intense feeHng in AustraHa. Australia had serious 
reservations about the dispatch of a Japanese expedition to the Antarctic in the 
1946/47 season, partly because Japan had refused to sign the International Whaling 
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Agreements Hmiting catches to conserve whale stocks and partly because of a fear 
that Japanese ships visiting AustraHan ports and Antarctic waters would obtain 
important strategic information." 
The controversy in the FEC over whaHng iHustrated the conflicting philosophies 
about the future of Japan. Most members of the FEC felt that the Japanese should be 
rather rigidly controlled and their economic activities restricted. The American view 
was that the Japanese must be permitted such a degree of economic activity as to 
enable them to feed themselves, to maintain a standard of living that would at least 
be high enough not to constitute an urge to brash aggression, and eventually to take 
their place in the family of nations. This second view formed the basis for State 
Department thinking on fisheries policy. It involved the acceptance of a United 
States policy even when it was opposed by the other ten members of the FEC. The 
United States politely rejected a British aide-memoire on 4 October 1946 opposing 
such a policy, even although it probably represented the views of both AustraHa and 
New Zealand. 
The differences of opinion between the Australian and American governments 
over whaHng illustrated the essentially American orientation of SCAP and its 
disregard for the views of America's lesser alhes. The original directive to SCAP had 
made it clear that in the last analysis, in the event of a conflict of interest between the 
Allies and the United States, the American view should be adopted. 
The Australian view was that SCAP was adopting a soft rather than a hard Hne in 
deaHng with Japan and that the views of the smaller powers (and probably of the 
United Kingdom) were being either disregarded or being ignored by SCAP. The 
growing feeling of resentment in Australia was expressed by a Melbourne Age 
editorial: "The whaHng dedsion has a background of great moment to AustraHa; it 
is but one of the scores, if not hundreds, of day-to-day decisions by a dictatorial 
regime shaping the whole pattern of Japanese life — political, industrial, economic, 
educational and sodal."*" 
There were other issues on which the two countries disagreed: the supply of food 
to Japan, Japanese representation at overseas conferences, and the promotion of 
Japanese exports. The American view was invariably adopted. On some domestic 
issues, concessions were made to the Australian view, especially that a strong trade 
union movement was an essential part of the development of a democratic socio-
poHtical system. On 6 December 1946 the FEC sanctioned the formation of trade 
unions "for the purpose of preserving and improving conditions of work" and 
"partidpating in industrial negotiations to this end". Trade unions were permitted 
to take part in poHtical activities and to support political parties.*' 
The question of reparations was inevitably a sensitive area, but an area in which 
hard bargaining was possible. An admirable summary of the discussions and agree-
ment is given by R.N. Rosecrance in Australian Diplomacy andfapan.''^ Evatt was 
determined at the end of the Pacific War that Japan must be severely punished for her 
aggression, and so he demanded full reparations. He was concerned primarily with 
the disarmament and demihtarization of Japan with control over heavy industries 
that were capable of rebuilding Japanese military strength. He was also anxious to 
carry out drastic economic and social reform which would act as the basis for a 
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proper democratic system of government. There was little in his initial policy to sug-
gest a deep interest in reparations in a physical or financial sense. 
The Potsdam Declaration provided: ' 'Japan shall be permitted to maintain such in-
dustries as will maintain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in 
kind but not those which wiH enable her to re-arm for war."*' From the beginning, 
most countries were anxious to adopt a punitive policy towards Japan, and their in-
terpretation of 'just reparations" varied greatly. The Soviet Union and China seized 
Japanese equipment, machinery, and assets on the mainland of Asia, and at the same 
time insisted on sharing in the reparations pool from Japan proper. 
The Inirial Post-Surrender Policy insisted that "the exisring basis of Japanese 
miHtary strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive". Like most 
other countries, the United States was strongly influenced by wartime emotions. 
President Truman appointed Edwin Pauley as his reparations commissioner. His 
report proposed a draconic and comprehensive programme of interior removals from 
Japanese industry as part of a reparations programme. The removals and production 
cuts covered the aluminium and magnesium industries, steel ingot and machine tool 
production, as well as the removal of all equipment in twenty shipyards. 
Attempts to secure agreement between the AlHed Powers foundered largely on 
conflicting greeds and an inabiHty to agree on a fair method of apportioning the pro-
perty installations and funds expected from a defeated Japan. The FEC was ill 
equipped to handle the complex and technical problems involved, and the Soviet 
Union opposed FEC proposals, drawing a distinction between "war booty" and 
"reparations". 
On 19 June 1947, the Far Eastern Commission issued the Basic Post-Surrender 
Policy for Japan, the definitive document about allied policy. It was much less 
draconic and insisted that the reparations shall be "in such a form as would not en-
danger the fulfilment of the programme of demihtarisation and which would not 
prejudice the defraying of the cost of the Occupation and the maintenance of a 
minimum civilian standard of living".** But the sHces of the cake were to be deter-
mined "on a broad political basis" taking into account war damage and destruction 
and "each country's contribution to the cause of the defeat of Japan". 
Attempts to determine the percentage of reparations each member of the FEC 
should receive broke down despite general revisions of their claims by both AustraHa 
and the United States. By the end of 1947 Australia was beginning to realize that 
there was no prospect of obtaining its 28 per cent of the pool and that it would at 
best receive only nominal reparations. The United States had now become complete-
ly disillusioned about the FEC. It had "become useless since it had become a forum 
for Soviet complaints". The State Department after discussions with the Depart-
ment of the Army and the joint chiefs of staff decided to ignore the FEC. It felt that 
it was important to dispel business and financial uncertainty in Japan over possible 
reparations burdens and accelerate economic recovery. It was also important to 
lighten the heavy American financial responsibility for Japan.*' 
This important change in American policy was not really economic. It arose out of 
the shifting Far Eastern balance of power with the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek and 
the decision to convert Japan into an ally, "the Far Eastern bastion" against com-
munism. The whole purpose of reparations had to be re-examined.*' 
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The new policy meant that the United States had completely revised its policy on 
reparations and on the levels of economic industry in Japan. It was agreed in 
Washington that the American government would "remove no reparations 
whatever to the conrinental United States". Kenneth C. RoyaH, the secretary of 
war, said bluntly that "there should be no limitarions on Japan's producrion for 
peaceful purposes or on levels of Japanese productive capacity on industries devoted 
to peaceful purposes".*' General McCoy told the FEC that if Japan were to become 
self-supporting "it had no resources surplus to its peaceful needs".*' 
Australia had adopted a realistic attitude towards reparations after 1947 and had no 
higher hopes in 1949. But to her, the disturbing thing was that the United States 
was in fact relaxing all limits on Japanese industry. She had consistently argued that 
strict controls would have to be placed on certain industries to prevent Japan from 
rebuilding a military potential. This had become an essential part of Australian oc-
cupation and peace treaty policy. The EEC's decisions on levels of economic life in 
Japan were due to lapse on 1 October 1949. Australia joined with Russia and China 
in attempting to extend this date, but the proposal was vetoed by the United States. 
With the shift in United States policy which would lead to the economic recovery of 
Japan, Australia changed the thrust of her policy towards regional security and a 
Padfic pact. 
In the discussions over the draft peace treaty, AustraHa and New Zealand joined 
the Philippines, China, and Burma in reviving the reparations issue even though they 
must have realized that they were up against a practical impossibility.*' In the 
penultimate draft of the treaty, Japan accepted the obligation to pay reparations in 
"prindple" although it agreed that the Japanese economy could not stand the 
burden of reparations. The final draft required Japan to enter into negotiations for 
compensating the Allied powers for war damage. Japan also agreed (Article 16) to 
indemnify prisoners of war out of the proceeds of the liquidation of overseas assets. 
On 25 May 1955 Japan paid £4.5 million sterling to the International Committee of 
the Red Cross as a final settlement of her obligations. Australian prisoners of war 
shared in the distribution.'" 
The Allied Council for Japan 
The Russian acceptance of the terms of reference for the Far Eastern Commission 
was due largely to the agreement of the foreign ministers in Moscow to set up a 
small Allied Council in Tokyo to act as a watchdog for the Allies in supervising the 
administration of occupation policy. The Soviet Union had demurred at the setting 
up of the FEAC, preferring an Allied control commission on the spot. AustraHa was 
extremely anxious to be represented on the Allied Coundl as a full member. The 
United Kingdom had proposed that AustraHa might be "invited to be present" on 
occasion at meetings of the Big Four Allied Council. Canberra felt the "participation 
in the Coundl should be direct as of r ight"." The Dominions Office was at first 
lukewarm in its support of Australian membership. It envisaged the function of the 
AHied Coundl to be to "supervise the execution of the terms of surrender", to 
"consult with and advise SCAP''.'* John Burton, secretary of the Department of 
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External Affairs, would have liked it to have much wider powers: to have effective 
control over the carrying out of policies formulated by the FEC, and to "be a check 
on action taken by the Supreme Commander in implementing polides and if 
necessary, intervene to assert collective responsibility in both policy making and 
execution"." At first Canberra, with support from London, argued for a five-
member council representing the Big Four and Australia. This was unacceptable to 
Washington and Moscow. Evatt told Dean Acheson that "so far as intra-
Commonwealth discussions were concerned . . . the primary position had been ac-
corded to Australia. . . . it would be utterly incompatible with this result to have 
the United Kingdom singled out as one of the Potsdam powers with spedal 
prerogatives on the Far Eastern Commission or as one of the powers to be 
represented on a Control or other Commission to be set up in Japan."'* 
There was no support for a five-member Allied Coundl, and the Moscow Declara-
tion of 27 December stipulated that it be confined to China, the British Com-
monwealth of Nations, the United States, and the USSR. The phrase "British Com-
monwealth of Nations" gave the opportunity for the nomination of an Australian 
representative instead of a man from the United Kingdom. Shortly afterwards the 
United Kingdom accepted this alternative and invited the Australian government to 
nominate a delegate who would represent India and New Zealand as well as the 
United Kingdom and Australia. The Allied Council was set up for "the purpose of 
consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementa-
tion of the terms of surrender, occupation, and control of Japan and of directives sup-
plementary thereto, and for the purpose of exercising control authority therein 
granted"." However, MacArthur would issue all implementation orders as "the 
sole executive authority, for the AlHed Powers in Japan". He "would consult and 
advise the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the 
exigendes of the situation permitting"." 
There was set up then, in the last four months of 1945, a control system for Japan 
consisting of four agencies: the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), 
the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), the AlHed Council for Japan (ACJ), and the 
United States government. The Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, approved by 
the FEC on 19 June 1947, provided that "the occupation shaH have the character of 
an operation on behalf of the Powers that have participated in the war against 
Japan". In the final determination on titles, the State Department had objected to 
the term Allied Control Council, and so Control was omitted. This in effect removed 
the last obstacle to effective American control of occupation policy in Japan. The 
complex structure promoted rather than hindered that control. 
The decision to appoint an Australian to represent the Commonwealth was an 
important departure in the development of the Commonwealth in the devolution of 
responsibflity. The appointment of an AustraHan representative to the FEC and the 
nomination of Northcott to command the British Commonwealth Occupation 
Forces marked that increased recognition of Australia's role in the Pacific War and in 
the formulation of Commonwealth Pacific policy that Evatt had been attempring to 
achieve for many years. 
It was felt that a senior man of ministerial standing should be appointed to the 
AlHed CouncH, and several well-known Australians were suggested: S.M. Bruce, Sir 
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John Latham, Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Morshead, Lieutenant-General 
E.K. Smart, and Sir Frederick Shedden. Prime Minister Chifley chose instead W. 
Macmahon Ball, a forty-four-year-old political scientist who had been seconded by 
the University of Melbourne to the Australian government as controller of its 
overseas broadcasting services during the war." He had been one of the Australian 
advisers to Evatt at the San Francisco conference in 1945 and had served in Java as the 
Australian government's representative attached to General Christison. 
The nomination took the British Office and Dominions Office by surprise, and 
they immediately expressed their reservations: "Nothing in the record would sug-
gest that he is of the necessary calibre"; his "experience is very limited and 
academical for the task to be done"; "Nothing in his honorable record suggests any 
experience in negotiation or inspires any hope that Mr. Ball would be able to keep 
his end up when faced with extremely senior people like MacArthur and the Soviet 
representative." It was felt that he would be the only dvilian on the Allied Council 
and so must have standing. "We are inclined to doubt whether Mr. Macmahon Ball 
in fact possesses the degree of standing, experience and influence which are requisite 
for the job." They preferred a senior ambassador or high commissioner. AustraHan 
ministers in London were sounded out, and it was dedded to ask the Australian 
government to reconsider the appointment. The Foreign Office was reluctant "to 
have a first class row with the AustraHan Government"; but, they said, "we are 
after aH pladng our considerable interest in their hands and ought not to be put into 
the position of having to accept any nominee whom they put forward." Attlee was 
persuaded to cable Chifley on 8 February indicating the official reservations and sug-
gesting Keith Officer as an alternative. Chifley replied briefly that despite his lack of 
diplomatic experience, Macmahon Ball and his advisers would ably represent the 
interests of the British Commonwealth on the Allied Council. Ball was Chifley's 
personal choice and not Evatt's, but in the eyes of the British there was no question 
that the "Australians (probably due to Dr. Evatt)" were being "obtuse and short-
sighted over this" ." 
Ball, unaware of the cabled interchange between Canberra and London, accepted 
the appointment with enthusiasm as "a generous acknowledgement by Great Britain 
of the part played by Australian fighting forces in the war, particularly in the war 
against Japan". "It is an indication," he said, "of the heavier responsibihties 
Australia must accept in the Pacific in partnership with other nations of the British 
Commonwealth". His position was the more difficult because in a sense he 
represented a condominium and his briefs were to come from New Delhi and 
WeUington as well as London and Canberra. His instructions were very explidt: 
"You will represent the joint views and interests of the British Commonwealth 
Governments concerned." His detailed instructions were to come from Evatt acting 
on behalf of those governments, and he was to communicate direct with the 
Australian minister for External Affairs who would inform the other three govern-
ments of developments in the Allied Council. Ball would be able in Tokyo to consult 
a committee of advisers representing those governments. Australia also appointed a 
liaison officer (B.C. Ballard) with SCAP to deal with specifically Australian matters 
in much the same way as Britain appointed General Sir Charles Gairdner as the prime 
minister's personal representative with MacArthur. 
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The success of this experiment in joint representation depended in large part on 
close consultation between the four powers. But there is no evidence to show that 
the foreign offices were consulted before Ball's instructions were drafted: a copy was 
sent to the Dominions Office with little time for a reply. On a number of occasions 
Sir Alvary Gascoigne, the British ambassador, complained of scanty consultations in 
Tokyo. The committee of advisers rarely met, and the flow of information from 
Canberra to London, New Delhi, and Wellington was often very meagre. Evatt 
insisted that Ball report solely to him and issued instructions directly to him. BaU 
consistently carried out these instructions — for example, about amendments to the 
draft constitution and Japanese whaling — which meant direct clashes with 
MacArthur. 
On arriving in Japan, BaH called on MacArthur on 4 April, just before the first 
meeting of the Allied Council. MacArthur had expressed misgivings to Gascoigne 
about BaH's appointment, arguing that he would be pro-Russian, and not pro-
Australian, and regretted that Australia did not appoint a soldier. The Foreign Office 
felt that he would "be Dr. Evatt's mouthpiece". "He wiH in fact be the represen-
tative of Australia rather than of the four British Commonwealth of Nations coun-
tries," Gascoigne remarked." MacArthur gave BaH a "most cordial welcome". In a 
message to Evatt, BaH said, "He assured me that despite his initial opposition to the 
establishment of the AHied Council, he would now do everything possible to make 
his work influential and effective." During the hour-long interview, he impressed 
BaH with his anti-Russian views. He said that "Russia's policy was directed towards 
sabotage of Allied policy, in order that Russia might subsequently build here upon 
the Japanese communist party a satellite state. . . . The Russians here in pursuit of 
this policy made bitter vituperous attacks against the Allies, and that these attacks 
were based on deliberate falsehoods. He beHeves that Derevyanko, although pro-
bably a brilliant soldier, is hopelessly stupid about non-military questions."*" 
The first meeting of the Allied Council was held on 5 April. Major-General 
William F. Marquat was SCAP's deputy as chairman, Lieutenant-General Chu 
Shih-ming represented China, and Lieutenant-General Kazma Derevyanko 
represented the Soviet Union. Macmahon Ball was the only dviHan member of the 
council and so was surrounded by men accustomed to military processes of thought 
and procedures. MacArthur was known to have strongly opposed the setting up of 
the Allied Council and told Secretary of State Byrnes before the Moscow conference 
of foreign ministers that the Allied control plan was quite unacceptable to him; he is 
reported to have threatened to resign if the impending Allied agreements in any way 
curtailed his authority. Apparently Byrnes was able to convince him that concessions 
had to be made to Russia to maintain some degree of unity among the Big Four and 
thus Russian participation in, rather than hostiHty to, AHied plans for a peace settle-
ment in Japan.*' 
MacArthur's opening address set out clearly what he regarded as the functions of 
the Allied Council. It was to be an advisory and consultative body without any ad-
ministrative functions: SCAP was "the sole executive authority for the Allied 
Powers in Japan". The coundl would make avaHable to him the "several viewpoints 
of its members on questions of policy and action". To facihtate this, he had issued 
instructions that copies of all directives issued to the Japanese government should be 
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given promptly to the councU together with "such background information as may 
be appropriate to permit a full understanding thereof, or as the Council may 
spedfically desire. Matters of substance will normally be laid before it prior to 
action." This certainly appeared to indicate his willingness to co-operate closely with 
the coundl, but it quickly became apparent that such co-operation would be on his 
own terms: he warned the councH "against sharp and ill-conceived criticisms of our 
Occupation polides". The offer of fuH co-operation in documentation surprised 
members of the coundl. Ball wanted to know what advance notice of major direc-
tives would be given to the council so that they could study them at leisure and make 
comments in coundl. Marquat assured him that this would be done "immediately 
the directive is ready for issuance", but refused to be pinned down to a time 
period.** At the second meeting, on 17 April, the council was told that ten days' 
notice was impossible and that it would normally be about forty-eight hours. Pro-
cedural questions "must not be aHowed to interfere with the prompt and orderly 
process of government administration. Minutes of meetings could not be supplied on 
the same day as meetings but were promised within twenty-four hours of the conclu-
sion of meetings." 
The second meeting of the Allied Council was the critical one which largely deter-
mined its future course of action and proceedings. The session began with a routine 
discussion of procedures and then a report by Brigadier-General Courtney Whitney, 
head of SCAP Government Section, in reply to a question at the previous meeting 
from General Derevyanko about the progress of political purges. The question was 
framed badly and somewhat provocatively in wording but scarcely warranted the 
three-hour lecture that Whitney delivered to the Allied Council. He listed ad 
nauseam ultra-nationalist, terrorist, and secret patriotic societies that had been or 
were in process of being purged, whereas his essential points could have been made in 
ten minutes. His answer confirmed the Russian view that there were a number of 
undesirable persons still in public office. Ball said that he "treated the Council with 
ridicule and contempt. . . . It was his aggressiveness and offensive manner, his 
glaring and hostile glances at the Russian Member, his asides that made the perfor-
mance such an ill-mannered affront to the CouncH."*' 
BaH attempted to persuade the chairman to adopt procedures that would prevent 
the time-wasting of this second meeting, which went to three half-day sessions bet-
ween 17 and 19 April. When he suggested that the member proposing a question or 
motion open the discussion and then be followed by the SCAP representative, he was 
ignored and Whitney was allowed to continue. Ball then pointed out that the coun-
cil did not invite anyone to make a speech but rather wanted "to have a witness give 
evidence". Whitney angrily replied, "I don't consider that I am here as a witness 
and I don't consider that I am here subject to examination. I appear as a represen-
tative of the Supreme Commander for the purpose of answering as fully as I can 
specific allegations made by a member for the USSR."** When BaH again protested 
about procedure and raised the question whether the Allied Council or MacArthur 
determined council procedures, the rather unhappy chairman said, "The Supreme 
Commander was being challenged and the Allied Council cannot prevent his 
representative from telling the Council facts indicating their error in making these 
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statements." It was clear that MacArthur would brook no criticism and regarded 
himself, Hke Caesar's wife, as being above reproach. 
The most serious effect was to exacerbate the already strained relations between 
the American and Russian members of the council and to set the tone of bitterness 
and bickering which soon characterized almost every meeting. The British charge, 
N.A. Morland, was concerned at MacArthur's performance: "He is rabidly anti-
Communist and anti-Russian and sees malignant influences at work in places where 
they exist only in his own imagination." But although he approved of Ball's stand 
over the Whitney fiasco, he pointed out that from the first meeting, MacArthur saw 
Ball as "obviously siding with Russia against the United States" and already felt that 
it would be undesirable to use Ball as a channel for United Kingdom representations 
to SCAP. General Gairdner was obviously a much more reliable channel of com-
munication.*' 
The Dominions Office pointed out that collaboration with the United States in 
other parts of the world was "of such outstanding importance that we are not 
prepared to be committed in advance to a general poHcy of mediation in Japan".*' 
This might well fail to achieve its purpose in Japan and at the same time cause fric-
tion with the United States government. The matter was raised with Evatt and 
possibly with Chifley, who was about to visit London. Ball was instructed before 
the second meeting not to attempt to act as a mediator between Russia and the 
United States. He was told to refer important cases to Canberra for consultation and 
"do everything possible to promote harmonious relations in Council". Evatt 
strongly reprimanded External Affairs for riot referring Ball's letter asking for 
instruction to Evatt himself. "BaH's exercise of jurisdiction has to be supervised by 
me, not by the department adviser who is responsible for the draft reply."*' Evatt 
told BaH that his first job must be to uphold MacArthur and that only in minor 
matters could he attempt any co-ordination of the American and Russian views.*' 
(Ball has denied receiving these instructions. It was widely believed in the Depart-
ment of External Affairs that Burton knew invariably when Evatt had no intention 
that the cable should go further than the departmental file and consequently did not 
send it.) 
Ball was already convinced (18 April 1946) that MacArthur desired to torpedo the 
Allied Council and had no intention of allowing it to function. He also reaHzed that 
the terms of reference gave the council little or no power in any dispute with 
MacArthur, and so MacArthur could use it for his own purposes. The last thing he 
wanted from it was advice, and hence he was normally reluctant to give it any infor-
mation that might lead to critical questions conceivably reflecting on his own 
achievements. Despite the apparently spontaneous offer of information by MacAr-
thur at the first meeting, a new procedure for obtaining information was laid down 
by GHQ: all requests from council members were to be made in writing to the 
secretary-general, who then channeHed them through the diplomatic section before 
reaching the section that could supply the information. It took three to four weeks 
to get a reply to a question that could have been answered in ten minutes in a per-
sonal interview with the desk officer. Such direct contacts were, however, sternly 
disfavoured.*' General Chu expressed his frustration on 6 May in a conversation with 
BaH: "What is the use of saying anything? We cannot give advice without informa-
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tion; we cannot get information with asking quesrions; we cannot ask questions 
without the Chairman or SCAP's representative telling us that we were impertinent 
to aiticise the work of the Supreme Commander."'" 
After the trauma of the second meeting of the Allied Coundl, it looked as if some 
of the tension would disappear with the resignation of General Marquat and his 
replacement by George Atcheson, Jr., as MacArthur's deputy and chairman of the 
council. He was an experienced State Department diplomat who had spent more 
than twenty years in the Far East and had been the department's assistant chief of Far 
Eastern Affairs from 1941 to 1943. The appointment of a civihan chairman, it was 
hoped, would ease the tension. But Atcheson had no illusions about his functions as 
chairman and the difficulty of the job. He wrote to Hugh Borton, chief of the 
Division of Japanese Affairs, on 3 May: "It seems so far that my job on the CouncH 
is basically one of protecting American policy and the American occupation from the 
effort of these two gentlemen (Derevyanko and Ball) to attack and undermine 
American policy and the occupation. It is, I suppose, chiefly a matter of having the 
patience to sweat it out with them but it is not a happy j o b . " " 
Atcheson's appointment in fact changed Httle, and he was forced "to sweat it out 
with them". At the morning session of the third meeting (30 April), Chu proposed 
a nevy procedure to cut through some of the red tape and assist coundl deliberations. 
He suggested the appointment at a middle level (advisers to members of the council) 
of four sub-committees to make a preliminary study of documents for members of 
the council and perhaps even to initiate field studies. Ball supported the idea with 
minor modifications, but Atcheson flatly rejected it; the only committees he was 
prepared to tolerate were committees consisting of the three members of council, the 
United States not participating. When a motion by Ball designed to secure informa-
tion about Allied food policy in Japan came up for discussion, Atcheson ruled that 
the forwarding of food to Japan by the United States was not a matter for council. 
BaU rather incredulously commented, "You don't suggest, Mr Chairman, do you, 
that this Council is not concerned with the problem of the miHtary occupation?" 
"It is," the chairman replied. "The CouncH can always advise"; but he decHned to 
allow the Allied Council to compare the Japanese food situation v^ dth that in other 
countries. Ball then placed on the agenda more specific questions dealing with the at-
titude of SCAP to the Zaibatsu. This was followed by Russian requests for informa-
tion on land and educational policies and the techniques of control in carrying out 
SCAP directives.'* 
With these sensitive questions on the agenda and the Russian member raising the 
question of the demobilization of the Japanese officers corps at the fourth meeting, 
Atcheson defined his views of the role of the Allied Council in the occupation at the 
two sessions on 15 May: "It is my conception that this CouncH was set up to 
facihtate and assist the Occupation rather than to obstruct or interfere with the 
machinery of the Occupation." Ball pointed out that he reaHzed that "the job here is 
to help and not to hinder Headquarters" but that the Allied Council machinery gave 
members little opportunity to help in discussions of policy. Derevyanko's request for 
information about a people's meeting on 1 May was met with Atcheson's comment 
that the meeting was simply a propaganda exercise. He completely rejected the 
Russian member's suggestion that the council might act as a corporate body: "There 
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is no reference (in Article 5 of the Terms of Reference) to consultation with the 
CouncH, as a whole, and if you wiH kindly refer back to Article 1, it is apparent that 
such consultation was not contemplated."" 
Wrangles over the procedures to be adopted in council as well as the scope of 
council discussions were not prevented by this blunt speaking by Atcheson. It was 
not until the fourteenth meeting that the procedures were agreed upon: the frequen-
cy of normal meetings with provision for the holding of special meetings at the 
request of any members. At the insistence of the United States, all meetings were to 
be open to the press and the general public. The subject matter for discussion was to 
be without restrictions on aH phases of the occupation, but all topics for discussion 
had to be notified five days in advance to SCAP with an indication of the specific 
information desired. There was Httle attempt to speed up SCAP's replies; the 
cumbersome and slow procedures were retained. 
In addition to the procedural problems, there was a real American fear that the 
sole Russian purpose in attending meetings was to use the Allied Council as a pro-
paganda forum. This was why SCAP was reluctant to provide information about the 
May Day meeting, which it saw as a crude attempt to assist the Japanese Communist 
Party.'* The debates in the council tended to become ideological battles between the 
American chairman and the Soviet representative. 
The propaganda battle did not leave Ball unscathed. An experienced academic, he 
attached great importance to procedures, and as a director of Australian broadcasting 
he was committed to the dissemination of information. On many of the early pro-
cedural issues both the Chinese and the British Commonwealth members supported 
the Russian members. Had a vote been taken, it would in many cases have been three 
to one. 
Political friction in the Allied Council had become endemic; however, apart from 
casual bickering it rarely surfaced on a serious manner. But at the seventeenth 
meeting, on 16 October, a head-on clash took place between Atcheson and Ball. 
After a long debate, Atcheson took exception to Derevyanko's references to the elec-
tion of 10 April and claimed that the general election "demonstrated to the people of 
the world a free, honest and orderly election such as few, if any, of the Western 
democracies could boast to a more complete degree". He went on: "I may say that I 
often wonder at the continued allegations and charges made against the Japanese 
authorities in connection with their efforts under the occupation. They seem never in 
this Council to receive credit for the good work they do. . . . In fact the time has 
come when Japanese aims have become virtually identical with Allied aims."" Ball 
said that he would not like to identify himself with Atcheson's "expressions of cor-
diality and confidence towards the present Japanese government". When chaUenged 
by the American chairman, he went on: "I think I have noticed in the last few 
months that when any member of this Council has raised questions which might 
possibly be construed as a criticism of the Japanese Government, that the United 
States member has been very quick and eager to defend the work of the Japanese." 
What he was pointing out was that there were differing assessments of occupation 
policy in rehabihtating Japan. He was much more cautious than MacArthur and 
Atcheson in his estimate of success and rejected the view that the aims and ideals of 
the present Japanese government were "virtually identical with Allied aims"." 
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BaH's exchange with Atcheson inevitably aroused a great deal of comment; the 
meetings of the Allied Coundl were, after all, open to the public and the press. It 
confirmed MacArthur's worst suspicion about Ball's poHtics and policy in the Allied 
Council. MacArthur also said that Ball's appointment was probably a recognition of 
his services in AustraHa's internal politics. He attributed Ball's policy in the AlHed 
Coundl to vanity; BaH repeatedly broke in and backed up the Soviet member, often 
in connection with questions which were not BaH's subjects, so that he would get a 
favourable press in Australia and especially with the Australian Left. The alternative 
explanations were a "sincere feeling for Moscow's ideology and professional pride as 
a debater". MacArthur's diatribe against BaH concluded with the statement that 
people in the United States would conclude from the press reports that "the United 
Kingdom and, as usual, Russia, were making a joint effort to tear the shirt off the 
back of the Allied Administration in Japan". He had developed a strong personal 
dislike for Ball, and this was one of the reasons why he did not "treat the AlHed 
Coundl seriously"." It was clear that BaH was becoming unacceptable to the 
Americans as a British Commonwealth representative. Ball himself realized that he 
was being cast for the role of public enemy number one in Japan. 
Atcheson, of course, shared these conclusions. After five months' association with 
Ball, he had come to the view that he was "personally pro-Soviet in his thinking". 
This was two weeks before the head-on clash on 16 October. After the clash, 
Atcheson told Byrnes: "This was an apt reflection of his general attitude of seeking 
not only to cast the occupation in an unfavourable light but also to misinterpret 
remarks made in Council by me and even to place in my mouth words which I have 
not said. It is with considerable regret that we have come to the conclusion that Mr. 
BaU's actions in this respect were both deliberate and malicious."" 
Gascoigne had long been unhappy at Ball's performance and felt, rather Hke 
MacArthur, that he was jeopardizing the Anglo-American alliance. He felt that ever 
since he took up his post in Tokyo Ball had "lined up with the Russian member 
against the American or . . . indulged in some unnecessary disputes with Atcheson". 
By early October he felt that BaH's local position was deterioraring: "As he 
represents not only Australia but also the United Kingdom, the time has come when 
a word should be said to the AustraHan Government to ask them to change our 
Coundl representative." His view that BaH had made his position untenable was 
shared by General Gairdner, the prime minister's personal representative with 
General MacArthur: "His vanity and his lack of savoir faire made him unsuitable. 
He is doing us no good nor can he do so in future."" 
The crisis in Australian-American relations after the seventeenth meeting of the 
Allied Council left Macmahon Ball in a difficult position. British diplomats were 
deeply concerned at what they regarded as a sharp fall in the reputation of British 
Commonwealth prestige in Japan and of the possible effect on their own standing in 
Tokyo. Gascoigne's view was that the British reputation had been affected very lit-
tle, largely because of the close relationship of Gairdner and himself to MacArthur.'" 
Ball was not unaware of the slump in Commonwealth prestige and of the criticism 
of his handling of problems in the AHied Council. A week after his clash with At-
cheson, he wrote to Evatt outHning the problems of the Australian mission in Japan, 
the failure of the governments concerned to show "any understanding of their 
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obHgations in Japan". The Australian commander of the British Commonwealth 
Occupation Forces in Japan was given thirty shiHings a day entertainment aHowance. 
But much more important was his suggestion that Evatt should visit Japan as soon as 
possible: "I feel that only your direct investigation on the spot is likely to restore the 
prestige of Brirish countries, and particularly of AustraHa in this area."" MacArthur 
had made a similar proposal on several occasions, and the British Foreign Office 
would have been delighted. But the Evatt visit did not take place until July 1947. 
The bitter differences in the Allied Council did not lead to a complete breakdown 
in the relations between SCAP and the AlHed Council. At the meeting of the coundl 
on 29 May, General MacArthur submitted a list of subjects on which SCAP was 
carrying out a series of staff studies, and on which the Allied Coundl would be asked 
for advice. The list included some of the critical economic issues affecting the future 
of Japan. It included the development of the Japanese coal industry, the future of 
Japan's mercantile marine, Japan's foreign trade, and the post-war level of the 
Japanese textHe industry, whose rapid expansion in the thirties had done so much to 
create economic and political tension in the Pacific. At the twelfth meeting of the 
AlHed Council, MacArthur made a second proposal to involve the Council more 
directly in the work of occupation. He suggested that the seven other members of 
the Far Eastern Commission join with the Allied Coundl to discuss substantive 
problems of Japan. The council reacted with little enthusiasm to what it regarded as 
an interesting public relations exercise. The critical point on every issue was the 
absence of detailed information which SCAP alone could produce and was reluctant 
to provide. 
On a number of specific issues a good deal of progress was made. Ball's proposals 
for a land-reform programme were largely based on the work of an Australian 
economist, Eric Ward. Its basic premise was that "the emancipation of the peasant 
must be the first and most important step in any programme for the economic and 
spirital emancipation of the Japanese people".'* In October 1946 the Japanese Diet 
passed bills which included most of the substance and much of the detail of BaU's 
ten-point programme. 
On many of the policies formulated by MacArthur there was little criticism from 
the Allied Council except from the Russian member. Ball made critical comments on 
some aspects of occupation policy but accepted many of the long-term poHcies. He 
and Chu opposed the appointment of a commission by Premier Kijuro Shidehara to 
investigate the causes of the war and the Japanese defeat. Ball felt that it would con-
centrate on a study of the causes of the Japanese defeat and that there was little 
likelihood of the Japanese agreeing with Allied conclusions about the causes of the 
war. MacArthur induced Shidehara to abolish the commission. There was agreement 
on a number of issues such as the extention of the areas in which Japan could fish but 
sharp disagreement on Japanese whaHng. 
After the clash on 16 October between the chairman and the British Com-
monwealth representative, the AlHed Council meetings were more sedate. The eigh-
teenth meeting on 30 October lasted only four minutes, and the next two meetings 
were short. BaH was more co-operative and less critical. He had submitted no items 
for the agenda since 30 April. Since the Chinese member had never placed any items 
on the agenda, it was left to the Russians to become the most frequent contributors 
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to the agenda. They used the AlHed Council, the Americans beHeved, as "a spring-
board for allegations against the occupation authorities or the Japanese Government 
or for other propaganda purposes"." MacArthur was becoming completely disillu-
sioned over the working of the coundl, and Atcheson showed Httle more enthusiasm 
for lengthy meetings; the twenty-second and twenty-fourth meetings each lasted 
fifteen minutes. BaH's reports became very brief and so factual that most were 
unclassified. At the twenty-third meeting, on 8 January 1947, when the question 
of local elections was raised, Derevyanko told the council that he believed that 
"Japan was deliberately delaying the purge and the holding of munidpal and other 
elections".'* BaH made no spedfic recommendations and took little part in the 
discussion other than to strongly support Derevyanko's request that local elecrions 
be further postponed. 
At the twenty-eighth meeting, on 19 March, Atcheson reported on his recent visit 
to the United States, presumably for further briefing and contact with the Far Eastern 
Commission: 
The American Government is solidly behind the Supreme Commander. In discussions with 
a wide variety of people in different parts of the United States, I gained a definite impres-
sion that the American people as a whole are much gratified at the progress of the Occupa-
tion and are giving General MacArthur their fullest support. The American people are 
proud of the AUied Occupation; they look upon the Occupation as a bright spot in a 
troubled world and one where whole hearted AUied co-operation can achieve Allied goals 
to the benefit of the entire world. 
He went on to express American concern at the threatened general strike of 1 
February and "at the endeavours of some of the misguided strike leaders to circum-
vent the Supreme Commander by appeaHng to Members of the Allied Council". 
The strike was regarded in the United States and by MacArthur as purely political in 
purpose. "The union members were regarded as dupes and tools of the aggressive 
minority which in so many cases has been manipulating unions in this country for 
selfish and ulterior poHtical purposes." Finally, he said that "the American people 
while they did not forget were not vengeful and their eyes were turned to the future. 
They expected Japan to be given access to the resources of raw materials and exports 
of other countries for Japan's peacetime needs." Atcheson referred to the non-
emotional attitude of Americans in contrast to Australian "unwilHngness to forgive 
and forget quickly what the Japanese did in the war", which "is generally regarded 
as an emotional (and rather unreasonable) attitude". Ball reported the speech 
without comment. 
Evatt arrived in Japan on 25 July 1947, at MacArthur's invitation, at an important 
time in AustraHan relations with the United States. The Australian government had 
invited other members of the Commonwealth to a conference in Canberra on the 
peace treaty with Japan. On 19 June the Far Eastern Commission had issued the 
Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, a revised version of the original Initial docu-
ment formulated in 1945. MacArthur described it as "one of the great state papers of 
modern history". BaH had some months before strongly urged Evatt to visit Japan 
to try to re-estabhsh Australian prestige; Evatt was aware of Ball's wish to return to 
AustraHa. 
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Evatt's ship, the Kanimbla, arrived at Kure eighteen hours ahead of schedule. This 
gave him the opportunity to hold a press conference at which he outlined AustraHa's 
requirements in a peace treaty. He announced his intention of interviewing Japanese 
leaders, a distinct breach of occupation regulations which prevented any official 
approach to Japanese except by SCAP personnel. Evatt and Ball travelled by train 
from Kure to Osaka, a very uncomfortable journey since it was midsummer and the 
air-cooHng apparatus in Evatt's special coach broke down. Evatt then flew from 
Osaka to Tokyo to be met by MacArthur at Haneda airport, a most unusual compH-
ment. The two great men strode together from the plane to the waiting cars, com-
pletely ignoring the heads of Commonwealth missions in Tokyo who had come to 
pay their respects. Gascoigne later remarked to the Foreign Office, "We stood 
around and watched the meeting feeling rather like naughty schoolboys awaiting ad-
mittance to the headmaster's study." 
MacArthur interviewed Evatt twice, on 28 and 30 July. Evatt had been one of the 
main AustraHan critics of MacArthur and his policy," and before meeting 
MacArthur, he had congratulated Ball on his reports from Tokyo. However, 
MacArthur's charisma charmed Evatt and converted him from a critic to an en-
thusiastic supporter. His frank and friendly talks led to "an understanding as to the 
fundamental points of the Japanese peace settlement". Evatt said, "We found 
ourselves in agreement on the steps to be taken in negotiating the Japanese treaty, on 
the main principles which should be contained in it, and also on the possible lines of 
the supervisory machinery which should be established under the treaty."" This 
volte-face by an Australian minister for External Affairs was unprecedented. 
Gascoigne told the Foreign Office that Evatt "spoke to me with the voice of 
MacArthur". There were some critics in Tokyo who believed that Evatt had been 
"bewitched" by MacArthur. Evatt was convinced that he had reaHzed that MacAr-
thur was a great administrator who had been responsible for stripping the country of 
its pre-war fascism and for laying the foundations for future democracy in Japan. He 
had been able to demobihze and demilitarize Japan. 
MacArthur's conversion of Evatt left Macmahon BaH out on a limb and changed 
the attitude of the British legation in Tokyo. Gascoigne had been upset by Evatt's 
rudeness to him at a dinner arranged by Ball on 26 July, when he felt he had a 
"hate" towards the United Kingdom. After an interview with Evatt on 1 August 
he was convinced that Evatt's attitude to the United Kingdom had changed from 
one "of hostiHty and contempt" to one of "courtesy and friendship". Gascoigne 
felt that Evatt's hostile attitude to SCAP had changed to a "feeling of admiration, 
amounting almost to homage". 
The flak inevitably was concentrated on Macmahon Ball. He became persona non 
grata at the minister's official dinners in Tokyo; he was deliberately omitted from the 
official guest Hsts. His critical comments on MacArthur's enthusiastic reaction to the 
Basic Post-Surrender PoHcy for Japan were noted. MacArthur's conversations with 
Gascoigne suggesting that Ball was not consulting regularly with the United 
Kingdom and was possibly acting independently of Canberra strengthened 
MacArthur's opposition to Ball in his conversations with Evatt. Inevitably, faced 
with Evatt's diplomatic volte-face and with British diplomatic criticisms, BaH 
decided on 18 August to resign from his post on the AHied Council." 
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Evatt's explanation that BaH had to be removed because of his reporting from 
Tokyo was unconvindng. It is hard to beheve that he was so out of touch with the 
proceedings of the AlHed Coundl , of BaH's atritude, and of MacArthur's policies. 
The Foreign Office, which privately commented that "nobody will be sorry to see 
Mr. Macmahon Ball g o " and had been from the beginning one of his strong critics, 
also confessed, " I t is difficult to avoid feeHng that Dr. Evatt is making a scapegoat of 
Mr. Macmahon BaH. He has gone over to the MacArthur camp for reasons which 
one can only hope are good ones, but his alibi that he was previously misinformed is 
th in ."" It could be that the reports from Tokyo were filtered to Evatt by his own 
departmental advisers. BaH's resignation was not accompanied by any explanation. 
He was told by Chifley to report direct to the prime minister before he met the 
press. This he did, but later reported in a series of four articles in the Melbourne 
Argus on his views on Australia's relations with Japan. Evatt ignored the resignation 
in his report to parHament on his visit to Japan on 7 August and did not even refer to 
Ball's role on the AHied Council. In a conversation with the American ambassador in 
Canberra, Robert Butler, Evatt explained his action, which Butler recorded: 
His troubles were cleared up after he got there and saw the inefficiency of his own office 
and the manner in which they harassed the American group. There was a clique of them 
who would go out with the Russians, imbibe freely and cook up trouble for MacArthur. 
He claimed that he would clean it out, assuring me that he would cut deeply. He con-
sidered that BaU had done a very poor job and was recalling him. He spoke highly of 
Atcheson and said that BaU was altogether too touchy. 
There is Httle other evidence to support Evatt's explanation of his poHcy leading to 
Ball's resignation. It may not be irrelevant that Paul Hasluck, closely associated with 
Evatt for several years, resigned on 4 March to take up another position because 
Evatt was "tending to bend to his own use and purposes a service which itself had 
continuing responsibflity in external affairs"." 
BaH's position seems to have been almost untenable from the beginning, given the 
initial and persistent hostiHty of the British Foreign and Dominions Offices. 
Gascoigne and Gairdner shared the British tradition of recognizing merit where 
merit existed, where gentlemen observed tjie rules they had made. The rules were 
drawn by professionals. Ball was a dviHan thrown into the professional diplomatic 
pool, an amateur handicapped by his essentially academic background. This often led 
to theoretical discussions only partly connected with the realities of the Japanese 
world. His academic experience of procedures and the realities of politics rarely coin-
dded with the habits of thought of men trained in the miHtary mould. The military 
mood was one concerned with problems of behaviour rather than with discussion. 
As early as April 1947 the British Embassy was coming to think that BaH was pro-
posing himself as the mediator between the Russians and the Americans with the ap-
proval of the AustraHan government. Gascoigne's inirial telegram of 12 April shows: 
Such complete misapprehensions of Soviet habits and poUcy that I think a frank reply to 
Ball's request for instructions is required to the effect that Soviet polides in the Far East and 
Japan are certainly opposed to ours and the United States governments, that one of the 
main aims is to drive a wedge between us and the American government, that the meanmg 
they give to the word "democracy" is totally opposed to that of the British Com-
monwealth and that Ball's innocence on these matters alarms us.'" 
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Ball's constant voting with the Soviet Union and China confirmed British doubts 
about the suitability of Ball as the Commonwealth representative. Gascoigne knew 
that MacArthur believed after tlie first meeting of the AlHed Council that Ball "was 
obviously siding with the Russians against the United States". Gascoigne thought 
that BaH was not reflecting the general Australian, much less the British, attitude to 
MacArthur. He asked J.A. Beasley, the AustraHan minister in London, what 
Australian views were on MacArthur. Beasley replied that "MacArthur was a real 
hero to the Australians and the Australians trusted him implicitly". He recalled that 
during Chifley's recent visit to Japan, he was transported on MacArthur's own 
plane." 
Other approaches were made at very high levels to Evatt to discipline Ball and 
make him stick to his last. Evatt's instructions were sucdnct and to the point: desist 
from mediation. He also told Ball to send more facts and less comment in his reports. 
At the same time, he drew a neat distinction between two kinds of reports: those 
sent direct to the Department of External Affairs and the supplementary reports 
direct to the minister.'* 
The British high commissioner in Canberra raised the matter of Ball's suitabihty 
with Evatt. Evatt had previously admitted to McNeil, the British ambassador in 
Paris, that the British Commonwealth representative should do what he could to 
support General MacArthur, who had the responsibility for the execution of poHcy 
in Japan. Both the Foreign Office and the Dominions Office were behind a new 
approach to Evatt on 1 November. Evatt did not give an inch, and declared that too 
much had been made of the differences. He admitted that Ball was Leftist in sym-
pathy and inclined to exhibitionism but said that it was important that "the British 
Commonwealth representative be not seen as a stooge of the United States". Burton 
was to raise the matter vdth Ball but no copy of this letter was ever sent to the high 
commissioner in Canberra. The British attempt to have Ball recalled and perhaps 
transferred to another post failed. It was realized that a second diplomatic approach 
would be a waste of time: it would need to be at the prime minister level. Gascoigne 
thought that, given enough rope. Ball might hang himself: "The Americans might 
in the end approach the Australians direct and ask for his removal."" His spirits 
temporarily rose when he heard strong rumours that Ball was to be recalled to 
become the AustraHan ambassador to Moscow. But his journalistic contact proved to 
have been misinformed. 
The British Embassy in Tokyo had deferred its proposals to secure a replacement 
for Macmahon Ball, largely because Evatt felt that Ball "had been more sinned 
against than sinning". The embassy became more disiHusioned with the Allied 
Council and the ideological bickering that took place at meetings. Gascoigne felt that 
Atcheson was "a nice feHow," but to talk to him was "rather Hke addressing a large 
lump of cotton wool". Gascoigne commented: "One never gets anything concrete; 
he seems scared to open up at all." The Foreign Office agreed. A marginal comment 
(by D.J. Cheke) on Gascoigne's message notes: "The dumb Atcheson is an unattrac-
tive contrast to the loquacious MacArthur, but he represents the State Department 
with whose views on the Peace Settlement, the food situation and the Allied Council 
we are more in harmony with than those of MacArthur."'* 
The resignation of Macmahon Ball coincided with other changes in the composi-
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tion of the Allied CouncH. In May, Chu had resigned because of ill-health and was 
replaced by Shang Chen. Atcheson, the American chairman, was killed in an air 
crash near Honolulu on 15 August. He was replaced on 2 September by William J. 
Sebald, one of MacArthur's deputies, a tough naval officer who subsequently became 
American ambassador to Australia. 
Evatt suggested that BaH be replaced by General H.C.H. Robertson, the com-
mander of the British Commonwealth Occuparion Forces. He forgot that the 
appointment had to be a joint one made after consultation with Britain, India, and 
New Zealand. Gascoigne had no great respect for Robertson's abihty and felt that he 
would not be remarkably successful on the Allied Council. He was very anxious that 
there be close consultation on the appointment, even a temporary appointment. 
There is little evidence that there was. In the end, Patrick Shaw, a rising young 
Australian diplomat, was appointed as acting representative for the British 
Commonweath. 
BaU's resignation was a great relief to the senior British diplomats in Tokyo. 
Gascoigne said: 
I can only conclude that he [Evatt] now at last reaUses what a nefarious influence this man 
has had for the past 18 months on our local commonwealth relations -with the Americans. 
It may be, of course, that MacArthur (who it would appear has succeeded in gaining 
Evatt's confidence and admiration) had spoken severely to Evatt regarding Ball; but the 
manner in which Evatt spoke to me was so emphatic and so bitter that I expect he has now 
reaUsed how unfair much of Ball's criticism of the Americans has been and how adversely 
this has affected AustraUan relations with MacArthur." 
He felt that now Evatt had found so much common ground with MacArthur there 
would be few differences between the procedures for negotiating a peace treaty and 
probably few over major questions of substance. The task of the United Kingdom in 
Tokyo would be easier. 
The Americans, too, were greatly relieved by BaH's resignation. The mending of 
bridges between Washington and Canberra began. MacArthur told Gairdner that he 
considered Evatt's visit was "the greatest diplomatic success that had occurred in 
Japan since the occupation; it would silence hostile press criticism of Australia in 
America. He found Dr. Evatt was generally in complete agreement with his 
views."" Evatt told him that "he had undergone as complete a revolution in feeHng 
towards the occupation as had the people of Japan". In typical fashion, Evatt asked 
MacArthur to cable Prime Minister Chifley, pointing out how much they were in 
accord. This would protect him when he returned to Canberra after making a com-
plete volte-face over MacArthur and occupation policy. Atcheson felt that the visit 
was a "highly satisfactory" one and that he had gained a closer understanding of 
occupation problems than he had had before. Harsh criticism had been replaced by 
praise and admiration for MacArthur's policies." 
Press conclusions in August that "this was the death kneH of the AlHed CouncU" 
were exaggerated, but the changes did tend to relegate the Allied Council to a secon-
dary position. There were changes in procedure which led to bitter criticism from 
the Russian member, but the frequent heated exchanges between Russia and the 
United States became a thing of the past. Sebald commanded a tight ship, and 
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meetings were usually very short. Major questions were discussed but briefly. Shaw 
took a less active and more discreet part in the debates in the Allied Council and 
showed much more poHtical nous than Ball. He showed a greater sensitivity of the 
need to maintain close relations with the United States and MacArthur. Whether he 
had been discreetly advised by Gascoigne not to criticize the United States in front of 
the Russians (i.e., especially in the Allied Council) is not clear. 
Shaw did take an active part in the discussion of the poHtical dispute in Tokyo in 
September 1948. Trade unions were attempting to protect the rights of members 
employed by the government. Without consulting the other three countries that he 
represented as the British Commonwealth member, he made a moderate but sHghtly 
critical speech in the Allied Council." MacArthur took umbrage at his speech 
discussing the rights and wrongs of the strike and regarded it as evidence that the 
British Commonwealth was lining up with the Russians against the United States. 
Shaw subsequently received a thirteen-man deputation from the recently formed 
League for the Defence of Democracy. It was a left-wing, possibly Communist, 
group of trade unionists. Shaw discussed the strike issues and then promised tQ send 
copies of their petition to Canberra and Washington. The interview was reported 
prominently in the left-wing press in Japan. This added fuel to MacArthur's fire: he 
preferred Commonwealth criticism of American policy not to be made in such a way 
that the Russians and the press could use them." This was really a storm in a teacup 
that quickly passed over. 
The United Kingdom was disturbed at Shaw's behaviour. Although the views he 
had expressed were quite acceptable to the British ambassador, he had not consulted 
Gascoigne. This was not uncommon, and Gascoigne felt that it was essential that the 
"Commonwealth member refrains from taking any other public step which is likely 
to give General MacArthur the impression that the United Kingdom is ganging up 
in any way with the Russians against him". 
Shaw's appointment to the Allied Council had been a provisional one in expecta-
tion that a Peace Treaty might be concluded by March 1948. London felt that his 
position should be regularized and that instructions should be drafted in consultation 
between the four Commonwealth countries that he represented. Despite his youth, 
Shaw had the strong approval of his British colleagues, who were reluctant to take 
steps that might lead Evatt to replace him.'" Shaw flew to London towards the end 
of the first week in October, and with typical British courtesy Sir Esler Dening, 
assistant under-secretary of state in Foreign Affairs, dined him, and he met the king 
and queen and Queen Mary. There is no indication whether Shaw's behaviour in the 
Allied Council was more diplomatic after this "treatment" by the Foreign Office. 
The Shaw episode illustrates on the one hand the difficulties of consultation bet-
ween the four states represented by the British Commonwealth member and on the 
other hand the acute sensitivity of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in 
dealing with him. The cumbersome and almost impossible machinery for consulta-
tion meant that BaH and Shaw often short-circuited the contacts and presented a 
general Australian point of view. The United Kingdom was extremely anxious to 
collaborate with the United States, not only in the Far East but also in Europe and 
the Middle East. It resented what it felt to be the attempts of amateur and inex-
perienced Australian diplomats to deal with Far Eastern/Japanese problems, and to 
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deal with them in a manner that associated the United Kingdom with those at-
tempts. MacArthur was even more sensitive about attempts to examine his occupa-
tion policy. Through his deputies, Atcheson and Sebald, he expressed his views 
about the attempts of the Russian member to use the AHied Coundl as a fact-
gathering agency to feed a propaganda machine. He reduced the number of formal 
directives on matters of substance to the Japanese government and so the matters on 
which he invited the Allied Council for its opinions. Consultation was reduced to a 
minimum. 
As a result, the AlHed Coundl ceased to play an important part in the machinery 
for the formulation and supervision of Allied policy in Japan. The decreasing input 
from SCAP meant that the agenda tended to become meaningless. The AlHed Coun-
dl from time to time debated a poHcy issue with the Soviet Union's representative 
using the council as a sounding board for propaganda charges against SCAP's ad-
ministration in an attempt to win support from the Japanese people. With members 
other than the Soviet Union reluctant to place matters on the agenda, the AHied 
Coundl meetings had nothing to discuss. As sessions were convened, there was no 
agenda to discuss and then no minutes to adopt. Meetings became farcical, lasting in 
one instance for thirty-eight seconds and frequently for from one to two minutes. 
The occupation of Japan, despite the formal participation of the AlHed Powers 
contributing to the Pacific War, became Httle more than an American exercise sup-
ported with varying degrees of enthusiasm by the powers represented on the Far 
Eastern Commission and the Allied Council. The State Department and the 
American government were responsible in the last resort for formulating poHcies. In 
the event of any conflict in the quadrilateral machinery, the final decision rested with 
Washington. Should there be disagreement in the Far Eastern Commission on an 
important issue or should a member of the commission (usually the Soviet Union) 
veto proposed action, the United States immediately issued an interim directive on 
the ground of urgency and the inabiHty of the Far Eastern Commission to suggest ac-
tion. It did this on seventeen occasions. The relevance of discussions of Japanese pro-
blems by the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council receded as the central 
issue became not the details of the occupation of Japan but rather the principles and 
details of a peace settlement with Japan as the suggested deadline of March 1948 had 
been abandoned. 
13 The Peace Treaty with Japan 
In the later stages of the Pacific War, Australia became increasingly concerned at the 
unilateral discussions of the Big Three about the defeat of Japan, the procedures for a 
surrender, and the conclusion of a peace treaty. On some questions there were sharp 
differences between Australia and the Great Powers. The Japanese peace offer of 10 
August stipulated that the emperor should retain his prerogatives after surrender. 
This was entirely unacceptable to the Australian government, which insisted that 
"as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, he [the Emperor] 
should be held responsible for Japan's acts of aggression and war crimes". The State 
Department had itself unilaterally formulated an Allied surrender proposal and for-
warded it to Japan on 12 August through the Swiss Legation. Australian views about 
a tough policy towards Japan did not reach the secretary of state until 3 p.m. on 13 
August. Australia's views thus arrived too late to influence the American draft 
terms. In reply to a request that they be submitted, the desk officer in the State 
Department said, "I do not see anything to be done about i t . " ' 
The United Kingdom's protest about the manner in which the ultimatum was 
drafted also arrived too late to have any impact on the document. Further protests by 
Eggleston and the British ambassador in Washington were also unavailing. Secretary 
of State Byrnes replied simply that "the United States was not in a position to 
consult their allies". Eggleston agreed privately with Evatt that Australia had been 
treated in an unsatisfactory manner. But the mood of the United States was, in 
Eggleston's words: "They have won the war and they have not that sort of 
greatness which recognizes the share of others and especially that of smaller nations. 1 
do not know what more could have been done. The only thing more would be to 
take the Secretary of State by the neck and shake it out of him, and this was obvious-
ly impossible."* 
Evatt was determined that AustraHa should take its place in the surrender 
ceremony as one of the principal allies in the Pacific war. John Minter, the charge at 
the American Embassy in Canberra, reported his interview with Evatt on 14 August. 
"He views it as unthinkable that Australia, which barring the United States has con-
tributed proportionately more with bases, works, supplies and fighting men to bring 
about the present happy development than any of the Big Four, should be deprived 
of that honour."' The original American proposal was that the dominions attach a 
service representative to the British group at the surrender ceremony. The Australian 
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government on 17 August appointed General Blamey as a member of MacArthur's 
headquarters staff for the ceremony. Evatt bypassed the State Department and 
darified Blamey's status with MacArthur himself. He also made the strongest 
representations to Minter in Canberra, telling him that the original American pro-
posal was "entirely unsatisfactory". Minter told the secretary of state, "I have not 
yet encountered such strong language of official protest as I have during this 
episode." He felt that the future co-operation between the United States and 
AustraHa in Japan was threatened.* 
Truman and the State Department were surprised at the angry reaction from 
Australia and New Zealand and other smaller powers. Minter told Evatt on 19 August 
that the Australian armed forces would be represented, and two days later it was 
agreed that, in addirion to the Big Four, AustraHa, Canada, France, New Zealand, 
and the Netherlands would sign the general terms of surrender. The close relations 
between MacArthur and two Australian prime ministers undoubtedly influenced 
President Truman's decision. AustraHa thus signed the surrender terms on the USS 
Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 with an independent status.' 
The Australian tactical victory over the signature of the terms of surrender left 
unresolved two questions of differing importance: AustraHan participation in the oc-
cupation of Japan after the surrender, and Australia's role as "a party principal in all 
proceedings associated with the Japanese settlement". The short-term problem was 
Australia's partidpation in the occupation force in Japan. There was general agree-
ment that there should be a British Commonwealth occupation force representing 
AustraHa, New Zealand, Great Britain, and India. But MacArthur objected to 
Australian proposals that the British Commonwealth forces be placed under the 
command of an Australian military office: he preferred the appointment of an 
American commander to the composite Commonwealth force. Diplomatic discus-
sions between MacArthur, the State Department, and the Australian foreign 
minister led to the decision that the Commonwealth forces should be Hmited to 
36,000 rather than the AustraHan target of 43,600. 
The Commonwealth occupation forces of 36,000, compared with the American 
forces of approximately 400,000 gave Australia and the Commonwealth token 
representation in Japan. On 31 January 1946, Washington finally accepted the Com-
monwealth point of view. But the feeling was that the British Empire occupation 
force was "neither needed nor wanted".' 
The question of AustraHan status in Japan was decided by her appointment to 
represent the British Commonwealth on the Allied Council and to membership of 
the Far Eastern Commission. As weH, an AustraHan general, commanded the Com-
monwealth contingent in the occupation forces and an AustraHan judge. Sir WHliam 
Webb, presided over the war crimes commission. 
But Evatt realized, perhaps obliquely, that the crucial factor in Australian par-
tidpation in a settlement with Japan was full representation at the conference work-
ing out draft peace terms. He had put the argument for Australian representation on 
a number of occasions: "its parricipation in the war . . . was second only to that of 
the United States."' He felt that as late as October 1947 the United States was not as 
firm as it had been on the understanding conveyed to him by Secretary of State 
Byrnes that Australia "would have a position second to none in the making of the 
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Japanese peace treaty". General McCoy, the United States member of the Far 
Eastern Commission, had recommended on 11 December 1946 that the United 
States government would wish to include Australia in the group of states which 
would participate fully and equally with the United States and other major powers in 
the forthcoming peace conference for Japan.' But the State Department was reluctant 
to agree about Australian representation. Dean Acheson asked the American minister 
in Canberra to tell Evatt in confidence that "the United States hopes and desires that 
Australia will participate on full and equal basis in the formulation of a peace treaty 
with Japan and that negotiations and drafting will take place outside the Far Eastern 
Commission".' 
American reluctance to give Evatt a cast-iron guarantee that Australia would be a 
major participant at a peace conference with Japan arose primarily out of the need to 
ensure that the Soviet Union and China would both attend such a conference. 
Moscow would have preferred that the four foreign ministers meeting together 
would resolve the major problems. China would not attend a conference unless the 
Soviet Union were present.'" John Foster Dulles told Evatt that the crucial question 
was the participation of both China and the Soviet Union: "the whole Japanese 
peace conference without the Soviet Union and China was manifestly meaningless". 
The central issue was voting whether a veto would be permitted. It was not untU 21 
November that Evatt received the firm American assurance that Australia would be a 
party principal at any conference convened to discuss a peace treaty with Japan. 
Australian attitudes to a peace settlement with Japan were determined largely by 
emotional attitudes to the Japanese thrust towards Australia in 1941-42 and by the 
memories of the treatment of Australian and other AlHed prisoners in Japanese 
prisoner-of-war camps after the fall of Singapore. Darwin had been bombed and 
Japanese midget submarines had entered Sydney Harbour. These direct attacks on 
Australian territory showed clearly that the United Kingdom was unable to provide 
the shield that Australia had for so long taken for granted. 
The Department of External Affairs in Canberra had been working for some time 
before the surrender on Australia's views on a peace treaty. It began with a firm in-
sistence that "Australia should take a direct part — preferably by way of personal, 
round-table consultation — in the formulation of Allied policies, the drafting of 
Armistice terms and signature of Armistice conditions, the definition of methods of 
control and the establishment and working of control machinery"." Australia was 
concerned about the short-term and long-term future of Japan. The short-term pro-
blem was the elimination of Japanese militarism and its threat to Pacific security and 
the punishment of war criminals. 
The Australian government regarded Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal, perhaps 
the number one Japanese war criminal, who should be indicted; the report to the 
Australian government by Sir William Webb, president of the International MiHtary 
Tribunal for the Far East, which was concerned with major war crimes, had 
"disclosed a deliberate system of terrorism and atrocity which must have been 
known to the Supreme Authorities in Japan". But MacArthur beHeved that it would 
be a tactical mistake to treat the emperor as a war criminal. It would require the 
stationing of a million allied troops in Japan and an indefinite miHtary occupation. 
His trial, conviction, and execution would strengthen the emperor cult worship in 
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Japan and make it more potent than ever before.'* Both the United States and the 
United Kingdom accepted MacArthur's views, and so Australia ceased to press for 
his indictment. 
The Australian analysis of August 1945 insisted on the economic disarmament of 
Japan covering all industry, the allied control of industry, including ship-buHding, 
and the restoration of Hght industries; and Allied control of Japan's import and 
export trade. This would foster the growth of essential consumer goods industries 
and help give effect to Allied reparation policy. 
An essential part of Australian policy was to carry out radical changes in Japan's 
political, social, and economic system: "The roots of Japanese mihtarism are embed-
ded in the totalitarian social, political and economic system built up over the past 70 
years." These changes would include the dissolution of the Zaibatsu, which 
dominated Japanese heavy industry and did much to shape the economy as a whole. 
They also included agrarian land reform and the encouragement of a strong trade 
union movement in an attempt to raise living standards. Such policies involved direct 
intervention in domestic Japanese affairs and the strengthening of the Japanese 
pohtical system to give it a sound democratic base. "This involves a considerable 
period of occupation and there is a danger that the occupying powers may weary of 
the task. This danger however should be weighed against the very real danger of a 
revival of Japanese chauvinism and aggression if the main features of Japan's social, 
political and economic life are left substantially unchanged."" 
AustraHa accepted in broad terms the principles set out in the United States Initial 
Post-Surrender PoHcy, the directive issued to MacArthur when he was appointed as 
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on 29 August 1945. Differences 
with the United States on specific issues developed at meetings of the Far Eastern 
Commission and the Allied Council. Early in 1946 Evatt began to press for an early 
meeting of interested powers to discuss a peace treaty. By 21 June, the United States 
released the draft of a twenty-five-year treaty on the disarmament and demilitariza-
tion of Japan.'* Evatt was in Washington the day before its release and protested to 
Dean Acheson about the manner in which the draft had been prepared. It appeared to 
be based on the recent treaty with Germany and the preamble indicated that it was 
the work of the Big Four. Evatt told Acheson, as he had President Truman, that "it 
would give AustraHa 'a set back' not to be one of the parties to the proposed treaty 
to demilitarise Japan". He asked that the release of the draft be delayed so that the in-
clusion of Australia could be considered. Acheson and Hickerson declined to do so 
and informed the AustraHan Legation that ' 'it was mechanically impossible to stop 
the release". The draft was referred to the appropriate committees in London and 
Canberra for further consideration." 
The main points of difference between Australia and the United States were over 
the timing of the peace conference and its composirion. AustraHa was anxious to 
make the conference as representative as possible and above all for AustraHa to be at 
the conference table. When the United States planned to retain control over some 
Japanese islands in the Pacific essential to American security, and to do it through 
"strategic trusteeships" under the United Nations, Britain, AustraHa, and the Soviet 
Union opposed the proposal. Evatt felt that while the United States should be 
allowed to retain control over the islands, proper legal procedures should be follow-
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ed. He also suggested that whatever decision the Security Council might make 
"should be related to and made subject to final confirmation by the Pacific Peace 
Conference". Washington rejected both proposals but finally accepted a formula 
suggested by Australia and Britain. Six other states agreed, and Evatt claimed that 
this transformed the Security CouncH into "a small repHca of the Peace 
Conference"." The price for American acceptance of this procedure was Austraha's 
agreement to accept the draft trusteeship agreement as it stood. 
The timing of a peace conference was becoming more urgent for Australia. The 
United States felt frustrated by the long debates in the Far Eastern Commission on 
policy matters and by the futility of much of the discussion in the Allied Coundl. 
The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy document had recognized that "in 
the event of any difference of opinion, the poHcy of the United States wiH govern". 
The United States adopted the device of issuing interim directives to MacArthur and 
was able to deal with many smaller issues by executive action through SCAP. This 
meant, as Evatt told the House of Representatives, that there was "a distinct tenden-
cy to settle matters piecemeal or on a temporary basis"." 
Differences of opinion developed oyer MacArthur's estimates of the practical 
achievements of the occupation. On 2 September 1946, the first anniversary of the 
surrender, MacArthur gave a glowing account of the achievements of a year's 
occupation. 
They [the Japanese] suddenly felt the concentrated shock of total defeat. . . . It left a com-
plete vacuum, morally, mentally and physically. And into this vacuum flowed the 
democratic way of life. A spiritual revolution ensued almost overnight, tore asunder a 
theory and practice of Ufe built upon two thousand years of history and tradition and 
legend. . . . This revolution of the spirit among the Japanese people represents no thin 
veneer to serve the purposes of the present. It represents an unparalleled convulsion of the 
social history of the world." 
Macmahon Ball had the gravest of doubts that there had been an instant change in 
Japanese attitudes. Evatt reflected these doubts when he told parliament that "too 
much may be claimed in the way of permanent results in relation to Japan's future as 
a nation". He doubted whether the militarists responsible for Japanese aggression in 
the past had been effectively excluded from political and economic influence." 
MacArthur's optimism was not shared by an advisory committee on the Japanese 
settlement set up by the Australian government. Chaired by Sir Frederic Eggleston, 
with Professor K.H. Bailey as vice-chairman, this representative and high-powered 
committee debated at length the question of the time needed to complete the re-
education of the Japanese people and the entrenching in power of the new liberal 
elements. Most members beHeved that a long occupation would be necessary, an oc-
cupation of twenty to twenty-five years.*" 
By mid 1947 Evatt finally accepted MacArthur's invitation to visit Japan. This 
would enable him to attend the British Commonwealth conference on the Japanese 
peace settlement in Canberra beginning on 26 August with a first-hand knowledge 
of the progress of the occupation. He had already made tentative overtures to 
MacArthur about the timing of a peace conference and the length of the occupation. 
As noted in chapter 12, Evatt changed his mind about MacArthur completely and 
"returned from Japan completely sold on General MacArthur" and what he was 
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doing there, saying he had been "completely misinformed regarding both the 
General and conditions in Japan".*' In Tokyo he discussed with MacArthur and 
George Atcheson in separate conversations his ideas about a peace settlement. Evatt 
and MacArthur both felt that a peace treaty should be negotiated as speedily as 
possible, but for different reasons. Evatt was anxious to prevent SCAP from making 
a de facto peace by a series of decisions on matters of detail, which would amount 
to a piecemeal settlement that would meet most American strategic objectives. 
MacArthur, on the other hand, realized the danger of a prolonged military occupa-
tion after a successful war. History was on his side. He felt that the immediate objec-
tives of the Potsdam Declaration had been achieved. Japan was disarmed and demil-
itarized, and there was little prospect of any short-term resurgence of Japanese 
mihtary power. An early peace treaty would have the added advantage of reducing 
occupation costs, which were a heavy economic burden on the United States. 
Evatt proposed that all eleven members of the Far Eastern Commission should par-
tidpate in the settlement. He was prepared to gamble with the Soviet Union, believ-
ing that if it did not join at the beginning it would later, so that it could have a voice 
in the interim regime of control. He suggested that a preliminary conference be held 
of foreign ministers rather than their deputies ("foreign ministers have their jobs to 
get back to and thus are forced by circumstances to progress with the conference 
work and achieve results"). He hoped that voting would be unanimous. He also 
outlined an interim control system under an American chairman and hoped that 
Japan would be admitted to the United Nations, sponsored by the signatories to the 
peace settlement. Atcheson said that he expressed himself "as completely optimistic 
that basic American and British Commonwealth policies were identical, and that 
agreement as to the essentials of a peace settlement would not be difficult".** 
While Evatt was on his way to Japan, the United States had tried to convene a 
meeting of all FEC members for a preliminary conference on a Japanese peace treaty 
on 19 August. The proposal was dropped when aH the Commonwealth countries 
decHned the American invitation. The State Department had its reservations about 
the Canberra meeting, fearing that it would lead to the formation of a Com-
monwealth bloc of five of the eleven members of the FEC. This was not Evatt's in-
tention, although he was anxious to avoid holding a peace conference within the 
FEC framework, where the veto could be used. The State Department had some 
thoughts of sending their ambassador, Robert Butler, to Japan with Evatt. Butler 
thought that the Evatt visit to Japan "would provide opportunities for exerting a 
moderating influence on the present virulent and individualistic Australian 
thinking".*' Butler did not leave Canberra, but the visit did pay handsome 
dividends. 
The Canberra conference had been planned before Evatt's euphoric meeting with 
MacArthur. The conference met from 26 August until 2 September 1947 and was 
attended by the five Commonwealth members of the Far Eastern Commission 
(AustraHa, Canada, India, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom), together with 
Burma (which was later admitted to the FEC), Pakistan, and South Africa. It 
accepted the Australian and American view that a peace conference should be held at 
the earhest possible date and that voting should be by a two-thirds majority without 
any veto. It approved in substance but not wholly in detail the occupation and con-
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trol policies followed by MacArthur and endorsed the rather vague oral agreements 
reached by Evatt in his July discussions. It was a valuable exercise in clarifying the 
views of Commonwealth members and in establishing a close correspondence with 
those of the United States. The final communique set at rest American fears that a 
Commonwealth bloc might be created to gang up against the United States. It urged 
that discussions about a peace treaty begin at the end of September.** 
Although Evatt discussed the conference with Secretary of State George MarshaU 
during the second session of the UN General Assembly, Marshall was non-
committal. "I did not find it necessary to make any important statements."*' Evatt 
suggested a timetable, a short three-to-four-day preliminary conference at Pearl 
Harbor followed by a main conference within three months. 
In a sense the Canberra conference was little more than a historical exercise, 
because the State Department, the joint chiefs of staff, and MacArthur were aU 
reassessing their views. The Soviet Union was also beginning to modify its stand on 
both the peace conference and the veto. Evatt was also changing his attitude to the 
veto: "Even the existence of such a veto need not necessarily preclude the reaching of 
a satisfactory arrangement in relation to Japan."*' 
American political, economic, and military policies were changing. General 
McCoy, the American representative and chairman of the Far Eastern Commission, 
told the FEC on 21 January 1948 that aH possible and necessary steps consonant with 
the basic policies of the occupation should be taken "to bring about the early revival 
of the Japanese economy on a peaceful self-supporting basis". Congress was planning 
in 1949 to provide additional funds "for the procurement of such imports as in-
dustrial raw materials and spare parts to assist Japan to expand the output of its 
peaceful industries towards a status of self support". The report by Under-Secretary 
of the Army WiHiam H. Draper outlined a programme to make Japan economically 
self-suffident by 1952 or 1953. 
The reassessment of American interests in Japan and the west Pacific was being 
made in both Washington and Tokyo. The re-examination of those interests was 
being carried out partly by George F. Kennan, who had outHned a policy of contain-
ment of Soviet expansion in an anonymous article in Foreign Affairs, "The Sources of 
Soviet Conduct". He argued that "all regional policies of the United States must be 
integrated into a global American strategy". This meant that Japan would become 
an anti-communist bastion for the defence of the free world against spreading com-
munism, and the cornerstone in American containment of communism in the Far 
East.*' 
Kennan's argument was strengthened by the gradual collapse of American policy 
in China as the Nationalist party slowly disintegrated. Japan was of crucial impor-
tance when it became probable that the Communist Party would assume power. A 
new American approach was essential. 
But demilitarisation is no longer a serious problem in the case of Japan. Japan could not in 
the foreseeable future resurrect itself as a first class military power. It can only gravitate 
into the orbit of one or other of the super powers. As for democratisation, it is a question 
as to whether the presence of the USSR on an international supervisory body would con-
tribute to democratic advances. It is unUkely that the USSR in this position would be a 
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disruptive influence in Japan, placing the onus for continued supervision on the United 
States and conspiring to bring about sovietised totalitarianism.2' 
The State Department's review of its Japanese policies was accelerated after the 
Kennan criticisms. It began to question aH the assumptions upon which the case for 
an early peace treaty were based. Above aH, the deterioration of Japan's economy was 
delaying her recovery, and for a number of years she would need substantial 
American assistance.*' In this process of analysis, many of the key parts of the 
Australian hard-line policy came under careful re-examination — the role of the 
Zaibatsu, a new role for trade unions, and the democratic processes being bmlt into 
the Japanese political system. The end result was a drastic revision and reversal of 
American policy in Japan. 
Kennan, the director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, was 
working on a draft treaty early in 1948 and on 1 March visited Tokyo to discuss the 
whole problem with MacArthur. He prefaced his visit with a memo that seemed to 
reflect the views of the secretary of state, especially his feeling that a peace treaty was 
StiH a long way off, although most of the Potsdam objectives had now been achieved: 
"We are faced with a further extensive period of indefinite duration during which 
we will have to carry on without a treaty." During this period, when Japan was 
being prepared " t o stand on her own feet when the protecting hand is withdrawn", 
it was suggested that the emphasis should be placed on 
(a) A firm United States security poUcy for this area, envisaging both the coming interim 
period and the eventual peace period, and designed to give the Japanese adequate 
assurance against future military pressures. 
(b) An intensive program of economic recovery; and 
(c) A relaxation in occupational control, designed to stimulate a greater sense of respon-
sibility on the part of the Japanese Government. 
MacArthur agreed that it would be unwise to try to negotiate a peace treaty in 
1948: it might have been possible a year earHer but the opportunity had been missed; 
the changing position of both China and the Soviet Union was responsible for this. 
The danger lay in a prolonged occupation that "would end by Japan becoming 
within 30 years a real satelHte of the United States". The important thing that 
emerged was MacArthur's definirion of America's strategic boundaries (the first of 
what become almost an annual exercise for the national press and retired admirals and 
eenerals). They were 
no longer along the Western shores of North and South America, they lay along the 
eastern shores of the Asiatic continent. Accordingly, our fundamental strategic task was to 
make sure that no serious amphibious force could ever be assembled and dispatched from an 
Asiatic port. In the past the centre of our defence problem has lain further south, in the 
neighbourhood of the PhiUppines. It had now shifted to the north, since it was now only 
toward the north that a threat of the development,of amphibious power could mature. 
This meant that it was necessary for the United States to have a striking force in "a 
U-shaped area embracing the Aleutians, Midway, the former Japanese mandated 
islands, Clark Field in the Philippines, and, above aH Okinawa" (the area excluded 
Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand).'" 
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Kennan recommended on his return that Washington should not press for a peace 
treaty at present but be ready to begin negotiations when the members of the Far 
Eastern commission had composed their differences over voting. Japan's economic 
recovery should be the prime objective of the United States. The instruments of con-
trol — SCAP, the EEC, and the Allied CouncH — were to remain unchanged, but 
the FEC should be discouraged from discussing new matters that were scarcely rele-
vant to its main function of executing the terms of surrender. These proposals would 
mean the retention of full American control of occupation policy. There was no 
dissent from Kennan's recommendation to defer negotiations over a peace treaty. 
Discussions about the timing of a peace conference and treaty with Japan centred 
on American estimates of the most suitable date. This was related to the varying and 
often conflicting analyses of the State Department and the joint chiefs of staff and the 
individual estimates of the departments of the Army and Defence. These tended to 
take into account the views of the United Kingdom as the major ally and very 
marginally of the other nine members of the Far Eastern Commission, of which 
Australia was one. Washington inevitably related its views about timing to the 
changing international situation — the outbreak of the Korean War and the 
dismissal of MacArthur on 10-11 April 1951 were important components. 
By 1949, AustraHan criticisms of American timing and details of a possible peace 
treaty had increased. Evatt felt that decisions about a peace settlement in the Pacific 
were being determined by European issues, especially relations with Russia. The 
issues in the Pacific were different and more relevant to Australian interests. Evatt 
argued: "You rearm Japan and remove all the restrictions to which it agreed in the 
Armistice and so develop its war potential, and you are quite satisfied that in any 
future struggle in the Far East Japan wHl do the bidding of the western democrades. 
That is a fallacy."" 
On the sensitive issue of the recovery of the Japanese economy and the raising of 
living standards (with a possible increase in Japanese exports). Prime Minister 
Chifley conceded that ' ' the people of those countries [Germany and Japan] must be 
permitted a decent standard of living".'* Evatt supported on humanitarian grounds 
the raising of Japanese living standards but felt that "it would be completely wrong 
if Japan were to be reconverted into an arsenal which might possibly be used in one 
direction but which might ultimately be used according to the wishes of the Japanese 
leaders and turned in the direction of the South Pacific to the detriment of this 
country"." 
Underlying the whole Australian approach to Japan was concern -with AustraHa's 
security, protection against any external military threat. Australia had no real choice 
other than to revise its own draconic economic policies if it were to retain American 
support on broader questions of strategy and security. Australia conceived of the 
principal threat to its security as coming from a resurgent militarized Japan. The 
State Department felt that a more probable danger came from a "Communist Asia 
backed by the Soviet Union". There has been a tendency in Australia to avoid the 
realities of the Far Eastern situation in the knowledge that the United States would, 
as before, "bail them out" of any miHtary crisis.'* This belief was shaken by the 
withdrawal of American defences to the west coast of North America. It led 
Australia to support the strengthening of the American military position in the west 
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Padfic and an American strategic trusteeship for the Bonins and the Ryukyus. It did 
not convert AustraHa to American policies towards Japan but rather caused Australia 
to feel that "untH the present situation is clarified, no irrevocable steps should be 
taken which might even partially restore Japanese power". 
Washington was fully aware of Australia's fear of a resurgent Japan and its desire 
for some kind of regional security system. W. Walton Butterworth, the assistant 
secretary of states for Far Eastern affairs, pointed out that any security guarantee to 
Australia would in fact be directed against any attack by the Soviet Union, directly 
or indirectly. A broader regional Pacific pact, concluded during the formative period 
of a Padfic association of states, would transform the assodation "from an organ for 
pohtical, economic, and sodal co-operation — as now contemplated — into an anti-
Communist alliance which would be unacceptable to India, Burma, Indonesia and 
probably other states"." He strongly opposed any security guarantee to AustraHa at 
this stage. 
Washington was uncertain about Australian policy and interests in a peace settle-
ment. The United States charge in Canberra, Andrew B. Foster, felt that Evatt 
would continue to lead an almost automatic opposition to United States proposals 
and polides in connection with the future of Japan. The impending Australian 
federal election in December 1949 cast its shadow over discussions. The setting up of 
the People's Republic of China on 27 September compHcated the bitter electoral 
political campaign. Nine months later. North Korean forces attacked South Korea. 
In discussions with Acheson in Washington, the British foreign secretary, Ernest 
Bevin, pressed for an early peace treaty and suggested that one of the main problems 
was to get the Commonwealth to underwrite and agree on a treaty for Japan, accep-
table to the United States, so the United States did not need to Have veto powers. 
"He thought he could get the Commonwealth together to write the basic provisions 
of the treaty which would be satisfactory to us," Acheson noted. "We should teH 
the British in advance what our requirements are." This was not an open cheque to 
Washington, but a practical move to establish closer communications between 
London and Washington. The final draft of the peace treaty was, in fact, the work 
of the two governments. Bevin felt that a meeting of Commonwealth foreign 
ministers would be held in January 1950 at Colombo." (Bevin had hoped that con-
sultation with the Commonwealth would take place in Australia. Prime Minister 
Chifley would be present and this "would be much better than if Evatt were to 
come to Washington or elsewhere".) Evatt held a short second Canberra conference 
on the Japanese peace settlement with British and New Zealand diplomats. It was 
agreed that a four-year delay in discussions over a peace treaty was far too long, but 
there was disagreement over whether a conference could be held without Russia. 
AustraHa believed that Russia would attend a conference without a veto because it 
could refuse to ratify a treaty drafted with a two-thirds voting rule. 
Co-operation and consultation between Canberra and Washington were becom-
ing less frequent in 1949, partly because of the abrasiveness of Evatt's handhng of 
issues and partly because of CIA estimates of growing left-wing influence in 
AustraHan poHtics. The Labor government as a whole was "extremely jealous of the 
independent position of AustraHa, suspidous of what it regards as American 
economic imperiahsm, and determined not to be pushed around"." Evatt approach-
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ed Acheson expressing concern at discussions in Washington about Far Eastern pro-
blems without an Australian representative participating. Acheson angrily replied 
that "it would be quite impossible for the United States to undertake that it would 
discuss no matter affecting the Far East except in the presence of a representative of 
AustraHa"." Evatt was to be under no illusion about the matter, but to understand 
that America would continue to proceed as it had. A security pact as a quid pro quo 
for Australian acceptance of an American draft peace treaty with Japan was out of the 
question. The State Department and the president were relieved at the defeat of the 
Chifley government in December 1949, although they would not have gone as far as 
the rather inept American ambassador in Canberra did; Jarman congratulated R.G. 
Casey, the federal president of the Liberal Party, on his party's defeat of Labor before 
election day. 
American reporting from Canberra had for some time been less adequate than it 
had been in the days of Nelson Johnson and John Minter. Robert Butler, Johnson's 
immediate successor, had been interested primarily in reciprocal taxation. His suc-
cessor, Myron Cowen, spent nine months in Canberra before being transferred to 
Manila at his request. In his address to the Australian-American Association in 
Sydney on 27 September 1946, Cowen had commented that it was easier in 1860 for 
a Californian to come to AustraHa than to go to New York. "I have heard many of 
them preferred to come to Australia," he said, and suggested that attitudes had not 
changed greatly since then. He discussed the case for a soft rather than a hard peace 
with Japan, and said that this less draconic poHcy "was designed to destroy the 
Japanese war potential without destroying the Japanese people"." His successor, 
Pete Jarman, was a defeated congressman from Alabama who applied for the 
Canberra post because he needed the money. "Since I really need to go on the 
payroll, I will very much appredate your expediting my appointment in any way 
possible", the international trustee of the International Woodworkers of America 
wrote to Truman regarding the appointment.*" 
The defeat of the Labor government meant the replacement of Evatt by the suc-
cessful Sydney barrister Percy Spender, an extremely capable advocate who was much 
more adept in diplomatic discussion than Evatt. The change in government in both 
Canberra and Wellington on the eve of the meeting of Commonwealth foreign 
ministers in Colombo was less serious than expected, because there was a great deal 
of common ground between the two Australian political parties on policy towards 
Japan. Menzies, the new prime minister, had insisted while in opposition that a set-
tlement in Japan was to wait for the establishment of democracy in Japan. "It may 
wait so long that democracy will never be estabhshed in Japan," he said. "There is, 1 
think, a common ground between us that — I use the Minister's words — "Japan 
must never again be permitted to develop the means of waging war." 
Just after the election, James Plimsoll (then a member of the Australian delegation 
to the Far Eastern Commission) told John M. AlHson in the State Department that 
while the new Australian government "would wish to go as far as possible in co-
operating with the United States on Japanese matters", he was "certain that such 
co-operation could be made easier if some sort of definite defence arrangements could 
be concluded regarding the Pacific between the United States and Australia".*' 
Menzies moved much more closely towards the American position by the middle 
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of 1950. He said at a dinner in the AustraHan Embassy on 28 July that he wanted a 
prompt treaty which "should be a generous and not a punitive treaty. He did not 
believe that the treaty should impose economic or miHtary restrictions upon the 
Japanese except possibly restricting their right to build a navy with offensive 
capabihties".** The AustraHan ambassador to Japan, Colonel W.R. Hodgson, was 
the only allied diplomat who opposed an early peace treaty. Menzies indicated that 
"Colonel Hodgson's views would not carry great weight with his government". 
The Colombo Conference of January 1950 adopted a much more reaHstic view of a 
peace settlement than the first Canberra Commonwealth conference in 1947. A 
working party discussed detailed proposals for post-treaty security and the problem 
of protecting Japan against external attack. It made no recommendations, but the 
discussion appeared to favour the Australian view that the best solution would be a 
defence treaty between the United States and Japan. This would allow American 
troops to remain in Japan and so act as a check on the revival of Japanese militarism. 
It was agreed that all countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission should 
attend the peace conference, including the Soviet Union provided it was prepared to 
do so on terms acceptable to the democratic nations. The status of the People's 
Repubhc of China was left in abeyance, since the United States did not recognize it 
and so could not permit its representatives to officiaHy attend a meeting on American 
territory. The Colombo Plan itself was directed primarily at checking the spread of 
communism. 
Bevin's hope that the United States could provide a detailed outline of its plans for 
a peace settlement for the Colombo Conference was not reaHzed, primarily because 
sharp differences of opinion were developing in Washington. Before Bevin's depar-
ture for Ceylon, Acheson pointed out to Sir OHver Franks, British ambassador to the 
United States, "the adverse repercussions which would flow from any publidty 
emanating from the Ceylon Conference to the effect that the United States was 
holding back on proceeding with a Japanese peace treaty; that it was in all our 
interests that it should be fully appreciated by everyone, including the Japanese, that 
it was the predatory and unco-operative attitude of Soviet Russia that was at the root 
of our difficulties". *' 
Major differences of policy had developed between the State Department, the 
Department of Defence, and the joint chiefs of staff. The differences were so impor-
tant that a meeting was convened by Dean Acheson on 24 April to try to resolve 
them before he met Bevin and Robert Schuman, the French foreign secretary. The 
joint chiefs of staff felt that a peace treaty was premature and had said so in December 
1949. They had insisted on two mutually exclusive requirements for a peace treaty: 
that United States forces remain in Japan and that the USSR and the Communist 
government of China should be parties to the peace treaty. Acheson felt that to state 
that a peace treaty was premature was a "masterpiece of understatement". 
The differences in Washington arose largely out of the dvilian and military 
assessments of the situation in Japan and of their respective responsibihties before and 
after the conclusion of a peace treaty. The State Department saw the problem as a 
twofold one: protecrion against the possible resurgence of Japanese mihtarism and 
protection against Soviet aggression against a disarmed Japan. It wanted a non-
punitive peace treaty and a multilateral mutual security arrangement under which 
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Japan would grant to the United States whatever bases and rights were necessary to 
defend Japan against aggression. 
The joint chiefs of staff had not yet determined where the American defence 
perimeter in the Pacific was located and wanted to defer a peace conference for six 
nionths so that it could determine where the United States military power base in the 
Pacific would be. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson strongly resisted State Depart-
ment proposals at a tense conference in June ("no copies made of the minutes" to 
prevent security leaks). He then proposed to fly to Tokyo on 12 June to clarify 
MacArthur's views. The ground was cut from under his feet when MacArthur em-
phatically reiterated his view that "we should proceed to call a peace conference at 
once, work out just and proper terms among those in attendance, invite all the 
nations concerned, whether participants or not, to ratify the peace formula agreed 
upon. . . . Japan and all of Asia would witness the resurgence of our moral leader-
ship and renewal of our initiative in the conduct of Asian affairs".** He repudiated 
the conditions suggested by the joint chiefs of staff as "offering no insurmountable 
difficulties except the provision that the USSR and the People's Republic of China 
should be signatories of the final treaty. This, of course, is impossible." 
During the deadlock between the Department of Defence and the State Depart-
ment, President Truman appointed John Foster DuHes on 6 April as foreign policy 
adviser to the secretary of state to take charge of the treaty negotiations. Dulles told 
Acheson, "You'H never get anything done unless you select someone in whom you 
have confidence, give him a job to do, and then hold him to results. Look at the 
Japanese Peace Treaty — the department has been discussing it for four years without 
result. Why don't you give someone one year in which to get action, with the 
understanding that if he can't do it he fails? Give him a target and enough authority 
to get there."*' 
Two and a half months later the whole Far Eastern power balance changed 
dramatically when North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950. 
The appointment of Dulles led ultimately to the successful conclusion of the 
Japanese peace conference in September 1951. It involved an immense amount of 
paper work as he consulted with the other members of the Far Eastern Commission 
about the drafting of an acceptable peace treaty -with Japan. The major contributor to 
such a draft treaty was inevitably the United Kingdom. But the peripatetic 
diplomacy of Dulles covered most of the other members of the Far Eastern Commis-
sion as weH as Japan itself. DuHes visited Japan three times (with detours to the other 
capitals of FEC members) before making recommendations about a draft treaty. For 
Australia, the most important of these analysed the problem of security for post-war 
Japan. 
Dulles said that the entire area of Japan must be regarded as a potential base for 
defensive manoeuvres with unrestricted freedom reserved to the United States as the 
protecting power.*' The Korean War made Japan an immediate (rather than a 
future) base for the operations of a United Nations force commanded by MacArthur. 
It led gradually to the healing of the conflict between Defense and State over a peace 
treaty largely under pressure from DuHes. On 7 September 1950 the two depart-
ments, on the initiatives of Defense, agreed that there should be no definitive 
Japanese peace settlement "until after favourable resolution of the present miHtary 
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situation in Korea". Chinese intervention in the war led the joint chiefs of staff to 
want a further delay in discussing a peace settlement. 
In this situation it became imperative to convert Japan into a dependable and useful 
ally. The draft letter of instructions to Dulles before he made his first visit to Japan 
said: 
It is the policy of the United States government that the United States wiU commit 
substantial armed forces to the defence of the island chain of which Japan forms a part, that 
it desires that Japan should increasingly acquire the abiUty to defend itself, and that, in 
order further to implement this policy, the United States Government is willing to make a 
mutual assistance arrangement among the Pacific island nations (AustraHa, New Zealand, 
the Philippines, Japan, the United States, and perhaps Indonesia).*' 
In hearings before the House and Senate Foreign Affairs committees on 11-12 
January, Dulles explained that "the real purpose of his trip was to find out how 
dependable a commitment could be obtained from the Japanese Government to ahgn 
itself with the nations of the free world against Communist imperiahsm and what 
the cost to the United States would be". Both the State and Defense departments 
agreed on the instructions given to Dulles. 
Part of "the cost to the United States" had already been a reversal of its restric-
tions on the growth of Japanese industry. The logistics of a west Pacific war 
necessitated the use of Japanese industry to help supply the needs of the United 
Nations and American forces. The longer the Korean War dragged on, the more im-
portant was full Japanese support for the United States. Dulles decided that the 
simple solution would be to scrap the restrictive clauses on Japan's economic 
development and allow more rapid growth of the economy. This is evident in the 
outline for a peace settlement prepared by the Dulles Mission by 3 February.*' He 
had also decided to give Japan freedom of choice in deciding whether to remain 
ahgned with the United States and the West in the cold war. What was impossible 
was the rearming of Japan. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida made it clear that "for 
the immediate present, rearmament is impossible for Japan". Yoshida appreciated 
the effect of Japanese rearmament on the smaHer Pacific powers. Dulles was gambl-
ing up to a point: the Diet and press opinion were favourable to closer relations with 
the Western democracies rather than the Soviet Union and China. 
The peace treaty outHned by Dulles in seven points met with warm Japanese ap-
proval. Yoshida assured Dulles that there was a secret agreement between the two 
major poHtical parries that would ensure its acceptance. Dulles gained the impression 
that "the Japanese were so eager for a treaty that they would be wilHng to approve 
almost anything".*' 
The new liberal policy, especially the scrapping of restricrions on most sectors of 
Japanese industry, and the reassessment of Japan's role as a bastion against com-
munism in the Far East, posed problems for Australia. AustraHa had pressed in 1945 
for tight control over key industries with war potential. But it became evident by 
1950 that a draconic economic policy was impracticable. On 9 March 1950 Spender 
had admitted, "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Japan wHl have to be 
allowed to become self-supporting by industrial production and trade. Whether we 
like it or not, there is Httle doubt that much of Asia in its present stage of develop-
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ment stands in need of many goods that Japan only is at present in a position to 
supply."'" He did not speH out his behef that this could help check the spread of 
communism in Asia by easing economic and sodal tensions. It could fit in with the 
Colombo Plan policy of economic assistance to Asian countries. 
The main problem from an Australian point of view was to prevent the resurgence 
of Japanese mihtarism. MacArthur referred to Australia's "irrational fears largely 
borne of its isolated position". The United Kingdom also felt that AustraHan fears 
were exaggerated; only New Zealand gave constant support to Australia on the ques-
tion of Japanese rearmament. Anti-Japanese feeling in Australia accrued largely from 
having been the victim of bombing raids on Darwin and midget submarine attacks 
on Sydney; it also arose out of Japanese wartime atrocities. The result was such a 
strong popular feeHng that Japanese ships usually kept out of Australian, ports and an 
international conference that Australia was to host in 1951 had to be moved to 
another country for fear of attacks on Japanese delegates." 
Australia accepted with poor grace MacArthur's piecemeal policy of slowly 
building up Japan's industrial potential in heavy war industries and of easing restric-
tions on rearmament. This had the obvious advantage of an insurance policy to 
strengthen the informal ties between Canberra and Washington. The changing 
character of the Korean War increased American dependence on Japanese industrial 
support. Dulles, before his visit to Tokyo and Canberra in January-February 1951, 
decided that the State Department decisions of 7 November 1950 had to be revised. 
Japan must have the right to rearm, with treaty Hmitations. But the drastic 
Australian demand for a total prohibition of armaments was impossible to supervise. 
It would be a constant political and psychological irritant which could mihtate 
against the success of a peace treaty. The vital thing was to build a strong united 
front against communism in Asia. A lenient peace treaty with Japan and the 
Colombo Plan were tactical weapons in the ideological battle.'* 
All this reinforced the Australian conviction that it was essential to obtain a securi-
ty pact with the United States. Spender argued vigorously for "the revival of the 
close working association with our American friends which existed during the war. 
The relationship should, in due course, be given formal expression within the 
framework of a Pacific pact."" Despite gratitude for the Australian contribution to 
the United Nations force in Korea, both Acheson and Dulles were extremely reluc-
tant to become involved in any regional arrangement in the Pacific. Acheson told 
Spender that he could not conceive of Australia's being subject to hostile attack and 
the United States stand by without giving her aid. Dulles, at a meeting in Flushing 
Meadow during the UN session, presented Spender with a draft treaty representing 
the most extreme American view and omitting all reference to any limitation on 
Japanese rearmament. Spender rejected the draft as totally unacceptable to AustraHa 
and told Dulles that the retention of American troops in Japan provided not the 
slightest security for Australia. A Pacific pact was the only way out of the dilemma 
facing both AustraHa and the United States. After a rather tense discussion, Dulles 
agreed that a compromise solution would have to be found. 
Discussions between Dulles, Dean Rusk, and Spender on 30 October 1950 led to 
American acceptance in principle of the Australian proposal. Chinese troops had 
crossed the border into Korea five days earlier. The United States was anxious to 
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secure support, particularly when the United Kingdom opposed the American pro-
posal that United Nations forces might now have to move into Manchuria. Spender 
gave the United States fuH support in the Security Coundl. "We must permit 
nothing to prevent the free peoples, in particular the British people, standing stead-
fast with the United States of America in the difficulties that confront us," he 
argued. Co-operation between the two countries was so close that Keith Shann, a 
young AustraHan diplomat, was substantially responsible for drafting a United States 
resolution on 20 January. The joint chiefs of staff accepted in prindple the need to 
explore the possibiHty of a Pacific pact as soon as possible. During his visit to 
Washington, Menzies had told both Acheson and Dulles that he wanted "a 
generous and not a punitive treaty" and that he did not believe the treaty should 
impose economic or military restrictions upon the Japanese except possibly restric-
ting their rights to buHd a navy with "offensive capabHities". Canberra told the 
State Department that "it would be politically impossible for any AustraHan govern-
ment to enter into a 'liberal' Japanese peace treaty without firm guarantees against 
Japanese aggression". Spender expressed the intent of his government to hold out for 
a Padfic pact as the price for a liberal treaty with Japan.'* 
On his first visit to Tokyo in January, Dulles carried in his briefcase instructions to 
seriously consider a multilateral Pacific security pact. On his arrival in Canberra, 
Spender insisted on devoting the first two days of the discussions to the question of a 
Pacific Island Security Pact. Dulles agreed, because it was obvious that the willing-
ness of Australia and New Zealand to accept an American version of a peace treaty 
would depend on "the degree to which the United States would formalize its securi-
ty relations to them". Only when an informal agreement was reached did Spender 
consider some aspects of the peace treaty itself. Reparations, Japanese trade, and the 
commutation of sentences imposed on war criminals were the main issues raised. 
Australia reaHzed that the United States was adamant in opposing the inclusion of 
any restrictions on Japanese rearmament in the treaty. Australia did hope that Japan 
would make a voluntary statement on armaments and trade practice and volunteer to 
dismantle excessive shipyards that were not needed for "normal peace time 
requirements"." 
Dulles carried out the formidable task of consulting the other members of the FEC 
in the next six months. The final draft of the peace treaty was the result of close con-
sultation with the United Kingdom. There was some delay, and the State Depart-
ment thought that London was stalling over the representation of China at the peace 
conference. The United Kingdom had recognized the People's Republic of China, 
and the United States had refused recognition. It was agreed that the Australian pro-
posal (supported by seven other states) that neither China be invited to the con-
ference should be adopted. There was almost a fatal last-minute hitch. General 
MacArthur was dismissed by President Truman on 10 April and relieved of all his 
commands. Acheson and Truman asked Dulles to fly to Japan to brief General 
Matthew Ridgway, MacArthur's successor, on the detaUs of the peace treaty, the 
final text of which would be released on 15 August. He was also to confer with 
Japanese political leaders and assure them that MacArthur's dismissal involved no 
change in American policy and that the United States would stiH "stand strong 
against communism in Asia and to hold the off-shore islands"." After consulring 
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Republican party leaders, he agreed to fly to Tokyo immediately. He succeeded in 
allaying Japanese fears, and the danger passed. 
On 4 September 1951 the Japanese peace conference opened in San Frandsco. 
Three days earlier, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States signed the 
ANZUS Treaty at the Presidio in San Francisco Bay. On 29 August the United 
States signed a security agreement with the Philippines. A mutual security treaty bet-
ween the United States and Japan was signed on 8 September 1951 at the conclusion 
of the peace conference. 
The ratification of the treaty showed that there were sharp differences between the 
major Australian political parties, which led Dr Evatt to point out, "There is no 
identity of policy between the Australian Labor Party and the government on foreign 
affairs."" Menzies and Casey who replaced Spender as foreign minister when 
Spender became ambassador to Washington, both argued that there was no alter-
native since the United States was not prepared to occupy Japan indefinitely. Unless 
Australia (and the other allied Pacific nations) was prepared to raise a force from 
Australia to defend Japan, there were no alternative to allowing Japan to make her 
own defence arrangements. 
There was little enthusiasm in Australian government circles for the treaty, and 
Casey in his second-reading speech expressed his doubts of the wisdom of restoring 
Japanese autonomy without controls on its policy. There was no certainty that Japan 
was democratic or that it would avoid either economic or mUitary aggression. Yet 
"the immediate problems we have to consider," Casey said, "from the point of 
view of the security of Australia and the stability of Asia and the Pacific, is the securi-
ty of Japan rather than security against Japan."" Japan unarmed was in danger of 
becoming an active partner in the communist campaign to subjugate the whole of 
Asia as a preliminary to striking out towards Australia. The long-term problem was 
whether the danger to AustraHa would come from a resurgent imperialistic Japan, 
allied to and perhaps guided by the Soviet Union, or from a powerful Communist 
China suspect of imperialistic ambitions in South-East Asia. There was a calculated 
risk involved, and the danger of a power vacuum developing with an unarmed Japan 
which could succumb to Chinese pressures appeared the greater. 
Casey admitted that the treaty did not restrict Japan's right to rearm, but he felt 
that the immediate dangers were not great. Japan was virtually defenceless and had 
shown minimal eagerness to assume responsibility for its own defence. The treaty 
denied her access to raw materials on the mainland of Asia. United States troops 
would still be able to use military bases in Japan and would continue to occupy many 
Japanese island territories for an indefinite period. The clinching argument for 
Australia was the new ANZUS Treaty. 
The Australian Labor opposition fought ratification on party lines with con-
siderable Australian public support. The ALP was concerned at the informal revival 
of the Zaibatsu and the de facto rearmament of Japan under MacArthur's leadership. 
"The only justification that has been advanced for ratifying this treaty," Evatt said 
" . . . is that if Japan is to be permitted to rearm, it will always use its arms in the 
interests of the Western democracies against Russia and China. In my view this is a 
deadly delusion.'" Labor criticism of this "shabby document" with a determina-
tion not to be "fantastically generous" reflected their idealism and ideological con-
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sistency rather than their realism. Much as many Australians disliked the peace 
treaty, they had no option but to ratify after its overwhelming adoption in San Fran-
dsco. The treaty was finally ratified by the Australian parliament along party lines, 
fifty-four to forty-six in the House and thirty-one to twenty-one in the Senate. The 
dedding factor, despite ALP opposition, was the ANZUS Treaty: AustraHa had 
obtained an American guarantee.'" 
What part did Australia play in the final peace settlement with Japan? In a Hmited 
sense very little. When replies from the members of the FEC on the final draft of the 
peace treaty were received, the Australian contributions were minimal. The final 
State Department analysis of FEC repHes showed that Australia was concerned with 
a number of spedfic but not vitaHy important points and also with territorial limits, 
fisheries, war crimes sentences, reparations, and the restitution of Allied property. 
Australia accepted with considerable reservations the American view that Japan 
would opt for an alliance with the Western democracies rather than the Soviet 
Union and Communist China." The AustraHan contribution to the final settlement 
lay not so much in the peace treaty itself as in the internal reforms designed to 
strengthen democratic reforms in Japan: land reforms and the promotion and 
strengthening of trade unions. This involved some differences of opinion and friction 
with the United States. But on questions of rearmament and the future options of a 
post-war Japan, Australia had little alternative but to accept State Department 
dedsions. 
14 Indonesian Independence 
Indonesia was one of the areas in which the interests of both Australia and the 
United States were defined, rather belatedly, after the Japanese surrender. Margaret 
George has analysed very ably the early interests of Australia in Indonesia in Australia 
and the Indonesian Revolution. Japanese control of its occupied Asian territories ended 
before the surrender. On 17 August 1945, Indonesian nationalists declared their in-
dependence and began a long guerilla campaign against a Netherlands government 
attempting to re-estabHsh its pre-war colonial control over the Netherlands East 
Indies. 
Australia had planned to open a consulate in Batavia before the war broke out. In 
1945 it appointed a consul-general to Batavia and shortly afterwards appointed W. 
Macmahon Ball, then director of Radio Australia, as its special representative in 
Indonesia. His visit was a relatively short one, aimed at examining the political situa-
tion when "hard facts were extremely difficult to come by in Java". He felt that 
whUe the Japanese influence might explain the "form of Indonesian nationahsm but 
not its driving force", nationalism, in the form of a deep emotional resentment 
against the restoration of Dutch rule, was nearly universal. "This means that the real 
problem is not whether the Indonesians can govern themselves but whether they wiU 
allow the Dutch to govern them," he reported. He was disturbed by the outlook of 
British advisers to the Supreme Allied Command, South-East Asia (SACSEA), 
"who assumed that Europe was, and would remain, the centre of the world's 
political gravity", and also by "the muddling ineptitude" of most of the leading 
Dutch officers and administrators. General Sir PhiHp Christison, the British com-
mander, told him that when he checked Dutch military intelligence reports, "he 
found that nine out of ten were misleading or false".' 
Ball's report was in part an attempt to look into the poHtical crystal baU in post-
war Indonesia. He recognized the options open to the government in Batavia and 
pointed to the danger of a continuing civil war between the restored Dutch govern-
ment and the ebullient nationalist political groups in Indonesia. He argued against 
any independent Australian initiative, despite the vital interests involved; Australia 
would be unacceptable to the Dutch as a mediator, and if she did become implicated, 
this could involve some obHgations to "back our political intervention with miHtary 
force".* He suggested that should the deadlock continue, the issue should be referred 
to the United Nations. There was no hint in his report of any United States interest 
or involvement. 
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Evatt quickly recognized that Indonesia could afford an opportunity for him to 
promote Australia as a major force in the Pacific, replacing the United Kingdom as 
the dominant Commonwealth power in the region. This would also enhance his 
reputation as a Pacific statesman. His role in Indonesia as minister for External 
Affairs was a dominant one. He was handicapped by his reliance on a very young and 
expanding department which changed its permanent head on several occasions after 
1945. His last appointee, Dr John Burton, was a brilHant outsider whose contacts 
with the new and senior members of the department were tenuous. Burton had 
definite views about Australia's foreign policy and understood his minister's ap-
proval. Evatt was inclined to express his instructions to Australian diplomats at 
foreign posts in no uncertain way. He was frequently out of Australia during this 
CTitical period, partly as president of the United Nations General Assembly. This 
meant that responsibility for policy decisions often rested with his relatively untried 
secretary, John Burton.' 
Australian-American relations over Indonesia developed slowly after 1945, largely 
because in the American scale of diplomatic priorities Indonesia did not rate very 
highly. As far as one can determine, the first Washington analysis of the Indonesian 
problem was made in its aide-memoire to the Indonesian Republic on 27 June 1947. 
The American consul-general had gone into exile in 1942 and had not been replaced. 
America's primary interests had always been in Japan and Western Europe, rather 
than in Indonesia and South-East Asia. A peace settlement in Japan had the highest 
priority in Washington. StabOity in Western Europe to prevent any Russian aggres-
sion had the next priority. The Netherlands was an important piece in the Western 
jigsaw puzzle. This was a clear case in which American global interests relegated 
regional interests to a minor position. 
The American aide-memoire is not included in the appropriate volume of the 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers series for 1947. It is merely 
referred to in a dispatch from the American ambassador to the United Kingdom.* It 
was forwarded after the Netherlands government had sent its long ten-thousand-
word final proposals to Prime Minister Sutan Syahrir for a settlement of the dif-
ference between the Netherlands government and the Republicans. The Republican 
reply was forwarded on 8 June, and on 27 June Syahrir resigned as prime minister of 
the Republican government. The American aide-memoire, perhaps drafted to 
strengthen Syahrir's position, arrived in Jogyakarta, the Republican capital, on the 
evening of his resignation. It emphasized the increasing alarm of the United States at 
"the danger inherent in the failure to implement the Linggajati Agreement. . . . 
The United States must necessarily be concerned with the developments in Indonesia 
because of the importance of Indonesia as a factor in world stabHity, both economic 
and political." The central issue, according to the aide-memoire, was "the immediate 
formation of an interim control government in Indonesia estabhshed upon the princi-
ple of federation as proposed by the Netherlands Government and accepted in princi-
ple by the Indonesian Republic". The United States government therefore urged the 
Indonesian Republic "to co-operate without delay in the immediate formation of an 
interim federal government". (Syahrir had already agreed to this.) The aide-memoire 
promised that "after the interim government shall have been estabhshed and mutual 
co-operation along a constructive path assured, the United States Government 
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[would] . . . discuss if desired, with representatives of the Republic and other consti-
tuent areas, financial aid to assist the economics and rehabilitation of Indonesia".' 
The American hint of economic aid was of critical importance to both the 
Netherlands government and the government of the Republic, led by Amir Syarifud-
din after Syahrir decHned to withdraw his resignation. The Dutch negotiator, H.J. 
van Mook, on 29 June refused to go beyond the fundamental points of his memoran-
dum of 27 May and told the Republican leaders that there must be full agreement 
and action on the Dutch points within one week. The gross inadequacy of com-
munications between Batavia and Jogyakarta made this virtually impossible. The in-
terchange of memoranda between the two political centres produced no further con-
cessions. The result was that on 21 July Dutch troops moved from their base for the 
renewal of hostilities. The United States aide-memoire had resolved no problems 
although it had delayed the outbreak of hostilities. The two sides could not agree on 
the interpretation of the Linggajati Agreement, largely because "of the deep seated 
distrust which each party maintained towards the other". 
The United Kingdom rather than Australia took the initiative on 4 June and raised 
the question of possible mediation by the United Kingdom and the United States.' 
After some hesitation, Evatt and Burton asked that Australia be included as a third 
party to such intervention.' The United Kingdom refused, and the State Department 
told the British ambassador on 17 June that the United States could not join in the 
offer of good offices. 
A week later Britain again invited the United States to join her in offering good 
offices but at the same time telling the Australian high commissioner in London, 
Beasley, that Britain was anxious "to give full weight in framing United Kingdom 
policy to Australia's point of view".' Both Washington and Canberra considered 
offering economic aid to Indonesia, but the Hague felt that the Australian offer was 
designed to promote Evatt's personal interests and at the same time to upstage 
the American offer of economic assistance. 
Negotiations in Indonesia between the two parties were deadlocked by 18 July. 
Two days later van Mook arrested the Indonesian delegation before beginning the 
first Dutch "police action" with the backing of a hundred thousand troops. This 
converted a colonial war into an international issue. After some hesitation, Australia 
grasped the diplomatic nettle and Evatt suggested to Chifley that the dispute be 
referred to the Security Council. Nehru felt that the Dutch police action was part of 
a "carefully and long prepared military campaign whose real purpose is to inflict 
complete military defeat on the Republic and to prepare the way for a political settle-
ment favourable to the Dutch". On 29 July India referred the issue to the Security 
Council under Article 34 of the United Nations Charter. Washington and London 
were most reluctant to support a move which could delay a decision by protracted 
debate and which might lead the Netherlands to claim that the issue was a matter of 
domestic jurisdiction covered by Article 2.7 of the charter and so beyond the scope of 
the Security Council. Australia then referred the Indonesian dispute to the Security 
Council under Article 39, claiming that a breach of the peace had taken place. This 
would take precedence over the Indian referral and lead to a much speedier decision 
by the Security Council.' 
The United States attempted to prevent Security Council intervention by offering 
INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE 203 
its "good offices" to both the Netherlands and the Republican governments. This 
could produce a settlement outside the Security CouncH.'" The Security Coundl on 1 
August adopted a more loosely drafted resolution than the AustraHan, calHng for an 
immediate cease-fire and for arbitration or "settlement by any other means". 
The new American move threatened to take the initiative away from Australia. 
When the Netherlands accepted the American offer on 5 August, AustraHa revived 
its earHer proposal to join the United States in a joint offer to assist the settlement of 
the dispute. The State Department discussed the matter coldly with the Australian 
ambassador to Washington, Norman Makin, that day. When Makin was asked why 
Australia had taken five days to make the offer, he could only reply that "Mr. Evatt 
was somewhere at sea and perhaps it had been difficult to communicate with him". 
The American under-secretary of state, Robert Lovett, promised Makin that he 
would study the Australian offer. After Makin and Alfred Stirling, AustraHan 
minister to Washington, had left the State Department, the discussion led to the 
conclusion that "Australia was motivated largely by Dr. Evatt's desire to play a 
leading world role and to take the Hmelight wherever possible". It was probable that 
the Australians had already approached the Indonesians about the American offer. 
Should the Indonesian decline the American offer or attach unacceptable conditions, 
the United States would let its offer lapse. 
On 7 August Chifley, feeling that "good offices" would be insufficient, repeated 
Australia's willingness to "act jointly with the United States in a capacity of 
mediator and arbitrator"." On the same day, the Indonesians formally accepted the 
United States offer of "good offices" with the suggestion that Washington use 
them to secure the establishment of an international commission to arbitrate the 
dispute. This meant a polite rejection of the American offer.'* The Republican 
government further complicated the situation by also accepting the Australian offer 
on 10 August." The Security Council, preferring mediation to arbitration, adopted 
a United States resolution offering to assist in securing a settlement through a Securi-
ty Council committee of three, each party selecting one member and the third to be 
chosen by the two members already selected. In addition, the Security Council asked 
those members with consuls in Batavia to prepare a report on the situation in 
Indonesia. This led to the setring up of the Consular Commission consisting of the 
United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and AustraHa. 
It took nearly two weeks to set up the three-member Good Offices Committee. 
On 8 September, Australia accepted the invitation of the Republican government to 
become its nominee to the Good Offices Committee. AustraHa had been host to 
many Indonesian nationaHsts during the war, and the Australian Waterside 
Workers' Federation had banned the movement of Netheriands ships from 
AustraHan ports to Indonesia without the support of either the Australian govern-
ment or the Australian Council of Trade Unions. Margaret George suggests that the 
AustraHan reaction to the Dutch police action was "caurious and calculating rather 
than emorional, and procrasrinating rather than impulsive".'* Evatt was an ex-
perienced politician anxious to win the Netherlands vote for his nominarion as presi-
dent of the General Assembly and realizing that, despite political empathy with the 
Republicans, the Republic of Indonesia was not yet a member of the United Nations 
and so had no vote. As a constitutional lawyer in the British tradition, he leaned 
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towards the British solution for its disintegrating position in India: the grant of 
dominion status. But this would have been unacceptable to the Netherlands and in-
comprehensible to the Repubhcans. It was probably Syahrir's recognition of 
Australian support for the Republic in the Security Council debates that led him to 
recommend to the Republic cabinet that it nominate Australia. Two days later, 
Belgium accepted its nomination by the Hague to represent the Netherlands. Very 
reluctantly the United States agreed to a joint request by Australia and Belgium to 
become the third member of the UN Good Offices Committee (GOC)." 
On 26 September the Australian government nominated Justice Richard Kirby as 
its representative on the GOC. He had recently visited Indonesia to investigate the 
murder of three Australians looking into war crimes executions. He had greatly im-
pressed Evatt by his work, and as early as July 1946 Evatt tried to persuade the New 
South Wales government to release him to serve with the Commonwealth govern-
ment for three or four months. His request was refused, but in September 1947 New 
South Wales agreed to second him to the AustraHan government. As a justice of the 
Industrial Court, he was extremely well equipped to deal with what might be called 
a domestic issue with international ramifications. 
One of the questions raised shortly after his nomination to the GOC was his rela-
tionship to the Australian government while serving on a United Nations commit-
tee. In reply to a question in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Chifley 
assured the house that "he had had a personal discussion with Mr. Justice Kirby but 
had not given him specific instructions"." Kirby reported directly to the United 
Nations as a member of the GOC. But from the beginning he was also reporting 
directly to the Department of External Affairs. The department regarded this as a 
confidential matter. 
Burton told the Dutch minister (Shantz) that "External Affairs was giving Judge 
Kirby no recommendations and allowing him an entirely free hand, not wishing to 
give him any bias on the question". The American delegate to the GOC, Frank 
Graham, reported directly to the State Department almost on a daily basis, using the 
American consul-general in Batavia to forward his reports in the diplomatic bag. 
Periodically he received advice/instructions from the State Department, on occasion 
directly by cable from the Secretary of State. Graham had a reputation as a liberal 
academic, but to the Dutch he "was an idealist, too much of a professor", out of 
touch with practical political reaHties." The Belgian representative was a rather col-
ourless civil servant who almost invariably followed the Dutch Hne. 
From an Australian point of view, the GOC seemed to provide an excellent op-
portunity to play a major part in a settlement. Burton told the AustraHan am-
bassador at The Hague, Keith Officer, "We are fairly confident that we can seU any 
solution we think is just to the Indonesians, and the recent Dutch attitude to us 
makes us believe that they too wish to find a solution through the Committee of 
Three."" The solution that Burton was moving towards was the formula adopted 
by the United States in granting independence to the Philippines. This protected 
United States economic interests. 
The Good Offices Committee moved majestically towards Indonesia. It had its 
first formal meeting at Lapstone in Australia. It was decided that members should act 
as representatives of the Security Council rather than as spokesmen for their 
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nominees." It was not untH 29 October that the GOC arrived in Batavia. By this 
time, the Consular Commission of five (appointed at the same time as the GOC) had 
already presented its first report to the Security Council. This said that despite the 
cease-fire order, there had been many violations, mostly by the Dutch rather than the 
Indonesians. The Dutch had been quietly consolidaring their miHtary posirion and 
establishing what had come to be known as the "van Mook line". Evatt, who had 
returned to the Security Council as Australia's representative, was extremely critical 
of the Netherlands for her numerous violations of the cease-fire order. AustraHa 
attempted without success to compel a withdrawal of the rival forces to at least five 
kilometres behind their positions when the Dutch poHce action began. Finally, the 
Security Council adopted, on 1 November, a United States resolution which 
transferred responsibility for the cease-fire to the two parties, the GOC and the 
Consular Commission.*" 
What was not clearly defined was the function of the GOC and the meaning of 
"good offices". The Netheriands minister, Jonkheer Reuchlin, had asked the State 
Department to clarify the phrase. It caught the department a little by surprise, and 
the acting chief of the North European Division, John Morgan, admitted that he 
"was not able to enlighten him as to what form 'good offices' might take, but sug-
gested that the iniriative should come from the Dutch". Reuchlin then assumed that 
acceptance of good offices would mean that the two governments would consult on 
the further appropriate steps. Morgan agreed that this would be his understanding of 
the situation also but that if he could obtain any more definite information, he 
"would be glad to inform him further".*' 
The Indonesians were also confused about the meaning of the term. To them it 
implied that a third party was ready to assist in bringing two disputants together for 
discussion. It did not necessarily imply mediation — that is, active participation in 
the discussions by the third party. It could lead to mediation if this were the joint 
wish of the two parties. What it certainly did not mean was arbitration — that is, a 
settlement by a third party which would be accepted in advance by the two 
disputants. The Indonesians were afraid that "good offices" meant arbitration and 
consequently the imposition of a settlement by three Western powers. Shortly after 
the GOC arrived in Batavia, Kirby clarified the nature and scope of the GOC to the 
Indonesians with "great skiH and complete fideHty to the US Security Coundl 
resolution".** He dissipated their fear that the GOC was primarily concerned with 
arbitration. 
Almost immediately after arriving in Batavia, Kirby, with the full support of the 
United States, attempted to manoeuvre the parties into asking the GOC to make 
recommendations. However, the United States delegate became increasingly con-
cerned at the way the other members of the GOC were behaving: "The GOC is in 
no sense a Good Offices Committee as it might have been had each of the three 
members been agreed upon by both parties. The Australian delegation and the 
Belgian delegation are protagonists of Republican and Netherlands point of view 
respectively, and on crudal points are proving nearly as uncompromising as [the] 
parties themselves."*' Such partisanship was openly acknowledged by Kirby, who 
had several times stated that unless GOC decisions could be reached by a majority 
vote, the GOC might as weH go home. The agreement at the Lapstone meeting of 
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the GOC members before leaving Australia that aH three members should act as 
representatives of the UN Security Council rather than as representatives of their 
nominees appeared to have been completely forgotten. 
Dutch views were very similar to those of the United States. Burton's increasing 
dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the GOC led him to threaten further Securi-
ty Council intervention and even the possibility of direct discussions between the 
Australian government and the Republic.** The leader of the Netherlands delega-
tion, H.T.L.K. van Vredenburgh, protested to Kirby that AustraHa was abandoning 
its "good offices" role on the GOC. Kirby shared Burton's impatience at Dutch 
stubbornness and intransigence in negotiations. His suggestion that the GOC itself 
abandon "good offices" and impose a cease-fire demarcation Hne on both the 
Republicans and the Dutch meant a form of arbitration. The Dutch immediately ob-
jected. It looked as if Burton and Kirby were proposing to take as speedily as possible 
a strong anti-Dutch Hne into the Security Coundl. 
The major problem to be resolved after the GOC reached Batavia was where the 
two parties could meet for discussion. The Republicans were reluctant to meet on 
Indonesian soil, and it was then suggested that they meet on a vessel anchored at the 
wharf. The United States would have preferred that Australia provide a ship, but 
when this was found to be impossible, the United States reluctantly agreed to pro-
vide one. The GOC then met on USS Renville from 14 November. 
The discussions over a cease-fire line and the withdrawal of troops made no pro-
gress in three weeks. Graham, the leader of the United States delegation, was becom-
ing pessimistic about a solution to the impasse. There were, he felt, only two 
realistic solutions: (1) to construct a United States of Indonesia with the present 
Dutch plan under de jure and de facto Netherlands authority, which involved the 
reduction of the Republic to a small state that could take part in the federal scheme 
or "stew in its own juice"; and (2) to recognize the sovereignty of the Republic 
alone or of the United States of Indonesia with the Republic as the dominant 
element. There was, particularly with the latter alternative, "the danger of serious 
factional conflicts amounting in some areas to local wars, and doubtless national 
paralysis of Latin American type might characterize political life for years before 
equilibrium is established". The role of the United States was to be a "moderating 
and stabilizing one", but it must decide to adopt one of the two options since there 
could be no compromise over the question of ultimate sovereignty. The United 
States choice could not "take account of local considerations alone, but must be 
based on overall American foreign policy". Should the deadlock between the two 
parties continue, then he urged that a plebiscite be held under international supervi-
sion. He suggested the setting up of bicameral legislatures of the American type to 
safeguard the interests of the small states and the granting of dominion status to the 
United States of Indonesia.*' 
Evatt and Burton were playing it tough with both the Netherlands the United 
States, largely because of the hard line adopted by the Netherlands. The United 
Kingdom consul-general in Batavia, Sir John Shepherd, believed that the Dutch had 
made up their minds what to do and saw prospects of complete success. He com-
mented that Kirby was "shocked by the intransigence and almost venomous attitude 
of van Vredenburgh. . . .An agreement would probably be reached but for him."*' 
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One of the possible pressures on AustraHa was its concern that its membership of 
the Security CouncH would end on 31 December and that it might lose its member-
ship of the GOC to Canada, or another member of the United Nations. There was 
really no danger of this happening, because both Great Britain and the United States 
felt that AustraHa's membership of the Security Coundl would not affect its position 
on the GOC. But a fingering doubt may well have spurred Burton to tougher at-
titudes. Before the Graham proposal of 20 December was drculated to GOC 
members and so to Canberra, Burton had urged the United States to "prod" the 
Dutch immediately through the Security Council. The State Department was not ac-
customed to be asked to "prod" any other country and stood on its dignity in refus-
ing to adopt an unneutral attitude by prodding the Netheriands at all. Burton was 
perhaps being too blunt in using such an undiplomatic word as prod. The State 
Department was unfavourably impressed by the Australian tactics, which were 
designed "to place the Netherlands in an embarrassing position with no benefits to 
operations [of the] GOC"*' and flatly refused to support the Burton proposal as an 
unneutral act. 
Burton's pressure on the State Department and perhaps a slow realization that 
protocol might not prevent a collapse of the Renville negotiations led the State 
Department to have second thoughts. "The time has probably come for the United 
States to take a strong position along these lines," Graham duly noted, "to produce 
positive and salutory effects on other GOC members and on parties."*' 
The Australian ambassador to the Netherlands, Keith Officer, told the 
Netherlands government that Australia was concerned at the reluctance of Dutch of-
ficials to assist the GOC discussions. He told the Netherlands foreign minister. 
Baron van Boetzelner, that Australia was instructing its representative to the Securi-
ty Council to draw attention to the delays in the Renville negotiations. Australia was 
attempting to use all its influence in London, Washington, and The Hague to break 
the deadlock. Its view was, and both the United Kingdom and the United States 
were coming round to this view, that "the Netherlands had Httle real intention of 
agreeing to a compromise and was simply stone-walHng at meetings of the GOC so 
that it could further its plans for creating a multi-state USI with the Republic 
occupying a minor position". 
The GOC adjourned for Christmas 1947 with negotiations at a critical stage. On 
Christmas Day, the GOC reminded the two parties of their responsibihty to imple-
ment the Security Council resolution without delay and at the same time made 
specific proposals for an immediate truce. It also referred to the two parties a plan to 
settle the poHtical issues. Pressure on the Dutch became very intense. The United 
Kingdom and the United States had expressed strong disapproval of Dutch policy. 
T.K. Critchley, Kirby's deputy, with the support of Burton and Evatt, urged the 
GOC to submit a fuH report to the Security CouncH before 30 December. The 
Republicans accepted the GOC's Christmas proposals, but on 2 January the Dutch 
made counter proposals (twelve political principles), which were foHowed by some 
six additional GOC principles modifying in some detail the Dutch twelve points. On 
8 January the Netherlands delegation gave the Republic an ultimatum: unless it 
accepted the revised Dutch proposals within forty-eight-hours of a deadHne of 11 
January, the Netherlands would be bound to resume its freedom of action — that is. 
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resume military action. On 12 January the Netherlands suddenly reversed its poHcy 
and accepted the GOC proposals, and with the acceptance by the Republicans of the 
original proposals and the subsequent counter proposals and modifying prindples, 
the way was open for the signature of the Renville Agreement on 17 January. 
This involved a complete victory for the Dutch, whose military position had been 
consolidated behind the van Mook Hne. RepubHcan-held territory was drastically 
reduced. Politically the Republic was to become one member of the Dutch-
sponsored United States of Indonesia. Provision was made for a plebiscite to be held 
before the end of the year in the Republican territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra 
to determine whether the people wished to form part of the RepubHc of Indonesia or 
to become another state in USI. (This apparent concession to the Republic was 
meaningless because the plebiscite was never held.)*' 
The Renville Agreement, however, did provide a breathing space and a partial for-
mula for further discussions between the parties. It represented a personal triumph 
for the patient diplomacy of Graham, who resigned shortly after the signing and was 
replaced by Coert Du Bois. The British consul-general reported that at the signing 
"there were no signs of Dutch friendship towards Indonesia, the atmosphere being 
one of victors and vanquished". The Foreign Office rightly commented, "If the 
Dutch persist in adopting a take it or leave it attitude, there will be no agreement."'" 
Kirby's suggestion that Australia send between thirty and fifty truce observers to 
Indonesia with perhaps a similar number from the United States was received with 
horror by General S.H. Spoor, commander of the Netherlands Indies army, who had 
no intention of having a Western invasion of his own or Republican territory. 
One of the explanations of Dutch intransigence was the fear of communism. "It 
has for long been the official Dutch military view that the Republican Government 
is almost entirely controlled by the Communists." It was also one of the problems 
with which both Vice-President Hatta, who became leader of the government on 29 
January, and Syahrifuddin had to contend with in a Republican cabinet which in-
cluded in its spectrum a wide range of different ideologies. 
During the Renville discussions, the Dutch had insisted that there be no poHtical 
discussions unless an effective truce were achieved. An essential condition of the truce 
was, the Dutch felt, the maintenance of the van Mook line. While Kirby proposed 
that the GOC should establish a demarcation line after hearing the two parties and 
taking into account the position of the armed forces on 4 August as well as the 
normal administrative boundaries, the Dutch refused to go further than to accept 
this as a basis for discussion. They stHl regarded the retention of the van Mook Hne as 
essential. The Republic accepted the Kirby proposal unconditionally and also the 
GOC's Christmas programme. The Dutch refused to accept the provisions requiring 
both parties to stop organizing new states until the plebiscite was held, the civil ad-
ministration restored to the position of 20 July, and the provision for international 
observation of the area until the United States of Indonesia was formed. The Dutch 
clearly adopted a "take it or leave i t" attitude. 
A formula was finally found by Graham and reluctantly accepted by the Dutch. 
Van Vredenburgh was the most difficult member of the Dutch delegation to work 
with. One of Graham's advisers (Brandis) reported to the State Department that van 
Vredenburgh did not expect the truce to work, nor did he want it to. "He would 
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prefer to see the truce break down because of violations on the part of the military 
extremists in the Republic so that the Dutch could go ahead with its program of 
organizing the USI irrespective of the agreement and that the Republic would not, 
because it was the violator, have a convincing case before the Security CouncH."" 
Brandis was less pessimistic and felt that the settlement had a chance of succeeding 
because of moderate RepubHcan support for it and their belief that the plebiscite 
would provide a real opportunity for self-determination.'* 
The Renville Agreement was essentially pro-Dutch in its temporary settlement. 
Charles Eaton, the AustraHan consul-general in Batavia, felt that the Dutch were so 
confident that they would overplay their hand." The ink was hardly dry on the 
Renville Agreement before the Netherlands ambassador in Canberra, P.E. Teppema, 
suggested to Evatt that the Australian government should act to end the trade union 
boycott on Dutch shipping. Evatt declined to intervene. Kirby was clear as to the 
"real intention of the Netherlands government: a continued attempt to create in the 
occupied area new political entities and a failure to accord fair representation in the 
Provisional Federal Government as provided in the first of the six prindples". 
United Kingdom miHtary observers felt strongly that "the Committee of Good 
Offices have aHowed themselves to be bulHed by the Dutch into bullying the 
Republic and they are now almost to the man strongly anti-Dutch".'* 
When the Security Council met to consider the first interim report of the GOC, 
Kirby said that the Renville truce and the political principles embodied in it were 
only a provisional settlement and not as the United States hoped the basis for a final 
settlement. He told the Security Council on 9 February that both he and the GOC 
had persuaded the Republic to accept a temporary "disadvantage and loss, which, if 
allowed to become permanent would cause it irreparable damage, and perhaps make 
its continued existence as an entity and party to the dispute impossible"." 
W.D. Forsyth, who was a member of the AustraHan delegation stressed to the 
Security Council the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Republic. The 
Republic was "a symbol of the aspirations of vast numbers of peoples in the Indies". 
He rejected the State Department's interpretation of the first of the six poHtical prin-
ciples that sovereignty rested with the Dutch government and suggested that the 
Republic be allowed to continue internal and external trade and to maintain foreign 
representation, and that the Dutch be not permitted to form new states in those areas 
where the Republic exercised de facto sovereignty. Both he and Kirby argued that the 
Security CouncH should give the GOC a "mandate" to maintain an active role in 
negotiations because "a speedy and permanent settlement depended on the GOC 
being in a proper posirion in the future to render useful assistance to the parries". 
Australian attempts to persuade the Security Council to extend the role of the GOC 
were defeated, largely because of the opposition of the United States. The Security 
Council debate merely strengthened the hand of the Dutch and made evident the 
growing differences between Canberra and Washington about the nature of a settle-
ment and the tactics needed to secure it. On 9 March, when he inaugurated the 
interim Indonesian government, van Mook held out an oHve branch. Although the 
Republic was not represented, he guaranteed that "the door would remain wide 
open for the participarion of the Republic". This was perhaps the result of British 
pressure on the Dutch to "pursue a less provocative policy"." 
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On 10 February Graham resigned as the United States representative on the GOC 
and was replaced by Du Bois, a career diplomat who had been consul-general in 
Batavia from 1927 to 1930. At the end of February, Kirby returned to AustraHa to 
resume work as chairman of the Stevedoring Commission, quite unconvinced that 
there had been any change in Dutch poHcy. He was replaced by T.K. Critchley, his 
deputy on the GOC. Critchley was instructed to actively continue negotiations 
through the GOC and to try to secure a negotiated settlement based upon the whole 
Renville Agreement." The GOC was to try to restrain the Dutch from forming new 
states until plebiscites could be held under GOC supervision. This shift from the 
Kirby view, that Renville represented a provisional settlement, may have been due to 
concern over the stabiHty of the Hatta government and the growing fear that Com-
munist influence was increasing. Dutch military leaders in Indonesia had long held 
the view that the Republican government was "almost entirely controlled by the 
Communists"." A press cartoon in June 1948 was not untypical of conservative 
Dutch views; the Republic was depicted as a marionette being juggled by Stalin 
before the GOC. Washington, too, was always concerned about the possibiHty of a 
Communist takeover of much of the territory held by the Republic. 
Although the second interim report by the GOC was presented to the Security 
Council on 11 May, negotiations in Indonesia proceeded at a snail-like pace. Six 
weeks later, no progress had been made at all because of stalling tactics by the Dutch. 
On 12 July the Critchley-Du Bois plan for a settlement was announced. It reflected 
Critchley's growing disillusionment with the work of the GOC and the attempt of 
the Dutch to bypass it by opening direct discussions with Hatta early in June." 
The Critchley-Du Bois proposal was an informal and confidential working paper 
drafted primarily by Critchley but representing the personal views of two members 
of the GOC. They were convinced that "the Dutch did not want an agreement with 
the Repubhcans since this would involve a loss of control. The Dutch want to work 
out a form of government for the rest of Indonesia leaving the Republicans out and 
them in virtual control."*" The issue was becoming critical because of the increasing 
challenge to the Hatta cabinet from the communist PKI, which was becoming 
disillusioned by the failure to reach a political settlement after the Renville 
Agreement. 
Critchley and Du Bois proposed to submit their working paper to the Security 
Council should the Netherlands and the Republicans decline to accept it. It outlined 
the principles for setting up a sovereign United States of Indonesia which would then 
enter into equal partnership with the Netherlands. The first step would be to set up a 
provisional government representing all the peoples of Indonesia. At the same time a 
technical commission would delimit the boundaries of existing and potential states to 
secure as fair a representation as possible in the new Constituent Assembly. This 
would be democratically elected and would then confirm the boundaries of the states 
in the project USI. The Constituent Assembly would immediately become a provi-
sional parliament which would elect an interim government. Both the Netherlands 
and the Republic of Indonesia would transfer the powers necessary for administra-
tion. Gradually the USI would become a fully self-governing federation. 
Critchley presumably used the AustraHan Department of External Affairs working 
paper of 18 April 1948 in preparing the document for Du Bois. It involved a fresh 
INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE 211 
approach and a greater acceptance of Evatt's moves in April towards acceptance of 
Indonesian self-determinarion. The working paper envisaged Dutch concessions 
which van Mook was not prepared to make. The Netherlands government rejected 
the proposal out of hand and the Belgian member of the GOC adopted van Mook's 
view that the GOC was exceeding its charter. 
Attempts by Du Bois to get firm State Department support for the joint working 
paper were unsuccessful. The department tried to prevent the submission of the 
paper to the Security Council. The Australian government hesitated but finally 
instructed its delegation to the Security Council to secure a full discussion of the 
Critchley-Du Bois working paper with the suggestion that the Security Coundl 
adopt it as the basis for a political agreement. 
The State Department redrafted the Critchley-Du Bois paper early in July after 
Du Bois had returned to Washington because of HI health. He was replaced by Merie 
Cochran, who arrived in Batavia on 15 July with a new team of American advisers. 
Before he left Washington, a State Department committee re-examined its policy on 
Indonesia. It felt that the Dutch Hne was hardening and that the Dutch had proposals 
for settlement that "would make the function of the Good Offices Committee 
simply that of a salesman for the Dutch proposals". This raised the question of 
whether the United States should continue its participarion in the GOC. It dedded 
to continue membership of the GOC largely because it felt that "the Republic 
would not accept a settlement unless it originated with, and be offered by the 
GOC".*' 
The Dutch administration in Batavia was complaisant. The State Department was 
exerting some token diplomatic pressure on The Hague but not enough to worry 
van Mook. The AustraHan government was giving Critchley little strong support as 
differences developed between Evatt, Burton, and Chifley over AustraHan policy. 
The Netherlands government felt itself to be in a sufficiently strong position to urge 
Australia to recall Critchley and replace him by Kirby. This Evatt refused, but later 
agreed to make Kirby available for a short period if necessary. The Dutch govern-
ment felt that a collapse of the Republican government was possible. It was prepared 
to resume hostiHties if necessary. As a very senior Dutch officer admitted, "AH is in 
readiness for a rapid breakthrough at two hours notice."** 
Neither Australia nor the United States nor the United Kingdom was prepared to 
act decisively. All three countries were concerned at mounting Communist pressure 
on the Hatta government and the increased influence of Communists in Malaya. The 
State Department was anxious to retain Netherlands support in Western Europe, 
and Evatt did not want to take political risks in his campaign to become president of 
the United Nations General Assembly. Bevin had agreed with Evatt on the general 
objective in Indonesia: that the Indonesians should have a square deal and that a 
settlement should be reached before the situation deteriorated further. Dutch foreign 
affairs minister Dirk Stikker made certain that no new Australian initiatives in the 
Security Council would be taken by telling Evatt that he would oppose his can-
didature for the presidency of the General Assembly and use Dutch influence to cam-
paign against him with other members of the United Nations. 
On 10 September Cochran presented to the Dutch and Republican delegations in 
Britain a new proposal for a general political settlement. This informal and confiden-
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tial proposal was given to the Australian and Belgian members of the GOC on the 
following day. Although a long time in gestation, it appeared to be a redraft of the 
July revision of the Critchley-Du Bois proposals; it did not differ drastically from 
them and planned the establishment of a Federal Council which would restrict 
Republican membership to one-third. The Netherlands would retain control of all 
Netherlands forces in Indonesia.*' 
The Cochran plan was a desperate attempt by the State Department to get real 
negotiations moving again.** Sir Esler Dening, the United Kingdom ambassador to 
Washington, had told the State Department that the British position was exactly 
simHar to that of the United States in that the British deprecated miHtary or police 
action by the Dutch and strove to keep the negotiations going. "But I hope the 
Dutch will listen to you. They will not listen to us any more." The Cochran plan 
was launched a few days before the Communist revolt at Madiun against the central 
government. 
The PKI revolt threatened Hatta's somewhat precarious government partly by 
splitting the Republican forces and partly by giving an opportunity for Netherlands 
intervention in Republican territory; but the Republican army quickly occupied 
Madiun and suppressed the revolt. Republican morale was strengthened, and the 
State Department reappraised Hatta's position and promised him greater support. 
The Australian government backed the Cochran plan and hoped that the United 
States would resist any substantial modifications. Diplomatic circles felt that the 
Netherlands did not seriously intend to negotiate and was simply stalling in the hope 
that the Hatta government would collapse. Critchley reported on 23 September that 
there had been no political negotiations of any importance for some four months. He 
felt that tension was growing to a stage where a peaceful solution might become 
impossible. "Urgent action is necessary not -within weeks but within days."*' 
On 14 October the Netherlands circulated its reservations about the Cochran plan 
and a day later decided to resume negotiations. Before Stikker arrived in Batavia he 
asked Ernest Bevin, the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, to try to bring 
the United States and the Dutch points of view closer together. Charles E. Bohlen, 
US State Department counseHor, stated bluntly that aH three leaders of the United 
States delegation on the GOC — Graham, Du Bois, and Cochran — "felt that the 
Dutch were delaying and stalling on this Indonesian question". There had been dif-
ferences between the State Department and its GOC representatives, but now there 
"was complete unanimity on the necessity of proceeding without delay with the 
holding of elections". On the eve of Stikker's talks with Hatta, the State Depart-
ment drafted a frank aide-memoire, for presentation to the Dutch, critical of Dutch 
policy. The United States suggested that it would consider resigning from the GOC 
but weakened the effectiveness of its threat by pointing to the need to further 
Western European economic recovery and unity.*' 
The Stikker-Hatta discussions took place from 4 to 11 November; then Stikker 
returned to The Hague on 27 November for consultation. During the whole of the 
period, there were rumours that the Dutch were considering terminating the truce 
and resuming hostilities. Stikker blandly denied this. On 11 November Evatt told 
Chifley that further police action was probable on 20 November. Burton was anx-
ious to bring the whole Indonesian question before the Security Council through a 
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further report from the GOC hoping for a general condemnation of Netheriands 
policy, which seriously affected the Western European Economic Union. 
Washington was concerned at the "violent pro-Republican feelings of Evatt and 
Burton, not to mention their general disinclination to follow the United States lead 
on Indonesia and South East Asia".*' 
With time rapidly running out, the State Department delivered to the 
Netherlands a second aide-memoire on 7 December. The United States said that it was 
imperative to resume bona fide negotiations to secure a reasonable political settle-
ment with the moderate Hatta government. The creation of a fully formed provi-
sional federal government without the participation of the Republic would be 
disastrous. It would discredit the Hatta government and jeopardize any further 
negotiations. The United States believed that the welfare of Indonesia 
was vitally dependent upon the continued availability to Indonesia of the experience, judg-
ment and technical and administrative proficiency of the Dutch. In the long run the in-
fluence of the Netherlands and the stake it retains in Indonesia wiU be proportional to the 
confidence and goodwill accorded the Dutch by the Indonesian people. The preponderant 
desire of the Indonesian people to govern themselves finds its chief expression in the 
Repubhc of Indonesia, which must be considered not as a geographical concept but as a 
pohtical force.*' 
This was the strongest line taken by the United States in the dispute so far. It 
admitted that the Netherlands forces could quickly defeat the Republican army but 
rejected totally a miHtary solution. Should the Dutch fail to effect a fair settlement, 
then the United States would take the Cochran plan to the Security Council and con-
ceivably withdraw from the GOC. It was a stand that took the State Department 
closer to the Australian view about the role of the United Nations and the Security 
Council and to the tactical moves of Critchley, Burton, and Evatt.*' 
On 11 December the Dutch cabinet decided that military action would be 
necessary and told the GOC that any further discussion between the parties would be 
futile. Cochran tried to avert the final breach but failed after the Netherlands gave 
Hatta eighteen hours in which to reply to a note. Given the state of communications 
in Indonesia, this was a virtual ultimatum. On 19 December the Netherlands an-
nounced that it would begin a second police action in two hours' time. The military 
action was completely successful. Jogyakarta was captured and so were most of the 
Republican leaders, including Hatta, Sukarno, and Syahrir, as well as most of the 
cabinet. On 29 December the Netherlands announced that it had achieved its objec-
tive and that further hostHities would cease almost immediately. 
The breakdown in negotiations by 18 December had taken the United States by 
surprise. Makin was told that America did not favour a Security Council debate and 
was reluctant to do more than condemn the Dutch without itself adopting economic 
pressure or pressing strongly for the withdrawal of the Netherlands forces. Makin 
admitted defeat on 28 December. "Australia has no effective influence but we have 
done aH in our power."'" Australia almost from the beginning had been pro-
Indonesian and anti-Dutch in its analysis of the situarion in Indonesia. An unsigned 
and undated background note on Netherlands policy in Indonesia, probably written 
by an AustraHan diplomat in Canberra on 25 or 26 December, makes this dear. 
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Netherlands policy in Indonesia has been consistently aimed at restoring Dutch coloniaUsm 
by force. . . . The Renville truce agreement which was largely the result of a Dutch 
ultimatum was the means of digesting the first bite (27 July 1947). . . . The process of 
digestion consisted in the economic rehabilitation and the extension of the Netherlands 
unilateral pohtical programme to Dutch controUed areas: The Netherlands had never had 
any intention of purposeful negotiations with the RepubUc. Such negotiations as were con-
ducted after RenviUe were a facade behind which the Dutch have continued to carry out 
their unilateral policy to form a government in which the Republic would eventually be 
forced to participate. The efforts of the Committee of Good Offices to facilitate a poUtical 
settlement have been ignored. Proposals by the United States and AustraUan members in 
June and by the United States member in September were by-passed by delay tactics, diver-
sions in the form of direct talks and finaUy direct refusals to consider the proposal. . . . 
The second miUtary action has been designed to destroy the RepubUc and bring all the 
areas of Indonesia under Netherlands control. Reports of the Committee of Good Offices 
show that it cannot be justified on any ground." 
This strong anti-Dutch point of view was not shared by the United States, which 
always looked at the problem from a European as well as a South-East Asian point of 
view. It was strongly anti-communist, and this made Australia sometimes slightly 
suspect because of its inability to control the waterside workers in their ban on 
Dutch shipping in Australian waters. 
Burton had always been rather impatient with the State Department and felt that 
it had not really attempted to restrain the Dutch. United States pressure tended to be 
gradual, but its policy and pressure had hardened considerably between the aide-
memoires of 5 November and 7 December. Burton's criticisms were also levelled, less 
strongly, against the United Kingdom; he claimed that for months he had unsuc-
cessfully tried to ginger them into action. Burton was aware of Washington's con-
cern about his criticisms but shrugged them off, expressing the hope that bygones 
were bygones, and added, " N o w that the United States and Australia are in this 
together we must go forward together." '* The strong anti-Dutch attitude of the 
Australian government was responsible for the trenchant criticism of the Netherlands 
by Colonel Hodgson, Australia's representative at the Security Council, and his 
demand for the expulsion of the Netherlands from the United Nations. The 
vehemence of his attack on the Netherlands apparently surprised Evatt and led him to 
raise his eyebrows. Hodgson appears to have exceeded his instructions or interpreted 
them very liberally. 
Disillusionment with the work of the G O C had been growing throughout 1948, 
and the second Dutch police action brought it to a head. Cochran on 3 January 
wrote to the State Department saying that he was convinced that "no appropriate 
role" remained for him and that the dissolution of the G O C might be advisable, 
allowing him to act in a personal capacity." At the same time, he indicated that he 
was prepared to act as an intermediary if the State Department met certain 
conditions: 
The United States clearly and publicly disassociated itself from present Netherlands policy. 
This requires definite unequivocal statement by us made either individually or in SeciKity 
Council that in our view Netherlands is aggressor. This is to be foUowed or accompanied 
by pubhc notice that further ECA aid both to Netherlands and Indonesia is suspended until 
a fair and reasonable settlement of Indonesian question has actually been achieved. . . . 
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Netherlands cease hostilities forthwith and free all Republican leaders 
Dismissal of Beel [representative of the Netheriands Crown in Indonesia] who although 
only one of numerous militaristic leaders here, may be taken as symbolizing whole group 
Better StiU, dismissal of Spoor as well.'* 6 i'-
These proposals were similar to those of Critchley but were too drastic for the 
American secretary of state. However, the State Department accepted part of the 
Cochran ultimatum, and on 11 January the United States for the first time condemn-
ed Dutch policy in the Security Coundl." The State Department moved towards a 
revision of the functions of the GOC and its replacement by a new body, the United 
Nations Commission on Indonesia (UNCI), which would act as the representative 
of the Security Coundl in Indonesia. It was empowered to recommend the extent to 
which dvil administration should be progressively returned to the Republic of 
Indonesia. It was also empowered to act by majority vote and to make recommenda-
tions to the parties as weH as to the Security CouncH. Should dther party fail to 
accept the recommendations of the commission, it should report immediately to the 
Security Council with its proper recommendations for a solution of the differences." 
The Security Council reconstituted the GOC on 28 January and called for a cessation 
of hostilities and the release by the Netherlands of all Republican political 
prisoners." The GOC held its last meeting on 31 January and UNCI met for the 
first time next day. 
While the debate was going on in the Security Council, India, on 3 January, in-
vited AustraHa to attend a conference in New Delhi later in the month to discuss the 
Indonesian quesrion. Australia was reluctant to take part, but the Department of 
External Affairs decided to send Burton and Colin Moodie as observers." Evatt was 
overseas, and AustraHa's official attendance at the New Delhi Conference could have 
been construed as an admission of the failure of Evatt's attempts as president of the 
United Nations General Assembly to obtain a solution through the Security 
Council. The New Delhi Conference opened on 20 January, when the Security 
Council had not been able to find a formula to resolve the Indonesian impasse." 
Both Nehru and Burton emphasized the point that the conference was not designed 
to "supplant" the Security Council but rather to "supplement" its work by ex-
pressing regional views. On 22 January the conference adopted a series of recommen-
dations to the Security Council, These included the release of Republican political 
prisoners, the withdrawal of Dutch mHitary forces, and the transfer of sovereignty to 
the United States of Indonesia by 1 January 1950. They were recommendations 
rather than resolutions binding on the signatory countries. By signing the resolu-
tions, Burton seems to have exceeded his brief. Some parts of the New Delhi resolu-
tions were accepted by the United States and incorporated in the Security Council 
resolution of 28 January.'" 
The Netherlands hesitated about responding to the Security Council resolution, 
let alone complying with it. The Security Council had asked the two parties to the 
dispute to report back by 15 February and, faihng any agreement, that UNCI should 
itself report to the Security Council. UNCI by a majority vote agreed to defer the 
matter until 1 March. The United Kingdom was now extremely critical of Dutch 
policy. Prime Minister Attlee felt that "the very great potential importance of 
Indonesia in Asiaric and world affairs made it imperative that when the transfer of 
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power [was] effected, Indonesia [would] not emerge as a centre of instablHty which 
would play into the hands of the communists". Chifley was afraid that the United 
Kingdom might still support the Dutch winter proposals provided they were in ac-
cordance with the "spirit" of the Security CouncH as The Hague claimed." 
The United States view was rapidly hardening towards the Attlee-Evatt view. 
Bernard Baruch, the American ambassador to The Hague, reported on 4 February: 
"We left no possible shred of doubt in our statement to [the] Foreign Office of [the] 
deadly earnestness of our Government and the serious view we take re the situation 
in Indonesia and the full intentions of our Government to do everything necessary to 
push home objectives and the meaning of resolutions we sponsored in Security 
Council. Stikker, Lovink and members of Cabinet can have no illusions that [the] 
United States is speaking with its tongue in cheek".'* 
The Netherlands moved very slowly to deal with the Security CouncH resolution 
and then the Beel Plan as a basis for discussion and negotiation. The Beel Plan pro-
posed to circumvent the January resolutions by itself convening a round-table con-
ference at The Hague beginning on 12 March. 
UNCI was required at first to report to the Security Council by 15 February and 
then by 1 March on progress towards carrying out the January resolution. Stikker 
unveiled the Netherlands proposals for the Round Table Conference (RTC) on 23 
February and argued that there was no essential difference between the aims of the 
Security Council resolution of 28 January and those of the Netherlands government. 
Although Washington had threatened unequivocal support of the fulfilment of the 
resolution of 28 January, it was privately beHeved that the United States would go 
no further than to press the Dutch to clarify their proposals." 
UNCI'S unanimous report to the Security Council on 1 March was debated early 
in the month. The Australian view was put clearly and succinctly by John Hood on 
11 March. The UNCI report stated explicitly that the Netherlands had not complied 
with the terms of the council resolution. The RTC proposal bypassed UNCI and 
failed to meet the "most essential point of the Council's resolution; the poHtical and 
territorial restoration of the Republic". Five days later he argued that the second 
Dutch "poHce action" had been designed "to give the Netherlands a free hand in 
framing the kind of settlement in Indonesia best suited to itself".'* 
When the Security Council adopted an innocuous resolution with United States 
support, Australia and India requested the UN secretary general to place the Indone-
sian question on the General Assembly agenda. With the support of Evatt, president 
of the General Assembly, this was done on 12 April. 
The Republicans were reluctant to take part in any RTC discussions unless the 
Dutch agreed to evacuate Jogyakarta, the Republican capital, and to release 
RepubHcan political prisoners, including their leaders. Critchley strongly urged 
them to decHne to co-operate in any way with the Dutch unless these preconditions 
were met and to stand firm on the Security Council resolution of 28 January in "the 
hope that international pressure will force the Dutch to give way" ." 
Critchley was "proving difficult" to both the United Kingdom and the United 
States." He felt that Dutch intransigence could be largely explained by the reluctance 
of the United States to adopt a tough stance towards The Hague. He overlooked the 
fact that in March the State Department had told Stikker that "he should clearly 
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understand that the United States, while prepared to create NATO and to give 
miUtary aid to its future allies, would not be wilUng to give such aid to allies like the 
Netherlands so long as they had not solved their colonial problems". Only when the 
United States assured him that amendments to the Economic Co-operation Act 
would not affect aid to the Netherlands did Stikker sign the NATO agreement. This 
was a major card in the American hand, but a card that the State Department was 
reluctant to play. It is not clear whether Critchley was aware of these discussions. He 
wanted both the United States and the United Kingdom to increase pressure on the 
Netherlands in the General Assembly. He believed that the United States was largely 
responsible for the Dutch refusal to meet Republican demands and should be so 
charged in the General Assembly debate. On 20 April the Department of External 
Affairs suggested to Evatt that he privately tell the United States delegation that if a 
stalemate developed in Bata\-ia. AustraUa with the support of India and other 
members of the General Assembly would publicly question the official attitude of the 
United States *' 
As the current session ot the General Assembly was drawing to a close, the 
Indonesian question was stiU unresolved. Evatt, as president of the General 
Assembly, felt it unwise to interfere with discussions in Batavia on the RTC in the 
hope that they could produce a compromise. He apparently disagreed with the 
pessimism of both Burton and Critchley and was wiUing to let the Batavia discus-
sions go ahead. The matter was referred to an ad hoc committee. "Both the United 
States and Australia were reluctant to allow a full-scale debate in the General 
Assembly while there was any chance that the Batavia discussions might succeed. 
The United States delegation was instructed that under no circumstances should the 
United States condone Dutch poUcy or guarantee the success of the Batavia talks." 
This stand in general terms differed Uttle from the Australian view. Critchley was 
less optimistic than the State Department and was not quite convinced that the 
Dutch meant business but saw The Hague conference and the Beel plan as "the best 
opportunity for settlement". Sir John Shepherd, the United Kingdom consul-
general, noted, "Critchley was less unreasonable that I had been led to expect."" 
A General Assembly debate on Indonesia did not eventuate, because the Dutch and 
the RepubUcans agreed on 7 May on a preliminary settlement to restore the 
RepubUc. Two days later, India and Australia sponsored a joint resolution in the ad 
hoc committee welcoming the breakthrough and deferring further consideration of 
the question until the fourth regular session of the General Assembly.'" 
Under the agreement of 7 May (the Roem-van Royen statements), the 
Netherlands agreed to release Republican prisoners and to restore the Republican 
govenmient to Jogyakarta, and the Republicans agreed to attend a round-table con-
ference at The Hague. The aim of the conference was "to bring about a just and 
lasting settlement of the Indonesia dispute as soon as possible by reaching an agree-
ment with the participants concerning ways and means to transfer real, complete and 
unconditional sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia, in accordance with the 
RenviUe principles"." UNCI would participate in the conference in accordance 
with the terms of reference established by the Security Council. 
The agreement was the result of the persistence and skill of both Cochran and 
Critchley, who successfully pressured the two principals.'* Shepherd noted the 
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"almost startling contrast on the part of the Dutch to their previous meticulous con-
sideration of every individual point". He continued: "They seem to have been ac-
commodating almost to the point of recklessness. I rather think that the Van 
Royen-Roem agreement has brought it home to the Dutch that the die is cast and 
their doom is sealed, and that the best thing to do is to transfer Indonesia to the 
Indonesians as quickly and with as Httle fuss as possible"." 
Acheson warmly congratulated Cochran on his skilful handling of an extremely 
difficult situation: "You have realized the primary condition for final peaceful settle-
ment of Netherlands-Republican dispute."'* Rusk virtually gave Cochran carte 
blanche in future negotiations: "You are carrying the ball and . . . we must not try 
two quarterbacks plays from here. You have the Department's admiration and com-
plete confidence in the handling of this enormously complex and important 
matter."" Canberra was more restrained in its congratulations to both men. 
Critchley was asked to attend The Hague RTC conference only two days after the 
van Royen-Roem statements. Beel had resigned, and with the death of General 
Spoor, the commander of the Netherlands Indies Army, two of the diehards had 
disappeared from the scene. "With the coming of Van Royen one cannot help 
feeling that new winds are at last blowing in Indonesia," Critchley reported." 
The RTC was opened on 23 August and concluded on 2 November with the 
agreement to transfer sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia 
and for the USI to become an equal and independent member of the Netherlands-
Indonesian Union. Australia adopted a low-profile stance at The Hague conference 
and only took a vigorous part in the discussions on the future of West New Guinea. 
After two and a half years of close diplomatic contacts, from the setting up of the 
Good Offices Committee in 1947 to the conclusion of the RTC conference in The 
Hague in 1949, Australian and American policies had converged and led to the 
recognition of an independent Republic of Indonesia in November 1949. Austrahan 
unofficial policy for a large part of the period had been determined by the left-wing 
Waterside Workers' Federation with the backing of the politically insignificant 
Communist Party of AustraHa. This led to the black ban on the loading in all 
Australian ports of Dutch ships sailing for ports in the Netherlands East Indies. The 
rationale was that to assist the Dutch in any way was to assist avaricious Dutch 
imperialism against Indonesian democracy." The Australian Labor government 
adopted a low-key attitude to a policy of which it officially disapproved but 
unofficially approved as an expression of Australian-Indonesian worker solidarity. 
But both the Chifley government and Evatt, its foreign minister, were seriously em-
barrassed by its inabiHty to frame Australian foreign policy in the Department of Ex-
ternal Affairs rather than on the waterfront. This meant that when the question of 
Australian representation on the Good Offices Committee arose in 1947, Austraha 
was more than suspect in both Batavia and The Hague. There were also repercus-
sions in Washington. 
Despite its initiative in appointing the Macmahon Ball committee to examine the 
situation in Indonesia, the Chifley government was very slow in formulating a 
policy and an objective. In April 1948 the Department of External Affairs in 
Canberra made an appreciation of Australian policy towards Indonesia. 
The Department paper was pessimistic as to whether the federation proposed by the Dutch 
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would guarantee order and stability through the archipelago. It posed the question 
whether from a hard-headed point of view, Australia's security might not be better served 
by the Dutch giving way to local nationalist movements as they coalesced, while remaining 
in full control in outlying and more backward areas indefinitely. Yet the paper recognized 
that Australia was bound to assist the Dutch commitment to establish a sovereign federa-
tion. It surmised that the Republic would dominate the federation, and therefore con-
sidered Australia justified in maintaining a sympathetic and helpful attitude towards the 
Republic. Such a policy, the paper said, need not imply antagonizing the Dutch, although 
Australia had a legitimate interest in seeing that the Dutch did not prolong unrest and 
disorganization in the area. Although ambivalent towards the Dutch in Indonesia, the 
Department paper implied a reluctant recognition of the Republic which was obviously in 
conflict with the government's generous attitude. . . . The Departmental paper suggested 
a number of steps by which Australia could use its influence directly with the parties and 
through the G.O.C. to persuade both the Dutch and the Republicans to concentrate on 
the larger issues in dispute between them." 
AustraHan policy was moving slowly towards the recognition of an independent 
Republic of Indonesia. The instructions to Critchley suggest this as a solution to the 
problem. The Chifley government had an ideological affinity with the Republicans 
in Indonesia. This attitude was complicated by two things: (1) the personal ambi-
tions of Dr Evatt, including his candidature for the presidency of the United Nations 
General Assembly, which predisposed him to adopt a United Nations rather than 
perhaps an AustraHan attitude to the complex poHtical problem in Indonesia; (2) in 
the later stages of the discussion, an emphasis on the strategic importance to 
AustraHa of West New Guinea as a vital element in its security." 
The AustraHan attitude towards the Indonesian problem was compounded by its 
ideological sympathies with the Indonesian nationaHsts and a belated recognition of 
the strategic importance of West New Guinea. The United States, on the other 
hand, appraised the Indonesian situation from a European rather than a South-East 
Asian point of view. Throughout the discussions, the United States was acutely con-
scious of its obligations in Western Europe. The Netherlands was a vital part of the 
developing N A T O complex. Economic pressures on the Netherlands could affect 
not only the situation in South-East Asia but also in Europe. When the question of 
diplomatic pressure on the United States or the United Kingdom arose, it was 
always primarily in the European rather than the South-East Asian context. 
The United States had been a reluctant participant in the affairs, political and 
economic, of Indonesia. It was only after considerable pressure from other states — 
including AustraHa — that Washington agreed to become a member of the Good 
Offices Committee. '" The United States had become one of the anti-colonial powers 
with httle sympathy for Dutch attempts to re-establish its East Indian empire. On 
the other hand, she tended to look askance at popular nationalist movements, 
especially if there was any danger of their becoming communist in character. 
United States policy was reflected in the Critchley-Du Bois proposals. These were 
based on a Critchley draft revised by Du Bois. After the rejecrion of the 
Critchley-Du Bois proposals, Cochran and the State Department drafted the 
Cochran proposals of September 1948. These proposals, and the aide-memoire to 
Cochran in Batavia on 5 November and the Acheson telegram of 23 August to the 
embassy in the Netherlands on the eve of the Round Table Conference oudine in 
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detail American objectives, the "cardinal elements of United States policy". These 
were "the establishment of a genuinely independent Indonesian state" which would 
enter into a bona fide Netherlands-Indonesia Union. "The structure of the perma-
nent federal government and the delineation, form of government and size of 
member states should be determined in some measures at least by the Indonesian 
people rather than by self-appointed representatives." "The new nation should 
adopt as one of its underlying tenets the principle of fair treatment to the 
Netherlands and other interests in Indonesia."" Summed up, the State 
Department's objective was an independent Indonesia in which Western economic 
interests would be protected. 
Basically, there was little difference between mature Australian and United States 
proposals. There were differences in emphasis on details and procedures. There were, 
too, differences in their assessment of Dutch interests and policies. Australia was 
much more critical of the Netherlands for its delays and often deliberate obstruction 
in negotiations. This difference was evident in the constant Australian attempts to 
put pressure on the State Department to lean heavily and effectively on the 
Netherlands. Australia reaHzed that it lacked the clout to induce the United States to 
exert pressure on The Hague or on Netherlands offidals in Batavia. Accordingly, 
Australia sought the support of the United Kingdom for its efforts to move the State 
Department. The Republicans tended to regard the United States as fundamentally 
pro-Dutch. The Netherlands regarded the United States as its last Hne of defence 
against the Republicans supported by vociferous Australian diplomats. Economic 
pressure, it was felt, was the big stick that ought to be raised and if necessary used to 
bring the Netherlands to a speedy acceptance of Indonesian independence. 
A second point of difference between Australia and the United States was the role 
of the United Nations. Macmahon Ball's 1945 suggestion of United Nations in-
tervention had of course been accepted when Australia became a member of the 
GOC and subsequently of UNCI. Australian interest in the United Nations arose 
largely because of Evatt's role as one of its founding fathers and then in 1948 as presi-
dent of the General Assembly. He felt a moral obligation — not shared by the 
United States — to give firm support to its principles. Both the GOC and UNCI 
were obliged to make periodical reports to the Security Council. The timing of these 
reports was often important, especially if the General Assembly were also to be used 
as a forum where pressure might be exercised. The United States was less impatient 
than Australia in using either the Security Council or the General Assembly to 
pressure the Dutch. On occasion, Cochran persuaded Critchley to agree to defer 
reports from the GOC. 
India and China attempted to secure the discussion of the Critchley-Du Bois plan 
in the Security Council with Australia giving verbal support. The proposal was 
defeated with the United States voting against it. Critchley urged unsuccessfully that 
the GOC submit a full report to the Security Council before 30 December 1947. The 
second Dutch police action stung Chifley and Evatt into action. Evatt from London 
had instructed Hodgson, the Australian representative at the Security Council, to 
take strong action against the Dutch and to press for a vote before the councH ad-
journed. On 23 December Hodgson made his celebrated attack on the Netherlands, 
accusing it of deliberately violating the United Nations Charter: "The consequences 
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must be — if the Council faces up to the matter — expulsion from the United 
Nations." The United States was less harsh in critidzing Dutch policy and did its 
best to prevent the Soviet Union from appearing to champion the Republican 
cause.'* 
In March 1949 the Security Council discussed the UNCI report and Australia 
pointed out in the strongest terms that the Netherlands government had not com-
plied with the Security Council resolution of 28 January. When the McNaughton 
resolutions, a compromise proposal from Canada, was submitted, AustraHa opposed 
it because it prejudiced the position of the Republic. Both India and Australia asked 
the United Nations secretary-general to place the Indonesian question on the General 
Assembly's agenda. This move was made without any consultarion with the United 
States, the United Kingdom, or the Netheriands. Critchley's view was that the 
United States was primarily responsible for lack of progress in Batavia. 
In May, as some progress was being made in the talks in Batavia about the RTC, 
and the General Assembly was approaching adjournment, both Australia and the 
United States agreed to confine the discussion of the UNCI report to the Security 
Council rather than to the General Assembly. They agreed that immediate and open 
discussions in the General Assembly could endanger the prospects of settlement 
through the RTC. AustraHa, however, left the Indonesian question on the agenda 
for the next session in the hope that this would spur both parties to agree to a settle-
ment before the 1948 General Assembly met in regular sessions. 
There were, then, differences in tactics by Australia and the United States in 
bringing the Indonesian question before the United Nations. AustraHan policy was 
rather serpentine in its attempt to reconcile the views of its president of the General 
Assembly with those of departmental officials like Burton and Critchley. The United 
States was facing similar problems in relating the views of its field representatives to 
those of senior State Department officials. The differences did not reflect any attempt 
by a great power to dictate a settlement to a small power. The end objectives were 
virtually identical, the differences were primarily of tactics and timing. 
The Good Offices Committee and the United Narions Commission on Indonesia 
functioned smoothly without the bitter wrangles and personal animosities that 
characterized the work of the AHied Council for Japan. Herremans, the Belgian 
originally nominated by the Netherlands, was virtually a nonentity and was replaced 
by Paul van Zeeland. Most of the initiatives were taken by Graham or Cochran on 
the one hand or by Kirby and Critchley on the other. Kirby was popular with both 
Graham and the Dutch; from time to time they suggested that he might be recalled 
to replace Critchley. Cochran's relations with Critchley were most cordial: the only 
quahfications seem to have been that a long stay in Indonesia could induce fatigue. 
The alternating chairmanship of the committee was conducive to good working rela-
tions. There were genuine differences of opinion on a number of issues and 
sometimes tactical moves. On one occasion a statement was redrafted within the 
United States delegation: "It was rejected by Van Zeeland (Belgium) without ex-
planation and by Critchley without being read."" This was an unusual tactical ploy 
by Critchley to retain Belgian support on another issue. 
Critchley almost from the beginning saw his role as that of protecting Republican 
interests and advising Republic leaders in their discussions with the Dutch. Both the 
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State Department and the Foreign Office felt that he sometimes pressed the 
Republican case too vehemently. The Foreign Office noted that he was being 
specifically referred to in 1948 as "the Attorney for the Indonesian RepubHc".'* The 
Belgian feeling was that this meant that "there was no possibiHty of the Committee 
playing the role of objective mediator, and at the same time speaking with one 
voice". This was why the Foreign Office would have Hked Evatt to return Kirby to 
Batavia. It felt that the prolonged Australian support for the Republicans may have 
delayed final agreement. 
Criticisms of Australian poHcy were made chiefly by the State Department and the 
Foreign Office. The State Department had had many skirmishes with Evatt during 
the war and then over post-war policies. Sir Oliver Franks, the British ambassador to 
Washington, reported that the State Department was "suspicious of the motives of 
the Australians on Netherlands East Indies matters"." Lovett, the acting secretary of 
state, told the American ambassador in Canberra that the State Department was un-
favourably impressed by Australian tactics in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute "as a 
member of the GOC and the Security Council. Although selected by the Indone-
sians, Australians as members of the Security Council and the GOC are expected to 
exhibit reasonable neutrality." Lovett resented Burton's suggestion that the United 
States might get the Security Council to prod the Dutch. A year later, Lovett sug-
gested to Franks that the United Kingdom government "might care to advise the 
Australian Government . . . that some caution and moderation and regard for the 
ultimate steps were called for". Franks drily agreed that "his Government had found 
the Australians no less irritating". Presumably he was especially irritated by the 
Hodgson outburst against the Dutch in the Security Council." 
Andrew Foster, the United States charge in Canberra, noted "the violent pro-
Republican feelings of Evatt and Burton, not to mention the general disinclination 
to follow the United States lead in the Indies and South-East Asia". The Foreign 
Office was aware of the almost pathological hatred of the Dutch evinced by the 
Australians. The mercurial Burton was the constant subject of criticism for his sud-
den initiatives, especially when Evatt was away from Canberra at the United 
Nations. A Foreign Office official commented marginally on one occasion: "As long 
as Burton is where he is I doubt if we shall ever get anywhere with the Australians 
over Indonesia. But it is to be hoped that, if the Secretary of State sees Dr. Evatt next 
week he will be able to give the latter a correcter perspective of the situation than 
Dr. Burton's."" 
Burton was aware that the State Department resented his criticism of the United 
States for faihng to restrain the Dutch, but he hoped that bygones were bygones. 
The State Department was not prepared to accept the Dutch view that Du Bois and 
Cochran (and subsequently Critchley) were prejudiced because they completely 
denied the possibiHty of Dutch good faith." Temperatures in the State Department 
and the Foreign Office rose sharply from time to time, but there was nothing of the 
animosity felt by the State Department and by George Atcheson, the chairman of the 
AHied CouncH for Japan, towards Australia and its representative Macmahon BaU. 
15 The Korean War 
Australian involvement in the Korean War has been dealt with critically and 
analytically by Robert O'NeHl in his brilliant Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. 
His study is based on fuH access to Australian and United States files as official war 
historian. These files lie inside the closed period for ordinary access. 
Korea had been occupied by Japan in 1910 and remained under Japanese control 
untH the end of the Second World War. To Japan, Korea had always been 
strategically important: "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan". But to other 
powers it was of marginal importance. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, it was 
divided into two zones at the 38th parallel. North Korea was occupied by the 
Russians until December 1948, and South Korea was placed under American control 
until the American occupying troops were withdrawn in June 1949. The United 
Nations General Assembly had set up a temporary commission on Korea on 14 
November 1947. A year later the General Assembly called on members to recognize 
the Republic of Korea and established the United Nations Commission on Korea 
(UNCOK) to replace the temporary commission. Its members were AustraHa, 
China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, and Syria. It was designed 
primarily to use its good offices for the reunification of Korea. This was regarded as 
desirable by both parts of Korea even if force by one part was necessary to achieve 
unity. 
On 12 January 1950 Dean Acheson addressed the National Press Club in 
Washington and defined the American defence perimeter in the West Pacific as the 
island chain off the Asian mainland. "This defensive perimeter runs along the 
Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense posi-
tions in the Ryukyu Islands and these we will continue to hold. . . . The defensive 
perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands."' Korea, AustraHa, and 
New Zealand lay outside the perimeter. He was subsequently criticized for having 
given the green light to North Korea to attack the south. There is little evidence to 
suggest that this was his intention: nothing, it seems, could have been further from 
his mind.* 
At the request of UNCOK, AustraHa appointed two military observers to report 
on developments that might lead to military conflict in Korea. These observers spent 
fourteen days (9-23 June 1950) visiring South Korean troops and assessing the situa-
tion. They presented their report to UNCOK on 23 June.' 
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The following morning. North Korean forces launched a fuH-scale attack on 
South Korea. On the basis of the report from the American ambassador in Seoul, 
John Muccio, the United States decided to go to the UN Security Council. The 
American assumption was that responsibility for the attack rested on both North 
Korea and the Soviet Union. The report of the two Australian military observers to 
UNCOK had made it clear that the attack was not provoked by South Korean 
forces. An American intelligence estimate prepared by the State Department's Office 
of Intelligence Research was circulated to Dean Rusk, George Kennan, and other 
senior officials late in the afternoon of 25 June. The analysis intelligence report 
declared, "The North Korean Government is completely under Kremlin control and 
there is no possibility that the North Koreans acted without prior instruction from 
Moscow. The move against South Korea must therefore be considered a Soviet 
move. . . . The liquidation of the South Korean Government would fit into the 
Soviet global strategy in the following particulars. . . . Soviet miHtary domination 
of all Korea would give Moscow an important weapon for the intimidation of the 
Japanese in connection with Japan's future aHgnment with the US."* 
The analysis pointed out that Japan was of crudal importance. The reaction of the 
Japanese government to the American response would determine whether Japan 
would move towards neutrality, whether her "utility and reliability as an ally" 
would be reduced. Failure of the United States to act would cause significant damage 
to American prestige in Western Europe. "The capacity of a small Soviet satelHte to 
engage in a military adventure challenging, as many Europeans will see it, the might 
and will of the US, can only lead to serious questioning of that might and wUl." 
This was only a background paper but one that reflected very well the thinking of 
Truman and his advisers on 25-26 June and the decision to refer the matter to the 
Security CouncH.' 
On 27 June, in the absence of the Soviet delegate as a protest against the failure of 
the United Nations to send a representative of the People's Republic of China, the 
Security Council recommended to all members to place armed forces at the disposal 
of the UN commander-in-chief in Korea. Truman ordered American air and naval 
forces to support South Korea, but confining their efforts to south of the 38th 
parallel. The Seventh Fleet was ordered to prevent an attack on Formosa, and the 
Nationalists were warned to desist from any attack on the mainland. On 30 June, 
American ground forces were committed to the defence of South Korea when 
MacArthur, after a hasty visit to Seoul, reported that American combat troops were 
necessary to halt the Korean retreat. 
Australia responded immediately to the Security Council appeal for assistance. In a 
conversation with C.P. Noyes, of the US Mission to the United Nations, who was 
consulting members for their reactions to the attack, Keith Shann, the leader of the 
AustraHan mission to the United Nations, asked whether the United States intended 
to meet force with force and suggested that ' 'perhaps the Australians were in a posi-
tion to help if the United Nations decided to take strong action". Shann, in discus-
sion with the UN delegation, showed "a surprising firmness towards what might 
ultimately be necessary". He pointed out that the United States would be involved 
"in an extremely hazardous enterprise with almost limitless possibilities. It would 
also involve us indirectly because of our relationship with the United States and our 
place in Asia."' 
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The crisis came when Australia was involved in discussions about a peace treaty 
with Japan and Percy Spender was also attempting to persuade the United States to 
negotiate a Pacific security pact with Australia. There were obvious advantages in a 
speedy Australian response. On 29 June, Prime Minister Menzies placed Australian 
naval vessels in Far Eastern waters at the disposal of the United Nations. These were 
the frigate Shoalhaven, already in Japanese waters, and the destroyer Battaan, on its 
way to Japan via Hong Kong. MacArthur asked for the commitment of the 77th 
RAAF fighter squadron to Korea. He felt that "it was the best fighter squadron in 
Japan and one of its pHots the best shot in the Far Eastern Air Force".' The 
Australian government immediately agreed, despite his breaking news of his request 
to newspaper men who accompanied his plane to Korea on 29 June before formally 
approaching the AustraHan government. Mustangs of No. 77 Squadron were in 
action on the morning of 2 July, strafing North Korean T54s. The Australian forces 
were the first foreign troops to go into action. 
AustraHan ambassador Norman Makin reported "the obvious anxiety of the State 
Department to obtain backing as soon as possible for their Korean move through 
United Nations and their genuine gratification at AustraHa's prompt response".' 
After the early reverses in Korea, an appeal was made by the UN secretary-general, 
Trygve Lie, on 14 July for additional support, especially ground forces. AustraHa 
was in the process of a long-term restructuring of aH her defence forces, and there 
were few ground troops available. Menzies was reluctant to commit AustraHan 
troops, partly because he regarded the Middle East as having a higher priority and 
partly because Ernest Bevin was unwilling to send British troops to Korea. The 
Australian chief of staff finally agreed to commit the Third Battalion, Royal 
AustraHan Regiment, even although it was not battleworthy and the troops under 
the terms of their enlistment were not obliged to serve outside Japan. 
On the morning of 26 July, the counsellor in the United Kingdom High Commis-
sion in Canberra told Alan Watt, secretary of the Department of External Affairs, 
that Attlee and Bevin had changed their minds and were going to announce their 
decision to provide ground forces to Korea at 8 p.m.' Watt felt that this was a 
British attempt to upstage Australia by being the first Commonwealth country to 
send ground forces to Korea and that this would weaken the growing accord bet-
ween Australia and the United States. Menzies was on the Queen Mary in mid-
Atlantic on his way to New York and incommunicado. Before leaving London, he 
had told Spender to delay the decision to dispatch troops to Korea. Watt telephoned 
Spender, who was at Moss Vale recuperating from an illness, and immediately took a 
fast Commonwealth car to report to him. Spender quickly realized the seriousness of 
the situation and telephoned Arthur Fadden, the acting prime minister, in Brisbane. 
Fadden was reluctant to act, knowing Menzies' views, but was persuaded to agree to 
make a statement if the acting minister for Defence, P.A.M. McBride, agreed. 
Spender caHed McBride in South AustraHa and obtained his consent to the issuing of 
a statement in Fadden's name. Watt telephoned a statement to the AustraHan Broad-
casting Commission, which announced at 7 p.m. that "in response to the appeal to 
the United Nations, the AustraHan Government had decided to provide ground 
troops for use in Korea". The announcement continued: "The nature and extent of 
such forces will be determined after the conclusion of discussions which the Prime 
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Minister will have in the United States."'" Watt heard the announcement on his car 
radio as he returned from Moss Vale. Menzies was met by Shann vnth a copy of the 
decision as the Queen Mary reached New York. 
Menzies had no option but to accept the fait accompli with good grace, even 
although he did not share either Spender's sense of urgency or his anxiety to con-
clude a Pacific Pact. R.N. Rosecrance in Australian Diplomacy and Japan comments: 
"America was hard pressed in Korea and the offer of Australian ground forces at 
such a critical time must have been warmly welcomed in all sections of the American 
government. It would probably be correct to say that Australian-American relations 
attained a degree of cordiality in the summer of 1950 which they had not known 
since the days of the Padfic War". Spender probably acted s-mftly to prevent the 
State Department from feeling that a later response by Australia meant that AustraHa 
was merely following Britain." 
The main problem was the size of the Australian force for Korea. Menzies saw 
Truman and Acheson the day after he arrived in New York. He declared that 
"Australia was whole-heartedly behind American forces and wished to play its full 
part in the defense of the free world". But he pointed to the limited size of the 
Australian army and to the legislative problems involved in rapid expansion and the 
dispatch of troops to Korea. He concluded by warning the president that "it would 
not be immediately possible to provide the forces".'* DiJles and Acheson told him 
that the next ten days would be critical and that a thousand Australian troops now 
would be much more valuable than a larger force later. The American chiefs of staff 
hoped that Australia and New Zealand could provide three battalions in the next 
three or four months as part of a British Commonwealth force." 
Menzies was fully aware of the difficulties the Australian army was facing in its 
reorganization. In his speech to Congress he said, "We are not rich in manpower. 
We are not rich in standing armies or immediately available resources." But he pro-
mised aid as speedily as possible. In the euphoria that greeted a masterly piece of 
oratory. Congress overlooked the fact that Menzies had deliberately refrained from 
indicating the size of the Australian contingent. He left Washington with the pro-
mise of an American loan of US$250 million for general economic development. It 
was not until 28 September that the first Australian troops from Japan landed in 
Korea to form part of a British Commonwealth force of a brigade rather than the 
division hoped for by the United States.'* 
Why did Australia respond so speedily to the UN secretary-general's appeal for 
assistance? It was the result of Australia's estimate of its security needs. Australia 
clearly reaHzed that its security depended largely upon the willingness of the United 
States to extend an umbrella over Australia through perhaps the conclusion of a 
Pacific security pact. This was Spender's primary aim, an aim only partly shared by 
Menzies, whose attachment to Great Britain and the Commonwealth was very 
strong and who felt that the Middle East and Malaya were more important than 
Korea. Australia was also anxious to strengthen collective security through the 
United Nations, which was now facing its first major crisis of credibiHty. Evatt 
strongly favoured full Australian backing for the United Nations in Korea with the 
commitment of a larger Australian component to the UN command. Menzies did 
not fully share the enthusiasm of one of the UN's founding fathers. 
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The objectives and tactics of the United Nations in Korea were the subject of con-
siderable discussion. The immediate objective was to repel the North Korean attack 
and drive thdr forces over the 38th parallel. Very early in the military campaign, dif-
ficulties developed between MacArthur, designated as commander-in-chief of the 
UN forces on 8 July, and both Truman and the American joint chiefs of staff. 
MacArthur regarded Formosa as of great strategic significance and would have liked 
to involve Formosa in the war. In a statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars he 
said, "Formosa in the hands of such a hostile power could be compared to an un-
sinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accompHsh offensive 
strategy and at the same time checkmate defensive or counter-offensive operations by 
friendly forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines"." President Truman strongly 
objected to MacArthur's statement and insisted that he immediately withdraw it. It 
was the beginning of a series of differences between MacArthur and Truman which 
culminated in his dismissal on 10 AprH 1951. Defense Secretary Louis Johnson 
queried Acheson on 25 August — "whether we dare send [MacArthur] a message 
that the President directs him to withdraw his statement". Acheson was in no 
doubt." 
As MacArthur's forces neared the 38th parallel and made the daring amphibious 
landing at Inchon on 15 September, the question of future objectives became impor-
tant: whether MacArthur should cross the 38th parallel, what was to be the role of 
the UN forces in South Korea after the North Koreans had been expelled, and what 
was to be the future of the Rhee government. Australia was reluctant to support of-
fensive operations in North Korea and was extremely dubious about continued sup-
port for Syngman Rhee, whom Hodgson described on 21 September as "a most un-
predictable stubborn reactionary". David Dexter, head of the Pacific Division of the 
Departmental of External Affairs, had warned on 8 August: "Chinese Communist 
troops will help the North Korean army when it needs help. If and when the UN of-
fensive drives the North Korean Army back to the 38th parallel, Chinese Com-
munists wiH be sorely tempted to intervene."" 
The danger became acute after the Inchon landings, and the diplomatic problem 
with obvious military impHcations came to be one of warning the Chinese against in-
tervention directly or through "volunteers". This involved a means of preventing a 
Soviet veto in the Security Council of any future UN action in Korea. On 20 
September Acheson made his "Uniting for Peace" speech proposing the transfer of 
responsibility to the General Assembly should action by the Security Council be 
prevented by a veto. The General Assembly had power under Article 10 of the 
United Narions Charter to discuss and make recommendations on "any question or 
matter within the scope of the present Charter". On 7 October the General 
Assembly passed by 47 to 5 with 8 abstentions the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, 
sponsored by seven members, including Canada." 
ft was supported but not sponsored by AustraHa, whose role during the September 
discussions of the resolution was minimal. Canberra declined an invitation by the 
United States to become a co-sponsor. Spender had some reservations about the 
resolutions, particularly the proposal to set up a collective measures committee to 
gather information about the military and economic resources which members might 
place at the disposal of the United Nations to prevent aggression and to study effec-
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tive means of organizing collective measures. Behind the proposal was the idea that 
the United Nations might set up a skeleton UN command with forces earmarked by 
the member governments for use in emergency. This was an echo of proposals for 
creating a UN force during the San Francisco discussions in 1945. Spender also had 
some doubts about the legality of the new procedure but did not propose any amend-
ments, although invited by Dulles to do so. 
The resolution, drafted by the British delegation led by Kenneth Younger, called 
for the taking of "all appropriate steps . . . to ensure conditions of stabiHty 
throughout Korea" and the holding of elections under UN auspices to estabhsh "a 
unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign state of Korea". 
It recommended that UN forces should not remain in any part of Korea except so far 
as was necessary to achieve these objectives. All necessary measures were to be taken 
to rehabilitate Korea economically." The resolution also provided for the setting up 
of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea 
(UNCURK), which replaced the United Nations Commission on Korea 
(UNCOK). Australia agreed to become a member of UNCURK. 
In his "Uniting for Peace" speech, Acheson proposed the strengthening of the 
United Nations. The General Assembly should be able to consider situations promp-
tly and to recommend action in cases where international peace was threatened and 
the Security Council was powerless to act because of a veto by one of the permanent 
members. On 3 November these proposals, known as the Acheson Security Plan, 
were passed by the General Assembly. The long, five-section resolution was spon-
sored by Britain, Canada, France, the Philippines, Turkey, the United States, and 
Uruguay.*" 
What the resolution of 7 October did not do was to authorize the crossing of the 
38th parallel and the resumption of the attack on North Korea. On 27 September, 
MacArthur had been instructed by the US joint chiefs of staff and Truman to submit 
his plan for future operations north of the 38th parallel to the joint chiefs of staff for 
approval.*' This he did immediately but refused to be tightly bound by the rather 
vague 7 October resolution. He gave it his own interpretation which would have 
been unacceptable to the General Assembly majority. He issued a surrender demand 
to North Korea with the threat: "Unless immediate response is made by you . . . 1 
shall at once proceed to take such military action as may be necessary to enforce the 
decrees of the United Nations." These did not in fact direct him to establish by force 
a "unified, independent and democratic government of Korea".** Menzies on 27 
September told the House of Representatives, "We may say with a high degree of 
confidence that this invasion is going to be rolled back so long as nobody else 
intervenes."*' 
The joint chiefs of staff directive to MacArthur of 27 September had prohibited 
the use of non-Korean troops in the areas adjacent to China and the Soviet Union. 
MacArthur ignored these restrictions on crossing the 38th parallel and pressed north 
towards the Yalu River. In mid-October and the first half of November, the 
People's Republic of China moved some thirty divisions across the Yalu River 
without being detected by an inefficient American intelligence. 
MacArthur's thrust across the 38th parallel led both AustraHa and the United 
States to reassess their policies and attitudes. A senior member of the Australian 
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Department of Foreign Affairs, Patrick Shaw, prepared an analysis of Australian 
options in Korea: these were to conrinue the advance on North Korea to the Yalu 
River, to attack the increasing concentrarion of Chinese troops north of the Man-
churian border, or to create a buffer zone in northern Korea. He felt that the second 
option would increase the escalation of the Korean conflict into a global war and 
strongly argued the creation of buffer zone as the first step on an accommodation 
with China.** Menzies and Watt accepted the third oprion and urged the United 
States to adopt a cautious policy until Chinese policies became clearer. Australian 
attitudes were determined within the general context of discussions with the State 
Department about a peace treaty with Japan and the conclusion of a Pacific security 
pact covering Australia and New Zealand. 
At the same rime, the American government was considering its options in the 
light of relentless pressure from MacArthur. On the same day as Shaw analysed 
Australian interests, the State Department considered its objectives. The analysis of 
America's Korean poHcy by the planning adviser of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs 
was made to "advance the national interests of the United States". It assumed that, 
unless "a massive intervention by non Korean Communist forces took place . . . it 
would be possible to estabhsh a unified and independent Korea". The United States 
would need to extend economic and miHtary aid to the Republic of Korea and bear 
up to 70 per cent of the cost of reHef and rehabilitation. An important instrument for 
the settlement of problems in the Republic of Korea should be UNCURK, which 
could help resolve border problems between the unified Korea, the People's 
Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. American forces would be reduced as 
rapidly as possible in Korea but should form part of the unified command. The pro-
posal was a moderate one, especially in urging that the United States should neither 
propose nor support the holding of war crimes trials in Korea. It was based on an 
assumption that was quickly disproved: that no external massive intervention would 
take place. 
MacArthur had few doubts about the success of his drive to the Yalu and his abili-
ty to deal with the Chinese forces which were slowly encircling his armies. 
Acheson's mature view was that the chiefs of staff should have adopted a tougher 
policy towards MacArthur and severely restricted his advance. Acheson felt that "the 
Government missed its last chance to halt the march to disaster in Korea. All the 
President's advisers in this matter, civHian and military, knew that something was 
badly wrong, though what it was, how to find out, and what to do about it they 
muffed."*' UntH disaster struck on 4 December, Washington was as confused as 
Canberra about Chinese objectives in Korea. On the night of 25-26 November, 
China launched a major counter-attack against the UN forces. A new war had 
begun, and Menzies' worst fears were realized. Immediately, the question of bomb-
ing attacks on the Manchurian bases of the Communist Chinese forces was raised.*' 
The launching of the second Chinese offensive on 25-26 November to drive the 
UN command forces from North Korea created a new situation for MacArthur and 
for both AustraHa and the United States. "We face an entirely new war," 
MacArthur reported. "This has shattered the high hopes we entertained . . . that 
. . . the war in Korea could be brought to a rapid close by our movement to the in-
ternational boundary and the prompt withdrawal thereafter of United Nations 
230 "HIGH NOON": 1941-49 
forces."*' The disaster was of such a magnitude that MacArthur suggested a cease-
fire as one of the options, and President Truman, in answer to a press question on 30 
November, declared, " W e will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the 
military situation just as we always have." In answer to a question, "Wil l that in-
clude the atomic b o m b ? " , he replied, "That includes every weapon that we have." 
The decision about its use would be left to MacArthur.*' 
The United Kingdom was more cautious when Attlee visited Washington on 1 
December and strongly opposed the use of the atomic bomb as a means of rescuing 
MacArthur. Attlee was, however, "tired and despondent and, for him, quite on the 
defensive", Acheson noted. He commented that Attlee's thought impressed him as 
"a long withdrawing, melancholy sigh".*' Attlee's discussions with Truman led to 
assurances that the United States would not use atomic weapons as a panic reaction 
to the Eighth Army's defeat but not to an agreement that Britain consent would be 
necessary before the atomic bomb was used. 
Spender was concerned at the lack of consultation between the United States and 
its allies. Britain was almost the only country with forces in the U N Korean com-
mand whose views were regularly sought by the president and the State Department. 
This, of course, was painfully reminiscent of the situation in the Second World War 
when Evatt repeatedly asked for fuller consultation and information. Spender felt 
that it might be possible to negotiate a demilitarized zone between the two Koreas 
and then work out a settlement. Australia's policy in Korea was based on five 
principles. 
(a) to give effect to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in 
accordance with which members of the United Nations had sent forces to Korea to 
resist aggression; 
(b) to limit the area of conflict; 
(c) to express the special AustraUan point of view, as distinct from a purely European 
point of view, in determining what action was necessary in order to prevent or resist 
aggression in the Far East; 
(d) to exhaust political negotiation before undertaking new and irrevocable commitments 
in the military field; and 
(e) to devise, from time to time, the best methods of giving effect to these great 
principles.'" 
Menzies, like Spender, was most reluctant to enter the conflict by bombing 
Chinese supply bases in Manchuria. He stiH felt that AustraHa's main interests lay in 
Europe rather than the Far East. Spender and Menzies both leaned more towards the 
United States rather than the United Kingdom but saw Australia as acting as a 
bridge between the two countries. Gradually the United States began to accept the 
view that the Korean war must be a Hmited one and that diplomatic negotiation 
rather than massive miHtary retaliation would pay dividends. 
Proposals for a cease-fire in December led to the setting up of a UN cease-fire 
group. The Chinese Communists promptly denounced it. The United States became 
impatient and urged the United Nation to brand China as the aggressor and then 
determine what further action members might take. Sir Keith Officer, the head of 
the AustraHan U N delegation, urged the United States to agree to the adjournment 
ot the First Committee to allow further negotiations, perhaps even in Peking, by the 
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cease-fire committee. Hickerson of the State Department reminded Hodgson of 
Spender's Sydney speech of 10 December in which he said that "we could not afford 
to distinguish between aggression by a smaH power and aggression by a large 
power" and that the United States should not water down the prindple of no ap-
peasement by the terms of any agreement reached with the Chinese Communists. He 
went on, 
In the handling of this problem we had to seek a course of action between the two 
extremes. We certainly did not intend to become involved in an all-out war with China — 
that is what the Russians would Uke to see happen. On the other hand we cannot afford to 
simply evacuate Korea now that a larger aggressor has joined the North Koreans, except, 
of course, as a result of miUtary necessity. I said that in branding the Chinese Communists 
as aggressors we should also do what we have not done up to the present, expose the Soviet 
Union as the instigators of this aggression." 
The Australian attempt to clarify American long-range strategy in Korea led the 
joint chiefs of staff to suggest that Menzies be told firmly that "military operations 
should proceed on the assumption that the immediate military objective of the 
Chinese Communists [was] to drive the United Nations forces from Korea. General 
Omar Bradley noted: "While continuing every effort to localize the present 
hostilities and while at the same time strengthening UN abilities to resist further 
onslaughts that might be planned, I consider it vital to the United Nations that it 
not permit this aggression against Korea to succeed".'* The First Committee of the 
UN General Assembly decided to adjourn until the three-member group on a 
Korean cease-fire could report. This it did on 2 January 1951. Two days before, the 
Chinese launched a third-phase offensive which led to the capture of Seoul on 5 
January. 
The fall of Seoul created a new situation and led to various attempts to mobihze 
the United Nations to deal with the new crisis. On the one hand there was the at-
tempt of the Commonwealth prime ministers to secure a cessation of hostilities and 
fiirther negotiations to secure a peaceful settlement. The UN Good Offices Commit-
tee, consisting of Lester Pearson of Canada, B.N. Rau of India, and NassoHeh 
Entezam of Iran also attempted to revive negotiations. On 11 January, the commit-
tee presented five principles for a settlement in Korea. 
The second reaction was to mobilize United Nations opinion against Peking and 
to persuade the United Nations to condemn Chinese aggression. The General 
Assembly declared in its resolution of 19 January that the Peking government had 
"itself engaged in aggression in Korea" and called on it "to cause its forces and 
nationals . . . to cease hostiHties . . . and to withdraw from Korea". The resolution 
provided for the setting up of a fourteen-member Additional Members Committee 
to consider as a matter of urgency the additional measures to be employed to meet 
this aggression and the setting up of a three-man group to use its good offices "to 
bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of UN objectives 
in Korea by peaceful means"." 
In a critical review of the world situation on 4 January, Menzies had warned of the 
danger of condemning China and of the need to examine the views of the United 
States. Should a new world war break out, the Commonwealth could not survive 
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without the United States nor the United States survive without the Common-
wealth. It became evident that AustraHa was the closest of America's aUies on Padfic 
and East Asian matters and that Washington was reluctant to create strained 
relations with them. 
Peking denounced the resolution on 17 January as "illegal, slanderous, null and 
void" and refused to have anything to do with the Good Offices Committee. 
Menzies was anxious to avoid Australian support for any resolution condemning the 
Chinese as aggressors. Spender, however, felt it important for Australia to co-
sponsor a resolution proposed by the United States condemning Peking. On 1 
February, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommended by the PoHtical 
Committee by a vote of 44 to 7 with 8 abstentions. The resolution declared that 
Communist China "by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already 
committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostiHties against the United 
Nations forces there, had itself engaged in aggression in Korea".'* 
Australian support for the American resolution came not because of any upsurge of 
moral enthusiasm for the UN Charter and its prindple but because of Spender's 
anxiety to secure American support for a Padfic pact. The ANZUS pact was central 
to his whole thinking about Korea and resulted in American agreement in prindple 
to such a pact after his visit to Canberra on 14-16 February." 
The UN resolution of 1 February had produced bitter denundations by both 
Peking and Moscow as proof of "the aggressive ambition of American 
imperialism". It had little effect on either the poHtical or miHtary situation in 
Korea. The Chinese launched a further unsuccessful offensive in Korea on 11 
February. MacArthur defeated it and then stabilized the UN military Hne close to the 
38th parallel. On 7 March MacArthur released a statement referring to the "abnor-
mal miHtary inhibitions", the prospect of "the critical military stalemate", and the 
necessity for vital dedsions to resolve the difficulties hampering his miHtary ac-
tivities, hinting at action outside Korea. What he obviously wanted was the expan-
sion of military activities against the Communist Chinese. It had become clear that a 
wide gulf had opened between MacArthur's miHtary ambitions and the poHtical 
policies being formulated by the United States both in Washington and the United 
Nations. Two days later he reoccupied Seoul. The confHct of polides which Acheson 
had months earlier deplored led Truman to dismiss MacArthur on 10 April. 
Menzies on 7 March had outlined Australian poUcy to the House of Represen-
tatives and stated the UN objectives in Korea. He was concerned at the possibiHty of 
the extension of the conflict. Like other American allies, AustraHa was anxious to 
prevent any new offensive. On 10 April, on the eve of MacArthur's dismissal, 
although defending MacArthur's order to cross the 38th parallel, Spender reiterated 
Australian objectives in Korea: to resist aggression, to limit the area of the conflict, 
and to bring about a peaceful settlement. He strongly supported the work of the UN 
Good Offices Committee." 
The decision of Truman to dismiss MacArthur was the result of long and agonis-
ing discussions with the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the separate 
Defence departments. This is not the place to discuss the decision nor his triumphal 
return to the United States." The Commonwealth had been greatly concerned by 
MacArthur's unwillingness to submit to any form of control. Younger had deplored 
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the "irresponsible statements . . . as seen to come at frequent intervals from highfy 
placed quarters, without the authority of the United Nations, or indeed of any 
member Government". MacArthur's actions were threatening relations between the 
United States and its allies in Korea. The day before his dismissal Spender had 
rdterated the Australian view that the war should not be widened by plans to cross 
the 38th parallel and penetrating deeply into North Korea. He put forward a ten 
point plan for a settlement in Korea." Australia had not been consulted about 
Truman's dedsion to dismiss MacArthur but, Hke aH other members of the 
Commonwealth, was relieved at the decision to replace him by Ridgway. He was 
strongly in favour of negotiations and a cease-fire. On 26 April, Casey succeeded 
Spender as minister for External Affairs and Spender was appointed Australian 
ambassador in Washington. 
Despite MacArthur's dismissal, the United States stiH adopted a hard line toward, 
the Chinese, although Ridgway was much more moderate than MacArthur. On 22 
AprH the Chinese resumed the offensive, and bitter fighting conrinued for a week. 
For some months the American government had been pressing AustraHa to increase 
its component in the Commonwealth force and send additional ground troops to 
Korea. The Defence Committee and cabinet were extremely slow in responding. 
The small Australian army of 1949 had only been expanded gradually, and there was 
a belief that commitments in Malaya and the Middle East were more important. As 
O'NeiH has pointed out, "the AustraHan Government was in a very uncomfortable 
position with regard to the American request for more troops, at least untH negotia-
tions for the security treaty had been completed"." The enthusiasm that followed 
AustraHa's swift commitment offerees in June 1950 was beginning to evaporate. On 
24 May 1951 Menzies admitted that AustraHa "could not put a Division into the 
field anywhere in less than nine months. . . . it would seem a serious mistake to 
impair, by sending additional ground forces to Korea, our prospects of full readiness 
to carry out our responsibUities in the event of a global war". There was no positive 
Australian response for several months despite the new Chinese April offensive. 
When the second stage of the fifth Chinese offensive was launched on 16 May, the 
question of retaliatory bombing of Manchurian air bases was seriously considered as a 
vital tactical move. Canberra recognized the need for retaliation but was prepared to 
accept the British decision in case of emergency without separate consultation. The 
United States agreed to consult Britain but not to be bound by her decision. 
By early June the new Communist offensive had been halted and UN forces con-
trolled the line beyond the 38th parallel. Ridgway consolidated his position along 
this line but made no attempt to launch a new offensive with the Eighth Army, an 
offensive that might precipitate an expanded war which might become global. 
Acheson was prepared to open negotiations for a cease-fire and an armistice. George 
Kennan met Jacob Malik, the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, informally 
on 31 May and suggested truce talks as soon as possible. They met again on 5 June, 
and Malik said that the Soviet government wanted peace in Korea as quickly as possi-
ble. On 23 June MaHk spoke on the United Nations radio programme and said that 
the Soviet people believed that the conflict in Korea could be settled. The first step 
would be discussions among the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice pro-
viding for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel. If both sides really 
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wished to stop the fighting, he believed, a settlement could be made. The Soviet 
Union, of course, was formally not a belligerent, the United States decided to 
negotiate through Ridgway, who on 30 June broadcast to the commander-in-chief 
of the Communist forces in Korea an offer to send a representative to begin discus-
sions for a cease-fire. On 2 July the Communist commanders agreed, and talks began 
at Kaesong on 10 July. The discussions were military rather than political in 
character and concentrated on establishing a military demarcation liiie, details of 
cease-fire discussions, and the position of prisoners of war.*" 
Australia responded cautiously to the Malik broadcast but quickly came to accept 
his proposals as authentic. Menzies told Spender that Ridgway should stand on the 
existing battle line rather than withdraw to the 38th paraHel but rejected Spender's 
suggestion that Australia should represent the Commonwealth at Kaesong. 
The armistice discussions were, as Kennan commented, "long, wearisome and 
from the American and United Nations standpoint — exasperating almost beyond 
belief. . . . the talks were sticky and often from our standpoint infuriating."*' 
Australia was fortunate, perhaps, in not being a participant at Kaesong and then at 
Panmunjom. The talks and the later military operations are discussed in detail by 
Robert O'Neill.** They continued from 10 July 1951 until an armistice was finaUy 
signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953. Australia's role was not an important or in-
fluential one in the discussions, although it frequently expressed strong views on 
such matters as the repatriation of prisoners of war. 
Australia was, however, concerned at the lack of consultation between the United 
States and its allies, particularly after the talks at Kaesong broke down on 23 August 
1951 and subsequently in late November with the question of a warning to China 
against a serious violation of the armistice with a threat of heavy retribution. Often 
details of truce negotiations reached Australia days after decisions and changes in 
Ridgway's negotiating points. Consultation was often confined to the United 
Kingdom and Canada alone of the sixteen allies of the United States. In June 1952, 
Truman agreed to United States bombing raids on North Korean hydro-electric 
power stations on the Yalu River; not even the United Kingdom was consulted or 
warned beforehand. Spender declared that it was essential for the United States to 
devise a better system for consulting its allies: the fault lay primarily with the State 
Department but also at times with the Foreign Office and Dominions Office which 
failed to inform the dominions after being consulted by Washington. The patterns of 
behaviour regarding consultation and decision-making had changed little since Pearl 
Harbor despite the setting up of the Pacific War Council. The State Department 
usually confined contacts with its allies to periodical briefings of ambassadors or their 
representatives. 
Consultation became an important issue on several occasions, especially after the 
resumption of talks at Panmunjom on 25 October 1952. The question of Chinese ag-
gression was one that concerned the Australian chiefs of staff and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. Spender signed an amended declaration of warning to China. 
Australia was extremely anxious to participate in the peace talks which opened in 
Geneva on 26 April 1954. It was finally agreed that all belligerents would attend. 
Casey accepted the United States invitation on 27 February but did not press for 
representation at those sessions of the Geneva Conference devoted to Indo-China.*' 
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The limited Korean War was extremely important for the conduct of interna-
tional relations and of military operations. Australia's military role in the war was 
largely minimal. Key dedsions Were taken in Washington with some consultation 
with London on sensitive issues. 
From its outbreak on 25 June 1950, Australia realized that the war provided an 
unequalled opportunity for her to establish a closer rapport with the United States. 
The swift response in sending two naval vessels and No. 77 Squadron RAAF evoked 
great sympathy in the United States. Spender's decision to commit ground troops, 
made while Menzies was beyond the range of communication and consultation, was 
made to ensure that AustraHa, and not the United Kingdom, would be the first 
member of the Commonwealth to be so involved. Australian reactions were part of a 
deliberate attempt to achieve long-term security interests. It was clear that over the 
long term the United States rather than the United Kingdom would be the key to 
that security. A Padfic pact, a direct alliance with the United States, was the key to 
Spender's diplomacy and diplomatic and military relations with the United States 
during the Korean war. Menzies continued to have doubts about such an alliance 
until after the Canberra talks between Spender and Dulles in February 1951. 
Australian support for United Nations forces in Korea and for American policy in 
general aroused keen sympathy in the State Department and the White House. The 
reactions of the American joint chiefs of staff were muted by the long delay in 
landing Australian ground forces in Korea. They did not fully realize the relatively 
backward state of the Australian defence preparedness and the tendency to prefer the 
Middle East or Malaya to Korea. Menzies and Spender both succeeded in effectively 
concealing the size of Australian armed forces. Had the United States fully ap-
preciated this, there could have been less enthusiasm for concluding the ANZUS 
pact. The war undoubtedly reorientated Australian defence thinking. Japan ceased to 
be regarded as the immediate threat to Australia; the danger was increasingly 
perceived as coming from Communist expansion from Peking or Moscow. Japan 
instead gradually became an important trading partner for Australia. Finally, the 
experience of the Korean war led Australia to "understand and share sympathy with 
the concerns of Britain, Canada and India to restrain the United States from 
precipitate action in response to sudden crisis".** 

Part 4 
"Afternoon Light": 1949-1973 

16 The A merican A lliance: 
ANZUS and SEATO 
The problem of security for Australia in the Pacific had concerned Australian 
political leaders from Deakin to Lyons and reached crisis point with the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The traditional basis of AustraHan security was 
British naval power. Britain held the gateways to the Indian Ocean, and untH 1941 
Singapore was believed to be an effective shield for the northern coast of Australia. 
For almost a century, sea power had enabled Europe to control the coasts of South-
East and East Asia. The strategic implications of the trans-Siberian railway, permit-
ting pressure on East Asia by land as well as by sea, were grasped slowly. 
Australia has been in a sense a two-ocean continent. The western approaches have 
been through the Indian Ocean which washes the shores of Western Australia and 
portions of the Northern Territory. The Indian Ocean had been a predominantly 
British ocean when the approaches through Suez and the Red Sea and by way of the 
Cape of Good Hope were controlled by the United Kingdom. Security in this area 
had been a relatively minor problem until Britain's position in Egypt and Suez 
changed and Britain withdrew from the Indian sub-continent in 1947. The main line 
of AustraHan communications with Europe, the old axis of defence, to protect which 
Australian troops had fought in two wars in the Middle East, became more 
vulnerable than ever before. The Middle East in 1945 was a sensitive area for the 
whole British Commonwealth. It was the focal point in air communications 
between AustraHa and Europe and was, in the post-1945 period, the source of supply 
of oH for AustraHa. 
In the post-war years there was a dramatic shift in the balance of power in the 
Pacific. The Japanese advance southwards after Pearl Harbor had atomized the old 
European colonial empires, and nationalist movements completed the process of col-
lapse. The United Kingdom recognized the independence of India, Burma, and 
Pakistan and granted dominion status to Ceylon. Holland gradually abdicated her 
position in Indonesia, and the United States withdrew from the Philippines. The 
French colonial empire in Indo-China slowly disintegrated, and the old Japanese 
empire was destroyed by the surrender in 1945. European colonies carved out of 
China disappeared, and in 1949 a united China emerged. The Soviet Union alone of 
the European powers suffered no contraction of its empire. 
The shift in the balance of power can be seen most clearly in the case of the United 
Kingdom, "the great and powerful friend" on which AustraHan security had been 
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traditionally based. Her old Asian empire had crumbled. Hong Kong was left as a 
precarious outpost. Malaya was under Communist pressure, and Singapore had been 
partly reconstituted as a smaller strategic base. With the changes in India and the 
Middle East, the effective limit of British power had come to coindde broadly with 
the North Atlantic area. It was no longer possible for it to exercise effective pressure 
in the Pacific. The British Commonwealth came to resemble not a clenched fist, but 
an open hand with the thinly protected fingers in all seas. 
In the post-war period, then, with the old Pacific power structure coHapsing and 
revolutions developing in many Asian countries, the whole situation was extremely 
fluid. There was the danger of one or more power vacuums developing. It was dif-
ficult to determine from what direction a threat to Pacific security might come. 
Between 1946 and 1949 there was considerable discussion in Australia, New 
Zealand, Britain, and the other members of the Commonwealth about the need for a 
Pacific pact. These discussions contemplated a combination of the Padfic members of 
the Commonwealth with the United States and perhaps France. There was Httle 
basic difference in approach between Australia's Labor government and the opposi-
tion about the need for a security pact in the Pacific. Evatt pressed in 1946 and 1947 
for "an appropriate regional instrumentality" in South-East Asia and an understand-
ing with the United States for the defence of the south-west Padfic' But Labor's 
ideas on regional pacts were rather nebulous. Evatt was still optimistic about the 
ability of the United Nations to preserve peace. Very fiiendly to India and suppor-
ting the Indonesian struggle for independence, he toyed wdth the idea of a pact that 
might include the major Asian powers, Russia, and Communist China as well as the 
United States. Australia was the only non-Asian power represented at the New 
Delhi Conference of January 1949. Evatt's enthusiasm was not shared by other 
members of the Australian cabinet. 
In July 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and President Quirino of the PhiHppines proposed 
the formation of a non-military pact to include, in addition to Nationalist China and 
the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand.* 
The AustraHan prime minister, J.B. Chifley, was embarrassed by the invitation to 
become associated with conservative or reactionary governments in an anti-
Communist front. The United States did not receive an invitation, but Dean 
Acheson had said bluntly that "a Pacific defence pact could not take shape untH 
present conflicts in Asia were resolved".' Acheson, aware of the tendency of other 
Pacific allies to suggest that a NATO type alHance might be concluded, said, "WhUe 
the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty does not mean any lessening of our 
interest in the security of other areas . . . the United States is not currently consider-
ing participation in any further collective defence arrangements other than the North 
Atlantic Treaty . . . which was largely the product of a spedfic set of circumstances 
peculiar to Europe and the Atlantic Community.' '* 
For Australia, the urgency of a Padfic security pact became greater in 1949. The 
problem of security, when looked at from a different perspective — from 
Washington and Wellington, from Canberra and Tokyo, from New Delhi, 
Singapore and Jakarta — is always seen differently. In Canberra, the immediate 
danger had always been seen since 1945 as coming from a resurgent and militarist 
Japan. The events of the southward Japanese thrust through Malaya and Singapore to 
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New Guinea, with the final halting of the advance along the Kokoda Trail in the 
Owen Stanley Range and at Milne Bay, left an indelible impression on the Australian 
mind. During the debate on the ratification of the Japanese peace treaty. Prime 
Minister Menzies commented, "Nobody in this generation of AustraHans wiH ever 
forget the instances, all too weH attested, of brave soldiers murdered after capture, of 
nurses tortured and destroyed, of prisoners of war starved, enslaved, beaten, driven 
mad, driven into the grave."' Australia had strongly opposed the piecemeal settle-
ment of Japanese problems by MacArthur and the American decision not to impose 
limits on Japanese armaments in the draft peace treaty. In a Gallup poll on the peace 
treaty, it was significant that 67 per cent of AustraHans opposed ratification.' 
The American assessment of the threat to Pacific security was a very different one. 
The wartime distrust of the Soviet Union was revived with the rapid extension of 
Communist influence on Eastern Europe and the revival of Russian interest in East 
Asia. The spread of social revolution in Asia, the swift successes of Asian national-
ism, and the disintegration of Nationalist China brought a reorientation of American 
policy towards Japan. Japan was not only to become economically self-sufficient: it 
was to be converted into "the workshop of East Asia". 
The Australian dilemma was clear. The two political parties were aware of the 
Communist threat in Asia, of the danger of a southward thrust of Chinese forces 
into Indo-China and Malaya developing into a threat to Australia and to India. It 
was a question of balancing this potential threat against the pathological fear of a 
possible long-term Japanese threat. Japan must always choose "between a policy of 
continental expansion and a policy of oceanic expansion". The problem was, in 
Percy Spender's words: 
How can we prevent the resurgence of a miUtaristic Japan whilst at the same time allowing 
her to qualify for admission to the society of nations as a soverign power? How can we 
prevent her from becoming again a threat to the security of AustraUa whilst permitting her 
suffident strength to resist the threat of international communism? How can we in fact, 
impose conditions essential to secure AustraUa against future Japanese aggression whilst 
moving towards normal international relations between our two countries?' 
For AustraHa the real nightmare would be a combination of the People's Republic of 
China with Japan and possibly the Soviet Union and at the same time the withdrawal 
of the United States from East Asia. The secretary of the army, Kenneth RoyaH, had 
said in February 1949 that the United States might withdraw her troops and not 
defend Japan against enemy attack.' The argument was based on the assumption that 
American supply lines to defend Japan were so long that the task was an impossible 
one. Should a war break out between the United States and the Soviet Union, Japan 
could be a liability. As the New York Times commented, "the occupation of Japan, 
while perhaps useful as a deterrent to war, would be a disastrous commitment if war 
broke out ." ' 
Part of the difficulty arose out of the definition of the term Pacific. Its geographical 
boundaries did not coincide with the new twentieth century strategic boundaries. 
South America was of peripheral importance while the Panama Canal remained 
open. South and South-East Asia — Burma and Malaya, India and Pakistan, and 
perhaps Indonesia — became vitally important. A shift in power, political or 
strategic, in this area would vitally affect the rest of the region. 
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The State Department and the joint chiefs of staff refused to commit the United 
States to a vague multilateral treaty which would over-extend America's defence 
responsibilities and capabilities. On 10 January 1950 Acheson met the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in private session and defined the American defence perimeter 
in Asia as running "along the Aleutians to Japan and then . . . to the Ryukyus". He 
included the Philippines within this defence perimeter but omitted Australia and 
New Zealand and Formosa. "With bases on these territories, the United States 
would have an impregnable defence."'" His statement to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Commitee was confirmed in a speech to the National Press Club two days 
later. John Foster Dulles was appointed to deal with the Japanese Peace Treaty a 
week earlier. President Truman's instructions stated: 
The United States Government is willing to make a mutual assistance arrangement among 
Pacific island nations (AustraUa, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan and the United States 
and perhaps Indonesia) which would have the dual purpose of assuring combined action as 
between the members to resist aggression from without, and also to resist attack by one of 
the members, e.g. Japan, if Japan should again become aggressive. In connection with this 
latter point, the United States Government should agree to this course of action only as the 
other nations accept the general basis on which the United States is prepared to conclude a 
peace settlement with Japan (c.f. above)." 
Dulles was to explore the attitudes of other members of the Far Eastern Commission 
without any power to commit the United States government.'* It firmly rejected 
any involvement with countries on the mainland of Asia: it was to be an island 
defence system, but one going further than Acheson suggested on 10 and 12 January. 
Both "perimeter" definitions were made after the Labor governments of AustraHa 
and New Zealand had been defeated in the December elections. There is no evidence 
to suggest that this was deliberate rather than an accidental conddence. 
The new Australian minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, in his first major 
speech on foreign policy to the House of Representatives (9 March 1950), argued 
strongly for a regional Pacific pact." Spender's main argument for the pact was the 
increasing threat to Asian and regional stability from the global policy of the Soviet 
Union. This was aimed at the Communist infiltration of all democratic countries, 
"so creating unrest, causing economic disruption and discrediting governments", 
paving the way for their collapse and incorporation in the Russian sphere. The Com-
munist seizure of power in China had "fundamentally changed the whole picture of 
Asia". The danger to Asia and AustraHa lay in the Chinese communist attempt to 
"foment disaffection and disorder in other countries".'* 
Spender's anti-Communist stance meant a break with the poHcy of the previous 
Labor government. It also involved a break with the secretary of the External Affairs 
department, Dr John Burton, who had been a staunch supporter of Evatt. Burton's 
view was that "Australia's natural allies were the south Asian countries" and that 
Australia should help to create a south Asian mutual assistance pact, providing that 
members would remain uncommitted until a global war broke out or until aggres-
sion occurred in South-East Asia in defined circumstances; it involved the rejection of 
a Pacific pact with the United States." Burton was subsequently promoted upstairs 
to a High Commissionership in Ceylon in mid-1950. This also meant a closer align-
ment with the strong anti-communist policy of the State Department and of 
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Congress culminating in the astonishing but temporary ascendency of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy. 
Barely a month elapsed between the defeat of the Australian Labor government 
and the first session of the meeting of Commonwealth foreign ministers in Colom-
bo. Although a great deal of work had been done on major foreign policy questions 
in the Department of Foreign Affairs in the last half of 1949, AustraHan poHcy on 
many of the important issues before the conference was decided in the plane between 
Jakarta and Colombo. The result was the Colombo Plan, presented to the conference 
on 11 January. What the plan owed to the ideas of the Ceylon minister for finance, 
J .R. Jayawardene, stiH has to be determined. It would seem to be a predominantly 
Australian plan designed to check the growth of communism by economic measures. 
Spender's policy was one of a two-pronged attack on Communist expansion in Asia: 
economic and politico/military. What came to be known as the Colombo Plan en-
visaged large-scale economic aid to the countries of south and south-east Asia. The 
major Commonwealth funds would come from the United Kingdom. It was realiz-
ed, however, that United States financial assistance would immensely strengthen the 
plan. Spender did not attempt at Colombo to rally Commonwealth members to a 
political anti-Communist crusade. He quickly realized that India and probably 
Pakistan would oppose such an alignment. State involvement in vital economic 
functions — the tanks of south India, the relief works of the Famine Code, as well as 
the controHing of the Yellow River and the building of dykes in Tonkin — was not 
regarded as Communist in origin or purpose. It was left to Sir Frederich Doidge of 
New Zealand to raise the question of a Pacific pact. It was shot down in silence. 
For the next year. Spender campaigned ceaselessly and ruthlessly for a Pacific 
security pact. It became refined in discussions with key members of the American ad-
ministration to a tripartite pact with Australia and New Zealand. The honing-down 
process involved an acceptance of the island perimeter rather than the broad 
multilateral concept which originally embraced mainland Asia but which was 
reduced to a broadly based island chain. Spender's own hopes that the pact would be 
formed from a nucleus of Australia, the United Kingdom, and other Common-
wealth countries were not realized. He carried out an intensive campaign for a tripar-
tite pact during his visits to the United States and the United Kingdom in 1950. 
Bevin came to recognize the depth of Australian feeling on the issue but was con-
cerned about a " W h i t e Man's Pact". Spender discussed a Padfic pact with Acheson, 
Dulles, and Rusk and with President Truman. His interview with Truman on 13 
September 1950 was, he felt, the turning point in his discussions in the United States 
on the security pact. Truman's sympathetic grasp of the AustraHan view filtered 
through to the State Department ." 
Spender, who was described by the New York Times as one of the Pacific pact's 
"ablest salesmen", put the AustraHan position bluntly: 
I left Dulles in no doubt as to where AustraUa stood. I stated that Australia's immediate 
and primary concern was security against future Japanese aggression and that Australia 
could not under any circumstances, subscribe to a treaty with Japan unless there were 
adequate assurances, acceptable to Australia, affording her protection against future 
Japanese aggression. . . . AustraUa was, in a geographical sense, on the periphery of the 
world. And in this isolated position she was being asked by the United States to take Japan 
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on trust while at the same time the U.S.A. was, apparently, not prepared to consider any 
regional security arrangement in the Padfic which would give AustraUa some form of pro-
tection against aggression. I said Australia could not, and would not, accept such a 
position." 
One could almost sympathize with American diplomats of all ranks after Spender in-
structed aH members of the Australian delegation to the United Nations and the 
Washington embassy that "in any conversation that might be had with U.S. State 
Department offidals they should hold the Hne I had indicated: espedally they should 
be most careful to avoid giving any impression that Australia would be prepared to 
accept any re-armament of Japan in return for any Padfic pact"." 
On 21 January, the AustraHan Embassy in Washington reported that Truman had 
authorized Dulles to explore the idea of a Pacific pact. Spender was not aware of any 
specific proposal of Dulles or of the dissensions between Dulles and Sir Esler Dening, 
the British ambassador in Tokyo. Dening indicated that the United Kingdom was 
totally opposed to such a pact. 
The reward for Spender's intensive diplomatic campaign came with the visit of the 
Dulles mission to Canberra on 14-18 February 1951, a day before Menzies returned 
from London, where he had been attending the prime ministers' conference. Dulles 
had come to Australia to secure her support for the American plan for a peace treaty 
with Japan. On the second day Spender said that the Australian government was not 
prepared to accept a Japanese peace treaty unless "reasonable limitations were written 
into the treaty against Japanese re-armament" and "a satisfactory security arrange-
ment in the Pacific was able to be agreed to" . This arrangements, Spender said, 
"should take the form of a tripartite pact between the three countries that I had been 
contending for". Of less importance was the proposal to estabHsh "a permanent 
organization for consultation and action"." 
Spender then suggested that "the proper course was to postpone further con-
sideration of the terms of the peace treaty until we had explored the possibihties of a 
Pacific security treaty along the general lines I had indicated". DuUes was rather 
taken aback and pointed out that although he had no power to negotiate a security 
treaty he was prepared to discuss one. He proposed a presidential declaration 
guaranteeing Australia against attack, but Spender firmly rejected this solution. The 
United States was anxious to include the Philippines in any security agreement, and 
Dulles asked Spender categorically whether Australia would "refuse to accept a 
security treaty to which the Philippines was a party if this was the only treaty which 
the U.S.A. herself could accept". Without a chance to consult cabinet, Spender 
"had to bite on the bullet"; he agreed that Australia would if necessary accept the 
Philippines as a party but preferred the tripartite treaty as the starting point.*" 
There was no serious proposal to include Indonesia. The Australian delegation 
then prepared a draft treaty which Dulles finally agreed to on" 17 February.*' Spender 
wanted to reserve the right of the Australian government to propose limitations on 
Japanese rearmament in the peace treaty until the United States approved of the 
security treaty. When it did, AustraHa would not insist on provisions to restrict or 
supervise Japanese rearmament in the treaty. The ANZUS pact was initialled on 12 
July and became part of a network of separate pacts concluded by the United States 
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to consolidate security in the Pacific. Bilateral security treaties were signed by the 
United States with both Japan and the Philippines. 
Dulles had no power to conclude a binding treaty nor to indulge any Australian-
New Zealand participation in defence planning in the Pacific area. On his return to 
Washington he reported direct to President Truman, who had issued his instruction, 
rather than to Dean Acheson of the State Department. Truman's response to 
Spender's proposal for a security guarantee was far warmer than Acheson's. 
The ANZUS pact was a triumph for the persistence, toughness, and diplomatic 
skills of Spender and his Australian advisers. Australia for the first time had entered 
into a defence treaty with a foreign power to which the United Kingdom was not a 
party. Spender has vigorously denied that there was any deal between AustraHa and 
the United States: an American security treaty in return for a "soft peace" with 
Japan.** DuHes had long been aware of Australia's views about a Pacific pact even 
though neither he nor Acheson had seen them spelt out in detail. After the final draft 
had been agreed to in Canberra, he told Doidge, the New Zealand minister for 
External Affairs, "There is an interdependence between the contemplated Japanese 
peace treaty . . . and the contemplated security treaty in the sense that neither of us 
would be obhgated to accept one without the other."*' Spender had told Dulles that 
"it would mean political oblivion for our party" to go to parliament with the kind 
of peace treaty with Japan desired by the United States without a corollary security 
arrangement with Australia. This had been understood in Washington for some 
time, and Truman's instructions to Dulles recognized that there was in general 
terms a connection between the two kinds of treaty. There is no evidence of a formal 
"deal" in Canberra despite Spender's statement that "we are seeking a formal 
arrangement" and that "Australia could not accept a Japanese treaty which left it 
out in the cold". DuHes was an extremely shrewd and experienced diplomat who 
could read the signs clearly. 
The ANZUS Treaty obligations were rather more vague than many Australians 
desired. Article IV of the treaty provided that "each party recognises that an armed 
attack in the Padfic area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace 
and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance 
with its constitutional processes". As I have pointed out elsewhere, this was a much 
more diluted obligation than the corresponding obligation upon the members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty who "agree that an armed attack against one or more of them 
shall be considered an attack against them all", and that each will assist the party so 
attacked by taking "such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed 
force to restore and maintain the security of the area".** Both treaties constituted "a 
declaration of intent" warning potential aggressors of the sense of unity between 
members. There is no automatic commitment to go to war in either treaty: each 
member is bound to act "in accordance with its constitutional processes". The 
important thing is, as Alan Watt has said, not a "psychologically comforting and 
politically reassuring phrase" but rather "what each party is bound to do when an 
attack on one party comes".*' 
The less specific American commitment in the ANZUS Treaty was the result of 
careful drafting to avoid another bitter debate in Congress over ratification. Con-
gress had challenged the more precise NATO draft on the ground that it involved a 
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transfer of responsibility for the declaration of war from Congress to the president. 
Monroe Doctrine phraseology was adopted in the ANZUS pact because ' 'it involves 
no possibHity of a shift in the division of responsibility between the executive and 
congress".*' 
This revised draft was acceptable to both AustraHa and New Zealand. Dulles had 
pointed out that there was "no doubt in any quarter that an armed attack upon 
Australia, New Zealand or the Philippines would, in fact, involve the United 
States". But some critics of the pact have argued that, on the surface of it, AustraHa 
was more likely to be committed to military action than the United States. Article V 
defined "an armed attack on any of the Parties" to include "an armed attack on the 
metropoHtan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its 
jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the 
Pacific". Because of its global interests and the greater size and dispersion of 
American forces, it was much more probable that they would be involved in in-
ddents than Australian forces, and that Australia would be called upon to fulfil her 
obligations.*' On the other hand the much greater military strength of the United 
States gave Australia a positive advantage. There was periodically uneasiness in the 
United States that Australia was keeping its defence budget to a minimum because of 
the American shield. The question of material obHgations in the event of attacks on 
"island territories" or armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific did not 
become important until confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1963 and 
the stepping up of American involvement in Vietnam (see chap. 20). 
From the beginning, the ANZUS Treaty appeared to mean rather different things 
to the parties. To the United States the primary purpose of the treaty was to contain 
communism. Thomas Dewey argued that it was essential to defend the whole Pacific 
and South-East Asia, to "warn the Communists that if they invaded any free coun-
try, they would be destroyed by every weapon at our command". "We must either 
hold the whole Pacific or lose the whole Pacific. We cannot allow it to be chipped 
away piece by piece."*' But neither Acheson nor Dulles was prepared to assume such 
wide global commitments. To them and to President Truman, the main threat did 
not come from Japan but from Communist China. The Menzies government shared 
this view only in part. Casey asked parHament to read the Japanese peace treaty "in 
the light of the United States-Australia and New Zealand mutual security pact". 
The twin dangers to Australia came from a "revived Japanese imperialism or from a 
Japan under Communist control".*' He disagreed with the American view that 
Japan by itself did not constitute an offensive threat to AustraHa or New Zealand. To 
the Labour party, in opposition, the pact was clearly a reinsurance against Japan. 
When the first ANZUS conference was held at Honolulu in August 1952, Casey had 
begun to change his ground. He strongly supported Acheson's view that the purpose 
of the conference was to make a detailed survey of "our common interests and rela-
tionships in the Hght of Communist China's threats to the security of the Pacific 
Area".'" By 1954 the anti-Communist objectives of ANZUS had largely displaced 
its anti-Japanese purpose. 
Australia and the United States differed in their assessment of the chief danger to 
peace in the Pacific and the importance of Australia and the ANZUS pact to the 
United States. The "great debate" on American foreign poHcy which accompanied 
THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 247 
and preceded the dismissal of MacArthur had shown that, apart from South Korea, 
the United States was unwilling to accept any commitments to continental Asia. 
Some Australians might believe that ' 'even without a war, the vast Australian conti-
nent is beginning to emerge now as a key in any new collective security arrangement 
the United States may undertake to check further Communist inroads in the 
Pacific"." But as Walter Lippmann commented, South-East Asia and the South 
Pacific region lay "at the limits, not at the centre, of vital American interests and 
effective military power".'* To the United States, the ANZUS Treaty and security 
in the south-west Pacific were of peripheral significance; to Australia they were of 
central importance. There was always the danger that Washington would again be 
mesmerized by Europe. 
Although the ANZUS pact was the only bilateral agreement to set up machinery, 
that machinery was very fragile. The ANZUS Council normally met annually for 
two days. The joint chiefs of staff were totally opposed at first to the sending of an 
Australian military mission to Washington to discuss common defence interests. 
Article II of the pact required the parties to "maintain and develop their individual 
and collective capadty to resist armed attack" but did not spedfy levels of military 
preparedness." It was left to each country to make an honest and realistic assessment 
of the defence capacity it should maintain. Australia's estimates were extremely 
modest. 
Why was Spender able to obtain American agreement to a tripartite pact after 
Evatt's attempts had failed? The explanation lies in part in the American uncertainty 
about Evatt and at times a positive dislike of him. Evatt's wartime visits to 
Washington had aroused little enthusiasm for Australian policy and a good deal of 
caution about spedfic proposals. While his election as president of the United 
Nations General Assembly enhanced his own reputation, it did Httle to allay State 
Department concern about his objectives in the Pacific. Spender, on the other hand, 
was an acceptable alternative to Evatt as Australia's foreign minister.'* After his in-
duction as the new Liberal-Country Party minister for External Affairs, Spender 
adopted a pragmatic rather than an ideological approach to Australia's foreign 
policy, and especially about its relations with its northern neighbours. 
The United Kingdom had little enthusiasm for the tripartite treaty. So far as the 
Japanese peace treaty was concerned, London, had reservations about the procedures 
being followed by the United States." It had doubts about the territorial limits of 
Japan proposed by the American draft treaty but beHeved that Japan should be 
"permitted a reasonable scale of re-armament to carry out her obligations for internal 
security and defence". However, a tripartite pact would relieve the pressure on the 
United Kingdom to assist Australia and New Zealand in defending themselves 
against attack. The British navy would not be able to spare ships for the Pacific 
defence of the two dominions. Australia and New Zealand had traditionally sup-
ported the United Kingdom in Europe and the Middle East: an ANZUS pact with or 
without the inclusion of Great Britain could make it easier for Australia and New 
Zealand to assist the United Kingdom in carrying out its responsibilities in the 
Middle East. 
There was little enthusiasm in Washington for the inclusion of the United 
Kingdom in a Pacific pact. This could involve the United States in the defence of 
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British colonial territories when opinion in the United States was basically anti-
imperialist. Should Britain be admitted to a Pacific pact with the United States and 
Australia there would be immediate pressure from France and the Netherlands to be 
included and covered by a wide United State umbreHa. "There was an awareness of 
the danger of establishing regional pacts that could be interpreted by Asia as 
western pacts to safeguard white national interests to the exclusion of those of the 
region as a whole." Finally, there was the basic difference of policy over the People's 
Republic of China; the United Kingdom decided to recognize the new regime, 
while the United States, Australia, and New Zealand continued to recognize the 
NationaHst regime of Chiang Kai-shek." 
The United States was reluctant to extend its political and military obligations 
from the off-shore island perimeter to the mainland of Asia. That it did so later was 
irrelevant to the discussions in February 1951 and later months. The lengthening 
shadow of the 1952 presidential election made the United States reluctant to extend 
its treaty commitments to Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore, much less Indo-
China and Indonesia." When the chips were down, Australia and New Zealand 
were prepared to exchange a traditional but dubious United Kingdom defence sup-
port (remembering 1941-42) for a firm American commitment in 1951. AustraHa 
and New Zealand accepted, reluctantly, the exclusion of the United Kingdom from 
the ANZUS pact. 
The Spender's success in indudng the United States to accept a tripartite pact was 
the result of continuous diplomatic pressure and of shrewd calculations on his part. 
His earlier emphasis on the danger of a resurgent miHtarist Japan was replaced by a 
recognition of the menace of an expanding communism to Asian, and espedally 
South-East Asian stabiHty. Spender's swift response to the North Korean invasion of 
South Korea immensely strengthened his credentials as a prospective ally of the 
United States. In the final analysis, he had to choose between the United Kingdom 
and the United States, between the traditional but now ineffective protector of 
Australia and the new prospective guarantor of the second half of the twentieth 
century." 
Why was the United Kingdom excluded from the ANZUS Treaty? The early 
proposals for a mutual security arrangement in the Pacific had been based on a Com-
monwealth nucleus with the United States as an important addition to this nucleus. 
The question has been examined in detail by McHenry and Rosecrance in an article 
in International Organisation.^^ 
The United Kingdom was kept in touch with the negotiations about a broad 
Pacific pact and the narrower tripartite treaty between the United States, Australia, 
and New Zealand. Spender had told the British counsellor at the British Embassy in 
Washington of his September 1950 discussions with Dulles about the form of the 
Japanese peace treaty and his views about a security arrangement in the Pacific. The 
British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Esler Dening, had discussions with Dulles in 
January and was present in Canberra during the talks between Dulles and Spender. 
But neither Dening nor any member of the high commission's Canberra staff took 
part in these talks. Spender showed the text of the draft to Dening who "raised no 
criticism of principle". "Mindful of the views, on the official level, of the United 
Kingdom on both the form a Japanese peace treaty should take, and on Pacific securi-
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ty arrangements generally, to have invited the United Kingdom to participate in the 
Conference, could have been destructive of the purposes we had in mind."*" Spender 
was adopting a similar policy to Evatt in Pacific matters: Australia had a primary 
responsibihty to speak for the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom had no con-
stitutional right to be officially or unofficially present at the Canberra conference. 
The high commissioner in Australia, E.J. Williams, and Dening were taking a pre-
war rather than a post-war view of inter-Commonwealth relations and of the 
responsibility of the Foreign Office to negotiate treaties for Commonwealth 
members. 
There were some sharp differences between Australia and the United Kingdom 
about the peace treaty and the post-war position of Japan. The Foreign Office had 
decided to recognize the People's RepubHc of China and pressed for its representa-
tion at the peace conference to sign on behalf of China. This was not "only for the 
record" but because of a strongly held conviction that a self-sustaining Japan must 
have good relations with China.*' The State Department was concerned at what ap-
peared to be delaying tactics by London over the peace treaty and Padfic security.** It 
is doubtful whether the Foreign Office would have been stalling in the hope of an 
electoral victory for the Chifley-Evatt Labor government in December 1949. The 
draft text of the tripartite treaty had already been forwarded to London. On 11 May, 
the British foreign secretary, Herbert Morrison,*' told the State Department that a 
public statement about discussions between London and Washington at this stage of 
negotiations would "re-emphasise that the pact is being made with the full 
knowledge and co-operation of HMG. . . . My first reaction . . . is that so far as we 
are concerned it would not be necessary to delay discussions with Australia and New 
Zealand about the security pact until such time as you and we have reached agree-
ment on the terms of a draft Japanese peace treaty."** 
The exclusion of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS Treaty was a decision by 
both AustraHa and the United States for rather different reasons. Spender believed, 
after depressing discussions with Bevin in September 1950, that the United 
Kingdom would not join in any Pacific pact. It objected to a pact confined to the 
offshore island chain and one that did not include the nations of South-East Asia. 
Spender's mature view was that "the United Kingdom in 1950-1 was not interested 
in any Pacific security arrangement except on conditions which could not then . . . 
be complied with".*' Washington was not anxious to extend its commitments any 
further than the defence perimeter through the island chain. A broad rather than a 
narrow construction of its responsibilities in Asia and the Pacific meant that the 
United States was not prepared to underwrite the mainland or island empires of the 
United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom had com-
mitments in the Middle East which made less credible its abihty to protect its 
colonial possessions in south and south-east Asia. The United States was not 
prepared to guarantee with military support the British position in Malaya, 
Singapore, or Hong Kong. Just as it would have been political suicide for Australia 
to go into elections in 1951 on a programme of a soft treaty with Japan without 
security guarantees in the post-treaty period, so it would have been difficult for the 
United States, a major critic of colonial empires who believed that they should be li-
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quidated, to face a 1952 presidential and congessional election on a platform of 
bolstering up the British colonial empire on mainland Asia. 
Differences quickly developed over future membership of the ANZUS Treaty: 
whether new members should be included to estabHsh a stronger or wider 
multilateral arrangement. Spender regarded the pact as "the first step", and Article 
VIII provided for a co-ordination of defence efforts "pending the development of a 
more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific".*' Casey, in in-
troducing the treaty in the House of Representatives, said that the treaty could not 
be considered a complete and final answer to the problem of security in the Padfic.*' 
The Asian states tended to regard the bilateral pacts as Western devices to safeguard 
white national interests to the exclusion of those of the region as a whole. There 
could be obvious advantages in the inclusion of Asian countries in a multUateral 
Pacific security pact. But the United States proposed to include Japan in the ANZUS 
pact, a proposal that reflected a complete inability to grasp the strength of AustraHan 
concern in 1952 about future Japanese poHcy. (John Foster DuUes said in 1954 that 
he went out to the Far East in January of 1951 "on a mission to try to create a collec-
tive security pact in that area" [New York Times, 26 May 1954]. This hardly came 
within the scope of his instructions, and in any case he had largely abandoned them 
when he reached Canberra.) 
Inevitably the issue of British partidpation was raised at the discussions in 
Honolulu at the first ANZUS Coundl meeting on 20-26 September 1952. Britain 
had been opposed to a Pacific pact of the American type when DuUes had discussed it 
with Dening and had not changed its attitude when the treaty was concluded. 
Although Morrison conceded the right of Australia to negotiate a treaty with the 
United States, he was obviously unhappy about Britain's exclusion. In answer to a 
question, he admitted to the House of Commons, "It would not have been 
unwelcome to us if we had been included in the proposed pact."*' After the change 
of government in 1951, Winston ChurchiH expressed Conservative views directly 
about a pact that he regarded as an affiont to Britain. "I did not like the ANZUS 
pact at all. We did not have an entirely clean sheet on the matter when we took over 
power. I did not like it at aH and I am greatly in hopes that perhaps larger, wider ar-
rangements may be made which would be more satisfactory than those which are at 
present in force. But, as I say, it is not a matter where one can give directions. One 
has to endeavour to use influence and allow time to work."*' He was shocked 
because an Australian prime minister, a conservative and enthusiastic supporter of the 
Commonwealth of Nations, should have agreed to the exclusion of the United 
Kingdom from the ANZUS pact. Sentiment rather than realism led Australia and 
New Zealand to support a British request to send an observer to the first meeting of 
the ANZUS Council. The council would discuss common defence problems, the 
Korean War, and Padfic strategy in general. 
Much of the support for Churchill's request came from a British press that was 
both bitter and naive.'" It felt that the ANZUS Treaty had damaged the British 
Commonwealth and could convert Australia into an American satellite. Casey firmly 
rejected the idea that the new pact would "weaken or diminish the close ties of kin-
ship and co-operation which bind Australia to the other members of the Common-
wealth". But at the same time, AustraHa felt that she needed insurance against 
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threats to her security should Britain be unable to effectively assist Australia. The 
United States firmly rejected the British request for observer status at Honolulu. 
Churchill persisted in his attempts and raised the question unsuccessfully at the 
London economic conference of Commonwealth members in December. Australia 
and New Zealand both accepted Acheson's views about the danger of extending the 
ANZUS pact to include the United Kingdom. Menzies explained that the Honolulu 
decision had been a unanimous one. "It is generally acknowledged that the hard core 
of democracy for the future must be the closest possible relationship between the 
British and American peoples. The treaty is only a local manifestation of closer 
British-American relations. To my mind it is not by any means necessary that every 
self-governing member of the Commonwealth should be a party to every treaty or 
arrangement entered into with the United States. . . . The treaty carries no evidence 
whatever of any slackening of our interest in, concern with, and affection for the 
Mother Country."" He refrained from reminding the United Kingdom that the 
North Atlantic Treaty had been concluded by the United Kingdom and Canada with 
minimal consultation with other members of the Commonwealth. 
It had become evident at the end of 1952 that American opposition to the inclu-
sion of the United Kingdom was firmly based. In spite of further pressure from 
Churchill, Australia and New Zealand declined to argue strongly for British 
membership of ANZUS. When the chips were down, neither of the south-west 
Pacific members of the Commonwealth was prepared to antagonize the United 
States and so risk the termination of the ANZUS Treaty.'* The ball was now in the 
British court: the SEATO pact may have been the result. Professor F.L. Wood 
pointed out that Australia and New Zealand had followed Britain into two world 
wars and that the ANZUS pact was "essentially an attempt by small powers living in 
a danger area to reach, ahead of the crisis, a workable understanding with the Great 
Power predominant in that area"." 
From an Australian-American point of view, one of the most significant things 
was that Australia had signed the ANZUS agreement independently of the United 
Kingdom and had subsequently refused to include her in the new tripartite agree-
ment when the first ANZUS conference was held in Honolulu. There could have 
been no clearer demonstration of the independence of Australian foreign policy. 
There had been from time to time a reluctant recognition by the United States that 
the changing character of the British Commonwealth of Nations had led to greater 
independence of Canberra from London in these matters. The recognition of the new 
autonomy of the older members of the Commonwealth came belatedly and unevenly 
in the State Department. In 1942 the Organisation of Strategic Services had drafted a 
review of the changing relationship between the dominions and Great Britain. It 
recognized the growing tendency towards a dispersion of responsibility and the 
demand for a voice in the formultation of foreign policy. It also recognized the im-
portance to the United States of "the changing character of intra-imperial relations 
. . . so that we may be of the fullest assistance to our allies both in Britain and the 
Dominions. . . . For the first time in its existence the Dominions are realising that 
the reality of national existence means the natural protection of their own land 
against invasion by powerful aggressors."'* 
This assessment of the changing character of the British Commonwealth and its 
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relations with Washington and other important diplomatic centres was slow in per-
colating through to aH echelons of a State Department that had had to deal with 
H.V. Evatt. As late as 1945, the very experienced United States minister in 
Canberra, Nelson T. Johnson, reported: 
External Affairs is a minor department of the AustraUan Government, secondary espedally 
to the Attorney-General's Department since Dr. Evatt handles both. Notes to the Depart-
ment move from desk to desk and the Legation waits months for an answer which is pro-
bably the result of consultation with London. Dr. Evatt interests himself in external affairs 
only when he thinks that something can be done or that the Labor Party's interests can be 
advanced. Dr. Evatt makes periodic statements on conditions abroad but there has never 
been a debate on foreign affairs." 
Johnson, writing in March 1945, concluded: "Washington deals with Australia as 
a part of the Empire while he [Evatt] tries to see Australia as an independent state. 
But no matter which view is taken, the facts are that discussions between Australia 
and the United States are settled, not in Canberra, but in consultation at 10 
Downing Street." The State Department's experience with an Evatt matured at San 
Francisco and perhaps as president of the UN General Assembly indicated that 
Australia was relying less on British advice and was formulating its own poHdes. Ex-
perience in Tokyo and Jakarta as well as the Middle East showed this. 
An important element in the change was the expansion of the Department of Ex-
ternal Affairs in Canberra. In 1941 it had consisted of a handful of men who of 
necessity depended largely on British sources for information and advice. With the 
change of government in 1949, the department had expanded and had recruited men 
who had taken part in the war and were more mature than their predecessors. 
Spender was a totally different minister from Evatt and was bound less by tradition. 
Both the Colombo Plan and the ANZUS Treaty indicated this. 
SEATO 
The preamble to the ANZUS Treaty declared that the three members were co-
ordinating "their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and 
security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional 
security in the Pacific Area". Article VIII empowered the ANZUS CouncH "to 
maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Assoda-
tions of States or other authorities in the Padfic Area in a position to further the 
purpose of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area"." Casey told 
the Australian House of Representatives that although he regarded the pact as "a 
great advance along the road" to Pacific security, Australia did not regard it as "a 
complete and final answer to the problem of security on the Pacific". Dulles, too, 
saw the ANZUS pact as "one of a series of arrangements . . . to strengthen the 
fabric of peace in the Pacific", "initial steps" in the process. 
The exclusion of the United Kingdom was regarded by Australia and New 
Zealand as a necessary evil, partly because of differences of policy between London 
and Washington. Had they insisted on Britain's inclusion, there would have been no 
pact at all. The first meeting of the ANZUS Council in Honolulu in 1952 envisaged 
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the expansion of membership in general rather than specific terms. A year later 
(September 1953), the council changed direction; it unanimously dedded that "to 
attempt to enlarge its membership would not contribute directly and materially to 
the defence of the Pacific area"." The change of direction meant not the abandon-
ment of a broad security system but a different approach: the network of bilateral 
treaties. ANZUS was an inadequate base for a broader system." The change was due 
primarily to American concern with developments on the mainland of Asia, in Indo-
China. Dulles was afraid that the increasing aid to the Vietminh might be followed 
by the movement of Chinese troops into Indo-China: "The Chinese Communist 
regime should realize that such a second aggression could not occur without grave 
consequences which might not be confined to Indo-China. I say this soberly in the 
interest of peace and in the hope of preventing another aggressor miscalculation."" 
The earlier security pacts had been conceived of in terms of an island defence 
perimeter and not of mainland defence of American interests. With the conclusion of 
the Korean armistice in July, American policy in Asia became increasingly concerned 
with continued suspidon of Chinese aggression in East Asia, what Admiral A.W. 
Radford, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, called "aggression on the instalment 
plan". Eisenhower and Dulles had become convinced that "the Communist advance 
in South-East Asia must be blocked and must be blocked now". 
American defence policy was being given a new look since Communist China 
rather than Russia was regarded as the immediate threat to American interests and 
security. This re-examination of American defence was also the result of Russian 
progress with atomic weapons. Eisenhower had directed that American defence plan-
ning should be based on the concept of "the long puH" rather than that of the "year 
of crisis". The shift away from the Truman-Acheson policy of miHtary containment 
and economic aid was carried further by Dulles when he addressed the CouncH of 
Foreign Relations in New York on 12 January 1954. The new-look strategy meant 
placing "more rehance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive 
power", the retention of local defences, but their reinforcement by "the further 
deterrent of massive retaliatory power. . . . The way to deter aggression is for the 
free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places a id with 
means of its own choosing."'" Unfortunately the new policy, designed to keep the 
Soviet bloc and China guessing, had a similar effect upon many influential Americans 
as well as the alHes of the United States. But although American aid to Indo-China 
was stepped up, there was Httle attempt to co-ordinate the new-look strategy with 
American diplomatic activities. Far Eastern disputes were dealt with piecemeal in-
stead of as integral parts of a single problem: a peace treaty with Korea, an armistice 
in Indo-China, the recognition of the People's Republic of China and its admission 
to the United Nations, the question of Formosa. The State Department had not yet 
estabhshed a meaningful dialogue with the joint chiefs of staff nor reaHzed the global 
assumptions of the new look in defence policy. 
Prospects of an enlarged security arrangement for the Pacific were not encouraging 
at the end of 1953. But a dramatic change came in the next six months, following 
the collapse of French power in Indo-China. The Navarre plan for "the intensified 
prosecution of the Indo-China war" had broken down early in 1954. General Ely, 
the French chief of staff, visited Washington on 20-26 March and told President 
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Eisenhower that only large-scale American intervention could avert a complete 
French coHapse and the opening of negotiations with Ho Chi Minh. Faced with the 
possibility of sweeping French concessions to the Vietminh at the conference table, 
Dulles saw in this a direct threat to American defence treaties in South-East Asia. 
"Communist control of South East Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philip-
pines, Australia and New Zealand with whom we have treaties of material 
assistance." This threat "should not be passively accepted, but should be met by 
united action"." What he was proposing was intervention in Indo-China by the 
United States and her allies. 
This policy was a dubious one. George Kennan had told Secretary of State 
Acheson on 21 August 1950, "We are getting ourselves into the position of 
guaranteeing the French in an undertaking which neither they nor we, nor both of 
us together can win. . . . the closer view we have had of the problems of this area, in 
the course of our efforts of the past few months to support the French position there, 
has convinced us that the position is basically hopeless."'* He suggested that 
diplomatic moves might be undertaken to cover the only solution: a French 
withdrawal which might be partly obscured by making the "problem one of some 
Asian regional responsibihty". Dulles ignored this view. Eisenhower gave full 
approval to the Dulles plan, pointing out that Indo-China constituted the "cork in 
the bottle": withdrawal meant that the whole of South-East Asia would be opened 
to Communist expansion. On 3 April 1954, Dulles and Radford discussed the situa-
tion with bipartisan congressional leaders in an attempt to secure a joint congres-
sional resolution authorizing the use of American air and naval forces to save Diefi 
Bien Phu. But congressional representatives flatly refused to agree to intervention 
unless American allies were prepared to partidpate. Consultation in Washington 
with the ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Indo-China produced an American plan for joint action 
involving the use of American, Australian, British, and French aircraft carriers and a 
seven-power joint statement warning Peking not to intervene." But proposals for 
"united action" aroused little enthusiasm in London or Paris. Churchill refused to 
give any undertakings about United Kingdom military action in Indo-China "in ad-
vance of the results of Geneva". Air action would have been ineffective, and there 
was the danger that intervention "might weU have led to a general war in Asia".'* 
The Geneva Conference opened on 27 April. Australia was not a member of the 
conference, but Casey attended as an unofficial observer. The conference was of great 
importance to Australia. As American strategy appeared to oscillate between a con-
tinental and an "offshore" policy, Australian concern at the imperfections of the 
ANZUS pact was revived. The network of American treaties in the Pacific, a tourde 
force of the Dulles diplomacy, did not in fact seal off the Pacific from the Asian 
mainland. Australia occupied a somewhat precarious position in the gap between the 
fragile British defence line from Aden to Singapore and the American perimeter from 
Alaska to Manila. There was a gap in Australia's defences from Indo-China to 
Singapore and Indonesia. The Australian position was summed up by the Sydney 
Morning Herald: "For America and Britain, the defence of South-East Asia may be 
seen as strategically desirable; for France it is a matter of national prestige: but for 
AustraHa it is life and death. If the cork is forced out of the bottle . . . and aggressive 
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communism floods over the peninsula into Indo-China, Australia will be placed in 
immediate and deadly perH. The security of South-East Asia is Australia's security." 
Casey had left Australia for Geneva on 12 April. He flew first to Singapore and 
then to Saigon, where he had discussions with French and Vietnamese leaders. He 
left convinced that the Franco-Vietnamese forces were fighting a losing battle. The 
Franco-Vietnamese forces would probably not be capable "(without substantial 
increased aid from other countries) of the intensified effort necessary to combat and 
to defeat the probable Viet Minh intensified effort" which would follow a 
breakdown of the Geneva Conference." A brief visit to India was not reassuring; the 
Nehru-Krishna Menon line was an immediate cease-fire, evacuation by all foreign 
troops, and full independence for the Associated States. Casey arrived at Geneva with 
an impressive background knowledge of Asian aspirations and policies that was se-
cond to none. He had travelled widely in Asia over the years and was persona grata 
with most Asian political leaders. His visit to Singapore and Saigon gave him a con-
siderable advantage over foreign poHtical leaders who had never visited Asia. 
Dulles called a meeting of the ANZUS Coundl almost immediately after Casey's 
arrival in Geneva. Casey urged "that a meeting of military representatives of relevant 
countries be held as soon as possible so that we might have established by the more 
competent military authorities whether a lasting solution in Indo-China be reached 
by continuation of the fighting''. Military talks were held in Washington early in 
June." Casey had been convinced before the ANZUS meeting that American pro-
posals for "mass intervention" were wrong: it would not save Dien Bien Phu, it 
would have no United Nations backing and "would put us in wrong with world 
opinion, particularly in Asia", it would probably embroH Australia with Com-
munist China, and would wreck the Geneva Conference. Australian poHcy was 
frozen by impending federal elections, and Dulles agreed not to make American in-
tervention conditional on Australian intervention." Casey was away from Geneva 
from 3 May to 11 June to campaign in the federal election which returned the Men-
zies government for a further term. Dulles thought his absence was not too much, as 
France was in the death throes of her existence as a great.power. 
The American intervention proposals were killed by the marked lack of en-
thusiasm in the ANZUS Coundl and by Western political leaders in their private 
discussions with Dulles. Dulles then proposed a security pact for South-East Asia to 
underwrite any settlement that might emerge from Geneva. The immediate problem 
was the composition of the new pact group. The State Department envisaged at the 
outset eight members: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Britain was still reluc-
tant to commit itself before the Geneva Conference had ended; its caution led 
Washington to hint that the pact might be concluded without the United Kingdom. 
This suggestion and an implied American appeal to its two ANZUS partners was 
greeted with "icy resentment" in London." 
Of crudal importance for the new proposals — which Casey was already referring 
to privately as SEATO — was the attitude of Asia. As Dulles pointed out on 12 
May, the pact was "to save South-East Asia, to save all of South-East Asia if it can be 
saved; if not, to save the essential parts of it". "In my view there will never be any 
real security in South-East Asia without the good vwH of the free Asian countries. . .-
it wiH not be fully effective without the understanding and support of the Colombo 
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powers ." ' " But the Colombo powers were sharply divided. The final communique 
of the Kandy Conference of the Colombo powers (28-29 April) declared an 
"unshakeable determination to resist interference in the affairs of their countries by 
external Communist, anti-Communists or other agencies". It pointedly ignored the 
American proposal for a regional pact." 
The Australian government clearly understood the need for Asian support. There 
was a danger that the new SEATO would become primarily a group of Western 
powers, and "a white man's SEATO would be an effective fighting body, but it 
would not be an effective political body. Military resistance must have a firm 
poHtical basis."'* Casey pointed this out in the middle of the federal election cam-
paign (12 May) but added that " n o country can be saved from Communisin unless 
its people and government want to be saved"; the basic cause of the united British 
failure in Malaya in 1941-42 was the inertia and apathy of the Asian people 
themselves. On 4 June, just before Casey returned to Geneva, the Australian cabinet 
formulated its policy for Indo-China. 
(1) consideration of the situation in Laos and Cambodia separately from Vietnam; 
(2) the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia; 
(3) a division of the State of Viet Nam on the best possible terms that could be achieved 
by negotiation; 
(4) an international "guarantee" of the settlement with provision for its enforcement; 
(5) the association of the free Asian countries, esperiaUy India, with the settlement and 
the guarantee; 
(6) a regional defensive arrangement within the framework of the United Nations 
Charter in support of this settlement in Indo-China, but, of course, with a more 
extensive purpose." 
Casey felt that the "association of free Asian countries" with the Indo-China settle-
ment and guarantees was of paramount importance. He stressed this before he flew 
back to Geneva. " N o solution to that problem [Indo-China] could be lasting or 
effective unless it had the moral backing of the other peoples and governments in 
South-East Asia." '* 
India was the key to Asian support. On his second journey to Geneva, Casey spent 
twelve hours with Nehru before having dinner with him on 10 June. He argued that 
it was "essential to save Laos and Cambodia and possibly Cochin China, as buffer 
states against further Communist advances into South-East Asia. It would be 
necessary to have a collective guarantee of the continued autonomy of these States 
and their right to govern themselves. . . . The problem was essentially one for free 
Asia, although relevant Western countries could not avoid responsibihty". Nehru 
was concerned with the problem of how to achieve such a settlement. "India did not 
wish to sit in a remote ivory tower. If some reasonable arrangement came out of 
Geneva, India would not shirk her responsibilities."" India was prepared to accept a 
settlement provided that Britain, the United States, Russia, and China were the 
"primary guarantors" and that the United Nations was associated with its enforce-
ment. Pakistan, linked with the United States by a military pact, was willing to take 
part in discussions over a regional pact. Kashmir loomed larger than Vietnam; Indian 
aggression appeared a greater danger than Communist imperialism." 
When Casey reached Geneva on 12 June, the prospects of a peaceful settlement 
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seemed to have receded. But the Vietminh adopted a more conciliatory attitude, and 
this paved the way for agreement. On the other hand, the United States declined to 
partidpate in any guarantee which included both the Soviet Union and Communist 
China. The attempts of Casey and Eden to win Nehru's support for a settlement 
began to impose a strain on Australian relations with the United States. There was in 
Australia a growing fear that the United States would lose interest in South-East 
Asia and retreat into isolationism. The widening gulf between London and 
Washington led to talks between Churchill and Eisenhower on 25-29 June which 
brought agreement by the two governments to "hasten the planning of Asian 
defence against Communism and to set up an Anglo-American working party to 
consider the problem of security in the area". This meeting, which closed the widen-
ing gulf between British and American policy, was followed by a meeting of the 
ANZUS Coundl in Washington on 30 June. 
The ANZUS Coundl took "immediate action to form a South-East Asia collec-
tive defence system" and set up a second working party. At this stage there was no 
intention of presenting cut-and-dried formulae on a "take it or leave i t" basis to 
potential Asian members." Australia was prepared to join the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and other states in a guarantee of an acceptable settlement in Indo-
China "backed by force if necessary". Casey suggested that any SEATO should be 
confined in its membership "to the countries of South and South-East Asia, together 
with other non-Asian countries — i.e. omitting Japan, Korea and Formosa but in-
cluding the PhiHppines". As views about a new security treaty began to take shape, 
Dulles asked Casey whether the ANZUS Treaty should be abrogated when the 
SEATO Treaty came into existence. Both Casey and the New Zealand ambassador to 
the United States, Leslie Munro, repHed "in a loud voice and without hesitation 
'No' " . " 
Casey believed that it would be extremely difficult to stop South Vietnam from 
drifting to communism. "It would be necessary to create a stable, reliable and incor-
ruptible administration with good police, better communications, internal security 
and with the support of the people. All these are most difficult to achieve and cer-
tainly cannot be achieved without very considerable outside help." This estimate of 
the long-term consequences to Australia of a Communist victory in Indo-China were 
dramatic and distributing to AustraHa: "If we were to lose Vietnam as a whole to 
the Communists, there is no line on which we could stand (as apart from a delaying 
action) until you get to the Kra Isthmus 0ust to the north of Malaya, in Thailand), if 
the Communists chose to try to get the rest of South-East Asia."" 
As the choice was between Washington and a policy of continued support for full 
Asian inclusion in a regional security system, Australia had no real option but to 
support the United States. The prospect of including more Asian members had 
dwindled. Australia had abandoned her mediatory attempts and had come down in 
favour of American poHcies about regional security. This weakened Australian rela-
tions with the Colombo powers, espedally with India.'" 
The Geneva Conference drafted its final settlement on 20-21 July. This in large 
measure followed the proposals made by the Australian cabinet on 4 June. There was 
one important difference caused by the United States. No provision was made for an 
international guarantee with enforcement procedures. The State Department disliked 
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both the Geneva procedures and the nature of the settlement. But under strong 
pressure from Britain, France, and AustraHa, the United States reversed its policy of 
"dissodarion" from the settlement, although the final settlement was made without 
the active partidpation of the United States, which did not sign the conference 
declaration. The settlement was reached by direct negotiations between Mendes-
France, the Vietminh, and other Communist leaders. Eisenhower commented that 
the settlement "was not what we would have liked", but he did not know that he 
could find an alternative; and if he had no better plan he was not going to critidze 
what others had done. The United States had lost the diplomatic initiative, which 
had passed into British, French, and Australian hands. Casey's role throughout the 
conference had been an important one, even though he was not a delegate. Behind 
the scenes his influence was considerable. 
The Geneva settlement did end temporarily the fighting in Indo-China and 
prevented its developing into a world war: this could have foHowed any Western in-
tervention, led by the United States, under the "united action proposal". Casey had 
helped to kill the proposal by his proposal for an assessment of the situation by 
Western military leaders. The settlement "meant international recognition that Laos 
and Cambodia should have complete independence. The USSR, Communist China 
and the Viet Minh as well as the representatives of democratic countries at Geneva 
agreed to respect the integrity of these states."" The AustraHan government 
declared the day after the settlement was reached that it would apply the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, including Article 2(4) in which all members 
pledged themselves to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or the poHtical independence of any state. The 
government of Australia would view aggression in violation of the Indo-China set-
tlement as a threat to international peace and security.'* 
The Geneva settlement gave South-East Asian planning a new urgency for 
Australia with the collapse of proposals for an international guarantee with some 
teeth in it. Australian defence spending from 1953 to 1960 was limited, and so 
Australia could provide little military support against any aggression in Indo-China 
under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Casey returned to AustraHa disturbed at the 
Australian "lack of interest in Asia, the reluctance to support the Colombo Plan as 
either a humanitarian or (indirectly) as a security measure. On 28 July he came close 
to resignation" but accepted assurances of support from Prime Minister Menzies." 
On 26 July the Australian Defence minister. Senator McBride, had announced a 
sweeping revision of Australian defence plans. On 5 August Menzies suggested that 
the Communist frontier might before long lie not on the 17th parallel in Vietnam, 
but "on the southern shores of Indo-China, within a few hundred air miles of the 
Kra Isthmus". Convinced that "peaceful co-existence" was impossible and that the 
real danger lay in overt aggression by Communist China, he adopted the un-
precedented step of announcing in advance AustraHa's intention of accepting miHtary 
commitments as a price of her membership of the proposed regional pact.'* The revi-
sion of defence plans foreshadowed a shift in Australian poHcy. 
The swift negotiations to conclude the new regional security pact occupied some 
seven weeks. Many of the important problems had been discussed during the feverish 
diplomatic activity preceding the Geneva settlement. The first of them was the 
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question of membership. No security system could be effective without American 
support. For AustraHa it was almost a matter of life and death to extend the 
American defence perimeter from Manila to Singapore and to commit the United 
States to the Asian mainland instead of merely the island area. American global 
polides were being reappraised after Geneva, a swinging away from "liberation" to 
"containment" with the corollary of limiting specific miHtary commitments. 
The controversial issue was the scope of the military provisions of Article IV of 
the draft treaty emanating from the State Department after discussions with the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. The United States, believing that 
the chief danger in Asia came from the threat of Communist aggression, that the 
United States had been "acting on behalf of the independence of Asian countries", 
and that it had been "singled out by the Chinese Reds as the so-called imperialist 
threat to the place of the region", insisted that the treaty be directed specifically and 
exclusively against Communist aggression." Although Casey disagreed with 
Washington on the source of the main threat to the West, believing that it was 
coming from the Vietminh rather than Communist China, he felt that the treaty 
must apply to aggression from whatever source it came. In this he had the support of 
most other delegations who did not want the security treaty to become the basis for 
an anti-Communist crusade. 
There was the added danger that such an interpretation would alienate most of the 
Asian states. The United States was acutely conscious of Asian sensitivity to 
"imperiahsm" and "coloniaHsm" and disclaimed "direct territorial interests in 
South-East Asia". Casey had tried to win Nehru's support for a broadly based group 
of security nations which would include Western and Asian members." But Nehru 
felt that the new treaty was likely "to reverse the trend of conciHation" evident at 
Geneva. Krishna Menon went further and declared, "It is a modern version of a 
Protectorate. It is an organisation of some imperial powers and some other powers 
who may have an interest in it to join together in order to protect a territory which 
they say may be in danger. We are part of that Territory and we say we do not want 
to be protected by this organisation."" 
The American proposal would preclude the extension of membership to the 
strongly neutralist Colombo powers. India and Indonesia deliberately withheld ap-
proval of the proposed pact and later became critics. Mrs V.L. Pandit quipped later 
that SEATO was "a South-East Asian alHance minus South-East Asia". Pakistan was 
the only Colombo power to accept an invitation to the Manila conference, hoping 
that SEATO would strengthen its position against India in the struggle for control 
of Kashmir. Thailand and the Philippines were the only South-East Asian countries 
to join SEATO, which increasingly came to be regarded as a white man's security 
system. 
The disagreement with the United States over the military provisions was resolved 
by the deletion of all reference to Communist aggression in Article IV, and by the 
addition to the treaty of a protocol defining America's interpretation of her commit-
ment and limiting it to Communist aggression. Casey accepted the reservation reluc-
tantly because it involved AustraHa and the other members in a wider potential com-
mitment than the United States. Australia hinted at the possibility of making a reser-
vation with regard to intra-Commonwealth disputes. On 8 September a worried 
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DuHes discussed such a reservarion with Casey, arguing that " a chain reaction would 
result and the Treaty would not be signed today and indeed . . . its signing might be 
indefinitely delayed". Casey went on: 
The whole psychological effect of unity reflected by this Conference would be lost. He said 
that it would be taken as "indecision" on the part of AustraUa and that he could not 
overestimate the effect of such indecision on public and governmental opinion in the 
United States, the consequences of which to Australia might be "disastrous". Actually 
Dulles said a good deal more than this in which he used the words "catastrophic" and 
"calamitous". I have seldom seen him so moved. It is clear that if AustraUa signed with 
the same sort of reservation as the United States was to make, AustraUa would forfeit the 
goodwiU of the United States, which is so vitally important to us to maintain for the 
future." 
This was a price Australia was prepared to pay for the extension of the umbrella of 
American military power in the region. Casey abandoned his suggested reservation 
but at the same time told Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan's foreign minister that it would be 
"quite inconceivable that the Treaty should be invoked in any inter-Commonwealth 
dispute". ZafruHa completely agreed. The United Kingdom also agreed to sign 
without any reservation." 
A second point of difference arose over the question of the relative importance of 
military, economic, and political measures in checking Communist aggression. From 
a short-term point of view, miHtary collaboration between the SEATO powers was 
vital. But over the long term, it was necessary to use economic measures in an at-
tempt to check poverty and improve living conditions. Casey believed that the 
Colombo Plan provided an additional weapon in the struggle against Communism. 
AustraHa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, however, opposed Asian 
pressures to convert SEATO into any source of economic aid. Australia succeeded in 
including in Article III a recognition of the need for consultation on economic 
matters and strongly supported a rather grandiose Pacific Charter which accom-
panied the Manila Treaty. Dulles was worried about "a new method of [Com-
munist] warfare that is very difficult to combat. They take advantage of every sense 
of injustice and infiltrate themselves by siding with those who feel themselves ill-
used." '" Article II dealt, by implication, in part with co-operation to check subver-
sion and infiltration. But anti-subversion measures did not go far enough; Asian 
countries were curiously apathetic about subversion, and one of the early tasks of 
SEATO headquarters in Bangkok was to establish much more efficient regional co-
operation in checking subversion. 
The South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, better known as the SEATO or 
Manila pact, followed the ANZUS rather than the N A T O pattern in form. Under 
Article IV(1) the parties agreed that in the event of armed aggression against any one 
of them, or any state or territories unanimously designated, they would act to meet 
the common danger " in accordance with their constitutional processes". There was 
no binding commitment to miHtary action in specific circumstances. The commit-
ment was as loose or as tight as the ANZUS commitment; it deliberately eschewed 
the tighter wording of the 1948 Brussels Pact and N A T O for the same constitutional 
and poHtical reasons. No attempt was made to create a unified command or an in-
tegrated army of the N A T O type. Military consultation led to small-scale annual 
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military exercises in which the majority of SEATO members usually took part. The 
geographical limits of the SEATO area were carefully defined to exclude both Korea 
and Formosa. The treaty area was delimited south of 21"30' north latitude and in-
cluded Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam in so far as their governments were prepared 
to invite or consent to military action by the SEATO powers. Dulles was asked in 
Manila what the position was about trouble in or near Formosa. His reply was 
"We'H take care of that ."" 
SEATO was a vastly different document from that envisaged in April or between 
1951 and 1954. AustraHa had pressed for the enlargement of ANZUS to include 
other governments interested in South-East Asia; it had hoped for a broad construc-
tion of the regional pact to include Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth 
countries, Asian as well as European. American preoccupation with Communist ag-
gression in Asia dampened any interest in the treaty by any major Asian states. The 
Colombo powers — with the exception of Pakistan — were almost excluded by 
definition as well as by their neutralist stance in foreign policy. The United States 
was unprepared to consolidate the Dulles network of pacts into a more coherent 
treaty group. "The poHtical differences, the conflicts of interest, a certain lack of 
common tradition among many of the countries made it impossible at that time to 
bring this broader concept into being.' ''* 
As a means of ensuring Australian security, as a device for closing the Singapore-
Manila gap, the treaty met with Httle enthusiasm in Australia. Australia obviously 
lay on the third line of American defence, behind the Asian mainland and the off-
shore island chain." It did mark a significant departure in Australian policy by com-
mitting Australia in advance of an outbreak of war, allied without any spedfic 
miHtary commitment. But it added little to South-East Asian security. In signing the 
treaty in ManHa, Casey said, "The real purpose of the Treaty is to present a con-
certed front against aggressive Communism, which presents the free world with im-
mediate problems of security. Our own defence policy is directed to this dominant 
purpose."'* But the contribution of Australia to the combined strength of a South-
East Asian defence force would inevitably be a small one. The armies of Thailand and 
the Philippines were relatively weak despite substantial numbers. Pakistan's en-
thusiasm cooled rapidly. Britain and France were so heavily committed elsewhere 
that their military contributions to the defence of the region decreased. Perhaps the 
most important Australian achievement at Manila was to commit the United States 
to the region. It was the only member of the eight-nation pact with the effective 
force to deter or resist aggression there. The danger of the United States cutting its 
losses and retreating to island defences was averted, largely by Casey's skilful 
diplomacy. 
The original United States proposals for membership of SEATO had included 
Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam as full members. Casey suggested, however, 
before the treaty was concluded that the interests of Laos and Cambodia could best 
be served "by those states staying out of any security organization and becoming 
part of a 'neutraHzed' area". The United States finally accepted the concept of a 
designated area that would include the three states. They could appeal to the SEATO 
powers for military assistance if they deemed it necessary. 
Laos and Cambodia blew hot and cold over full membership of SEATO in the 
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next five years, depending largely on the strength and direction of prevaiHng poHtical 
winds. The political situation in Laos deteriorated considerably in 1957, and internal 
conflict broke out between the Royal Laotian government and the left-wing Pathet 
Lao forces led by Souvanna Phouma. The flow of arms and equipment to the Pathet 
Lao rebels across the border from North Vietnam alarmed the Lao government. On 
15 August 1959 the civH war reached the point at which the Laotian foreign minister 
Phoui Sananikone declared, "Regarding peaceful co-existence we shall have to 
inform neighbouring countries that we shall co-exist only with the free w o r l d . " " 
The crisis in Laos raised the question of what action should be taken by SEATO. 
The SEATO MHitary Advisers Committee had ordered the completion of plans for 
setting up a SEATO force to assist Laos should an emergency arise. No action could 
be taken without a spedfic appeal by the government of Laos. Each member of 
SEATO would then be bound to consult with other members and then deal with the 
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The United States supported 
the Royal Laotian government and began to replace outmoded American equipment 
used by the Royal Lao army. This aroused a strong protest from North Vietnam, 
which "regarded the introduction of new military personnel and fresh weapons into 
Laos as a declaration of a state of war in the provinces bordering Vietnam"." 
Sananikone flew to New York to discuss the situation with both the State Depart-
ment and the secretary-general of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold. As the 
internal situation deteriorated, Sananikone appealed for United Nations miHtary 
assistance and lodged a complaint against aggression from North Vietnam. The 
United States proposed the appointment of a four-power Security Coundl sub-
committee to report on the situation in Laos. This the Security Council proceeded to 
do as a procedural matter to avoid a Soviet veto. The Laotian foreign minister and 
the secretary for defence hinted at a direct appeal to SEATO or to the United States 
for military aid should the United Nations reject an appeal for an emergency force to 
halt aggression." 
Despite considerable pressure from sections of the Australian press, the govern-
ment was anxious to localize the conflict and prevent any Communist support from 
Peking or Hanoi to the Pathet Lao rebels. Casey strongly urged political rather than 
military means of quietening down the situation." The Australian government was 
obviously relieved that Laos had not invoked the Manila Protocol and made a formal 
appeal to SEATO for military assistance. Sir Garfield Barwick, acting as External 
Affairs minister during Casey's absence in London, told the House of Represen-
tatives on 17 September, "Neither the Laotian Government nor any of its friends 
would wish to see the neutrahty of Laos abandoned or modified." He fully sup-
ported the action of the Security Council in appointing a fact-finding committee to 
lower the political temperature over Laos. AustraHa was anxious to preserve the 
neutrality of Laos under the original SEATO arrangement. 
Both Australia and Washington preferred to act through the United Nations 
rather than through SEATO. Barwick said: 
At present the Australian Government does not see any active role for SEATO apart from 
such observation of the situation and consultation about it. In particular, it considers that 
the United Nations activities in Laos should be given every chance to succeed. Should 
the United Nations be unable to preserve the integrity of Laos against indirect or direct ag-
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gression sponsored by the Communist bloc, Laos might appeal to SEATO. In such an 
event . . . there could be no doubt that SEATO would take the course of action which it 
considered most suitable to meet the situation." 
This gave SEATO a much lower profile that it had appeared to have or was designed 
to have in the heady days of 1954. Then it was intended as a shield to guarantee the 
Geneva settlement. Casey and Barwick were not prepared to accept the advice of the 
West Australian: SEATO "should be ready to intervene with its forces at the 
moment that it appears that the Laotian Government cannot control the 
rebelHon".'"" 
The Security Council's fact-finding mission did temporarily reduce tension in 
Laos, but the whole political situation remained inherently unstable. A triangular 
dvil war developed between the right-wing supporters of General Phoumi Novosan, 
the Pathet Lao insurgents, and the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma sup-
ported by a section of the army. The revival of the civil war increased the danger of 
large-scale external intervention by North Vietnam and Peking in support of the 
Pathet Lao and by the United States on the side of General Phoumi. The SEATO 
powers were sharply divided. Australia, France, and the United Kingdom attempted 
to support the neutralist elements, while the United States continued to supply arms 
to General Phoumi in the hope that an effective anti-Communist army could be built 
up in Laos. 
In mid December 1960, the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma coHapsed 
and the stage seemed set for a large-scale civil war. Thailand became alarmed, and on 
15 December the Thai ambassador to the Philippines called on SEATO to get troops 
ready to move into Laos at twenty-four hours' notice. The Philippines government 
was reported to have prepared a military contingent for use by SEATO in Laos. 
Despite sabre rattling by military commanders inside and outside Laos, the Laotian 
government of Bonn Oum resisted these pressures and took no steps to invoke 
SEATO aid. Australia and the United Kingdom strongly resisted any attempts to 
involve SEATO and the continued American military aid to Bonn Oum. They pro-
posed the revival of the International Control Commission to Laos set up by the 
Geneva Conference in 1954. 
At the Bangkok meeting of the SEATO Coundl on 27-29 March 1961 there were 
again sharp differences of policy between members. There was agreement on 
Menzies' counsel not to "shrink from arms in meeting the Communist challenge"; 
it was also agreed that negotiation rather than force was the best means of maintain-
ing "a united, independent and sovereign Laos". Should active military attempts 
continue to gain control in Laos, members of SEATO were "prepared within the 
terms of the treaty to take whatever action may be appropriate in the 
circumstances".'"' The prospects of Western military intervention were slim. There 
were small Commonwealth forces in the ANZAM area — ANZAM denoting 
Australia, New Zealand, and (the British military organization in) Malaya — but 
Malaya had banned the use of its territory for SEATO operations. Airlifting of 
American forces was possible, but this would probably have led to a large-scale influx 
of Communist "volunteers". In any case, the United States was reluctant "to dedi-
cate any major elements of the United States Military Establishment to form an army 
of defence in this area". Laos was of Httle strategic interest to the United States; the 
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western Pacific was much more important. Neither the State Department nor 
Defence wanted a second Korea. 
SEATO members, other than the United States, were less interested and less able 
to back SEATO than they were in 1954. Britain's abihty to use massive force east of 
Suez had disappeared. French interest had waned rapidly after Dien Bien Phu and the 
Geneva Conference. Pakistan had become a sleeping partner. SEATO's regular 
defence exerdses had raised the military expectations of Asian members; failure to act 
in 1960 led them to reappraise its value. South Vietnam had lost interest in joining 
the club, and no other Asian states showed the slightest interest in joining SEATO. 
There was a growing feeling that SEATO was a paper tiger. Extensive activity to 
check subversion attracted little public interest despite its importance. 
The March 1961 meeting at Bangkok of the SEATO Coundl had acted very 
cautiously. It reiterated its belief in the need to preserve Laotian neutrality and it had 
supported the resurrection of the International Control Commission and the revival 
of the Geneva Conference. The significant thing was the shift in American policy 
towards support for a neutralized Laos as a means of keeping it out of the Com-
munist camp, with a government of national unity representing the three warring 
groups. President Kennedy on 23 March reaffirmed the goal of a neutral and in-
dependent Laos, tied to no outside power or group of powers, threatening no one, 
and free from any domination; he emphasized that the first step must be "a cessation 
of attacks by externally supported Communism". He supported the revival of the 
International Control Commission. This change of American attitude towards Laos 
was the result partly of quiet diplomatic pressure from Canberra and partly of discus-
sions with the United Kingdom which culminated in the Kennedy-MacmiUan 
meeting at Key West on 26 March. 
The second International Conference on Laos met in Geneva on 12 May. The 
Soviet Union had given a cautious acceptance of British peace proposals made during 
the SEATO conference in Bangkok. The International Control Commission (ICC) 
had been reactivated and a de facto cease-fire was arranged on 2 May. The United 
States went to Geneva only after the ICC had verified the cease-fire and a com-
promise had been reached over the representation of Laos. Australia accepted the 
need for effective supervision and the inspection of the cease-fire areas; it pressed very 
strongly for the neutralization of Laos under a coalition government. This was the 
consensus at a meeting of the heads of AustraHan missions in South-East Asia in 
Bangkok on 6 June. The State Department came reluctantly to share this view. 
Senator James Fulbright felt that American support for right-wing groups in Laos 
was mistaken: "Just as there was never any pro-communist motivation amongst 
most Laotians, there was no anti-communist motivation either and the United States 
utterly failed to inspire it. The illusions that we should make a bastion out of Laos 
cost us more than $300 mUlion. The cost to our prestige cannot be measured."'"* 
After interminable wrangles over the withdrawal of foreign troops and for ICC 
inspection to verify withdrawal, the conference finally drafted a declaration on the 
neutrality of Laos, which laid down the principles governing its independence and 
neutrality. The Lao government now undertook not to 
enter into any military alliance or into any agreement whether miUtary or otherwise which 
is inconsistent with the neutraUty of the Kingdom of Laos; it wiU not aUow the estabUsh-
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ment of any foreign military base on Laotian territory, nor aUow any country to use Lao-
tian territory for miUtary purposes or for the purposes of interference in the internal affairs 
of other countries, nor recognise the protection of any alUance or miUtary coalition, 
including SEATO. 
The protocol contained detailed provisions for the withdrawal of all foreign troops 
(except for a small number of French military instructors) and for the supervision of 
that withdrawal by the three-power (Canada, India, and Poland) International Con-
trol Commission for Laos. The agreement was finally adopted on 23 July 1962, four-
teen months after the conference opened. 
The significant thing was the withdrawal of the SEATO umbrella from Laos. 
This came as a result of strong pressure from the Eastern bloc members of the con-
ference led by Poland. The inclusion of Laos in the SEATO protocol area had always 
involved a rather precarious protection. The difficulties that Laotian governments 
had to face were not so much overt military intervention as infiltration and subver-
sion. SEATO had very limited success in checking infiltration and had to be content 
with countering Communist military intervention without doing more than teeter-
ing on the brink of collective SEATO miHtary intervention. The United States was 
unhappy about the details of the Laos Declaration with the prospect of a veto by one 
of the three members of the ICC. American representatives in Bangkok pointed out 
that "Laos was America's Rubicon. If it was crossed, the die is cast."'"' But this 
second Geneva settlement prevented the Rubicon from being crossed, and a crisis in 
American policy in South-East Asia was passed. The Geneva discussions pointed the 
way to some contraction of America's defence perimeter in the area and to the adop-
tion of a new bastion. Against Communist aggression, Vietnam became central and 
Laos peripheral to American policy. A precariously based three-headed monster with 
a low Hfe expectancy was attempting to get off its hands and knees in Laos. It faced a 
series of military coups and political crises which made stability virtually impossible. 
The contraction of SEATO protection in South-East Asia, the slow folding of the 
umbrella to exclude Laos, reflected the difficulties of collective action in the region. 
The Laos settlement threatened to produce a political vacuum there. Thailand was 
particularly sensitive to pressure from south China through Laos: ethnic frontiers 
with Laos were blurred, and dissident Thais settled in southern Yunnan, which 
became the centre of a Free Thai movement attempting to overthrow the govern-
ment in Bangkok. 
The deteriorating position of the composite government in Vientiane during the 
Geneva talks led Thailand to critically examine the effectiveness of the SEATO 
guarantee and to suggest that it constituted a liability to the anti-Communist 
movement in South-East Asia. Discussions with President Kennedy in April 1961 led 
to an American pledge that the United States would not permit the Communists to 
advance to the Mekong River boundary between Laos and Thailand or to seize any 
major Laotian centre. Continuing discussions between ThaHand and the State 
Department led to a strengthening of the guarantee by the Rusk-Khoman joint 
statement.'"* 
This statement involved a drastic reinterpretation of the SEATO obligation: 
members could be required to act individually if agreement could not be reached on 
collective action. This obligation under the Rusk-Khoman agreement meant that the 
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American obligation did not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to 
the treaty. This was a dramatic reinterpretation of the Manila treaty which could 
make it much more effective. Collective agreement on action had always been in-
hibited by the prospect of a French or even a United Kingdom veto. AustraHa im-
mediately endorsed the American decision, which appeared to convert SEATO from 
a paper tiger to a tiger with teeth. 
The settlement at the second Geneva conference on Laos had little effect on the 
internal situation. American troops were withdrawn by 7 October 1962, but the 
ICC was not able to verify the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces by the target 
date. The stability of the coalition government was threatened by a split in the 
neutralist group shortly after the Geneva conference ended. Quinim Pholsena was 
assassinated on 1 April 1965. This led to intra-party military fighting but not to any 
outside intervention. The SEATO Council meeting in Paris on 8-10 April 1963 
reaffirmed its support for the precariously based neutralist government in Vientiane. 
It continued to govern despite attempted coup d'etats and assassination. Neither 
Peking nor Hanoi attempted to intervene in the game of political chairs in Laos. 
The early months of 1962 had seen critical dedsions made affecting the treaty rela-
tionship with the United States and Australian defence: the reinterpretation of the 
SEATO commitment, the agreement to provide military instructors for Vietnam, 
and finally the Australian decision to establish a naval communications centre at 
North-West Cape in Western AustraHa. The three decisions form an important 
landmark in the relations between the two countries. 
The North-West Cape decision was made after high-ranking American defence 
experts visited Canberra for the eleventh meeting of the ANZUS Coundl on 8-9 
May. On 9 May Prime Minister Menzies announced the agreement, and a year later, 
on 22 May 1963, the House of Representatives passed a bill incorporating it for the 
leasing of twenty-eight acres (11.3 hectares) by the United States from AustraHa for a 
minimum of twenty-five years. The sixteen-article agreement was accompanied by 
an exchange of letters between the American ambassador and the Australian minister 
for External Affairs (7 May) defining the meaning of Article 3 of the agreement."" 
With the development of the inter-continental ballistic missile and the nuclear-
powered submarine carrying missiles with a range of between 2,250 and 4,600 
kilometres, it became important for the United States to have access to land bases 
which could communicate with its Polaris submarines. These were essential to enable 
Washington to send messages to submerged submarines about details of targets and 
instructions to attack. United States submarines were being deployed in the Indian 
Ocean to extend the offensive range of missile-carrying submarines into parts of the 
Soviet Union and of Sinkiang in southern China. It would also enable Washington 
to counteract a Soviet submarine fleet in the Indian Ocean. The most effective form 
of communication with submerged submarines was through very low frequency 
(VLF) transmitters. The 1963 agreement provided for the instaUation of a VLF 
transmitter on the tip of North-West Cape and for the development of a high-
frequency transmitting and receiving site for miHtary messages some fifty kilometres 
south.'"' 
The vital part of the agreement was contained in Article 3, which read: 
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(1) The two Governments will consult from time to time at the request of either Govern-
ment on many matters connected with the station and its use. 
(2) Except with the express consent of the AustraUan Government the station will not be 
used for purposes other than purposes of defence communication, and appropriate 
Australian authorities nominated by the AustraUan Government shall at aU times have 
access to the station. 
A basic principle — without which there would have been no base — was that " the 
station shaH be in the sole control of the United States". This was spelled out unam-
biguously in the exchange of letters that accompanied the agreement: 
Whereas this construction is not intended to restrict the Government of Austraha's right 
of consultation, it is intended to speU out clearly that consultation does not carry with it 
any degree of control over the station or its use. . . . it is clearly understood that consulta-
tion connoted no more than consultation and was not intended to establish AustraUan con-
trol over the use of the station nor to imply any Government of AustraUan design to 
restrict at any time United States Government use of the station for defence communica-
tions including, for example, communications for Polaris submarines. It is also understood 
that it was not intended to give AustraUa control over or access to the contents of messages 
transmitted over the station. 
Sir Garfield Barwick added: "Your memorandum is entirely in accordance with my 
understanding.' ' '" ' 
In the debate on the bill, Barwick repeatedly argued that the setting up of the 
North-West Cape base would increase the "individual and collective capacity of the 
ANZUS partners to resist armed attack". It would "significantly increase the capaci-
ty of the United States to perform its part of the ANZUS pact, and as well play its 
part in the maintenance of peace in the world generaUy. Use by Australian forces of 
the fadhties of the station will significantly increase their effectiveness both in train-
ing and wartime operations. It would enable Australia to perform its obligations as 
an ANZUS ally." '" ' 
The introduction of the bill brought to a head a heated debate that had long been 
taking place in the Australian Labor Party over the use of nuclear weapons and the 
need to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Southern Hemisphere. A special con-
ference of the federal executive in March 1963 decided by a 19 to 17 vote after a 
twelve-hour debate to endorse in general terms the government's decision to lease 
the base to the United States. Neither Calwell nor Whitlam (the leader and deputy 
leader of the parliamentary opposition) were debarred by party rules from voting. '" ' 
In opening the "momentous debate" ("because we are discussing an agreement 
for the estabhshment in peace time, of a miHtary instaUation by a foreign power") , 
Calwell quoted the ALP conference resolutions and then attacked the proposal 
because it meant the infringement of Australian sovereignty and because sole 
American control could involve AustraHa in a nuclear war without its consent and 
make it a probable target should a nuclear war take place. The second central point of 
Labor criticism was that it would "never agree that the great decisions of peace and 
war should be made for Australia by any other than the elected government of 
Australia". The left-wing minority in the ALP feared that the agreement "involved 
a total and irrevocable commitment to the United States policy . . . tying it hand 
and foot to the remote men in Wash ing ton" . "" 
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Although the government had only a majority of one in the House, the deep split 
in the ALP enabled it to carry the bUl. Whitlam declared that the party accepted the 
bHl as "a grim and awful necessity". It would, however, renegotiate the agreement 
should it win the next election. It was almost a decade before the ALP gained power 
and immediately reopened negotiations. 
The North-West Cape base agreement was one of the most momentous transac-
tions in Australian history and certainly a turning point in the evolution of the 
ANZUS alHance.'" The agreement had solid government backing, the support of 
the majority of members of the ALP (59 to 27 of the federal parHamentary party) and 
overwhelming pubHc support: a Gallup poH showed that 80 per cent favoured the 
building of the radio station."* The Age commented: "Whatever party is in office, 
Australia remains committed to the Commonwealth, to its American alHance, its 
United Nations obligations and to its newer strategic interests in South-East Asia. 
There can be no sudden withdrawal into a national shell and no rupture in its 
established alliances. The ANZUS treaty stands firm; it is only SEATO which the 
ALP party regards with displeasure."'" 
The West Australian base was the first of several United States defence satelHte 
facilities in Australia. Pine Gap was established under an agreement with 
Washington on 9 December 1966 and an agreement for a base at Narrungar was 
signed almost three years later. An American seismic station had been established at 
Alice Springs in 1955 as "part of a world wide system designed to observe the Soviet 
atomic test program". The Omega navigation station at Darriman in east Gippsland 
was a multi-purpose base designed partly to assist merchant shipping but also to 
communicate with United States missile-carrying submarines when fully submerged. 
All these stations have been suspect to the Australian Labor Party."* 
n Suez 
The Suez Canal meant vastly different things to the United States on the one hand 
and to AustraHa, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the other. Australian 
interests in the Middle East have traditionally been of two kinds, military and 
economic, with strong emotional overtones because Australian troops had fought in 
GalHpoH in 1915-16 and in the Western Desert in the Second World War. 
Australian and imperial defence planning in the first half of the twentieth century 
had been based on the assumption that Britain had defence responsibilities for those 
parts of the Commonwealth east of Malta and Suez. These could be met only if there 
were a string of imperial bases between London, Singapore, and Darwin which 
could make effective defence plans in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific 
Ocean areas. Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden, Colombo, and Singapore had been the 
normal naval and air bases regarded as vital to the safeguarding of the dominions east 
of Suez. Commonwealth security had been maintained through dominant British in-
fluence at key strategic points along what was regarded as the jugular vein of the 
Commonwealth. 
The gradual contraction of British influence in the Middle East and the changing 
pattern of the Commonwealth of Nations since 1947 modified the strategic interests 
of Australia in Egypt and the Middle East. India, Pakistan, and Ceylon became in-
dependent republics within the Commonwealth. This removed the shield of British 
protection from the northern top of the Indian Ocean. Her decision to withdraw 
from the Suez Canal zone on 17 July 1954, the evacuation of the last British troops 
on 13 June 1956, six weeks before the Suez crisis, and the revision of the Ceylon 
bases agreement with Solomon Bandaranaike in 1956 left the main line of strategic 
communications between London and Australia still further exposed. This led to a 
reassessment of Australian defence needs and responsibilities. On 1 April 1955 a 
revolutionary modification of Australian defence policy was effected with the ded-
sion to station Australian troops in Malaya. AustraHa tacitly made Malaya rather 
than the Middle East the pivot of Australian defence. Although this implied the 
abandonment of the Middle East as an Australian defence responsibility, it did not 
lessen Australian interest in poHtical changes in Egypt and the Middle East. 
Australia's main interests in the Middle East were economic rather than political 
or military. The oil reserves on which she could draw were located there; the forma-
tion of the Commonwealth Oil Refinery and the dependence of Royal Dutch Shell 
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on resources in the Middle East clearly indicated this. Much more important was the 
hard economic fact that a considerable part of her trade passed through the Canal. 
However, Suez was not as vital to the Australian economy as was thought. The 
alternative Cape route increased the sailing distance from Melbourne to London by 
only 888 kHometres. Only 12 per cent of Australian imports as compared with 43 
per cent of her exports went through Suez. The northward traffic from Australia 
was largely in wool, wheat, meat, fruit, and other primary produce.' Closure of 
Suez would not have catastrophic effects on Australian trade, would not strangle it, 
but merely cause inconvenience. About 23 per cent of her total trade would have to 
be deflected through other channels. The increase in freight charges would be about 
5 per cent. The considerable passenger traffic would have been hurt most. The vast 
majority of passengers travelled through Suez rather than round the Cape, partly 
because it was quicker and partly because there were few ports between the Cape and 
London. 
The Suez crisis of 1956 was touched off by the nationalization of the Suez Canal 
Company by Egyptian prime minister Gamal Abdel Nasser on 26 July. Although 
not a share-holder or a signatory of the 1888 Constantinople Convention which 
guaranteed free navigation of the canal, AustraHa was immediately affected because 
Australian trade valued at £900 milHon passed through the canal. The seizure of the 
canal threatened to increase canal charges and to convert transit rights into a poHtical 
weapon between Egypt and the Western powers. Australia shared the shocked sur-
prise in London and Washington that foHowed nationaHzation. Menzies shared 
Eden's view that " they could not allow Nasser to seize control of the canal in de-
fiance of international agreements". Dulles told the foreign secretariat at their first 
meeting in London that " a way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he 
was attempting to swallow. . . . W e must make a genuine effort to bring world 
opinion to favour the international operation of the canal."* The whole episode has 
been studied in detail elsewhere.' All that is necessary here is to examine its implica-
tions from the point of view of Australian-American relations. 
Eden has declared that 
the course of the Suez Canal crisis was decided by the American attitude to it. If the United 
States Government had approached this issue in the spirit of an ally they would have done 
everything in their power, short of the use of force, to support the nations whose economic 
security depended upon the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. They would have 
closely planned their policies with those of their alUes and held stoutly to the dedsions 
arrived at. They would have insisted on restoring international authority in order to in-
sulate the canal from the poUtics of one country. It is now clear that this was never the at-
titude of the United States Government. Rather did they try to gain time, coast along over 
difficulties as they arose, and improvise policies, each following on the failure of its im-
mediate predecessor.* 
From the beginning, the United Kingdom and the United States differed in assess-
ment of Nasser's intentions and of the appropriate means of dealing with the canal 
dispute when it was evident that identical or co-operative policies would afford the 
best method of deaHng with the situation by international action. Eden told Presi-
dent Eisenhower in January that the United Kingdom was prepared to fight in order 
to maintain her access to Middle Eastern oH. As soon as the crisis broke, he began to 
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make miHtary preparations in case force was necessary. When Dulles arrived in 
London for the eighteen-power meeting on 1 August, he told Eden that Eisenhower 
"was emphatic upon the importance of negotiation", but added, according to Eden, 
that "the President did not rule out the use of force". Dulles preferred not to be told 
the details of British preparations to intervene, although he "perfectly understood 
the purpose of [Britain's] preparations".' Eden seems to have assured himself that 
the United States would, in the long run, tolerate the use of force to make Nasser 
"disgorge what he was attempting to swallow". This was the one assumption that 
Eden was not entitled to make in the following weeks of American uncertainty and 
improvisation. Washington was anxious to localize the canal issue and separate it 
from the wider context of the Middle East and was extremely reluctant to use force 
at aH. It was not untH 4 September that Eisenhower finally came out emphatically 
against the use of force: 
For ourselves, we are determined to exhaust every possible, every feasible method of 
peaceftil settlement . . . and we beUeve it can be done, and I am not going to comment on 
what other people are doing. I am very hopeful that this particular proposal will be ac-
cepted, but, in any event, not to give up, even if we do run into other obstacles. 
We are committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute, nothing else.^ 
The statement was made in the middle of Menzies' mission to Cairo with shattering 
effect. 
Australian reactions to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company were 
almost unanimous in their condemnation of Nasser's "unprovoked act of interna-
tional brigandage".' The AustraHan cabinet met without the opportunity to discuss 
the issues fully with the prime minister, who had been abroad since 26 May. It 
adopted as the basic principle of Australian policy "freedom of passage through the 
Canal for all countries at all times without discrimination, reasonable charges and ef-
ficient operation".' There was a considerable identity of outlook between Canberra 
and Washington at this time if one excludes the issue of colonialism. The United 
States increasingly came to regard the conflict as one between a United Kingdom 
with a colonialist outlook and nineteenth-century concepts of imperial dominion, 
and the anti-colonialists with Nasser as their champion. The Australian Labor Party 
was anti-colonial in its approach but did not see the United Kingdom as a crusader 
for a dead imperialism. There was considerable Australian opposition to the use of 
force, of "gunboat diplomacy", as a means of settHng the Suez issue. 
The Australian cabinet left Menzies to formulate in detail the best method of deal-
ing with Nasser, of finding the best means of getting the canal functioning 
smoothly. Menzies was a close friend of Eden, passionately convinced of the value of 
the Commonwealth, and an ardent admirer of British values and methods. He was in 
Washington in early August. When Dulles returned from London on 4 August, 
Menzies learnt that the United Kingdom and France were considering the use of 
force despite American doubts of its wisdom. The following day he cancelled his 
flight to Tokyo ninety minutes before departure time and then flew to London. 
After discussions with Eden and foreign minister Selwyn Lloyd, he made a television 
appearance on 13 August, three days before the twenty-two-nation conference met at 
Lancaster House. He strongly attacked the legahty of Nasser's seizure of the canal. 
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The 1888 convention sought to estabHsh "a definite system designed to guarantee at 
aH times, and for aH the powers, the full use of the Suez Maritime Canal. . . . Nasser 
had violated the first principle of international law by using what would be a normal 
domestic power (to nationalize an industry) to violate what was a clear international 
obligation."' He spoke in the grand imperial tradition. 
The publication of R.G. Casey's diaries confirmed the widely held contemporary 
behef that the Australian cabinet was divided and that Casey was a critic of the prime 
minister's approach. Before Casey left Australia, he drafted a paper setting out his 
views on the Suez situation. He thought that it would be impossible to ensure Egyp-
tian performance in running the canal whHe it passed through Egyptian territory. 
"But we are entitled to believe", he wrote, "(at least untH the contrary is proven) 
that it will be possible to get by negotiation all that it would be possible to get by 
force." He was prepared, as a last resort, to "swallow an Egyptian Company undei 
an international commission empowered by treaty to direct policy and to take over in 
the event of non-performance''. He went on: "As to negotiations, it is my view that 
the United Kingdom should give Nasser some ice to slide on as regards the place of 
the conference and make it formally clear that the Conference will discuss ar-
rangements without pre-conditions."'" 
He told Menzies before he was to speak at the conference that "he should speak 
against the use of force to Anthony Eden. . . . it [the use of force] would put us 
completely in the wrong with public opinion in practically every part of the world". 
He repeated his views, which he said were personal and were not the general 
Australian cabinet view. "My attitude of mind did not correspond at all predsely 
with that of the U.K. — although there was a strong minority view in the U.K. 
Cabinet (the names of which I told him) which thought as I did. . . . I believed that 
our delegation should, if necessary, go to Cairo in order to have an opportunity of 
talking with Nasser personally."" The Menzies mission to Cairo in September was 
something entirely different. 
The Lancaster House conference produced agreement on a document to be 
presented to Nasser setting out proposals for a settlement. Eighteen of the twenty-
two nations attending signed the declaration, which was based very largely on an 
original Dulles draft. A committee of five was chosen to approach the Egyptian 
government to see whether it would agree to negotiate a convention on the basis of 
its views. The committee consisted of Australia, Ethiopia, Iran, Sweden, and the 
United States, with Menzies as chairman. L.W. Henderson, an under-secretary of 
the Department of State, was appointed as the American representative on the com-
mittee. There was a strong feeling that Dulles himself should have been a member. 
Whether he declined on the ground that it would be a loss of face to serve under a 
prime minister who was not his diplomatic equal is not clear. Menzies was summon-
ed to the American Embassy at 2.30 a.m. on 19 August and met with Dulles, Eden, 
Lloyd, and the American ambassador, who discussed the committee of five with 
him. Dulles said, "We want him as our chief spokesman, because he knows how to 
put a case." Menzies demurred because of his long absence from AustraHa and his 
desire to return. Cables from Eden and Dulles to the acting prime minister, Sit 
Arthur Fadden, led to unanimous agreement by the Australian cabinet that Menzies 
should accept the invitation and delay his departure to Canberra.'* 
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The mission to Cairo was almost doomed to failure from the beginning, and 
Menzies had no illusions about the difficulties it faced. As Menzies has said, "No 
chairman could ever have had a better committee."" He firmly repudiated the idea 
of any conflict between Henderson and himself and insisted that the committee had 
been unanimous in its findings. The crucial matter was, however, whether the Lan-
caster House conference's dedsion to appoint him as chairman was a wise one or one 
that may have prejudiced the success of the mission. Menzies was an unashamed ad-
vocate of British politices, an imperialist par excellence who had little sympathy with 
colonial powers. Despite his integrity and his very great gifts as an advocate, he was 
an unwise choice for an extremely delicate mission. 
Casey's suggestion that the venue for discussion might be left to Nasser led to the 
first meeting on 3 September in Cairo rather than in Geneva. Menzies regarded 
himself as carrying a warning to Nasser rather than merely a suggested basis for 
negotiation. He was impressed by "a patriotic Egyptian who had a strong sense of 
responsibility and of the gravity of the issue. Nasser was . . . obviously the master of 
his Government, of much inteUigence, but with some marks of immaturity and in-
evitable lack of experience. But he was impressive and clearly courageous." Menzies 
asked for a private talk with him and then expressed his views. "Nothing that I now 
say is to be regarded as a threat. I have no authority to make one, and I have no desire 
to make one." Reporting on the climate of opinion at the London conference, 
Menzies said, "I am merely saying to you, in a friendly way, that I believe that it 
would be a mistake to eliminate the possibility of force altogether from your mind. 
This is a completely spontaneous and individual observation from me, and I hope 
you will understand it in the spirit in which it is made." Menzies' view was that this 
frank conversation had shortened the odds for success from 1,000 to 1 to perhaps 100 
to 1. Menzies was conducting "his talks with customary candour and lack of cant". 
His growing optimism was shattered as he read over breakfast the Eisenhower state-
ment about American policy. The president rejected unconditionally and completely 
the use of force. This cut the ground completely from under the feet of the Menzies 
mission. Nasser was encouraged to reject the Dulles proposals and any watered-
down version of them and to write his own ticket.'* 
Menzies left Cairo on 6 September convinced that "there was no room left for 
negotiation, except at a disadvantage, and that France and England were left with a 
grim choice between surrender, or force". An unwise dinner engagement completed 
the destruction of the mission, which "departed from its visit to Cairo with nothing 
except a flea in the ear and dysentery"." Menzies presented his report and returned 
to Canberra after an absence of four months. 
Dulles, who "tended to think aloud publicly without fully realising the conse-
quences", came up with a delaying device, the formation of a canal users' associa-
tion. This proposal ultimately took a form rather different from the amorphous idea 
presented by Dulles and from the British suggestion that the association should have 
"teeth". Washington regarded it merely as a stalling device to delay miHtary action 
and so refused to give it teeth. Eisenhower told a press conference on 11 September, 
"This country will not go to war ever while I am occupying my present post unless 
Congress is called into session and Congress declares such a war. And the only excep-
tion to that would be in the case of unexpected and unwarranted attack on this 
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nation where self-defence itself would dictate some quick response while you call 
Congress into action." DuUes added an important footnote: " W e do not intend to 
shoot our way through. It may be we have the right to do it, but we don't intend to 
do it so far as the United States is concerned."" 
There was clearly a break in Western unity towards Egypt and the Suez Canal 
Users' Association slowly collapsed. The important difference between the United 
States and its Western allies came back to the basic reasons for the conflict between 
Egypt and the West. Washington reverted increasingly to its rather simpHstic view 
that the issue was primarily one of colonialism. 
Menzies returned to AustraHa on 18 September. There had been short statements 
by Casey setting out the broad prindples Australia supported for the navigation of 
the canal, but there had been no full-scale parliamentary debate on the broader issues 
involved or on the Middle East itself. There was uneasiness at the lack of consulta-
tion by Britain on vital matters of policy and about the negotiations themselves: 
Acting Prime Minister Fadden admitted that Australia had no foreknowledge of the 
canal users' plan. Public opinion was strongly in favour of supporting Great Britain 
as far as possible, but Australia boggled at the use of force. 
On 25 September, two days after the Suez dispute had been referred to the United 
Nations Security Coundl, Menzies outHned Australian policy to the House of 
Representatives. Taking his stand both as a lawyer and as a politician, he distin-
guished between the legal validity of nationalization and the justice and morahty of 
Nasser's action. He strongly defended the eigh teen-power London resolutions that 
he took to Cairo: "No fairer or more generous proposal ever emerged from a Con-
ference." Now that London and Paris had referred the issue to the United Nations, 
Australia had to dedde what action to take should the Security Coundl be dead-
locked. He described as a "suicidal doctrine" the argument that "force can never be 
employed (except presumably in self-defence) except by and pursuant to a dedsion of 
the United Nations Security Council"." Regarding the prospect of a deadlocked 
Security Council, he asked, "I face the choice in stark terms. . . . we can organize a 
full blooded programme of economic sanctions against Egypt, or we can use force to 
restore international control of the Canal, or we can have further negotiations pro-
vided we do not abandon vital principles, or we can 'call it a day', leave Egypt in 
command of the Canal, and resign ourselves to the total collapse of our position and 
interests in the Middle East." His own preference was clear: "avoid the use offeree 
if we can," but while "we are to seek peace at all times . . . we are not bound to 
carry that search so far that we stand helpless before unlawful action."" 
This extreme view was not shared by his cabinet and was bitterly attacked by 
Evatt and the ALP opposition in a heated debate. Evatt was totally opposed to the 
use of "fuH-blooded" sanctions against Egypt and gave complete support to United 
Nations action to solve the dispute. He was slowly moving towards the position 
Dulles finally adopted. Casey vigorously opposed the use of force. On 29 September 
he told Menzies: 
The use of force by the U.K. (except in retaUarion to the use of force by Egypt or some 
other physical provocation) would undoubtedly have the following consequences: 
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1. On the first shot being fired by the U.K., 75% of the countries of the world would 
forget completely the rights and wrongs of the Suez affair. 
2. A war would have been started that would involve the greater part of the Middle East 
— and might possibly develop into a world war. 
3. The Commonwealth would be spUt. Canada's attitude was, at best, very uncertain. 
India and Ceylon and probably Pakistan would be hostile and one or more of them 
was Ukely to leave the Commonwealth. 
4. The United States would probably not co-operate with Britain. 
5. Austraha and the countries of South and South-East Asia would be left in a condition 
of hostiUty and animosity to each other. 
6. The only country to gain from such a conflict would be Soviet Russia, whose 
influence must largely spread as a result. 
His final conclusion was that "the use of force (without going first to the U.N.) 
would destroy British and other Western influence and interests more quickly and 
more completely and permanently than any other thing that could happen"." 
Menzies was unmoved by Casey's argument, and by the end of September there 
appeared to be developing in Australia the unusual alignment of Menzies with Eden, 
and Casey with Evatt and Dulles (and perhaps even the British Labour Party). 
Menzies subsequently admitted that ' 'while taking a matter to the United Nations is 
seen by many of us as no more than a matter of procedure it has frequently been 
treated in high American drcles as the expression of a poHcy in itself".*" His govern-
ment, almost immediately after taking office in 1949, had reversed the priorities that 
Evatt had adopted towards the United Nations. 
Although it was dubious about the effectiveness of United Nations action, 
AustraHa supported the full draft of the original Anglo-French resolution, the first 
part of which finally emerged in amended form as the "six principles". The resolu-
tiori would have left the management of the canal to an international body with 
Egypt as a party to a new international convention but merely the instrument for 
"the operation, maintenance and development of the canal".*' After the Israeli 
attack on Egypt, the crunch for Australia came with the Anglo-French armed in-
tervention. The military decision was taken, and taken deliberately, without any 
consultation with other members of the Commonwealth or the United States, as 
Eden advised "we would have preferred to do this [consult the members of the 
Commonwealth]. Whatever the outcome of such consultation, it would have 
smoothed our path. On the other hand, however sharply pressed, such consultation 
was not possible within a matter of hours; it must take days at least. . . . We knew 
quite weU that, once palavers began, no effective action would be possible."** 
The Anglo-French attack on Egypt, which came as a bolt out of the blue, posed 
the dilemma that Australia (and New Zealand) had long feared but hoped to avoid: a 
vital clash of interests between the mother country and the United States, the new 
and powerful friend that had effectively replaced the United Kingdom in the Pacific. 
Menzies' reaction was inevitably support for the United Kingdom. It arose largely 
out of his deep respect for Britain as Australia's mother country. His authority as an 
imperial statesman was considerable and he had taken an important part in the earlier 
Suez negotiations. He was a close personal friend of Anthony Eden and had accepted 
his polides for dealing with Nasser. It was also based on some wrong assumptions 
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about the importance of the Suez Canal to AustraHa and for the Commonwealth as a 
whole. It had ceased to be the vital route for trade between AustraHa, the United 
Kingdom, and Europe. It is easier with hindsight to reaHze that it was no longer the 
jugular vein of Commonwealth defence between Southampton, Suez, and 
Singapore. 
Menzies was adopting a nineteenth-century view of Britain's role as a policeman 
beyond Suez and as the protector of the Asian and Pacific members of the Com-
monwealth. The contraction of British power here had begun long before Suez. It 
was accelerated after 1956 as Britain increasingly found that she could do little more 
than station token forces east of Suez. 
Britain and France vetoed a Yugoslav resolution in the Security CouncH calling for 
an emergency session of the General Assembly under the 1950 "Uniting for Peace" 
resolution. AustraHa abstained from voting as she had on the American resolution in 
the Security Council opposing the use of force in the Middle East: the resolution had 
been vetoed by Britain and France.*' On 2 November, Australia was one of the five 
powers (with Britain, France, Israel, and New Zealand) opposing the American 
resolution in the General Assembly urging "as a matter of necessity" an immediate 
cease-fire and a halt to the movement of further military forces and arms to the Suez 
area. Australia again abstained on Lester Pearson's resolution of the following day 
calling for the setting up of a United Nations emergency force. It was not surprising 
that the United Nations subsequently declined an AustraHan offer to provide troops 
for such a force. The United States used both the United Nations General Assembly 
and the secretary-general as instruments to secure a cease-fire after the Anglo-French 
forces withdrew. President Eisenhower condemned the invasion as unwise and im-
proper. There was icy American disapproval of the failure of Britain and France to 
consult the United States over an action "which gave Russia a propaganda plaster 
with which to cover up all its wounds in Eastern Europe".** (The Soviet Union had 
invaded Hungary on 30 October.) 
Both Eden and Menzies had miscalculated the impact of the invasion of Egypt and 
American reaction to it. "I did not foresee then that the United States Government 
would harden against us on almost every point and become harsher after the cease-
fire than before," Eden recalled in his memoirs. "I should have told the United 
States."*' The somewhat confused AustraHan voting in the Security Coundl and 
General Assembly reflected the division in the Australian cabinet and the .virtual 
ignoring of Casey by Menzies. Casey was faced with the difficult task of defending 
an Australian and British policy of which he only approved in part. He publicly sup-
ported the invasion "as an essential preHminary to the establishment of a United 
Nations Police Force in the Middle East".*' 
Australia and New Zealand were completely isolated in company with the three 
"aggressors" in the United Nations for the first ten days in November.*' Although 
Dulles had "understood" the AustraHan vote in the United Nations, relations were 
only slightly less cold than those with the United Kingdom. Casey regarded the 
breach in Anglo-American relations as "an unmitigated calamity" and was appalled 
by the spectacle in Washington and New York of "the Americans and Brirish unable 
to speak to each other . . . day by day for weeks".*' 
Menzies recognized the need for repairing the breach between the United States, 
SUEZ 277 
Britain, and AustraHa. "The free future of the world depends primarily upon mutual 
understanding and co-operative action between the people of the United States and 
those of the Commonwealth," he said in parHament. "This does not mean that 
either Great Britain or Australia, to take two instances, should simply subscribe to 
the American opinion of the moment. We have our own pride and independence and 
responsibUities." He was impenitent over the whole Suez episode, feeHng that the 
Americans would slowly come to reaHze the intention of British policy — "not war 
but the averting of war, not aggression but the effective settlement of disputes which 
could, if left to work themselves out, involve aU the peace-loving people of the 
world in the kind of conflict which they all hope honorably to avoid".*' 
The "re-building of the old bridges" with the United States was largely the work 
of Casey. In early November he visited Washington. "I was never more warmly 
received in the United States" and "I had every evidence that Australia still remains 
on terms of the closest intimacy with America and Britain," he noted. But he was 
unable to produce "any noticeable response from the United States".'" Brief and 
friendly talks were held at the meeting of the ANZUS Coundl on 17-19 November. 
The Americans maintained correct and outwardly friendly relations with the United 
Kingdom but did not take them into their confidence. The Americans "went to 
obvious trouble to be warm and forthcoming with Australia''. They were more con-
cerned about establishing or using existing bases in Australia, especially the 
Woomera rocket range, than with Australia's behaviour over Suez. Casey attempted 
to see President Eisenhower with a message from Menzies, but the appointment was 
canceUed and he had instead discussions with under-secretary Herbert Hoover, Jnr., 
and deputy under-secretary Robert Murphy. These were not very encouraging. 
Henry Cabot Lodge, America's permanent representative to the United Nations, 
with whom Casey had a close understanding, told him that he had been instructed to 
maintain a cool attitude to the United Kingdom untH the British "go out" of 
Egypt." It was months before any close co-operation became possible. Vice-
President Nixon's admission on 6 December contributed to an easing of tension. 
"We knew that our friends acted under great provocation and that their patience 
had been strained almost beyond endurance," he said. "We recognize that they 
were confronted with a series of aggressive acts short of the use of force, in addition 
to an ominous military build-up in a nation which they believed threatened their 
vital interests."'* 
The withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone led to a thaw in relations 
between London and Washington. The Bermuda Conference (21-24 March 1957), 
when Macmillan met Eisenhower, accelerated the return to normal: as the London 
Economist put it, "resentment had been written off, urbanity restored and good 
manners resumed"." The accord was made easier by the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
which was a belated recognition that the British assessment of the Middle Eastern 
situation during the Suez crisis had not been as wrong as the State Department had 
assumed. The president asked Congress for a blanket authorization "to employ the 
armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the ter-
ritorial integrity and political independence of any . . . nation or group of nations [in 
the Middle East] requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation 
controlled by international communism". He also sought authority to give 
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economic and military assistance to such Middle Eastern states as asked for assistance 
and to use up to $200 milHon of Mutual Security funds for these purposes. Dulles 
pressed for speedy congressional action to avoid the loss of the Middle East "in a 
great and maximum disaster" involving the "inevitabiHty of a world war".'* This 
attempt to bring stability to the Middle East was warmly welcomed by the 
Australian government. Revolutions in Syria and Jordan posed important problems 
for the State Department in applying the Eisenhower Doctrine but produced no 
serious issues affecting Australian-American relations." 
Despite the Menzies mission to Cairo and the close personal relationships between 
Eden and Menzies, Australian influence during the Suez crisis reflected the peripheral 
importance of Australia (and New Zealand) to the United States. At the same time it 
would be unwise to underestimate the influence of Casey in the post-Suez rather 
than the pre-Suez crisis. His reputation in the United States when he was the 
Australian minister (1940-42) was extremely high, and he did have access to the 
senior officials in the State Department and perhaps to the president. It is interesting 
to note his comments on American policy during the crisis: "The only people who 
know their own minds and are in position to get what they want are Egypt and 
Israel. The Americans seem to rely only on the United Nations and 
Hammarskjold."" 
18 Two Chinas? 
The proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 meant a severe 
diplomatic defeat for the United States, which had strongly supported Chiang Kai-
shek and the Nationalists. American concern at the spread of Communist influence 
contributed to its inclusion of the network of Dulles pacts when the peace treaty 
with Japan was signed. The Korean War intensified the growing fear of Chinese ex-
pansion in South-East Asia, an expansion variously interpreted as an imperialist at-
tempt to recover all the lost territories of the old Chinese empire or as an ideological 
crusade to build and enlarge a Communist power base in Asia. Increasingly 
Washington saw the Communist threat as coming from Peking rather than 
Moscow. In attempting to assess Chinese policies, the State Department was han-
dicapped by two things: firstly by the virtual destruction of its China section 
through the McCarthy hysteria, which removed most of the old China hands and 
left the interpretation of Chinese policies to relative amateurs in the area; secondly, 
the refusal to recognize the new regime meant that there were no American 
diplomats in China to assess trends and estabHsh first-hand contacts. The only con-
tact for many years was in Warsaw, where the American and Chinese ambassadors 
held a very limited dialogue. 
The major issues bedevilling Sino-American relations (other than the propaganda 
battle) for over two decades were the American attitude towards Taiwan, with the 
problem of the offshore islands; trade relations between the two countries; the 
recognition of the People's Republic of China by the United States; and the admis-
sion of Peking to the United Nations, where it would displace Nationalist China in 
the Security Council. 
Peking had adamantly refused to recognize Formosa/Taiwan as an independent 
state, claiming it to be an integral part of the People's RepubHc. After the Korean 
armistice and the growing shift in Communist policy to win the support of the anti-
coloniaHst movements, pressure increased for the "liberation" of Formosa. The 
United States assumed specific commitments to Formosa by signing a mutual defence 
treaty on 1 December 1954. Article V of the treaty resembled the corresponding 
article in the ANZUS Treaty except that it omitted the phrase covering an attack 
"on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific". The treaty was a 
response to the artillery bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu by Communist 
Chinese forces. These two islands, together with the Ta Chen and Nan Chi Shan 
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groups, were stiU held by NationaHst troops. As Communist threats were intensified 
early in 1955, President Eisenhower asked for and received from Congress on 29 
January authority "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems 
necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the 
Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection 
of such related territories of the area now in friendly hands and the taking of such 
other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defence of 
Formosa and the Pescadores".' The draft deliberately left vague the question of the 
status of the offshore islands. The United States made several attempts to persuade 
Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw from these islands, offering "very attractive in-
ducements".* Dulles succeeded only with the Ta Chen group, which was evacuated 
by 11 February. The rest of the islands remained an albatross round the American 
neck, as the Nationalists then regarded them as an essential to the defence of 
Formosa. 
The American defence treaty with Formosa was signed after the SEATO treaty. 
The Manila Conference defined the treaty area under Article VIII "to cover the 
general area of South-East Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian par-
ties, and the general area of the South-West Padfic, not including the Padfic area 
north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude". Formosa was deHberately excluded 
from it, as was also the British naval base at Hong Kong. The exclusion was in some 
ways arbitrary, given the American concept of the indivisibHity of security in the 
West Pacific. But it was the only way in which agreement could be secured with those 
states anxious to involve the United States in spedfic commitments in South-East 
Asia but differing from her in their polides towards Peking and Taipei. Article IV 
and V of the ANZUS Treaty set no geographical limits to "the Padfic area". To 
Australia and New Zealand, the question was whether an attack on American forces 
assisting the Nationalists in defending the offshore islands would involve them in 
that local conflict. Both Canberra and WelHngton qiuckly dedded that the ANZUS 
umbrella did not cover the Formosa area. 
Despite occasional alarums and excursions, no serious crisis took place over the 
islands until August 1958. On 2 May the assistant secretary of state, Walter S. 
Robertson, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "The Far East today is 
not all that we would like to see. . . . But I do believe there has been a turning of the 
tide."' But with the visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Peking (31 July-3 August), the 
situation changed. There were reports that the Soviet Union promised a supply of 
nuclear weapons and missiles to build up Chinese confidence against the nuclear-
equipped American air and naval forces in the Far East.* Three weeks later (on 23 
August, two days after the conclusion of the special session of the United Nations on 
the Middle East), Chinese artHlery began a bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu. 
Dulles immediately informed the acting chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, "These islands have been continously in the hands of the Republic of 
China, and over the last four years the ties between these islands and Formosa have 
become closer and their inter-dependence has increased. I think it would be highly 
hazardous for anyone to assume that if the Chinese Communists were to attempt to 
change this situation by force and now to attack and seek to conquer these islands, 
that could be a limited operarion. It would, I fear, constitute a threat to the peace of 
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the area." But this ambiguous statement did not really define America's position 
whether the Formosa resolution of 1955 might be invoked. Quemoy and Matsu 
were historically part of mainland China but were occupied by Formosa, an ally of 
the United States. The State Department was attempting to draw a fine distinction 
between an attack on the islands per se, which would not involve the United States, 
and an attack on the islands as stepping stones towards the invasion and conquest of 
Formosa itself. This would certainly involve the United States. 
The heavy Chinese build-up along the "invasion coast" and the development of a 
network of communications and airfields seemed to indicate that their objectives 
were not merely Quemoy and Matsu but Taiwan itself. After a discussion with 
President Eisenhower lasting for nearly two hours at Newport, Dulles announced 
that the United States realized that the protecting and securing of Quemoy and 
Matsu had increasingly become related to the defence of Taiwan. A presidential 
determination under the joint resolution of 1955 would be foHowed "by action both 
timely and effective". In a press conference with a "top government official" (in 
fact Dulles himself), he said that a decision had been taken to defend Quemoy and 
Matsu if the NationaHst garrisons were unequal to the task and that the bombing of 
the mainland might become part of the defence. But he dithered: in a later fencing 
match with the press he said that American treaty obligations were confined to the 
Pescadores and Formosa and did not include Quemoy and Matsu.' The Rubicon 
would in fact be the stretch of water between the two islands and Formosa. In a na-
tional broadcast. President Eisenhower declared that the bombardment of Quemoy 
was part of "an ambitious plan of armed conquest. . . . It would liquidate all of the 
free world positions in the western Pacific area and bring them under captive govern-
ments . . . hostile to the United States and the free world. Thus the Chinese and 
Russian Communists would come to dominate at least the western half of the now 
friendly Pacific Ocean." Firmly opposed to appeasement, he expressed the belief that 
the American people as well as its armed forces would be ready "to defend the prin-
ciple that armed force shall not be used for aggressive purpose".' 
This statement of American policy, the formulation of a new DuHes Doctrine, 
was based on the belieft "We do not consider the Communist Chinese hold on the 
mainland is to be accepted as a permanent fact of life and one of those inevitable 
things which we all have to accept and give way to. . . . I believe that it is in-
evitable, sooner or later, that the desire for personal freedom wiU manifest itself." It 
meant, in effect, that the United States had a responsibility to go it alone if necessary 
to oppose Communist aggression against Quemoy and Matsu, as part of its obHga-
tion "to stamp out the crime of Communist aggression in the Pacific".' 
Behind this tough American Hne was the Pentagon view that the offshore islands 
"had practically no military significance either to the Communist or the Nationalist 
Chinese. They had become a token." DuHes accepted this view that "they had no 
strategic or other real significance, but their retention by the Nationalist Chinese had 
become a highly important matter of/ace. . . . Communism had to be held and con-
tained at every point at which they were trying to inch forward."' This was before 
the second of Khrushchev's open letters to President Eisenhower (19 September) was 
received. It was so "abusive and intemperate" in tone that it was rejected by the 
White House and returned to Moscow. Khrushchev in this letter attacked the whole 
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basis of American policy in China. "An end must be put at once for aU to interven-
tion in China's internal affairs. . . . The American Fleet must be recalled from the 
Taiwan Strait and American troops must leave Taiwan and go home. This lacking, 
there can be no lasting peace in the Far East."' This firm Soviet view hardened the 
American line: 
(a) The United States cannot back down in the face of existing Communist Chinese 
miUtary pressure. . . . 
(b) If Peking increases pressure on Quemoy, the United States wiU have to increase the 
part they are playing, with consequent risk of progressive stepping up on both sides. 
(d) In any event, Formosa and the Pescadores must be held.'" 
Australia had vigorously opposed the inclusion of Formosa in the SEATO treaty 
area in 1954. It dissociated itself from any obligations that Australia had incurred 
under the ANZUS pact. AustraHa sympathized with the United Kingdom view that 
the offshore islands were part of mainland China. The distinction between the 
strategic line, which appeared to include them, and the jurisdictional line, which ex-
cluded them, was an important one. Menzies, after the Prime Ministers' Conference 
in London, distinguished between Formosa and the offshore islands, which Austraha 
felt "was not worth a great war". At the same time he sympathized with the 
American point of view. "The off-shore islands present a more difficult case, because 
their unconditional abandonment would not only intensify the truculence of the 
Communists but would also impair the morale of the non-Commimist Chinese in 
Formosa and South-East Asia, and of the free peoples throughout the area."" For 
this reason, he supported the American view that a naval and air umbreHa should be 
cast over the Formosan Straits. He preferred to find a solution to the problem 
through the United Nations so that the risk of a limited war developing into a global 
war could be avoided. 
After the Chinese Communist bombardment of Greater Quemoy on 23 August, 
the Australian government adopted a very low-key attitude. At the SEATO Council 
meeting in Bangkok in 1955, Dulles had declared that "the anti-Communist forces 
in South Korea and Formosa formed part of South-East Asia's defences".'* On 3 
September, Dulles called the SEATO ambassadors in Washington for a meeting so 
that the State Department could brief them about the American assessment of the 
situation. The assumption was that SEATO members were not directly impHcated. 
The president's message on 8 September, the fourth anniversary of the signing of the 
Manila treaty, simply stated that he was convinced that SEATO would stand firm 
against "an undiminished challenge" in the Far East." 
As criticism of American poHcy mounted at home and abroad, Dean Acheson 
warned: "We seem to be drifting, dazed or indifferent, toward war with China, a 
war without friends or allies, and over issues which the administration has not 
presented to the people and which are not worth a single American life."'* Dulles 
insisted that any attempt to interfere could have disastrous results, perhaps even forc-
ing the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's government. The issues were much wider than 
the fate of the two smaU islands. "What is involved," he said in a press interview, 
"and what is under threat is the entire position of the United States and its free 
world aUies in the Western Pacific. . . . what's at stake there are the vital interests of 
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the United States as well as the basic principle upon which world order is founded, 
which is that violence, force, shall not be used to acquire additional territory."" 
Australia was unquestionably one of America's allies that was most reluctant to be 
involved in a general war arising out of the Formosan crisis. On 10 September, 
Prime Minister Menzies told a press conference that the Australian government had 
no commitment to help defend the offshore islands should they be attacked and that 
Australia's commitments to mutual defensive action with American under the 
ANZUS pact excluded military operations in the Formosan region. He was express-
ing a personal view without consulting cabinet. Casey said in Washington after an 
interview with Dulles, "Our views are quite close on the Formosan situation."" 
The disturbing thing was that Australia had "no specific policy" according to 
Menzies. He was apparently refusing to make a public declaration of policy while 
diplomatic negotiations were in progress. The two general principles that Australia 
was supporting behind the scenes were that "there should be no encouragement to 
aggression as a means of establishing allegedly legal territorial claims", and that 
"there should be a settlement of all matters by peaceful negotiation"." Casey made 
these points in the United Nations General Assembly debate on 25 September but 
left the negotiations in the hands of the United States, the People's Republic of 
China, Nationalist China, and the Soviet Union. A meeting of the ANZUS Council 
was held on 1 October, and the joint communique declared that "the Communist 
resort to force and the threat of force constitute a serious threat to the peace of the 
area. . . . Armed force should not be used to achieve territorial ambitions." The 
three ANZUS members called on the Chinese Communists to discontinue their 
attacks on Quemoy and Matsu "as a first step in a peaceful settlement"." 
The ANZUS declaration followed intensive diplomatic activity inside and outside 
the United Nations to secure a formula that might prevent further conflict and at the 
same time enable the United States and the People's Republic of China to retreat 
gracefully from an increasingly dangerous and untenable position. Selwyn Lloyd 
urged Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko to exercise restraint over Peking, and 
both he and the French prime minister urged Dulles to adopt a more cautious policy. 
Casey and the New Zealand foreign minister also used their influence with Dulles in 
favour of moderation. 
On 1 October, the day of the ANZUS Council meeting, Dulles began a 
diplomatic retreat. What he called a clarification of American policy stated clearly 
that the United States had no legal commitment to defend the offshore islands and 
"no commitment of any kind to assist Chiang Kai-shek to return to the mainland". 
While the United States had not approved of the concentration of NationaHst forces 
on Quemoy and Matsu, it had not urged their withdrawal because to have done so 
would have undermined NationaHst morale and at the same time appeared as "a 
retreat under fire". "If there were a cease fire in the area which seemed to be 
reasonably dependable, I think it would be foolish to keep these large forces on these 
islands."" The increased flexibihty in American policy foHowed the reopening of 
the Warsaw talks between the American and Chinese ambassadors to Poland at the 
suggestion of Premier Chou En-Lai. The line of communication was opened after 
months of silence, but whether there were any fruitful discussions there is not clear. 
Both ambassadors started from the old prepared positions. American success in 
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preventing the seating of Communist China by the thirteenth General Assembly of 
the United Nations made it easier to work out an acceptable settlement. 
Mao Tse-tung decided to suspend the bombardment of the offshore islands for one 
week "out of humanitarian considerations". This paved the way for a de facto cease-
fire. On 25 October this was modified to provide for a bombardment on alternate 
days of the month on condition that American naval vessels refrained from escorting 
Nationalist supply ships. A few days earlier (21-23 October), DuHes flew to Taiwan 
and had discussions with a granitic Chiang Kai-shek. His tough stance led Chiang to 
publicly renounce the use of force to recover the mainland and adopt peaceful 
measures to implement Sun Yat-sen's three "people prindples" of "nationalism, 
democracy and social well being". He tried to persuade Chiang to evacuate Quemoy 
and Matsu, but subsequently told the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "There is 
no way in the world that I know of to make them to feel that way."*" The 
bombardment gradually ceased and Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu were 
thinned out. Crop failures and internal poHtical difficulties led Peking to desist from 
further military action. 
Australia and New Zealand had both adopted a low posture during August-
October and showed little incHnation to publicly back American poHcy on the off-
shore islands issue. This was part of the diplomatic methods of Casey and Menzies: 
to have no public arguments with allies but to make private representations. How far 
this led to the adoption of a milder line by Dulles is not clear: the real diplomatic 
clout was possessed by London and Ottawa and Paris rather than by Canberra and 
Wellington. The relative pubhc silence of both Australia and New Zealand under-
lined Dean Acheson's comment that the United States was drifting toward war with 
China, "a war without friends or alHes". There was a considerable area of common 
ground between Australia and the United States, especially over the "acquisition of 
territory by force of arms". West New Guinea was becoming a serious problem for 
Australia, and quiet Australian support for American policy over Quemoy and 
Matsu following military backing in Korea could form important precedents for an 
American quid pro quo should Indonesia attempt to occupy West New Guinea. Casey 
saw the wider implications of the off-shore island dispute: "There has been a 
demonstration by the United States that they propose to stand firm by the prindple 
of contesting the use of force to gain territory. The fact that the United States has 
stood firm on this matter of principle will give heart and courage to many small 
countries which might otherwise have been the targets of the expansive aggression of 
either Soviet Russia or Communist China."*' He might have added that the crisis 
was also a test of the strength and value of the network of Pacific security pacts with 
the United States. 
Unlike the United Kingdom and India, AustraHa refused after the election of 1949 
to establish diplomatic relations with Peking. The Chifley government had gone so 
far as to select a tentative site for an Australian embassy in Peking but held back 
because of the possible electoral impact of recognition.** Evatt had already indicated 
(25 October) that AustraHa, the United Kingdom, and the United States were 
agreed that recognition was not possible unless "the Government which is set upon 
1 October is, in fact, in control of the area it claims; it is, in fact, prepared to, and 
capable of, carrying out its international obHgarions; and it is a government sup-
TWO CHINAS? 285 
ported by the free wiH of the majority of the peoples it rules".*' In fact, Britain 
wanted specific assurances that the territorial integrity of neighbouring countries, 
notably Hong Kong, would be respected. Evatt therefore declared that in the cir-
cumstances "recognition cannot be granted any more than admission to the United 
Nations could be granted".** It looked as if Evatt and Chifley were as united on the 
issue as the United Kingdom and the United States. The loss by the Labor party at 
the New Zealand election a week before Menzies defeated the Chifley-Evatt govern-
ment led to the abandonment of proposals for recognition. The new government 
was elected partly on an anti-Communist platform and refused to consider recogni-
tion. Any lingering doubts about Australian poHcy were dispelled by the Korean 
war. On 30 July 1953 the prime minister declared unequivocally, " T h e question of 
recognition of Communist China does not even arise until the peace in Korea has 
been made."*' 
There was a growing body of opinion in Australia that a less rigid policy would 
pay dividends, that recognition was possible provided that Chinese policy showed 
itself "co-operative and non aggressive". " I t is a matter of dealing with existing 
facts and reaHties," the Melbourne Argus noted, "no t of cHnging to prejudices and 
congealed political attitudes of the cold war. Much as we disHke Peking, it would 
accord with the facts and realities if we agreed with the British view, that having 
estabhshed effective control of China, it must be accepted, recognised and negotiated 
with by the rest of the world."* ' The Australian refusal to recognize Peking lent 
colour to the view that while Canberra might propose, Washington disposed on 
many questions of Padfic poHcy. 
American opposition to diplomatic recognition was based on the conviction, after 
a stunning poHtical defeat in 1949, that recognition would bring no tangible benefits 
to the United States or its allies and that it would materially assist in the extension of 
Communist influence in Asia. This view was based on the assumption that the 
Communist victory of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in 1949 was merely a passing 
phase in the struggle for power in China. The United States had been involved 
diplomatically in this struggle and felt that the 1949 reverse was a temporary one. 
The refusal of recognition would help to topple a shaky regime in Peking. The 
American arguments were set out in detail in a State Department memorandum of 
11 August 1958. 
The basic considerations on which United States policy toward China rests are twofold. 
First the Soviet bloc, of which Communist China is an important part, is engaged in a life-
long struggle to destroy the way of Ufe of the free countries of the world and bring about 
the global domination of communism. The Chinese Communist regime has made no secret 
of its fundamental hostiUty to the United States and the free world as a whole nor its 
avowed intention to effect its downfall. Today its defiance of and attacks on the non-
communist world have reached a new level of intensity that has not been witnessed since 
the Korean war. The second basic factor is that East Asia is pecuUarly vulnerable to the 
Communist offensive because of the proximity of the free countries of that area to Com-
mimist China, the inexperience in self-government of those which have recently won their 
independence, their suspicions of the West inherited from their colonial past, and the 
social, poUtical, and economic changes which inevitably accompany their drive towards 
modernisation.*' 
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In many ways this was pure McCarthyism projected into the international arena. 
"Recognition of Peking would seriously hinder accompHshment of [national 
interests] and would facilitate the advance of Communist power in Asia." 
This analysis and these arguments dovetailed into the political phHosophy and the 
ideology of the Menzies government. It also strengthened that government and con-
tributed to its long-term electoral victories by splitting the Australian Labor Party in 
1955. The conservative wing of the party, largely Irish CathoHc and influenced by 
B.A. Santamaria and the National Civic Council, broke away to form the splinter 
group, the Democratic Labor Party. At the same time there were reservations about 
the value of the anti-Peking Hne in the Liberal-Country Party government. Casey 
was privately impressed by the "very considerable change for the better in the condi-
tion of China and the weU-being of the Chinese people" effected by the new Com-
munist regime as early as August 1951.*' He accepted the Canadian view that 
Chinese territorial ambitions were aimed at the recovery of "all the land areas that 
had, at one time or another, been Chinese — Formosa, Manchuria, Mongolia, 
Tibet, Turkestan and the Tonkin Delta of Vietnam — the latter possibly as a puppet 
state. They'd also want to have a dominating influence in Korea, and would even 
contest the U.S.S.R. to get this. . . . (All this corresponds pretty well with what 
Panikkar once said to me — that China would want to recover aU "the chopstick 
countries".)*' 
Shortly after the Manila conference about South-East Asia, Casey expressed the 
view in his diary that "it would be in the general interest to recognise Peking and 
get her into the United Nations". "To continue to regard Chiang Kai-shek as 
'China' was quite unreal." The Canadian government agreed with Casey and feh 
they should watch for "the first moment at which it would be politically expedient 
. . . to recognise Peking".'" But Casey's private views and those of Canada were not 
shared by the AustraHan government, which felt that it must support the United 
States policy of non-recognition. While the Department of External Affairs was con-
cerned about the absence of any effective contact with Peking, the Australian cabinet 
believed that recognition by Australia would impose an unacceptable strain on the 
American alliance. The Commonwealth heads of government in 1958 felt that "to 
press for recognition now would be to incur too high a price, and the price could 
well be at this stage of affairs a fracturing of Western alHances and could possibly 
mean a shattering of the framework of the United Nations"." 
The AustraHan government firmly refused to concede even de facto recognition to 
Peking. There were high moral overtones in the early official pronouncements with 
their insistence that China should "fulfil its international obHgarions". The Roman 
Catholic Church in AustraHa was implacably opposed to any concessions to Peking, 
and it would have been politically embarrassing to the government to modify its 
attitude. Much more important was a reluctance to diverge too much from 
American policy for fear that the alliance might be weakened. AustraHa was able, 
however, to differentiate between politics and trade and felt that trade should be 
colour-blind. Australia trade with China, mainly in wool and wheat, steadily ex-
panded during the fifties. On 31 May 1959, the acting prime.minister and minister 
for Trade, John McEwen, stated in a television interview that Australia would even-
tually recognize the Chinese Communists as the de facto government of the Chinese 
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mainland but declared that recognition had nothing to do with trade policy. There 
was a considerable fluttering in the poHtical dovecotes, and two days later McEwen 
amphfied and modified his statement when challenged by Santamaria, the secretary 
of the National CathoHc Rural Movement. Denying any shift in Australian policy, 
he said that "if the present Government of mainland China remained the Govern-
ment — and it certainly appeared that was likely — then in due course, at some point 
of time, the fact would be recognized by all countries as it has already been recogniz-
ed by the United Kingdom and most great powers". He added, "Considerations of 
high policy will continue to decide our attitude to political recognition of mainland 
China."'* 
These "considerations of high policy" were hinted at by Menzies in London and 
then by Casey in a long statement to the House of Representatives on 13 August. 
Denying that a regime's capacity to govern is the sole criterion for recognition by 
other governments, he insisted that the decision was one to be made in the Hght of a 
country's national interests. Peking rejected the concept of two Chinas and would 
accept diplomatic recognition only on condition that their sovereignty over Formosa 
was also recognized. This was a condition unacceptable to Australia because of its 
international consequences. Australia believed that the people of Formosa had the 
right to determine their own future, and a withdrawal of support for Formosa as a 
consequence of the recognition of Peking would strengthen Communist influence 
throughout South and South-East Asia. 
A consequence of recognition by AustraUa would be a fundamental breach of policy bet-
ween AustraUa and the United States. . . . The most important military counterpoise to 
Communist China is the United States. Australia and her alUes want the United States' 
presence in the Western Pacific region for their collective defence. . . . Recognition by 
AustraUa at this time could be exploited by Peking in such ways as to affect adversely at-
titudes in Asian countries towards, and confidence in. United States policies and objectives 
(Casey). 
There were no trading advantages in recognition. The "considerations of high 
policy" were obvious. "This simply amounts to the fact that recognition of Peking 
by Australia would clearly affect profoundly Australian-American relations". This 
was a considerable shift in the arguments of 1951 with their emphasis on morahty 
rather than pragmatisim and security. The onus for non-recognition was thrown 
back on Peking: "The reasons for our Australian attitude have been created by the 
Peking Government itself and not by us and others. . . . It is not a slamming of the 
door for aU time (Casey)." This view was confirmed by the deterioration in Sino-
Indian relations as border disputes developed a few weeks later, disputes that 
culminated in the Sino-Indian war of 1962." 
Australian concern over Chinese expansion deepened when the Indonesian Commu-
nist Party aligned itself with China and the Jakarta-Peking axis developed. Indonesia 
was an "ally of the first importance". "Indonesian prestige in the Moslem world is 
helpful to China," Sir Robert Scott wrote in Australian Outlook. "Indonesia is an 
example of the type of buffer state China would like to see established all over the 
area; and strategically Indonesia's position, separating the Pacific from the Indian 
Ocean, could be important for China."'* The danger largely disappeared with the 
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Indonesian military coup in 1968, which shattered the Indonesian Communist Party. 
In 1966 Australian reopened its embassy at Taipeh in Taiwan, largely to indicate that 
it had no intention of abandoning the Republic of China. The decision was taken by 
Prime Minister Harold Holt without the knowledge of the minister for External 
Affairs, Paul Hasluck." Hasluck rationaUzed the decision in the House of Represen-
tatives in terms of the expansion of trade and travel and the need to strengthen Na-
tionaUst morale. It involved a deliberate refusal to estabUsh diplomatic relations with 
Peking and instead to formalize relations with the second China. 
Hasluck strongly supported a tough policy towards Peking: "Peking must make 
moves that indicate a readiness to live in harmony with its neighbours and to accept 
international obUgations and enter into arrangements for their effective 
performance."'* His support for the reopening of the Taipeh embassy was probably 
the result of discussions with the United States. Washington argued that AustraUa's 
insistence on the recognition of Formosan independence as a condition for any change 
in the status of Peking would be more convincing if there were an Australian 
embassy in Taipei." Hasluck was severely criticized for his policy by a section of the 
Australian press. The Australian said in an editorial that Hasluck's comments "once 
again demonstrated the Government's ambivalent attitude towards a country with 
which the future shape of Asia is irrevocably bound up" . It went on: "He demands 
a standard of conduct by China as a pre-requisite to its membership of the United 
Nations that he does not expect of other countries with totalitarian regimes. . . . 
We must not forget our end of the bargain — for equally obstructive to an accom-
modation with China is the attitude of the Western nations that it was one of the 
world's untouchables."" The alternative to the Hasluck policy was to follow the 
British rather than the American policy towards Peking: open, direct contacts with 
the Communist Chinese government. 
Recognition of Peking had become inextricably bound up with the question of ad-
mitting the People's Republic to the United Nations. Formosa again lay at the heart 
of the problem: China was a permanent member of the Security Council, but its seat 
was occupied by the Nationalist government. The Soviet attempt to remove For-
mosa through the use of the credentials committee failed in 1950 and received little 
support later. When the Communist Chinese participated indirectly in the Korean 
war it would have been political suicide for any government contributing troops to 
the United Nations force in Korea to press for the seating of Mao Tse-tung's regime 
in the Security Council. 
The Evatt majority in the Australian Labor Party began to press for the seating of 
Peking in the United Nations in 1955. Leslie Haylen argued that "America's desire 
to preserve Taiwan's position cannot stand: Taiwan is part of China. The Cairo 
Declaration laid it down that Taiwan should be returned to China."" After the 
withdrawal of Formosa from the United Nations, a plebiscite could be held to enable 
the Formosan people to decide their own future. Arthur CalweU in August 1959 
argued in favour of a two-Chinas poUcy, insisting that AustraUa had the right to tell 
the Peking government that it had no judicial control over Formosa.*" The hard fact 
was that such a policy was totally unacceptable to Peking. The expansion of 
AustraUan exports to Communist China increased pressure for both recognition and 
the admission of Peking to the United Nations. At the height of the Matsu-Quemoy 
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crisis, a Gallup poll found that 48 per cent of those polled favoured admission of 
Peking to the United Nations as compared with 29 per cent opposed, with voters in 
both major poHtical parties expressing similar views. But the assumption was that 
Formosa would remain a member. The percentage in favour of admission was halved 
when it was reaHzed that there could not be two Chinas in the United Nations.*' 
The United States was adamantly opposed to the seating of Peking at the expense 
of Formosa. It felt it essential to find a formula that would retain Formosa under 
American protection. To preserve Western unity, it was necessary to oppose Com-
munist China's admission to United Nations. Communist China made no attempt 
to assist its supporters by accepting the principles of the United Nations or at least 
paying lip service to them. The portmanteau agreement in 1955 to admit sixteen 
new members to the United Nations increased the difficulties of the United States in 
securing the necessary majority to prevent a full-scale debate on the issue. It was 
important to win support for the non-admission policy and at the same time to 
maintain support among the faithful. This meant increasing emphasis on the danger 
posed by Communist China's expansionist policies in South-East Asia. In 1958 the 
State Department circulated to its diplomatic missions a memorandum on the 
recognition of China. The memorandum explained non-recognition as part of 
American policy to neutralize the threat of an aggressive communism which could 
have serious consequences for Australia and New Zealand. ' 'Loss of the islands of the 
West Pacific and of the South-East Asian Peninsula would isolate these countries and 
place them in a strategically exposed and dangerous position."** To Australia and 
New Zealand this was not a new argument and they were capable of making their 
own assessments of the danger, assessments which did not differ greatly from the 
American. But there is no evidence to suggest, as Trevor Reese does in Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States, that through ANZUS and SEATO the United 
States hammered its argument until "by the 1960s the Australian and New Zealand 
governments had accepted it wholly, almost invariably based their foreign policy 
speeches on it, and committed themselves without quaHfication to the straightfor-
ward, security-consdous, anti-communist view of Asia and the Pacific".*' What 
was happening was the merging and consolidation of views about the recognition of 
Peking and its admission to the United Nations. They became inseparable. 
What the Australian press, and to a lesser extent the Australian government, 
realized was that what was really involved was "not whether, but how and when, 
China should be recognized": "On our side, sooner or later, it wiU have to be 
admitted that the Chinese regime in Formosa no longer represents China."** But 
public opinion lagged behind the press and considerable academic opinion on the two 
questions of the recognition of Peking and its admission to the United Nations. A 
Gallup poll in August 1960 showed that those favouring admission had dropped 
from 48 per cent in 1958 to 39 per cent and those opposing admission had risen from 
29 to 42 per cent. Tibet and the border tension between India and China were large-
ly responsible for renewed public doubts about Peking's objectives in southern and 
south-east Asia. Only 21 per cent favoured admission to the United Nations if this 
involved the exclusion of Formosa.*' 
When Sir Garfield Barwick became minister for External Affairs, he regarded the 
twin problems of recognition and admission as problems to ' 'be faced in consultation 
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with our aUies". During his last years in office, Barwick stated his belief that "our 
long term foreign policy should look forward to a day when China shall once again 
enjoy her ancient place among the nations of the world. How speedily that day 
arrives wiH fortunately be more of her making than ours."*' There was evidence that 
China's "wilful behaviour" cast doubts on her bona fides in seeking to become a 
member of the United Narions. Hasluck told the House of Representatives in March 
1965: "So long, however, as the Peking regime continues to threaten the Chinese 
Nationalist Government and the people of Formosa, to promote the export of 
revolution abroad and to construct nuclear weapons to back these polides contrary to 
the overwhelming voice of world opinion, one can hardly expect this regime to help 
to solve any of the major problems fadng the United Nations."*' 
The escalation of the war in Vietnam inevitably affected the Australian govern-
ment's attitude towards Peking and strengthened the hard line adopted during the 
late fifties. Australian support for American intervention in Vietnam and its own 
commitment of troops was based on the belief that it was imperative to contain 
China. Menzies justified the dispatch of an infantry battalion to Vietnam on the 
grounds that the attempted Communist takeover of South Vietnam ' 'must be seen as 
part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Padfic oceans". This 
was a recurrent theme used to justify Australian intervention. "What is happening 
in South Vietnam today is perhaps only the first round of an attack by the Com-
munist Chinese to dominate the world."*' It seemed to be part of a pattern of ag-
gression: the Sino-Indian War, support for Indonesia over West Irian, and confron-
tation in Malaysia. 
Australian political leaders had also argued against both recognition of Com-
munist China and its admission to the United Nations on the ground that the 
government was unstable and incapable of fulfilling its commitments as a member of 
the United Nations community. The Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the ex-
cesses involved in the internal struggle for power lent colour to this view. There 
were renewed demands from Peking for the expulsion of the Republic of China from 
the United Nations and all its agencies. It made impossible demands on the United 
Nations. On 29 September 1965, Marshal Chen Yi, vice-premier and foreign 
minister, said, "The United Nations must rectify its mistakes and undergo a 
thorough reorganisation and reform. . . . Among other things it should cancel its 
resolution condemning China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as ag-
gressors and adopt a resolution condemning the United States as the aggressor. . .. 
aU independent States should be included in the United Nations; and aU imperialist 
puppets should be expelled."*' Neither Australia nor the United States responded 
favourably to such bullying tactics. 
As the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution died down, the People's Republic of 
China began cautiously to re-estabHsh Hnks with the outside world. This was accen-
tuated by the clash with the Soviet Union. The deteriorating Western position in 
Vietnam and the decision by Lyndon B. Johnson not to stand at the 1968 presidential 
election pointed the way to a shift in American policy, a shift that led to a slow 
revision in Australian policy. 
Feeling in Australia was beginning to change in 1968-70. A Gallup poll in 1968 
found that 54 per cent were in favour of admitting the People's Republic to the 
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United Nations, while 19 per cent were against admission, and a high 27 per cent 
had no opinion.'" The Australian Labor Party had been strongly in favour of 
recognition since the right-wing Democratic Labor Party broke with it in 1955. 
Farming interests — wheat and wool — represented in the Country Party also began 
to move towards recognition when the Australian Wheat Board failed for the first 
time in ten years to negotiate a contract with the Chinese government. 
By 1970, as Hedley BuH has pointed out, "aH four factors which had shaped the 
government's China policy had ceased to operate"." AustraHan troops were being 
withdrawn from Vietnam, and China was mending its fences with its neighbours as 
the Cultural Revolution had collapsed and the new threat was seen as coming from 
the Soviet Union. The increasing toughness of the Chinese over wheat contracts was 
reflected in the refusal to sign with Australia and a substantial purchase from Canada 
almost immediately after Canada recognized the Communist Chinese government. 
Finally, the United States was rapidly revising its policy towards Peking. President 
Richard Nixon was examining the bases of America's East Asian policy as part of the 
Guam Doctrine announced in 1970. The United States secretary of state, William 
Rogers, addressed the National Press Club in Canberra on 8 August 1969 and hinted 
at the new thrust of American policy: "Communist China obviously has long been 
too isolated from world affairs. This is one reason why we have been seeking to open 
up channels of communication. . . . Just a few days ago we liberalised our policies 
toward purchase of their goods by Arnerican travellers and towards validating 
passports for travel to China. Our purpose was to remove irritants in our relations 
and to help remind people on mainland China of our historic friendship for them." 
A liberahzation of trade in "such goods as food and pharmaceuticals" could be the 
thin end of the wedge. "We nevertheless look forward to a time when we can enter 
into a useful dialogue and to a reduction of tensions," he said. "We would welcome 
a renewal of talks with Communist China." 
But the Australian government failed to read the signs, and it was not until 15 
April 1971 that Prime Minister William McMahon announced that his government 
would seek an accommodation with "Continental China" but at the same time 
regard the preservation of the independence of Taiwan as a matter of first priority.'* 
Three months later, the State Department announced that Dr Henry Kissinger had 
been in Peking from 9 to 11 July; Gough Whitlam and his ALP colleagues visiting 
Peking had no hint that their paths had crossed with Kissinger's. It was also 
announced in July that President Nixon himself would be going to China in the near 
future. The Australian government was caught flat-footed. 
The device for excluding Peking from the United Nations was to treat its admis-
sion to the United Nations as an "important question" requiring a two-thirds 
majority. This procedure had been adopted for nearly twenty-six years with the full 
support of AustraHa and the United States. Each year the "Albanian resolution" 
sought to replace Taipei by Peking as the lawful representative of China: Australia 
and the United States invariably voted against it. But in the late sixties, partly 
because of the increase in membership of the United Nations and partly because of 
the growing influence of the Afro-Asian group of seventy-seven, it became more and 
more difficult to defeat the Albanian resolution and muster sufficient support on the 
two-thirds majority rulei In 1970, the Albanian resolution for the first time secured a 
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simple majority (51 to 49 with 25 abstentions). The United States saw the writing 
on the wall and as a first step adopted the two Chinas policy, which would have 
seated both Peking and Taipei, even though it reaHzed that the policy was unaccep-
table to Peking. This was part of a rearguard action to protect the interest of a state 
with which it had a mutual security treaty. Australia stUl clung to a two Chinas 
policy, hoping to protect the interests of those Chinese in Taiwan who feared incor-
poration and perhaps repatriation to the mainland. 
The issue of Chinese representation was finally resolved by the General Assembly 
on 25 October 1971. The Albanian resolution — to "restore aU its rights to the 
People's RepubHc of China, and to recognise its government as the only legitimate 
representatives of China in the United Nations and to expel the representatives of the 
Republic of China" — was adopted by 76 to 35 (including Australia) with 17 
abstentions. The attempt of Australia and the United States to prevent the expulsion 
of Chiang Kai-shek except by a vote under the two-thirds rule was defeated 55 to 59 
with 15 abstentions. The Australian delegation reported that it shared the "growing 
feeling in the international community, so . . . that the PRC, a nuclear power and 
the most populous nation on earth, should no longer be excluded from the United 
Nations"." The report also set out the Australian grounds for opposing member-
ship for the Republic of China. They included that expulsion would be "incompati-
ble with the concept of universality, contrary to the provisions of the Charter and set 
an undesirable precedent". The United Nations vote slightly speeded up negotia-
tions to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China, begun in May 
1971. But formal recognition did not take place until after the Australian elections of 
2 December 1972. The Whitlam government negotiated recognition on 22 
December, immediately after its electoral victory.'* 
An important weapon in the attempt to contain Chinese expansion was the trade 
embargo. Reacting to Chinese intervention in the Korea War, the United Nations 
adopted a resolution in 1957 calling on members to stop shipping strategic materials 
to China. In September 1952 the United Nations set up the spedal China Commit-
tee to co-ordinate the attempt of members to carry out the resolution. A tighter 
strategic list was drawn up to apply to China, a list more restrictive than that apply-
ing to the Soviet Union or other Communist countries." 
The United States was one of the first members to implement the United Nations 
resolution. In June 1951 the Kem amendment to a routine appropriations bill 
provided that all economic and finandal aid would be withheld from any country 
exporting to the Soviet Union or its satellites any arms, armaments, miUtary 
material, articles which could be used in manufacturing military equipment or 
articles embargoed by the United States for security reasons." Widespread opposi-
tion to the Kem amendment resulted in the passage of the Battle Bill, which gave to 
the administration wide powers to grant partial exemption or exceptions in the 
interest of national security. It was recognized in fact that a complete embargo was 
unenforceable and that some trading with China was inevitable. The Battle Act was 
finally approved on 26 October 1952. 
AustraHa established close Hnks with the China Committee and supported the 
Battle Act. The revolt against the China "differential" developed in Western 
Europe, where many NATO countries felt that it was handicapping their trade pro-
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spects. Britain was the most vocal critic of the differential, partly because of its grain 
imports from the Soviet Union and partly because the cutting off of Malaya's rubber 
market in China was causing heavy losses to the colony. By May 1955, European 
pressure had built up against the differential embargo. Most China Committee 
members followed the British lead towards equalizing and unifying the strategic 
materials Hst. In July 1957 Japan followed the European countries. The strategic Hst 
was then pruned considerably in the next eighteen months. By the beginning of 1959 
it was possible to export civil aircraft, engines, and many machine tools to China. 
The United States continued its total ban on exports to China. 
Few Australian strategic exports (except rutile) were important to China. The 
Australian government adopted a three-tier list of goods with some strategic con-
tent. One category included goods totally banned from shipment by the United 
States for export to China, but a larger category was more elastic. In 1957 Australia 
decHned to join the United Kingdom in abandoning the China differential. 
There were two reasons why the Australian government continued the strategic 
embargo. The more important was the felt need to support American policy. In a 
highly oversimplified explanation why Australia should move slowly towards relax-
ing bans, Casey declared, "The United States has, in effect, said to us, 'If anyone 
attacks you, we will consider it an attack on us'. We must not endanger our future, 
our interest or our security through this question."" The embargo had to be seen in 
the total China complex and of working as far as possible in tandem with the United 
States in a China containment policy. 
The second reason for not chafing unduly over the strategic goods embargo was 
that trade outside the embargo was expanding rapidly. Australian exports of wool to 
China rose sharply during the fifties and reached a peak of $26 million in 1959/60. 
Wheat sales to China jumped to $97 miHion in 1961/62 as the Australian Wheat 
Board announced that since December 1960 Australia had sold more than a million 
tons of AustraHan wheat and forty thousand tons of flour to China." This was the 
largest Australian wheat sale since the First World War. Between 1961 and 1971 
Australia sold wheat worth more than $1,000 million to China, about 34 per cent of 
the Australian wheat harvest. J. Wilczyski has calculated that the Chinese ate twice 
as much Australian wheat per head as Australians did. In addition to wheat and 
wool, Australia exported oats and tallow as well as a wide range of iron and steel 
products, copper and lead, zinc and rutile, and electrical equipment." Only Japan 
and West Germany had a greater share of the Chinese market than AustraHa. 
The United States was not at aU happy about AustraHa's trade with China. The 1957 
SEATO annual report warned members of the danger of depending on trade with 
Communist countries: "While SEATO members do not question the right of any 
country to seek new markets for its exports or to expand the volume or change the 
pattern of its trade, there is strong evidence indicating that the Communist countries 
have adopted trade and aid policies largely for poHtical ends."'" There was no 
evidence that it had in the late fifties and sixties so far as Australia was concerned: 
economics and politics were carefully separated and kept in their own compartments. 
What did worry the State Department was the extension of considerable Australian 
credit to finance wheat sales. China's wheat imports were subsidized partly by 
Australian taxpayers and consumers. The price per bushel to China was considerably 
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below the home consumption price ($1.35 as against $1.53). Credfts between 1961 
and 1965 covered approximately 80 per cent of the total value of wheat sold. The 
whole question of AustraHa's China trade and the credit system was discussed by 
Dean Rusk with Barwick when Rusk attended the ANZUS Council meeting ih 
Canberra in 1962. No change in AustraHan policy was observable. 
While the China trade did not seriously strain AustraHan relations with the 
United States, it did build up a large body of opinion in AustraHa favourable to the 
recognition of the People's Republic of China. McEwen and the Country Party 
strongly supported the expansion of trade. They even argued in 1959 that recogni-
tion had nothing to do with trade policy, but were forced to modify this under 
pressure from the Democratic Labor Party." The trade was creating a minority with 
a strong vested interest in regularizing poUtical relations with Peking. There was, 
however, the danger that Australia dependence on the Chinese wheat market would 
give it a strong political leverage when the two questions of recognition of Peking 
and its admission to United Nations reached crunch point. Australia for almost 
twenty years had been able to have its economic and political cake and eat it. 
Australia's strategic embargo against China was diplomatically correct towards the 
United States, of no defence importance either to China or AustraHa, and 
economically innocuous for Australian exporters. 
19 Indonesia, West Irian, and Malaysia 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and New Guinea formed part of an area extremely important 
for Australian-American relations and for Australian defence and foreign policy. The 
arc of islands between Aceh in Sumatra and Manila contains Singapore and Jakarta, 
the Strait of Malacca and the Sunda Straits. Beyond this archipelago Hes the mainland 
of South-East Asia. Bangkok and Rangoon, Saigon and Hahoi represented forward 
areas for AustraHan defence purposes but ranked below the archipelago in defence 
priority and foreign policy. Malaya, south of the Kra Isthmus, belonged to the inner 
defence zone. 
From an American point of view, the priorities in policy were reversed. Thailand 
and Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines were the areas of 
primary importance to the United States. The Indo-China peninsula was the bastion 
for the defence of South-East Asia against Communist and/or Chinese imperiahsm. 
Indonesia, on the other hand, was the largest and most populous of the ring of states 
off the Asian mainland. While recognizing the danger of the spread of communism 
in Indonesia, Washington was prepared to gamble on the probability that Indonesia 
would become a powerful and stabilizing force in the offshore area. In the long term, 
a strong, unified, and friendly Indonesia would prevent the development of a 
political vacuum which could make it possible for Peking to outflank the Western 
mainland bastion. The difference in Australian and American priorities here tested 
the strength of the AustraHan-American aHiance in ANZUS and revealed the 
strengths and weaknesses of the alHance. 
For Australia, the most sensitive part of the area was West New Guinea. The In-
donesian claim to West New Guinea (West Irian) dating back to the grant of in-
dependence by the Netherlands in 1949 was almost the only source of friction 
between Indonesia and AustraHa during the fifties.' Australian thinking about New 
Guinea since 1945 had been coloured by the recoUections of the almost successful 
Japanese thrust during the war along the Kokoda Trail to Port Moresby. This had 
reinforced the traditional Australian view that New Guinea must be in friendly hands 
if it were not controlled by Australia. The Australian colony of Papua and the trust 
territory of New Guinea (united for administrative purposes with United Nations 
blessing in 1949) gave a basis for miHtary security in the eastern part of the island. 
The dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West New Guinea had 
,een latent until the middle of 1949 when it was agreed that a round-table conference 
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between Dutch, RepubHcan, and Federalist representatives would be held at The 
Hague to discuss a speedy transfer of sovereignty to a federal republic. The 
Netherlands government had hoped ever since 1945 that it might be possible to 
salvage some part of their colonial empire — "this last emerald in the girdle of 
emeralds . . . as a last relic to the Netherlands c rown" — and had attempted to 
exclude West New Guinea from the federal state of East Indonesia.* As plans 
developed for the Round Table Conference, the Dutch in July 1949 brought it under 
their direct administration. 
The Australian government was taken by surprise when the West New Guinea 
issue surfaced as a potentially major question for the Round Table Conference. A 
departmental working paper of twenty-two pages was drafted on 15 July with 
detailed recommendations for T.K. Critchley as its U N C I representative. There was 
no mention of West New Guinea.' It had not been included in the agenda for the 
R T C sent by the Australian consul-general in Batavia on 20 June.* Canberra acted 
speedily to determine Australia's interests in the territory and on 28 July briefed 
Critchley shortly before he left for The Hague. 
Netherlands New Guinea occupies a spedal position geographically, ethnologicaUy and 
politically. It is the only foreign territory whose land frontier confronts our own, and it 
occupies a strategic position in relation to Torres Strait and the Northern Australian 
coastUne generally. Moreover, the welfare of the inhabitants of Netherlands New Guinea 
appears to call for their integration in the long run with the peoples of Papua New Guinea 
and the rest of Melanesia rather than from their absorption into an Indonesian or Asian 
world. The establishment of Indonesian control could lead to a large scale influx of Asiatic 
peoples whose influence on Australian New Guinea to say nothing of the Melanesian in-
habitants of Netherlands New Guinea might be disastrous. 
Critchley was urged to try to induce the R T C to separate out the substantive issues 
in the dispute between the Indonesians and the Dutch from the question of jurisdic-
tion over West New Guinea. After these major issues have been resolved, then the 
West New Guinea question could be discussed. Departmental thinking osciUated 
between the retention of Netherlands sovereignty untH 1960 and the creation of a 
trust territory in West New Guinea with the Netherlands as the administering 
authority. The department hoped that the question might be settled "without our 
being caUed upon to express any poHcy pubHcly in this connecrion". ' 
Almost immediately after he arrived in The Hague, Critchley reported that the 
West New Guinea question would become "an extremely contentious subject of 
discussion". " I shaU do my best to keep New Guinea out of the discussions," he 
said, "bu t . . . this is a lost cause." He hoped that Hatta might be prepared to 
postpone the New Guinea problem as a "quid pro quo for the generous Dutch treat-
ment of the problem of Indonesian deb t s " . ' 
For nearly three months the issue remained largely in the background of the RTC 
talks, with Australian thinking rather confused, oscHlaring between vague proposals 
for trusteeship and even perhaps a condominium.' On 7 October, Evatt replied to a 
question in the House of Representatives that the government had "no t favoured 
any particular solution of the Indonesian problem" but that Australia would favour 
co-operation with "whatever authority operates in Dutch New Guinea" . ' He subse-
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quently told the Netherlands that AustraHa had no vital interest in the future status 
of West New Guinea. Critchley became convinced that trusteeship would provide 
no solution and urged that the discussions over the future of West New Guinea be 
held after sovereignty had been transferred. Then the discussions could concentrate 
on the real problems of administration and development.' 
When the R T C conference was faced with a deadlock at the end of October, the 
Netherlands and Indonesian delegates asked UNCI to help resolve it. U N C I recom-
mended that the West New Guinea question be deferred until after the transfer of 
sovereignty. The recommendation was accepted with some modification in the final 
article of the conference resolution. The territory remained " in dispute" but "con-
tinued under the Government of the Netherlands". '" 
After the recognition of the independence of Indonesia, the Australian govern-
ment increasingly used the strategic argument that New Guinea was "an absolutely 
essential link in the chain of AustraHan defence" to insist that Australian interests 
should be taken into account. On 8 June 1950, Spender stated Australian policy with 
great clarity: 
Quite apart from Austraha's interests, one obvious consideration is the interest and desires 
of the people who inhabit this area, their ethnic origins, their affinity with the people of 
the rest of New Guinea and related factors. . . . We cannot alter our geography, which for 
aU times makes the mainland of New Guinea of vital importance to our security. It would, 
we think, be both unreal and unreasonable that any change of status for the territory 
should occur which disregards the interests of the indigenous population and those of 
Australia." 
When the issue was raised by Indonesia in the United Nations in 1954, Spender 
denied in the First Committee the legal, ethnological, "nat ional" , and historical 
basis of the Indonesian case. The core of his argument was AustraHan security. "The 
vital issue of this whole debate is the bare fact that it concerns New Guinea. . . . in 
the Hght of this sentiment, Australia can never stand idly by when a question which 
so closely affects the future of the island of New Guinea comes before the United 
Nations. We feel that the destiny of AustraHa is closely bound up with this 
island."'* 
Indonesia's referral of the issue to the United Nations in 1954 made Casey's at-
tempts to play down the issue and to keep it in cold storage outdated and irrelevant. 
The debates in the First Committee and the General Assembly forced Washington to 
clarify its rather vague views on the Indonesian situation, It also led Indonesia to 
withdraw its resolution calling for an immediate resumption of negotiations between 
the two disputants because it could not obtain the necessary two-thirds majority." 
Before the next General Assembly met, the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung and 
the admission of sixteen new members to the United Nations increased support for 
Indonesia. But Jakarta's unilateral abrogation of the R T C agreements caused concern 
amongst some of the older members. It also forced Indonesia to change ground in 
arguing for the inclusion of West New Guinea in the Republic. It could no longer 
be based on the transfer of sovereignty in 1949. The 1945 proclamation of in-
dependence then became the basis for Indonesia's claim. AustraHa also shifted ground 
and used self-determination rather than the old legal argument. Tension increased in 
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1957 when Subandrio, the Indonesian foreign minister, referred to the "dangers in-
herent in the dispute" as a threat to peace. He hinted that Indonesia might "embark 
on another course even at the risk of aggravating conditions in South-East Asia and 
perhaps intensifying further cold war tensions to further muddy the waters of peace 
in that part of the world".'* Subandrio succeeded in making the United Nations 
aware that it had an urgent problem on its hands. But he faHed to secure a two-thirds 
majority in the plenary session of the General Assembly (14-29-11) and indicated that 
Indonesia would not again raise the issue in the United Nations. 
The debates in the First Committee and the General Assembly forced Washington 
to re-examine its own attitude and polides. Indonesia posed pecuHar difficulties for 
the United States. Sympathetic to nationalist and anti-colonial movements, the 
United States was concerned at the development of economic chaos in Indonesia and 
at the rapid spread of communism at the general elections in September 1955, the 
subsequent elections to the Constituent Assembly, and at the local elections in Java 
in 1956. American anti-coloniaHst sympathies had to be quaHfied by the need to co-
operate with the Netherlands through NATO and with AustraHa through both 
SEATO and ANZUS. 
The United States adopted a poHcy of fairly strict neutrality towards Indonesia. 
DuHes caUed at Jakarta as he returned from the SEATO meeting in Karachi early in 
1956. He endorsed in very general terms Indonesia's nationaHst aspirations. But the 
United States was reluctant to provide substantial sums for economic development 
that would more than match Soviet loans and technical assistance. The confiscation 
of Dutch assets without compensation and the arrest of Dutch nationals made 
American private capital wary of further investment despite the success of oH com-
panies like Caltex in Sumatra. On each occasion that Indonesia raised the issue in the 
United Nations, the United States, under considerable pressure from both the 
Netherlands and Australia, abstained. This aroused intense critidsm in both 
Australia and Indonesia. "Mr. Dulles should be able to make up his mind one way 
or the other and be courageous enough to accept any diplomatic risks involved. The 
American equivocation is the harder to understand because of the Indonesians' persis-
tent refusal to ask the International Court of Justice to adjudicate on their daimto 
the territory. . . . His approach is characteristic of American handUng of foreign 
affairs. The Americans traditionally like doctrines which leave them free to 
manoeuvre, they distrust polides because they might be committed too 
specifically"" West AustraUan 23 November 1958. 
West New Guinea was discussed informally at the ANZUS meeting in October 
1957. Casey noted: "Dulles reaffirmed that the U.S. would regard the transfer of 
West New Guinea to Indonesia in the foreseeable future as definitely against the 
security interests of the U.S. This view had been reinforced by the recent trend 
towards Communism in Indonesia which might mean that West New Guinea 
became Communist territory (thus making a further breach in the island chain)"." 
The United States was walking a tightrope, attempting to maintain relations with 
those Indonesians who might be able to influence other Asian leaders and at the same 
time retain the support of the Netherlands and Australia. 
As the Sumatran crisis developed at the end of 1957 and early in 1958, the United 
States became increasingly concerned at the apparent disintegration of Sukarno's con-
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trol over the island archipelago. Gordon Mein of the south-west Padfic section of the 
State Department was sent on a fact-finding mission, and the United States joined 
AustraHa in rejecting the new Indonesian definition of territorial waters. This defini-
tion extending the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles was one totally unaccep-
table to the major maritime powers because it seriously interfered with all trade bet-
ween Singapore and the south-west Pacific. The intensification of the civil war and 
increasing hostility between Indonesia and the Netherlands provided in theory an 
opportunity for someone to act as an honest broker between Indonesia and the 
Dutch. The American ambassador in Jakarta, John M. Allison, offered to mediate in 
mid-December, and although Indonesia responded favourably, Dulles publicly 
repudiated the offer and shortly after recalled the ambassador. 
When the Sumatran rebels estabhshed a revolutionary government on 15 February 
1958, there was a danger of foreign intervention. The Soviet Union alleged that the 
joint Dutch-AustraHan statement on New Guinea of 6 November 1957 was part of 
an attempt to estabHsh naval and air bases in West New Guinea and to convert 
SEATO into "the spearhead against the liberation movement of the Asian 
people"." Foreign minister Subandrio professed to believe this Soviet interpretation 
of the Dutch-Australian agreement, which was, in fact, mainly concerned with ad-
ministration and the speeding up of self-government in both halves of New Guinea. 
Rumours spread quickly after the outbreak of the revolt that the United States and 
the Soviet Union were preparing to intervene to assist the dissidents and government 
respectively. Dulles told a congressional committee that the United States "would 
be very happy to see the non-Communist elements who are really in the majority 
there . . . exert a greater influence in the affairs of Indonesia . . . where Soekarno has 
moved towards this so-called guided democracy theory which is a nice-sounding 
name for what I fear would end up to be a Communist despotism"." 
The rebels attempted to draw SEATO into the civil war. On the eve of the Manila 
Conference (11-13 March) the rebel leader Syafruddin appealed to SEATO members 
for arms. He hoped that some measure of assistance would help the rebels to pur-
chase arms, especially aircraft and anti-aircraft guns, to check the ascendancy of the 
Indonesian air force. Other emissaries were sent to Taipei and Washington for the 
same purpose. Pote Sarasin, the secretary-general of SEATO, rejected the suggestion 
of SEATO intervention in Indonesia as "fantastic". Both the United States and 
Australia declared that they regarded the dispute as a domestic matter and that they 
had no intention of intervening. Informal proposals by Australia and a formal offer 
by the United States to use their good offices to secure a cease-fire were firmly re-
jected by the Indonesian government. The danger of foreign intervention disap-
peared by the beginning of June and with it the prospect of Indonesia's becoming 
another Indo-China. 
With the recall of Ambassador Allison from Jakarta and the appointment of 
Howard P. Jones, American policy towards Indonesia suddenly changed in May 1958. 
The United States resumed the shipment of arms to Indonesia to offset the purchase 
of planes and small arms from the Soviet bloc. This caused some concern in Australia 
because it was felt that this would jeopardize Dutch control of West New Guinea. 
General Nasution, the army chief of staff, had said earlier in the year that if 
diplomacy failed, "the military road must be foUowed". Casey told the House of 
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Representatives on 12 August that he accepted Subandrio's assurances that Indonesia 
did not intend to use force to obtain West New Guinea." A few days later the In-
donesian government indicated that it had undertaken to use the arms "solely for the 
maintenance of internal security and the legitimate self defence of Indonesia" and not 
for aggressive purposes.*" At the same time, Dulles was re-thinking American policy 
towards Indonesia and West New Guinea. At the October meeting of ANZUS, 
Casey pressed Dulles about the American attitude should Indonesia attack Dutch 
New Guinea, at the same time making it clear that Australia had no firm military 
commitment to the Dutch. Dulles declined to commit the United States and brushed 
aside Casey's attempt to separate the supply of American arms to Indonesia from 
American pressure for a guarantee that Sukarno would not use force. The furthest he 
would go was diplomatic advice and a promise that were he still secretary of state 
when such an attack took place, he would take the matter immediately to the Securi-
ty Council. Dulles said that "the United States saw the Dutch New Guinea problem 
in the context of the larger problem of Indonesia. The West had a big stake in In-
donesia, and it would not be of much help if we saved Dutch New Guinea while at 
the same time Indonesia itself went Communist."*' This illustrated the basic dif-
ference in priorities between Washington and Canberra. The State Department 
thought in global rather than local or regional terms. The crucial issue to Dulles was 
the checking of the spread of communism. This took priority over everything else. 
In December 1958 Subandrio visited Washington and two months later Canberra. 
Casey's invitation to Subandrio followed his journey to The Hague for discussions 
with the Dutch foreign minister, Joseph Luns. The Subandrio visit, while perhaps 
not "a landmark in the diplomatic history of the decade" nor "our first solo plunge 
into treaty making" was important partly because of the intense reaction it provoked 
in press and parliament but mainly because of the clarification of AustraUan and 
perhaps Indonesian views about Dutch New Guinea.** 
It was the final communique, drafted at Casey's home in Berwick on 14 February, 
that caused the storm in the press. 
The Ministers reviewed in detail Indonesian-Australian relations. There was a ftiU explana-
tion of the considerations which led each country to a different view over West New 
Guinea (West Irian), with Australia recognising Netherlands sovereignty and recognising 
the principle of self-determination. This difference remains, but the position was clarified 
by an explanation from Australian Ministers that it followed from their position of respect 
for agreements on the rights of sovereignty that if any agreement were reached between 
the Netherlands and Indonesia as parties principal, arrived at by peaceful processes and in 
accordance with internationally accepted principles, Australia would not oppose such an 
agreement. 
The Ministers indicated that they believed the issue between the Netherlands and 
Indonesia over Western New Guinea (West Irian) was one to be resolved by peaceful 
means, and that they were in accord with the view that force should not be used by the 
parties concerned in the settlement of territorial differences.*' 
The heart of the controversy was the statement that should the two parties prin-
cipal to the dispute, Indonesia and the Netherlands, reach an agreement after discus-
sion, "Australia would not oppose such an agreement". It did not mean that 
Australia gave the "green light for increased and intolerable pressures on HoUand" 
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to make a settlement. Casey indicated that "we would take no initiative in advising 
the Dutch to enter into negotiations".** There was, and Subandrio recognized this, 
no change in Australia's essential position on West New Guinea. The two conflic-
ting views had been explored and clarified. AustraHa admitted that, in a hypothetical 
situation, it was prepared to respect an agreement between two sovereign states and 
ignore the question of self-determination as a precondition for a transfer of the ter-
ritory to Indonesia. The debate in the House of Representatives had been a bitter 
one, but no speaker from any party admitted that there was little or nothing that 
AustraHa could do to prevent it from being put into effect.*' Yet as late as 15 
November, the head of the AustraHan mission to the United Nations, James 
PhmsoU, said that Australia believed that the Netherlands had the law on their side. 
He recognized, however, the issue had become a political rather than a legal one and 
insisted that in any settlement of the dispute, the principle of self-determination 
should apply.*' 
For nearly two years the tension was less marked. But during this period, In-
donesia steadily built up her armed forces. General Nasution and Subandrio visited 
Moscow early in 1961 to purchase military equipment. "War is not our intention, 
but we are preparing for i t ," declared Nasution. "It is an element in the situation — 
it could happen." The Russian arms deal was followed by the formation of the first 
unit in a West Irian regiment. By mid March, Nasution had transferred five combat 
battalions from Sumatra and the Celebes to the Moluccas, the archipelago closest to 
West New Guinea. The Netherlands indicated hopefully that it would expect 
miHtary support from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States should 
Indonesia attack West New Guinea. But neither Australia nor the United States had 
made any military commitments to the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom had 
given the The Hague no promises of support.*' Nasution warned Australia that an 
incident in West New Guinea (e.g., a clash of patrols or an actual invasion) could 
touch off a war. 
In March 1961 General Nasution paid a formal visit to Australia, not "to make 
concessions or agreements but to create better understanding". There was no real 
change in prepared positions, and Menzies declared that Australia recognized Dutch 
sovereignty, approved of ultimate self-determination, and deplored the use of force 
to secure a settlement. Nasution repeated Subandrio's 1959 promise that Indonesia 
would not support its claim by force but firmly rejected the principle of self-
determination for the people of West New Guinea. 
Three months later. President Sukarno returned to Jakarta after a world tour con-
vinced that President Kennedy was preparing to adopt a new approach and support 
Indonesian claims to West New Guinea. But Kennedy added that he would be great-
ly helped in this task by "a calm atmosphere", and urged him to use his influence to 
maintain "tranquiUity". American policy foreshadowed by Dulles in 1958 was one 
of cautious neutrality, rather sympathetic to Indonesian claims. Ambassador Jones 
was believed to be following a soft Hne which was "encouraging a miUtant tone" in 
Jakarta.*' 
The meeting of the General Assembly on 19 September 1961 saw a series of draft 
resolutions on the future of West New Guinea from the Netherlands and members 
of the Afro-Asian bloc with some support from Latin America. The Netherlands 
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proposal to set up a United Nations Commission to organize a plebiscite to enable 
the people of West New Guinea to determine their own future was defeated, and 
with it Australian support for a proposal to give the indigenous people "the right to 
opt either for independence or for some form of free assodation with its neighbours 
or, indeed, for complete political integration with Indonesia should this be their 
desire".*' The stalemate at the United Nations led the Netherlands to dedde to build 
up its defence forces in West New Guinea as a forlorn precautionary measure. On 19 
December, President Sukarno (appointed twenty-four hours earlier as commander-
in-chief of the forces for the liberation of West New Guinea) told the Indonesian 
people that they should be ready for general mobilization for the liberation of West 
New Guinea. The Indonesian government asked Canberra to restate its position on 
the West New Guinea dispute for the benefit of both Indonesia and the Netherlands 
and to indicate what it would do should Indonesia use force.'" 
The AustraHan government had attempted without success to persuade President 
Kennedy that the United States should adopt a tough line towards Indonesia. 
Kennedy had declined to attend the opening of the newly elected Dutch New Guinea 
Council in HoUandia in April 1961. Whatever the arguments used by Australia 
about self-determination for the people of West Irian and the legal rights of the 
Dutch in the territory, the core of the Australian position was that "New Guinea is 
an absolutely essential Hnk in the chain of AustraHan defence". Menzies' discussions 
with Kennedy had failed to convince him that the United States shovild intervene 
with military force to support Australia. Menzies recognised the hard facts of inter-
national life which necessitated "close consultation with the great powers, par-
ticularly Great Britain and the United States of America. No responsible AustraHan 
would wish to see any action affecting the safety of Australia on the issues of war and 
peace in this area, except in concert with our great and powerful friends."" One of 
them was powerless in the area and the other was not convinced that Indonesia's 
takeover of West New Guinea would endanger Australian security. The important 
criterion to the United States was that Indonesia should not drift into the Com-
munist camp as a result of any decisions taken over a small piece of real estate. West 
New Guinea. 
The Liberal-Country Party government in Australia had just survived a general 
election with a majority of two and with a new minister for External Affairs, Sir 
Garfield Barwick. The government's reply to the Jakarta request was given in a series 
of unpublished diplomatic notes and three public statements in January: Barwick on 
4 and 25 January and Menzies on 12 January 1962. Barwick made a full statement to 
parHament on 15 March.'* The AustraHan government was in an almost impossible 
position. It had made Httle attempt to build up its northern defences since 1950 and 
so had no mHitary clout to help the Netheriands. It had to depend on support from 
"its great and powerful friends", both of whom had turned a deaf ear to Australian 
requests. No power was prepared to back the Netheriands and Australia for fear of 
bdng branded as imperiaHsts intervening in a colonial war. Australian defence 
planners as weU as the cabinet appear to have downgraded the strategic importance of 
New Guinea. The important question was whether Australia had any choice. The 
answer was clearly that it had none. 
The reassessment of Australian policy was the result of a serious diplomatic 
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defeat largely because the United States had changed ground. American policy 
towards Indonesia was directed towards the stabiHzing of the situation in South-East 
Asia and preventing the development of a Communist-orientated Indonesia under 
Sukarno. The United States had abstained from voting for several years on Indone-
sian resolutions about New Guinea brought before the United Nations General 
Assembly. The debates in the General Assembly and its committee in 1961 showed 
that a shift in policy was taking place in the State Department and that there would 
be neither military nor diplomatic support for the Netherlands. As the year went on, 
the feeHng developed outside the United States that its government was more in-
terested in keeping Indonesia happy (and anti-Communist) than in safeguarding 
legahty or the rights of other parties in the New Guinea dispute. An appreciation of 
this fact led Barwick to remind Australians that they "must not lose sight of our 
major interest in reducing the spread of Communism"." 
The diplomatic retreat that the government was making had the support of the 
Democratic Labor Party, some moderates in the AustraHan Labor Party, and most of 
the major Australian newspapers. The Indonesian navy and air force were largely 
Soviet equipped; in mid-January, four new Soviet submarines arrived, raising the 
fleet to six. 'The first major clashes between Indonesian and Dutch forces took place 
when the Indonesians attempted, unsuccessfiiUy, to land a large group of infiltrators. 
As friction increased, Australia realized that it had few troops that it could deploy 
against Indonesia. Kim Beazley, a moderate ALP member, realized that Australia 
had no choice but to accept the changing position in West New Guinea. "There are 
greater powers in the world than Australia. . . . be prepared to face up to the dif-
ficulties of an unpalatable solution forced upon us by circumstances."'* Australia 
could not muster the numbers in a United Nations in which the Afro-Asian bloc was 
anti-imperialist and pro-Indonesia. Neither could she gain any support from the 
United States. 
Diplomatic moves were made in Washington and the United Nations to prevent a 
head-on military collision between the Netherlands and Indonesia and to secure a 
peaceful settlement. By 14 March both countries accepted a proposal from the 
United States for "secret preliminary discussions" in the presence of a third party to 
pave the way for formal talks. American ambassador Ellsworth Bunker sat in a 
personal capadty as a third party and mediator. A series of discussions took place near 
Washington between a two-man Indonesian delegation led by Adam Malik, Indone-
sian ambassador to Moscow, and Netherlands representatives led by Dr J.H. van 
Royen, Netherlands ambassador to Washington. The five months of negotiations 
were punctuated by the landing of Indonesian paratroopers in West New Guinea and 
clashes with Dutch troops who mopped up the paratroopers. There were repeated 
breakdowns and constant pressure from the acting secretary-general of the United 
Nations, U Thant, and President Kennedy to resume the talks. "I think everybody 
is displeased with our role," Kennedy said at a news conference on 11 April. "The 
role of the mediator is not a happy one, and we are prepared to have everybody mad, 
if it makes some progress." What the United States was attempting to do was not 
to impose a particular solution but rather to secure an adjustment that would prevent 
a military clash. Inevitably the United States leaned towards Indonesia as the larger 
and more mihtant of the two parties." 
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On 26 May the six-point Bunker plan for a settlement was made public. Its essen-
tial features were that the Netherlands would transfer the administrative authority of 
West New Guinea to a temporary executive authority under U Thant. U Thant 
would then appoint a mutually acceptable non-Indonesian administrator, who would 
administer the territory "for a period of not less than one year and not more than 
t w o " . Netherlands administration would gradually be terminated, and provision 
would be made to give the inhabitants " the opportunity to exercise freedom of 
choice" within a period of years "after Indonesia had assumed full administrative 
responsibility for West New Guinea". The Netherlands was to receive from 
Indonesia "adequate guarantees for safeguarding the interests, including the right of 
self-determination, of the Papuans". The period of years before which the people of 
West New Guinea would be able to exerdse their freedom of choice was to be 
negotiated between the Netherlands and Indonesia." 
Further sabre rattling by Sukarno, despite assurances that he desired a peaceful 
solution, led to a considerable watering down of the Bunker proposals. On 15 
August an agreement was finally signed shortening the transitional period from two 
years to eight months. Administration would pass from the Netherlands to the 
United Nations on 1 October 1962. As soon as possible after 1 May 1963, the 
United Nations would transfer control to Indonesia. Before the end of 1969 the 
Papuan people of West New Guinea would be given an opportunity to exerdse their 
right of self-determination by indicating whether or not they desired to remain 
under Indonesian control ." 
The settlement was in effect a diplomatic defeat for Australia. The only principle 
on which Australia had insisted as a condition for recognizing the transfer of Papua 
New Guinea was the principle of self-determination, and this was included in the 
Bunker plan. There was considerable doubt in Australia that Indonesia would carry 
out this part of the agreement. A bitter editorial in the conservative Sydney Morning 
Herald expressed much of Australia's disillusionment: 
The United Nations through its Acting Secretary General endorsed miUtary aggression as a 
legitimate method of enforcing national claims. On that day the United States praised sur-
render to aggression as a means of keeping the peace and congratulated itself on having 
contributed to the surrender. On that day, Australia was formally presented . . . as a 
nation without the will or the means to assert its national interests and without the 
courage to stand beside a friend in danger." 
While the Bunker plan was being hammered out in Washington, a meeting of the 
ANZUS Council was held in Canberra on 8-9 May 1962, the first meeting since 
1959. The Australian government had begun to re-examine both its defence plans 
and its system of external allies in the light of Indonesia's dispute with the 
Netherlands and with Malaysia over the territorial limits of the Malaysian federation. 
It had regarded the ANZUS Treaty rather than the SEATO treaty as the main pillar 
of its foreign and defence policies. But Australia felt that the United States was 
downgrading ANZUS and knew before the Canberra meeting began that the United 
States was not prepared to use military force. It became essential for Australia to 
redefine obligations under the ANZUS Treaty. Part of Article V of the treaty text 
was included in the communique: "Ministers called attenrion to the fact that these 
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obligations applied in the event of armed attack not only on the metropolitan ter-
ritory of any of the parties but also on any island territory under the jurisdiction of 
the three governments in the Pacific." Dean Rusk, speaking at the state dinner at 
Canberra on 8 May declared, "You can expect complete soHdarity from the United 
States for AustraHa's and New Zealand's responsibility in the Pacific." This was in-
terpreted as specifically covering any ambiguities over the scope of the ANZUS 
treaty." 
Averill Harriman, the under-secretary of state for poHtical affairs, declared in 
Canberra on 3 June 1963 and in WelHngton the following day that the United States 
would fight to defend East New Guinea: "the three parties would be in it 
together". The communique issued at the close of the Wellington meeting of the 
ANZUS Coundl (5-6 June) also drew attention to this point. "Anything which 
happens in the Padfic area is of vital concern to all three, and a threat to any of 
the partners in the area, metropolitan and island territories alike, is equally a threat to 
the others. The ANZUS Treaty declares in simple and direct terms that in matters of 
defence, Australia, New Zealand and the United States stand as one."*" The explidt 
statements by Rusk and Harriman as well as the Canberra and WelHngton com-
muniques removed all shadow of doubt. They may have reflected American willing-
ness to allay AustraHan concern about Washington's role over West New Guinea 
and a desire to make a quid for the Australian quo in Thailand and South Vietnam. At 
the same time Dean Rusk had pointed out in May 1962 that the United States might 
dedde to defend only those allies which displayed a will to defend themselves. 
Australia took the point and began to increase its defence expenditure. 
With the adoption of the Bunker plan, Australia had for the first time a common 
boundary with Indonesia. The boundary had subsequently to be deUneated on the 
ground by survey teams. Australia was not certain about the limits of Indonesian 
expansion/imperiahsm. Would Indonesia extend its territorial claims to eastern New 
Guinea? Shortly after the modified Bunker plan had been signed, Subandrio said that 
friendly relations between Australia and Indonesia could be "maintained without a 
pact". There had earlier been suggestions that a non-aggression pact might be signed 
between the two countries. Hasluck, as minister for Territories, commented the day 
before Indonesia ratified the agreement, "Australia relies with confidence on 
assistance from her allies if Papua and New Guinea were attacked. . . . the Australian 
Government regarded the defence of Papua-New Guinea in the same way as it regard-
ed the defence of the AustraHan mainland. It wiU defend both."*' His statement met 
with warm approval from an Australian press, reflecting a certain guilt complex over 
the fact that the Dutch were left unsupported in the United Nations when Sukarno 
used aggression against them. Hasluck gave his warning after first receiving 
assurances from Rusk at the Canberra meeting of ANZUS. 
The settlement of the West New Guinea question coincided with increasing 
Indonesian hostility to the proposed Federation of Malaysia. From the beginning, 
Sukarno had strongly opposed the plan unless it provided some protection for 
Indonesian interests in Borneo. His moral support for Azahari's rebellion in Borneo 
developed into a public attack on the federation and a determination to wreck it. At a 
press conference in Jakarta on 17 February 1963, Subandrio accused the Malayan 
prime minister of "incurable hostiHty" towards Indonesia. Sukarno's poHcy of 
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"confrontation" was played down during his meering with Tunku Abdul Rahman 
in Tokyo on 31 May-1 June and at the Manila conference on 7-11 June between the 
foreign ministers of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The new federation was 
inaugurated by the London agreement between the United Kingdom and Malaya. 
Sukarno denounced it as a "British project" and announced his intention to "crush 
Malaysia". The formal inauguration of the federation was delayed from 31 August 
to 16 September to allow a United Nations team to check the fairness of elections in 
Sabah and Sarawak. Sukarno refused to accept the United Nations conclusion in 
favour of Malaysia. Malaysia broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia on 17 
September. J .A.C. Mackie has examined in depth the clash between Malaysia and 
Indonesia in Konfrontasi.^^ 
Confrontation of Malaysia by Indonesia posed a difficult diplomatic and military 
dilemma for the Australian government whose traditional support was for the 
United Kingdom and Malaya, with Singapore base as an important part of 
Australian defence planning. At the Commonwealth conference in 1955, the British, 
Australian, and New Zealand prime ministers had set up a Commonwealth strategic 
reserve based on Malaya with units from all three countries.*' It was a new peacetime 
commitment for both AustraHa and New Zealand. Casey explored at the Bangkok 
SEATO meeting in February 1953 the possibility of American naval and air support 
should Australia accept major defence responsibihties in Malaya. But Dulles was not 
interested in involving the United States in a new colonialist area in South-East Asia 
and so limiting its foreign policy options. Two years later the United Kingdom con-
cluded a mutual assistance pact with Malaya as part of the independence agreement. 
This provided that the United Kingdom would give "such assistance as the Govern-
ment of the Federation of Malaya may require for the external defence of its ter-
r i tory". Subsequently both Australia and New Zealand undertook similar com-
mitments in September 1963. 
Prime Minister Menzies clarified the miHtary problem on 25 September 1963 in a 
short speech made on one of " the historic occasions". After tabling the text of a 
military agreement between Australia and the new Malaysian Federation, he 
declared: 
We are resolved and have so informed the Government of Malaysia and the Governments 
of the United Kingdom and New 2^aland and others concerned that if, in the circumstances 
that now exist, and which may continue for a long time, there occurs, in relation to 
Malaysia or any of its constituent States, armed invasion or subversive activity — supported 
or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia — we shall, to the best of our powers, and by 
such means as shaU be agreed upon with the Government of Malaysia, add our military 
assistance to the effort of Malaysia and the United Kingdom in defence of Malaysia's ter-
ritorial integrity and poUtical independence.** 
But despite this crystal clear commitment, no AustraHa troops were sent to Borneo 
until the following year when clashes took place between British and Malaysian 
troops on the one hand and Indonesian terrorists on the other. 
Australia was in fact walking a tightrope in an area which it regarded as critically 
important to Australian defence, one where British and American defence systems 
met and where Hues of responsibHity were not clearly drawn. The United States was 
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anxious to promote economic and political stability in Indonesia. The Humphrey 
survey mission in 1961 had recommended a substantial aid programme to help shore 
up Indonesia's Eight Year Development Plan.*' But there was increasing criticism in 
Congress of Indonesian internal instabiHty and a reluctance to foot substantial 
foreign aid bills. The Clay report in May 1963 on the United States foreign aid pro-
gramme stated bluntly, "We do not see how external assistance can be granted [to 
Indonesia] . . . unless it puts its internal house in order, provides fair treatment to 
foreign creditors and enterprises, and refrains from international adventures." 
Sukarno was irritated by criticisms from American economists and their attempts to 
lay down conditions for foreign aid. While the negotiations still were in progress, 
Sukarno launched his confrontation policy in February 1963. The United States 
withdrew from a $400 milHon consortium to stabilize the Indonesian economy part-
ly because of AustraHan representation.*' For three years the State Department 
exerted considerable diplomatic pressure to settle the dispute between the three 
major oH companies — Shell, Caltex, and Standard — and the Indonesian govern-
ment. The agreement made in Tokyo on 1 June pointed the way for special credits 
for Indonesia from the United States Agency for International Development as well 
as the International Monetary Fund. Congress was becoming increasingly restive, 
and in July, an amendment was successfully added to the foreign assistance authoriza-
tion bUl for 1964 requiring the suspension of military and economic assistance to 
Indonesia unless the president certified that it was essential to American national 
interests. The Senate later accepted this provision. 
Washington's growing disenchantment with Indonesia was not accompanied by 
any enthusiasm for Malaysia. As a further step in decolonization, the formation of 
the Malaysian Federation fitted in with American long-term policies of supporting 
movements for national independence. But a Senate committee advised the govern-
ment to adopt an attitude of "non-involved cordiaHty" towards Malaysia. Discus-
sions between Menzies and President Kennedy as the Australian prime minister was 
returning from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London were 
not very encouraging. The president indicated that the idea of Malaysia was "sup-
ported by the United States as a matter of principle; the one reservation being made 
by the United States to the effect that any defensive arrangement in relation to 
Malaysia seems to the United States to be essentially a Commonwealth matter at this 
stage."*' It continued to remain an ANZAM matter in American eyes as the situa-
tion in Vietnam continued to deteriorate. The United States had no intention of 
becoming involved in a second front in South-East Asia. 
On 13 January 1964, Robert Kennedy, the American attorney-general, was sent 
on a thirteen-day mission to attempt to arrange a cease-fire and to get the parties to 
begin talking without preconditions. The American ambassador to Jakarta, Howard 
Jones, had just been recalled to Washington for consultation after serving six years in 
Jakarta. The central problem was how to keep Indonesia neutral and to prevent the 
spread of war in South-East Asia, how "to take this controversy out of the jungle 
and put it round the conference table". On the eve of the discussions in Tokyo 
between Sukarno and Robert Kennedy, the Australian prime minister declared on 16 
January, "There is no immediate need for further AustraHan assistance. This assess-
ment is shared by Malaysian and British authorities."*' After a two-day meeting 
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with Sukarno, Kennedy announced that the problem would be worked out in con-
sultations between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Optimistic as a result of 
his discussions, Kennedy emphasized that "this was an Asian dispute and it must, in 
the last analysis, be decided by Asian nations". On 23 January, Sukarno agreed to 
issue a cease-fire order to Indonesian forces on Malaysia's borders. He also agreed to a 
summit meeting with President Macapagal of the Philippines and Tunku Abdul 
Rahman after the foreign ministers of the three countries had had preparatory discus-
sions in Bangkok during the first week in February. 
British scepticism about the success of the Kennedy peace mission was borne out 
by the fact that a few hours after Kennedy flew out of Jakarta, Sukarno and Suban-
drio told a youth rally that Indonesia would continue with its "confrontation policy 
to crush Malaysia unless the constitution of the new Federation were revised to meet 
Indonesian demands". They ignored the cease-fire agreement and said that the 
freedom struggle would go on, perhaps with different tactics. Sukarno was attemp-
ting the difficult task of removing American suspicions and of reassuring the Indone-
sian Communist Party that he was not about to make a deal with the imperialists 
over Malaysia.*' Kennedy seems to have believed that the dispute between Indonesia 
and Malaysia was largely a spin-off from British coloniaHsm and that British inep-
titude had led to the jungle fighting in Borneo. To British doubts about the success 
of the tripartite conference, Kennedy tartly pointed out that if it failed, they could 
"all go back into the jungle and shoot each other again. And all they would have lost 
is two weeks' killing each other."'" In fact this is predsely what did happen. The 
foreign ministers' conference at Bangkok held on 5-10 February broke down over 
the conditions of the cease-fire and the inability of Indonesia to police a cease-fire 
among its own troops. To Malaysia, the cease-fire meant the beginning of the 
withdrawal of Indonesian troops; to Sukarno it meant simply a freeze on the hues 
that they held. As the Tunku pointed out early in March, "To them a cease-fire 
means that we cease, but not they." The summit meeting in Tokyo in mid-June 
broke down over the same issues. On 16 April the AustraHan government announc-
ed the dispatch of an army engineer squadron to Borneo and the provision of addi-
tional mine-sweepers for patrol work and air transport assistance. In June the Soviet 
deputy premier, Anastas Mikoyan, visited Indonesia and promised further mihtary 
support: miHtary instructors and modern weapons "far better than the weapons 
possessed by the British in this area". 
Both Australia and the United States were anxious to prevent Indonesian confron-
tation of Malaysia from developing into a new and major theatre of war in South-
East Asia. Australia was primarily interested in securing a peaceful settlement of the 
dispute which would preserve the territorial integrity and independence of Malaysia, 
a fellow member of the Commonwealth, and at the same time the continuance of 
friendly relations with Indonesia now that the West New Guinea question had been 
resolved. Australia's contribution to Malaysian independence was defence support 
under the ANZAM agreement. 
The dominating interest of the United States in South-East Asia was opposition to 
the spread of communism. "But this would not be best served by war between 
Indonesia and Malaysia," Robert Kennedy affirmed." American opinion against 
Indonesia began to harden as a result of reassessment of President Sukarno's objec-
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tives and of the increasing squeeze on American capital in Indonesia. Sukarno's offer 
to abandon his "crush Malaysia" campaign if Britain would withdraw from the 
Singapore base and abrogate its guarantee of Malaysian independence reflected his 
ambition to destroy what he regarded as the last vestiges of colonialism and neo-
coloniaHsm in South-East Asia and to lead the "new emerging forces", the Third 
World, in the region. The American foreign affairs commentator Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong believed that Sukarno's proposals "were the opening move in a play to 
annex Sarawak and Sabah and oil-rich Brunei, after which Soekarno would see how 
best to move in on Singapore, one of the world's great ports, and then on Malaya 
itself".'* Many American politicians were coming round to support this analysis. 
The State Department was totally opposed to committing military forces in the 
region. Diplomatic and economic pressure were the appropriate weapons in a battle 
to prevent Sukarno from succumbing to pressure from the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI), and at the same time to protect American economic interests. The con-
siderable personal friendship between Sukarno and Ambassador Jones acted as a slight 
moderating influence on Indonesian policy. The main instrument for pressure was 
the foreign aid programme. This had been drastically cut back by the amendment to 
the foreign assistance bill, but the State Department kept a trickle of aid flowing 
during the first quarter of 1964 so that it could keep its foot in the door. By March, 
however, Sukarno reaHzed that he could no longer play a double poHcy and retain 
much American aid. He confronted Ambassador Jones: "There is one country 
threatening to stop its economic aid to Indonesia. That country thinks it can scare 
Indonesia. I say go to hell with your aid. Without any aid Indonesia is able to 
establish its own society. We will not collapse.'' The danger of a complete cutting 
off of American aid to Indonesia was that Indonesia might find alternative if less 
generous sources: the Soviet Union and other East European countries were sending 
limited aid which could be stepped up. The United States admitted both Malaysian 
and Indonesian officers to its training schools. Australia continued to provide some 
economic aid to Indonesia under the Colombo Plan. 
On 17 August, a three-hour speech, Sukarno denounced the United States in bitter 
terms and declared Indonesia's intention to dedicate itself to "a year of living 
dangerously". Small groups of Indonesian paratroopers were dropped at several 
points in Malaya. Tunku Abdul Rahman caUed for an urgent meeting of the Security 
CouncH to deal with Indonesia's "blatant" and "inexcusable aggression". But the 
Soviet Union vetoed a Norwegian resolution condemning Indonesia, and no action 
was taken. The Sino-Soviet rift was offering Sukarno an opportunity to play off the 
two Communist powers and to begin building the Peking-Jakarta axis. When, as a 
result of a tied vote, Malaysia was elected as a member of the Security Council for a 
one-year term, Indonesia carried out her threat to withdraw from the United 
Nations." 
American policies towards Indonesia hardened further with the attacks on 
American libraries in Jakarta and Surabaya in December 1964. Early in 1965, pressure 
from the PKI and his own policy of "living dangerously" took Sukarno further to 
the left. In April, EUsworth Bunker, the American envoy concerned with resolving 
the West New Guinea deadlock, met Sukarno to discuss the widening breach 
between Washington and Jakarta. The attempt to paper over the cracks led to a 
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vague agreement recognizing the need to preserve friendly relations between the 
United States and Indonesia despite differences on foreign policy ' 'which should not 
affect unduly the patterns of friendship between the two countries". It was also 
agreed that the United States would withdraw all Peace Corps members from In-
donesia. "Patterns of friendship" were weakened but not destroyed by anti-
American demonstrations on the arrival of the new American ambassador, Marshall 
Green, in July. Sukarno's bombastic speech on Indonesia's national day (17 August), 
which underlined Indonesia's adhesion to the anti-imperialist axis, did not lead to a 
formal breach in diplomatic relations.'* The attempted Communist coup and its 
crushing by the army on the night of 30 September-1 October 1965 brought a 
reorientation of Indonesia's foreign policy and the reversal of its anti-Western 
policies. The danger of Indonesia passing into the Communist camp was averted and 
with it the possible opening of a second military front in South-East Asia. It pointed 
the way to the end of Konfrontasi and a settlement of the dispute with Malaysia. 
In April 1964 Australia had sent engineers to Borneo and nine months later com-
mitted a battalion to Borneo. Given the clear-cut interpretations of ANZUS com-
mitments by Rusk and Harriman, the question inevitably arose whether the ANZUS 
obligation extended to Australian troops serving in Malaysia or Borneo. Sir Garfield 
Barwick, the Australian foreign minister, told the House of Representatives on 19 
March "that if Australian troops were attacked in Malaysia, the United States would 
be involved through ANZUS". In an airport press conference on his return from 
Manila on 17 April, he repeated a statement he had made at the SEATO conference 
in Manila: that an attack on Australian servicemen in Malaysia would come within 
the new interpretation of the ANZUS obHgations. "Borneo was . . . within the 
Pacific area and I said that both Indonesia and the Philippines had been made aware of 
this fact."" In reply to a question in the House, he repeated this interpretation: 
"The ANZUS Treaty does not give rise to any ambiguity or question. An attack on 
armed forces of a party is within the treaty if the attack takes place within the treaty 
area. . . . Borneo is within the treaty area. On this point there is no difference 
whatever between the American view and our view."" 
At no point in the debate that followed did Barwick indicate that he had received 
any specific undertaking from Dean Rusk in Manila. Challenged by Arthur 
CalweU's flat statement, "the American Government just does not see the Malaysia 
dispute as coming under ANZUS", the prime minister made a carefully worded 
speech in the House on 21 April in which he discussed the relationship of ANZUS to 
Malaysia." He pointed out that Articles IV and V contained "in the clearest terms a 
high level of responsibihty"; he stated categorically that nothing had been said on 
behalf of the United States "to waterdown or weaken the force or significance of the 
Treaty". Paul Hasluck, after succeeding Barwick, declared that the government 
"had received clear indicarions from the United States that the Prime Minister's 
statement accorded completely with American views". Menzies repeated his state-
ment after discussions with President Johnson at a press conference on 19 July 
1964." 
The State Department was rather taken aback by Barwick's interpretation but 
quickly declared, "The United States is reluctant to be drawn into any mHitary com-
mitments over Malaya. . . . it is conceded traditionally that the United States could 
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become involved under the Treaty. . . . However the prevailing view in 
Washington is that the Malaysian dispute with Indonesia is primarily a responsibility 
for Britain, Australia and New Zealand." It communicated its hostiHty to the Labor 
opposition. There was some anger in Washington at what was regarded "as 
AustraHa's determination to drag the United States into the fray by the ANZUS 
coat-tails"." By mid May both Canberra and Washington had warned Sukarno that 
ANZUS could be invoked if the Malaysian dispute led to fuH-scale hostiHties. These 
warnings were a form of diplomatic pressure on Indonesia. The operative word was 
could: there was no certainty that it would be. As the Melbourne Herald pointed out: 
"The United States is not handing out blank cheques for AustraHa to send troops to 
various hot spots, and invite attack without first consulting the United States."'" 
While President Johnson was prepared in July 1964 to offer the Malaysian prime 
minister equipment and military training for Malaysian troops, this was the limit of 
American commitment." The United States had other fish to fry, in Vietnam. 
Whatever the legal position — and it does not seem to have been clear — it was in-
judicious of Canberra to raise the issue at this time. It was highly improbable that the 
United States would have intervened to protect Australian engineers serving in 
Borneo. This would have been the responsibility of ANZAM rather than ANZUS. 
20 Vietnam 
The Geneva settlement of 1962 meant the contraction of the American strategic 
perimeter in South-East Asia and the adoption of a new bastion against Communist 
aggression. South Vietnam became central and Laos peripheral to American poHcy. 
There was a tendency in both the United States and AustraHa to write off the new 
Laotian coalition as a caretaker until the Pathet Lao could assume control. "Never 
before anywhere had a compromise government been glued together with such a low 
life-expectancy as the three headed monster now trying feebly to get on its hands and 
knees in Laos."' 
The development of a "Hmited war" in Laos, which threatened to produce a par-
tial political vacuum in South-East Asia, aroused considerable apprehension in 
Thailand in 1961. Thailand occupied a key position in the Indo-Chinese peninsula: it 
had common land frontiers with Laos and Cambodia in the north-east, Burma in the 
west, and Malaya in the south. Bangkok had become the junction for international 
air traffic in South-East Asia. R.G. Casey in 1951 had drawn attention to the vital 
role of Thailand in regional security. "If Indo-China and Burma were lost . . . 
Thailand would immediately be outflanked, and it would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for Thailand successfully to resist heavy Communist pressure unless very 
substantial help were afforded to her from without."* 
A cardinal point in Thai foreign policy as early as 1950 had been American support 
for Thai security. Both Australia and the United States strongly supported 
ThaHand's entry to SEATO as a foundation member in September 1954. Thai securi-
ty was then given a multilateral basis after bHateral discussions wfth the United 
States. As already mentioned in chapter 16, the rapid deterioration of the situation in 
Laos between 1959 and the Geneva Declaration in 1962 raised doubts in Thailand 
about the effectiveness of the SEATO guarantee. Marshal Sarit Thanarat suggested 
that SEATO as constituted was a HabiHty to the anti-Communist movement in 
South-East Asia. Thailand increasingly moved towards a bilateral agreement with 
the United States as an underpinning to or substitute for the SEATO guarantee. 
President Kennedy gave a pledge on 2 April 1961 that the United States would not 
permit the Communists to advance to the Mekong River boundary between Laos 
and Thailand or to sdze any major Laotian centre. This was further strengthened on 
6 March 1962 by the agreement between Dean Rusk and the Thai fordgn minister, 
Thanat Khoman. 
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The significant thing was the announcement that the United States was prepared 
to act alone if necessary against Communist aggression in Thailand. It interpreted 
the SEATO obligation as requiring members to act individually if agreement could 
not be reached on collective action: "This obligation of the United States does not 
depend upon the prior agreement of all the other parties to the Treaty since this 
Treaty obHgation is individual as weU as collective." This was a drastic reinter-
pretation of the Manila treaty which would make it much more effective. Pakistan's 
interest in SEATO had waned, and France usually assessed the situation in South-
East Asia in European rather than Asian terms. The Rusk reinterpretation of 
America's obligation removed the constant threat (or use) of a veto and seemed to 
prevent SEATO from becoming the paper tiger that Peking claimed it to be. 
The Australian government immediately endorsed this interpretation. Sir Garfield 
Barwick, the foreign minister, stated, "In making its decisions, the AustraHan 
Government will take into account the consultation and planning within the 
SEATO organisation and the action which other members are prepared to take, col-
lectively and individually, but at the appropriate time will decide itself how it will 
perform its obligations under the Treaty."' The appropriate time came in May when 
American marines joined a battle group in Thailand at the invitation of the Thai 
government. The American action was endorsed by a special meeting of the SEATO 
Coundl on 16 May. A week later, Barwick announced that Australia would send a 
squadron of Sabre jets to Thailand to help ensure its territorial integrity. The United 
Kingdom contributed an RAF detachment and New Zealand a small paratroop unit. 
The buHd-up of forces in Thailand thus assumed an allied character despite the 
inaction of France, Pakistan, and the Philippines.* 
Although AustraHa was not committed to the defence of Thailand, she was now 
giving token support to the United States here as well as in Vietnam. The numerical-
ly Hmited Australian military forces were being stretched to cover new areas as 
Australian foreign policy was undergoing a serious reassessment. For the first time, 
AustraHa was implicated ' 'in a foreign expedition outside the context of the British 
Commonwealth". The Melbourne Age commented: "At the moment we seem only 
to be foHowing an American initiative. This may be excellent sense but it is not a 
policy." As Charles Grimshaw has pointed out, "such an observation has a quaintly 
anachronistic ring. The die had been cast considerably earlier."' What the govern-
ment had failed to do was to let the Australian people know that the die had been 
cast. 
The centrepiece for the defence of South-East Asia against expanding Communism 
was Vietnam. Despite the Geneva settlement of 1954, free elections were held in 
neither North nor South Vietnam. The government of Ngo Dinh Diem was 
precariously based from the beginning but attracted massive American economic aid 
in an attempt to bolster the defence of a Western-orientated anti-Communist 
government.' Diem was a devout Roman Catholic in a predominantly Buddhist 
state whose first task was to consolidate his position as a Vietnamese nationalist and 
stamp out sectarian and army opposition. He met with considerable success, but as 
his government became increasingly authoritarian and,intolerant of criticism, his 
position became largely untenable without greater Western support. American 
mUitary instructors replaced the French advisers withdrawn after the Geneva Con-
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ference. Between May 1959 and September 1960 the Lao Dong (Communist) party 
in North Vietnam re-examined policies and tactics for the creation of a unified 
Vietnam. The North began to step up its plans to estabHsh a national democratic 
people's government in the South. Gradually a National Liberation Front was 
formed with administrative offices in Hanoi but in no town or district capital in 
South Vietnam. 
Disenchantment with Diem led to the expansion of anti-Diem guerilla groups and 
the stepping up of Communist political activities in South Vietnam. Communist 
military activities were strengthened by the infiltration of troops and poHtical agents 
from North Vietnam. The extent of this military and paramiHtary aid given to the 
Vietcong then and subsequently has been a matter of sharp dispute. Indian and 
Canadian representatives on the International Control Commission for Vietnam sub-
mitted a majority report (Poland dissenring) on 2 June 1962 to the United Kingdom 
and the Soviet Union as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954. The report 
declared: "There is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, 
munitions, and other supplies have been sent from North Vietnam to the South with 
the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities including 
armed attacks, directed against the armed forces and administration of the South . .. 
and there is evidence to show that the PAVN (North Vietnamese Army) has aUowed 
the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in 
the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South."' These ac-
tivities included the intensive training and political indoctrination of South 
Vietnamese who had migrated to the North and subsequently returned to the South, 
and the establishment of supply lines to the South, supply lines running through 
eastern Laos close to the Vietnamese border (the Ho Chi Minh trail). 
Australian interest in Vietnam was minimal to the end of 1961. There was little 
debate on policy and a general support for Diem as the head of government opposed 
to the spread of international communism. Casey greeted his reforms and policy 
with enthusiasm as the work of "a responsible and democratic leader. Mr. Diem has 
given undertakings in respect of the non-introduction of foreign troops, the non-
estabhshment of foreign bases. . . . I do not think the Geneva Agreements have been 
vitiated or violated in any way". ' AustraHans reporting from Saigon gave a less 
gloomy picture than reports reaching Washington. By early October 1961, President 
Kennedy felt that the Western position in South Vietnam had deteriorated so rapidly 
that he increased the number of American military instructors and then considered 
miHtary intervention, the dispatch of ground troops. Both AustraHan military in-
teUigence and the Australian charge d'affaires in Saigon had doubts about "the 
efficacy of introducing western ground troops" and their ability, apart from the use 
of massive forces, to break Vietcong influence. 
On 17 November 1961 the AustraHan ambassador in Washington, Sir Howard 
Beale, received the first American suggestion that AustraHa might provide some 
miHtary assistance, assistance in the form of equipment and advisers rather than 
ground combat forces. The approach came while the Menzies government was 
fighting a closely contested elecrion which it won by a majority of two with the 
assistance of Communist preferences. Beale reported on 5 December that 
"demonstrable Australian support for the RepubHc of Vietnam would make a very 
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favourable impression on the United States Admistration".' He suggested that 
AustraHa might supply counter-insurgency training personnel, small arms, and am-
munition. The Australian service chiefs were reluctant because of a manpower shor-
tage to do more than provide a small token contribution to training in addition to 
smaU arms and ammunition. The United States miHtary authorities in Saigon told 
the AustraHan ambassador to Vietnam on 14 December 1961 that no Australian 
assistance was needed either for training or the supply of arms and ammunition. The 
Pentagon was most reluctant to agree to the use of foreign military personnel in 
South Vietnam. It was only in February 1962 that it finally accepted the State 
Department proposals for inviting Australia to provide counter-insurgency and 
jungle fighting instructors. The motives for action by Australia were political, both 
in the American request and Australia's response.'" The first approach to AustraHa 
by the Diem government did not come until March 1962. 
The stepping up of American assistance to Vietnam followed an appeal by Diem in 
December 1961, almost a year after Hanoi's decision to set up a Front for the Libera-
tion of the South. Action was taken primarily in accordance with the American 
unilateral declaration of 21 July 1954 which was issued at the close of the Geneva 
Conference. Action to "help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to 
preserve its independence" was also taken "in response to your [Diem's] request". 
Members of SEATO were obliged if the protected states appealed for assistance, to 
"act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes". 
The American decision of 14 December to give military assistance to South 
Vietnam was extremely important to Australian short-term and long-term points of 
view. Australia had to reassess the situation in South Vietnam to determine what 
support it would give to South Vietnam in its war against communism. Obsessed by 
the West New Guinea problem, Canberra moved slowly in making its 
reassessment." By March 1962 Australia was moving towards miHtary assistance to 
South Vietnam. Ambassador Beale had recommended on 16 February that any 
American request for assistance should be considered favourably. The minister for 
Defence declared that AustraHa could make only a token contribution of possibly ten 
officers and some warrant and non-commissioned officers. At the ANZUS Council 
meeting in Canberra on 9 May, the Australian prime minister, R.G. Menzies, told 
the commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral H.F. Felt, of the deci-
sion. Cabinet endorsed this dedsion on 15 May, provided that a request was received 
from the Republic of Vietnam. Cabinet also had before it a suggestion from Felt that 
Australia might also supply two radar patrol ships, engineer units, a signals unit, and 
one transport aircraft. It upgraded its offer of assistance by one squadron of Dakota 
transport aircraft. 
On 24 May 1962, the minister for Defence announced pubHcly that AustraHa was 
providing miHtary instructors "at the invitation of the Government of the Republic 
of Vietnam". No specific request was received from Saigon untH 25 May other than 
a general appeal on 31 March "for increased miHtary assistance and support from the 
Free World countires to help prevent it from being overwhelmed". The message to 
Menzies requested that AustraHa should condemn Communist aggression.'* This 
could be, and apparently was, interpreted as a request for miHtary aid. Diem was 
informed by Felt of the Australian offer immediately after the ANZUS Coundl 
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meeting. It was not until 25 May that the Australian ambassador in Saigon offidally 
informed Diem of the Defence minister's offer. Despite the Defence minister's 
reference to SEATO, the Australian dedsion was taken in response to an American 
request, and Saigon was informed after the event. Australia had crossed its Rubicon. 
In 1963 and 1964 the United States again requested further assistance from 
Australia: a small RAAF component. The request on 14 February 1963 was refiised 
on technical grounds but was repeated on 2 April: one Dakota squadron and sixteen 
additional pilots. The Republic of Vietnam's ambassador in Canberra supported the 
American request. The acceptance of the request would have meant that Australia 
would have moved from a non-combatant to a combatant role in South Vietnam. All 
that AustraHa was prepared to do was to "reaffirm AustraHa's support and sympathy 
for the Republic of Vietnam in its present struggle" (McEwen, 25 June). In his Roy 
Milne Memorial Lecture to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
"Australian Foreign PoHcy 1962", External Affairs Minister Barwick devoted little 
attention to South Vietnam. 
The AustraHan press gave cautious approval to the committing of Australian 
troops in South Vietnam, recognizing the need for Australia to strengthen the 
American alliance and to provide a quid for the American quo on New Guinea. The 
Sydney Morning HeraW bluntly commented that the ANZUS conference had "made it 
clear that the United States is deeply dissatisfied with Australia's performance as an 
ally. The brutal truth is that America's dissatisfaction is justified". It demanded a 
drastic revision of Australian defence expenditure which would give AustraHa "the 
defence capacity which would make us a real power". Despite reservations about the 
conduct of American policy in both Laos and South Vietnam, the general feeling was 
that "in putting troops in South Vietnam, we are making the commitment to the 
defence of South-East Asia plainer: we are standing up to be counted". Douglas 
Wilkie of the Melbourne Sun concluded his analysis by quoting the Japanese pro-
verb: "Honour does not move sideways like a crab."" 
The situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate in 1963, and the United 
States was compelled to commit substantial additional American forces to support 
the Diem government. Increasing Western disillusionment with Diem led to his 
murder on 1-2 November 1963. Political instability increased, and the strategic 
hamlets plan began to collapse. The United States sent an aide-memoire to Australia 
on 6 May 1964 indicating directions in which additional assistance would be 
welcomed. A similar note was sent to twenty-five countries suggesting economic 
and social aid and military aid short of fighting units. Australia doubled its force of 
military instructors and increased it to a hundred early in 1965. As Senator Shane 
Paltridge, the new minister for Defence, announced on 8 June 1964, some of the 
instructors "would now also be employed in the field at battalion and lower levels as 
adviser teams".'* The problem of aid had increasingly become one for the SEATO 
powers and was discussed at the SEATO conference in Manila on 13-14 April. The 
SEATO conference contented itself with expressing "grave concern about continu-
ing Communist aggression against the Republic of Vietnam". It was agreed that 
"the defeat of the Communist campaign is essenrial not only to the Republic of 
South Vietnam, but to that of South-East Asia". The communique gave moral sup-
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port to the United States but it did not put a single soldier in the field to assist South 
Vietnamese or American troops. 
The Australian Embassy in Washington and the Department of External Affairs 
urged a sympathetic consideration of the American request. "Our objective should 
be to achieve such an habitual closeness of relations with the United States and sense 
of mutual alHance that in our time of need [the possibility of a crisis in relations with 
Indonesia] the United States would have Httle option but to respond as we would 
want."" In June the Australian military advisers team was increased from sixty to 
eighty-three in response to an American request. In July the Vietnamese prime 
minister. General Nguyen Khanh, appealed for assistance to thirty-four countries. 
Australia was formally thanked on 5 August for the assistance it had already given, 
with the hope that help would be continued. 
The military and poHtical situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate in 
the late months of 1963 and early in 1964, despite the massive build-up of the South 
Vietnamese army and an increase in the numbers of American military instructors 
from 685 to 16,500. By December 1968 there were 549,000 American troops in 
Vietnam. The position changed dramatically with the North Vietnamese attack on 
American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin on 2-4 August. This led to retaliatory 
bombing of PT bases and an oil depot on the North Vietnamese coast, the first 
American bombing north of the 17th parallel. President Johnson asked Congress for 
a resolution approving all necessary measures to maintain freedom in South-East 
Asia. The resolution, which was passed on 7 August by 98 to 2 in the Senate and 416 
to 0 in the House, declared, "The United States is therefore prepared, as the Presi-
dent determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist 
any member or protocol state of the South-East Asia CoUective Defence Treaty 
requesting assistance in defence of its freedom."" 
The United States appealed to the United Nations Security Council to deal with 
"acts of deliberate aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United 
States". The move was abortive partly because of the UN president's ruling that 
both North and South Vietnam attend and partly because there was little outside 
support. No action was taken. In any case, North Vietnam denied the competence of 
the Security Coundl to deal with the issue. 
The retaliatory action by the United States was fully supported by the Australian 
government. The minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, described the 
American action as "completely justified" and subsequently expressed the hope that 
"the restrained but determined actions of the United States" would have "a strong 
deterrent effect". He indicated AustraHa's determination "within the Hmits of our 
capacity . . . to stand with our allies in the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation in 
the defence against Communist aggression in South-East Asia. . . . There is at 
present no reason to assume that the conflict will extend."" 
Hasluck's support for American policy was announced with no knowledge of 
American plans for retaHatory air strikes against North Vietnam on seventy-two 
hours' notice and for fiiH-scale air war on thirty days' notice (Plan 34). President 
Johnson was anxious to broaden the base of popular support for the policy of the 
State Department and the Pentagon." This was accompHshed internally by the con-
gressional resolution of 7 August. The appeal to the Security Council had misfired. 
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What the president was anxious to obtain was wider international support for 
American policy, for some of America's aUies to stand up and be counted. Several ap-
proaches were made by the United States to persuade AustraHa to give fuller mHitary 
support. The approaches were sometimes made to the Australian ambassador in 
Washington. On 10 December 1964 Prime Minister Huong of South Vietnam made 
a direct request for increased Australian military assistance to the Australian minister 
for Air during his visit to Saigon. Huong based his appeal for more army instructors 
and air assistance on Australia's security needs and partly because "the 
Americans. . . . felt lonely and hesitant in their present position and needed stiffen-
ing by the support of nations like AustraHa". This was really the voice of the State 
Department. Four days later. President Johnson suggested that Australia should pro-
vide two hundred additional combat advisers as well as other supplementary naval 
support. This was technically impossible, largely because of AustraHan commitments 
in Malaysia, and politically difficult until Australia was clearer about American 
policies in Vietnam; whether, for example, the Pentagon and the State Department 
were planning an escalation of American pressure on North Vietnam. On 19 January 
the Australian ambassador in Washington was instructed to suggest that "Australia 
would give full pubHc and diplomatic support if the United States were to initiate air 
strikes against North Vietnam's infiltration system"." AustraHa was anxious to 
clarify American policies in South Vietnam. To suggest that it was pressing the 
United States to adopt a hawkish policy and so change the direction of American 
poHcy is to grossly overestimate the possible influence of Australia. AustraHa was at 
best a middle power which could not divert a great power from its own poHcy nor 
take the lead in Western pressures on North Vietnam. 
Persistent American suggestions for increased Australian military support led to a 
thorough analysis of Australian military resources. When Henry Cabot Lodge 
visited Canberra on 4 February 1965 he was told that it would be militarily feasible 
for Australia to make a combat battalion available for service in South-East Asia 
should the Australian government decide to commit it.*" 
The political decision was announced by the Australian prime minister on 29 April 
1965: an infantry battalion (eight hundred men) was to be committeed for service in 
South Vietnam after a request for assistance had been received from the South Viet-
namese government. It apparently foHowed the adoption of a tougher American 
policy in South Vietnam after the Vietcong attack on American military instaUations 
near Pleiku in central South Vietnam. President Johnson had told an emergency 
meeting of the National Security Council that the United States Air Force had been 
"directed to launch retaliatory attacks against barracks and staging areas in the 
southern area of North Vietnam which intelligence has shown to be actively used by 
Hanoi for training and infiltration of Vietcong personnel into South Vietnam"." 
The initial bombing was followed by extensive American attacks on barracks and 
lines of communications which indicated that American policy was becoming deter-
rent and not primarily retaHatory. The Australian minister for External Affairs 
firmly supported this "response to aggression". The clarification of American policy 
and the adoption of a tougher line facilitated military discussions between 
Washington and Canberra after American staff talks had been held in Honolulu. The 
American request for further Australian assistance was informal rather than formal. 
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It was not untH 13 AprH that Ambassador Beale in Washington made the offer of a 
battaHon. President Johnson made an important foreign policy address at Johns 
Hopkins University on 7 April which could have made the Australian offer redun-
dant.** The Australian offer was accepted with alacrity. Beale pointed out that the 
further dispersal of Australian forces might require Australia to look for support 
from the United States and that the president was fully aware of American com-
mitments under the ANZUS Treaty. 
Although the decision was made on 7 April, and communicated to President 
Johnson, it was pubHcly announced only after the arrival in Canberra of Henry 
Cabot Lodge as President Johnson's special ambassador. It was also timed to precede 
the opening of the annual SEATO Council meeting in London. The prime minister 
justified the decision on the ground that the Vietcong were intensifying their guerilla 
activities and that substantial forces of guerillas were being infiltrated from North 
Vietnam. He indignantly repudiated the suggestion that there was "an indecent 
bargain for dollars": an easing of American restrictions on investment in Australia in 
return for Australian miHtary aid to South Vietnam. Hasluck, some two months 
earlier in his first survey of international affairs since his appointment as minister for 
External Affairs, had declared, "Australia's own analysis of the situation — the 
analysis of the situation made by the Australian Government — has brought us to 
the behef that the United States action is necessary for the defeat of aggression 
against Asian peoples and is also an essential step towards the building in Asia of the 
conditions of peace and progress. . . . In South and South-East Asia, it is American 
armed strength which is the reality behind which the countries in that area have 
retained their liberty to choose their own courses. "*' 
The offer of troops by AustraHa was made in the first instance to the United States 
and not to South Vietnam. The Manila treaty provided that any action on the ter-
ritory of a designated state could only be taken "at the invitation or with the consent 
of the government concerned".** The SEATO umbrella was used by Australian 
ministers to justify its polides in South Vietnam. 
"AustraHa's MiHtary Commitment to Vietnam", a parHamentary report by 
Professor R.G. Neale tabled on 13 May 1975 but not printed in Parliamentary Papers, 
examines in detail the question of South Vietnam's invitation or consent to the com-
mitment of AustraHan troops to South Vietnam. Attempts to secure a formal South 
Vietnamese request were made between 9 and 29 April. "The State Department had 
given instructions that Dr Quat should be specifically asked to request Australia to 
supply the battalion." The diplomatic niceties were met by discussions between 
Quat and the American ambassador to Saigon, General Maxwell Taylor. The 
Australian offer was then made a day later. Quat's verbal rather than written consent 
was received in Canberra some three hours before the prime minister's offer in 
parliament. AH the precedents between 1962 and 1965 made it evident that the 
government of South Vietnam would receive the AustraHan offer with enthusiasm. 
Australian troop levels in Vietnam were increased by four stages. On 18 August 
1965 the battalion was built up to a battaHon group by the addition of ancillary and 
support units. The minister for Defence proposed to plan to commit a second bat-
taHon in March 1966, but cabinet rejected the proposal. Australian military resources 
were stretched, perhaps to the limit, because of developments in the Malaysia-
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Singapore-Indonesia area. The increase was made as a result of a request from Presi-
dent Johnson to Australia and other countries on the eve of an increase of American 
troops to forty-four battaHons to carry out the "search and destroy" strategy. No 
specific request for further military assistance was received from South Vietnam. 
Towards the end of 1965, American hopes for a speedy victory had receded and 
the Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, could see only a long and costly war, 
since the United States could not accept defeat. Pressure for further aUied aid was 
increased. In his first important statement to parliament after becoming prime 
minister on the retirement of Sir Robert Menzies, Harold Holt announced on 8 
March 1966 that the government had decided to create in South Vietnam a "self-
contained Australian task force under Australian command embradng all personnel 
serving there and enlarging our contribution to a total of some 4,500 men"." It 
would include a headquarters staff, two infantry battaHons, a Special Air Services 
squadron, eight Iroquois helicopters, and the necessary support forces. An important 
part of the new policy was the decision to include national service trainees when pro-
perly trained in the regular army units sent overseas. 
A third increase was made on 20 December 1966 after Holt had fought a general 
election in November largely on the issue of Vietnam and increased his majority. He 
immediately considered sending an extra battaHon to Vietnam and wanted a dedsion 
to be made speedily. Service advisers and foreign affairs experts felt that the miHtary 
situation in Vietnam was improving. It was decided to increase the total number of 
the Australian forces in Vietnam to 6,300, with all three services contributing, 
Discussions with Washington had been going on intermittently, and McNamara ex-
pressed gratification at the increase in Australian ground forces before the pubhc 
announcement. "There is no documentary evidence that the Government of the 
Republic of Vietnam was consulted about or given prior notification of this third 
increase in AustraHa's forces in Vietnam," Neale states. Air Vice-Marshal Ky was 
told of the decision after the Australian prime minister had announced the decision to 
parliament.*' 
The final increase in Australian combat troops was announced on 17 October 
1967. Much of the earlier American fear of losing the war was evaporating, but 
McNamara realized that it would be a long haul to victory. Washington in the early 
months of 1967 made no specific request for additional AustraHan military assistance, 
but it was clear from unofficial discussions in Saigon and Washington what the 
United States wanted. On 13 July President Johnson announced that the United 
States would discuss increased contributions with its allies, and two days later 
Johnson wrote to Holt "pointing to the need for additional effort but not mak-
ing a specific request".*' The United Kingdom White Paper on Defence (1967) an-
nounced Britain's intenrion to withdraw from South-East Asia by the early 1970s. 
Australia's attitude as the principal Western ally of the United States became par-
ticularly important. 
Towards the end of July, presidential advisers General Maxwell Taylor and Clark 
Clifford visited Canberra to see whether Australia could increase its forces in 
Vietnam. The discussions covered the political and military situation in Vietnam.lt 
quickly became apparent that Australian and American assessments at both levels dif-
fered considerably and that Canberra was much less optimistic than Washington. 
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Holt told Clifford and Taylor " that no decision had been taken on any aspect". 
Lengthy considerations were held in cabinet, and "extremely strong pressure was 
exerted by the State Department and President" (the Australian ambassador who 
was present at the meeting between the president and the Australian treasurer 
"could not remember stronger pressure being brought to bear").*' Finally, on 6 
October, Holt informed Johnson that Australia would increase its combat troops by 
some seventeen hundred, to eight thousand, by the dispatch of a third battalion 
together with the required support troops. These included a tank squadron, increas-
ed helicopter support, Skyhawk pilots, and an additional engineer construction unit. 
This was the upper limit of AustraHa's commitment and put her at the fuH stretch of 
present and planned military capadty. On 17 October Holt announced cabinet's 
decision to parliament.*' No formal request was received from the Vietnamese 
government, but it was informed a few days before the official announcement. It 
met with warm support from President Nguyen Van Thieu. 
Why did the Australian government on 29 April 1965 commit ground troops to 
South Vietnam in support of the United States and then subsequently increase them 
by stages to eight thousand? Prime Minister Menzies explained the initial dedsion to 
the House of Representatives on 29 April (see above). Holt answered the question 
"in simple terms" on 17 October 1967: 
We are there because we believed in the right of the people to be free. 
We are there because we responded to an appeal for and against aggression. 
We are there because security and stabiUty in South-East Asia are vital to our own 
security and stability. 
We are there because we want peace, not war, and independence, not serfdom, to be the 
lot of the peoples of Asia. 
We are there because we do not beUeve that our great Pacific partner, the United States, 
should stand alone for freedom. 
We will continue to be there while the aggression persists because as a free and indepen-
dent nation, we cannot honorably do otherwise.'" 
He was refining for purposes of debate the more complex and sophisticated analyses 
of the problem made in a series of statements by the minister for External Affairs, 
Paul Hasluck, over the years: 
The AustraUan case for intervention has stressed three main themes. In the first place, 
AustraUa is interested in preserving stabiUty in South-East Asia, a stabiUty threatened by 
external aggression against the small independent states of the region. Ever since the incep-
tion of the Colombo Plan and the development of SEATO aid, AustraUa has put some 
millions and miUions of pounds into the support of various movements on the Asian 
mainland. . . . We do not fundamentally want to alter the way of Ufe of these countries. 
We do not covet any of their territories or any of their goods. What is it that we 
want?. . . We see that aggression in order to change by force the lives of other countries is 
something that has to be resisted. I am sure that we also see that AustraUa cannot Uve to 
itself alone. We cannot withdraw into our own island. . . . the preservation of those 
things that we think good in Australia depends on the existence of a certain type of world. 
Unless there is peace in the world there cannot be peace in any part of it; unless there is 
some assurance of security for aU smaU nations, there cannot be an assurance for any smaU 
nation." 
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In assessing the situation in South-East Asia in general and South Vietnam in par-
ticular, the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Defence made 
similar assumptions to those of the State Department and the Pentagon. Hasluck em-
phasized the point that it was essential to distinguish between the basic and unessen-
tial elements in the situation in Vietnam: 
What is happening in South Vietnam is not a local rebeUion caused by internal discontent 
but the application of the methods and doctrines of Communist guerriUa warfare first 
evolved in China and then successfully used in North Viet Nam . . . where there is a large 
scale directed campaign of assassination and terrorism, a campaign directed from outside. 
Vietnam is in fact a test case in the application of the Chinese theory of wars of national 
liberation . . . what is at stake is more than Viet Nam — it is security in the region. . . . 
The outcome in Viet Nam will affect not only the future of Viet Nam but the future of aO 
Southern Asia" (Hasluck). 
The United States had appended to the SEATO treaty an understanding that "its 
recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack . . . apply only to com-
munist aggression". This quickly became identified with Chinese Communist ag-
gression. Dean Rusk made one of the fuUest official analyses of Chinese poHcy in a 
statement to a closed session of the Far East sub-committee of the United States 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 16 March 1966:" "The Chinese Communist 
leaders seek to bring China on the world stage as a great power. They hold that 
China's history, size and geographical position entitle it to great power status. They 
seek to overcome the humihation of 150 years of economic, cultural and poHtical 
domination of outside powers." He went on to suggest: "Peking's use of power is 
closely related to what I believe are its second and third objectives: dominance within 
Asia and leadership of the Communist world revolution, employing Maoist tactics. 
Peking is striving to restore traditional Chinese influence or dominance in South, 
South-East and East Asia. Its concept of influence is exclusive. . . . Where Peking is 
present, it seeks to exclude all others. And this is not only true in its relations with 
its neighbours, but in the Communist world as well."'* 
A fundamental part of Rusk's analysis was his belief that Peking was at once im-
periahst in a traditional Chinese sense and also in the twentieth century communist 
sense. The tactics of "people's wars of liberation" involved the use of gueriUa war-
fare and large-scale military action. They included an attempt to use Chinese 
minorities on the perimeter of the People's Republic of China, what C.P. Fitzgerald 
has caUed "the third China", as instruments for the subversion of non-Communist 
governments. 
While Rusk was aware of the distinction between the two motives for Chinese 
imperialism, he was usually content to put Chinese poHcy in simpHstic terms, as he 
did at the deventh meeting of the SEATO CouncH in 1966. "The communist threat 
. . . hangs over all of South-East Asia and over nations elsewhere in Asia and in the 
Pacific. Indeed, it is a naked challenge to world peace and order, and thus ultimately 
to the security of every free nation."" His broad analysis was shared by Richard 
Nixon before he became president in 1969 and became an article of faith for suc-
cessive Australian governments. 
The anti-Communist argument was linked with a second common assumption in 
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both Canberra and Washington, the so-called domino theory. Spender in March 
1956 used the domino theory to justify Australia's opposition to expanding com-
munism: "Should the forces of Communism prevail and Vietnam come under the 
heel of Communist China, Malaya is in danger of being outflanked and it, together 
with ThaHand, Burma and Indonesia, will become the next direct object of further 
Communist activities."" Casey used the argument on 27 October 1954. President 
Eisenhower adopted the theory from Dulles in 1953: "The loss of Indo-China wiU 
cause the faU of South-East Asia Hke a set of dominoes." Henry Cabot Lodge, the 
former American ambassador to Saigon, put it forcibly: "He who holds or has in-
fluence in Vietnam can affect the future of the Philippines and Taiwan to the east, 
ThaUand and Burma with their huge rice surplus to the west, and Malaysia and 
Indonesia with their rubber, oil and tin to the south. Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand would in turn be deeply concerned by the communization of South 
Vietnam."" Lodge was in Canberra as President Johnson's special ambassador when 
the AustraHan Prime Minister announced the decision to commit an infantry bat-
talion for service in South Vietnam. 
In its simpHstic form, the theory argued that all the dominoes would automatic-
ally topple one way. In its more sophisticated form it realized the interdependence of 
free countries in the region and also the internal and external effects of the collapse of 
one country on others; falling dominoes did not necessarily become Communist. 
This was a much more pragmatic analysis. The theory in one form or another was 
held as a matter of faith by most poHtical and military leaders in AustraHa and the 
United States." It failed to realize that Communist China was not monoHthic and 
that there were serious weaknesses in the Chinese political structure. In parts of 
South-East Asia it justified the retention of American forces in the region. An 
American defeat seemed unthinkable, and total withdrawal extremely unlikely. 
The domino theory was not seriously challenged in the United States until the 
middle of 1964. After the Honolulu Conference of June 1964, President Johnson 
asked the CIA to examine the theory. On 9 June, the CIA challenged it. 
With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is Ukely that no nation in the area would 
quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the faU of Laos and South Vietnam. Fur-
thermore a continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not be inexorable 
and any spread which did occur would take time — time in which the total situation might 
change in any number of ways unfavourable to the Communist cause. . . . The extent to 
which industrial countries would move away from the United States towards the Com-
munists would be significantly affected by the substance and manner of United States 
poUcy in the period foUowing the loss of Laos and South Vietnam." 
George Ball, the under-secretary of state, was the only important presidential adviser 
to seriously accept the CIA assessment. Criticism of the theory in Australia rarely 
got beyond a handfiil of academics. 
Australian intervention in Vietnam was based on ANZUS not SEATO obHga-
tions. The American case for intervention was based legally upon obligations under 
the SEATO Treaty and the Geneva Agreements.*" But this was not the case with 
Australia, even though from time to time Australian poHcy was publicly defended in 
terms of a SEATO commitment. As Neale states, "AustraHan troops were not sent 
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to Vietnam as part of a SEATO Operation or as a result of consultations among 
SEATO powers as a treaty organisation."*' 
During military talks with the United States in Honolulu in March 1965, 
AustraUa explained its presence in Vietnam as arising out of ANZUS rather than 
SEATO obligations when the matter was raised by the United Kingdom. South 
Vietnam's requests for military assistance were not made as a protocol state of 
SEATO. They were made on the prompting of Washington: Australian offers of 
defence aid were usually made directly to Washington before being made in Saigon. 
The third major reason for Australian intervention in Vietnam was a feeling of 
obligation to the United States and a belief that the preservation of an American 
presence in South-East Asia was an important insurance policy, especially in view of 
the British threat to withdraw from east of Suez. Over the whole post-war period, 
Australian policy has been directed towards securing a firm American commitment 
to the area between Singapore and Manila. ANZUS and SEATO were essential parts 
of that policy. The Australian ambassador to Washington saw the decisions between 
1962 and 1965 in the following terms: 
The willingness or ability of the United States to help us depended, not only upon the 
goodwill of the United States administration, but mostly upon Congress which alone had 
the power to declare war and to provide the fiinds to enable a United States president to go 
to our assistance. Congress is a potentially isolationist and sometimes parochial body, not 
willing to help those who will not help themselves and help their ally. The Australian 
government beHeved — and so did the majority of the Australian people, as two elections 
showed — that Australia could not eat its cake and have it too; it could not refuse to give 
help if called upon in a proper case, and yet expect to be given help when it needed it. I say 
"in a proper case", by which I mean a case where the government was satisfied as to the 
justice of the South Vietnamese cause, and as to the seriousness of the danger of communist 
expansion in South East Asia. In taking this stand the government was not being a puppet; 
it was being prudent.*^ 
Holt put it even more bluntly: "AustraUa . . . has a vital interest in the presence 
and active participation of this great power the United States in the area of Asia and 
the Pacific."*' In other words, Australian participation in Vietnam was her quidior 
the American quo: a continuing American interest in the ANZUS Treaty was essential 
to Australian security. 
Australian intervention in Vietnam was essentially political and military and was 
based on an estimate of national interest. This required close relations with the 
United States. It was important for AustraUa to stand up and be counted. This was 
true in December 1961, when the first overtures were made to Ambassador Beale, 
and remained true for a decade. At no stage was the Australian contribution of real 
military significance to the United States: the number of troops involved was too 
smaU. The presence of the Australian flag was much more important than that of 
combat troops. 
The Australian government had repeatedly stressed two points: first, that the 
dispatch of Australian troops to South Vietnam was at the invitation of successive 
South Vietnamese governments; second, that AustraUa was never "dragged into 
Vietnam by the United States". "We are not there simply to support the United 
States of America," Hasluck said in May 1966. "When Australia takes up a position 
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on Vietnam it does so because in the view of the government and the majority of its 
people it is serving Australian interests."** 
Consultation with South Vietnam is dealt with in detail in the parliamentary 
report "AustraHa's MiHtary Commitment to Vietnam". Between 1962 and 1967 
the role of the South Vietnamese government was a subordinate one. In some in-
stances no formal request for aid was made; in other cases the formal request was 
made after the Australian decision was taken and a few hours before the formal 
announcement was made in the Australian parliament. Saigon was normally pleased 
by the Australian decision to increase its military commitment and usually said so 
immediately before or shortly after the Australian dedsion was made. 
The Australian government has repeatedly emphasized the independence of 
Australia assessments of the situation, although several of the decisions about the 
commitment of Australian troops to Vietnam have coincided with or immediately 
preceded the visit of American leaders to AustraHa. From the beginning, Australian 
pohtical leaders and diplomats have regarded AustraHan military aid as an insurance 
premium for the defence of AustraHa in the event of attack. The timing of aid ded-
sions has always been regarded as politically important. 
When the Australian ambassador, Howard Beale, first received American over-
tures for military assistance in November 1961, he commented on 5 December that 
"demonstrable Australian support for the Republic of Vietnam would make a very 
favourable impression on the United States Administration''. When the first increase 
in the level of AustraHan combat troops was announced in August 1965, the Aust-
rahan Embassy in Washington was told, "We would like you to present it in a way 
that wiU make the greatest favourable impact on the Americans." Throughout the 
period, "the dominant influence was pressure from Americans at political and 
diplomatic levels for Australia to increase her commitment to Vietnam". Sometimes 
the pressure was indirect: the South Vietnamese government from time to time 
reported American views to the Australian ambassador in Saigon. On other occasions 
there was an exchange of views between the president and State Department as 
AustraHan cabinet ministers visited Washington en route to London. American 
pressure on Australia was partly to allay domestic opinion about democratic support 
for American intervention and partly to influence international opinion that in-
tervention was multilateral rather than unilateral. After the CHfford-Taylor visit to 
Australia in July 1967, the American pressure on Australia was "extremely 
strong".*' Australians were unaware of this continual American pressure but were 
concerned at Prime Minister Holt's ebullient comment, "AU the way with LBJ", 
when he visited the White House. In a more reflective mood he pointed out, "It 
doesn't mean, certainly, that Australia has any lack of independence of mind, and 
anybody who knows the President would be paying him no compHment if they felt 
that he was looking for the kind of friend who was never prepared to have an 
argument with him."*' 
The Australiaii Labor Party opposed the government's policy on both political and 
miHtary grounds. It was handicapped by internal divisions within the party. A 
strong left-wing faction was sympathetic to North Vietnam and extremely critical of 
the right-wing government in Saigon. The moderate leader of the ALP, Arthur 
Calwell, made an extremely capable speech on 29 April 1965 in which he challenged 
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the assumprions on which Australian poHcy was based. He referred to "an erroneous 
view of the nature of the war in Vietnam; a failure to understand the nature of the 
Communist challenge; and a false notion as to the interests of America and her 
allies". "The war in South Vietnam is a civH war aided and abetted by the North 
Vietnamese Government," he said. He feh that the commitring of a substantial part 
of the small Australian army to South Vietnam weakened Australian defences 
without substantially strengthening the American position in South Vietnam. "We 
beheve that America must not be humiliated and must not be forced to 
withdraw. . . . But we beHeve that the military involvement in the present form 
decided on by the Australian Government represents a threat to Australia's standing 
in Asia, to our power for good in Asia and above aU to the security of this nation."*' 
When the parliamentary debate was resumed on 18 August, Calwell urged the 
government to "strive for a cease-fire now, to be policed by a United Nations peace-
keeping force and for a conference of all parties directly involved, including represen-
tatives of both the Government in Saigon and the Vietong" to negotiate a settl^  
ment.*' His basic assumption had not changed by March 1966: "The war in South 
Vietnam is a cruel unwinnable, civil war, aided and abetted of course by the North 
Vietnamese Government but neither created nor prindpally maintained by it." J.F. 
Cairns, the chief spokesman of the left wing of the ALP, emphasized the moral issues 
involved in the Vietnam War, a war he regarded as essentially a civil war with Httle 
outside intervention or assistance, but he ignored the American aid programme for 
South-East Asia outlined by President Johnson in his Johns Hopkins University 
address. 
The ALP stand involved a head-on collision with the government in its analysis of 
the problems of South Vietnam. It also needed to rethink its views early in 1965 
about the American role in South Vietnam. It forgot that it had declared the 
American statement to the Security Council on 7 February about its object in South 
Vietnam to be "unexceptionable", that the case for air strikes against military 
instaUations in North Vietnam "deserved sympathetic AustraHan understanding", 
and that the Soviet demand "for the immediate departure of all American and other 
foreign forces from South Vietnam would be in the interests neither of the people of 
South Vietnam nor the people of AustraHa. . . . the presence of these forces is 
justified as a temporary means to an end and not as an end in itself."*' The failure of 
the five-man Commonwealth prime ministers' peace mission also weakened the 
Labor arguments. 
The ALP was reluctant to be branded as pro-Communist and anti-American, and 
both wings accepted the view that the American alliance was essential to the 
maintenance of Australian security. But at no stage in the debate before 1966 was 
there any ALP critical analysis of North Vietnamese political or miHtary poUdes in 
South Vietnam. It had not protested earlier against the token Australian commit-
ment of military advisers. 
The main thrust of Labor criticisms of government policy quickly centred on the 
use of national service conscripts as well as regular army volunteers in Vietnam. In 
the important debate on foreign poHcy in March-April 1965, most of the ALP's 
heavy artillery took part; in the August debate, most of the Labor leaders were con-
spicuous by their absence.'" The debate reflected what Professor Alexander has called 
VIETNAM 327 
"the outmoded, traditional Labor hostility to conscription for military service 
beyond Australian shores". The Menzies government had introduced conscription 
for mUitary service overseas in 1964. This flouted Labor tradition, even though the 
ALP had painfully swallowed conscription for overseas service in clearly defined areas 
during the Second World War. Its reintroduction by the Menzies government at a 
time when recruitment for the regular army was lagging was Hke a red rag to a bull. 
Partial conscription on the basis of a lottery was described as a "lottery of death" 
and aroused intense emotion inside and outside parliament. The merits of the 
Vietnam War were largely obscured by the debate over what was both a defence 
problem and a party ideological issue. 
AustraHans slowly and reluctantly accepted conscription for overseas service. The 
ALP made conscription one of the key issues in the by-election on 2 April 1966 
caused by the resignation of Sir Robert Menzies. The swing of 7.7 per cent to Labor 
reflected some disquiet over government policies, but not massive opposition to con-
scription. The theoretical, ideological conscription issue quickly became linked with 
the future role of Australian troops in Vietnam should the Australian Labor Party 
win the general election at the end of 1966. Calwell declared that the ALP would 
bring home all conscripts overseas if it were returned to power. Gough Whitlam, 
the deputy leader of the ALP, made the odd suggestion that Labor would give con-
scripts the option of leaving combat areas. Calwell told the Tasmanian branch of the 
ALP at Launceston that he would ' 'live or perish politically on the issue of conscrip-
tion". During the election campaign he hedged and talked about consulting 
Australia's allies before withdrawing any troops. Only 8 per cent of voters, accor-
ding to a Gallup poll, regarded conscription as a major electoral issue. In any event, 
the Australian Labor Party was defeated at the election of 26 November 1966 by the 
largest majority since 1903. Calwell did perish poHtically as a result of the landslide 
and was replaced as leader of the ALP by Whitlam in February 1967. 
One of Whitlam's first tasks was to persuade the Labor party executive to adopt a 
less rigid attitude towards unilateral, unconditional withdrawal of Australian troops. 
At the Adelaide conference in 1967 the ALP decided to oppose conscription for 
Vietnam or elsewhere outside Australian Territory except in time of declared war, 
but did modify its withdrawal policy: 
The ALP on achieving office wiU submit to our alUes that they should immediately 
(a) cease bombing North Vietnam 
(b) recognise the National Liberation Front as a principal party to negotiarions 
(c) transform operations in South Vietnam into holding operations thereby to avoid 
involvement of civiUans in the war, cease the use of napalm and other objectionable 
materials of war and provide sanctuary for anyone seeking it. 
Should our alUes fail to take this action, the AustraUan Government would then consider 
that it had no alternative other than to withdraw our armed forces." 
The conference failed to resolve the problem of how to reconcile the retention of 
the American alliance — support for ANZUS — with a policy of withdrawal should 
Washington reject these conditions. 
The party redefined its policy towards the war and announced its opposition to the 
continuance of the war in Vietnam and to Australian participation in it. Lance 
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Barnard, the deputy leader of the ALP, put the party's preconditions more fully on 2 
November: 
We wiU use every initiative at our command to achieve a negotiated peace so that all 
foreign forces can be withdrawn from South Vietnam. . . . the bombing of North 
Vietnam must cease immediately. We maintain that the National Liberation Front must he 
recognised as a major party in any negotiated settlement. We cannot countenance a 
poUtical settlement of the war that ignores the National Liberation Front which certainly 
has a large Communist component but also has strongly nationaHst and non-Communist 
elements. . . . The Labor Party insists that the scope of the war be scaled down so that 
some measure of normal economic Ufe can be restored to South Vietnam. We msist that 
napalm, phosphorus bombs and similar weapons of war be withdrawn from the conflict so 
that thousands of innocent people are not shriveUed to death in agony.'* 
This partial rethinking of ALP policy was the result of a growing critidsm of the 
South Vietnamese government. Labor policy towards Indo-China as a whole and of 
American policy in east and south-east Asia had always been critical because 
Washington appeared to be backing conservative or reactionary governments — Bao 
Dai, Chiang Kai-shek, and Syngman Rhee as well as Ngo Dinh Diem — in its at-
tempt to check the spread of communism. There was an increasing beHef that "the 
preservation of the undemocratic and corrupt Government of South Vietnam is not 
worth one drop of Australian blood"." The critidsm of the South Vietnamese 
government was sharpened by the seizure of power by Air Vice-Marshal Nguyen 
Cao Ky and General Nguyen Van Thieu in June 1966. The Australian government 
was more concerned with political stability than with the poHtical colour of the 
government in Saigon. Elections held on 1 September and 21 October were observed 
by a small Australian parliamentary delegation. It reported that although there were 
"some minor irregularities and defidendes, . . . the elections were fair and free — 
indeed remarkably so — and that the irregularities were not enough in their extent 
or importance to affect the general outcome of the poll'' .'* 
In January 1967 Air Vice-Marshal Ky visited Australia as part of a tour of coun-
tries assisting his government in the war. The visit was a colourful and controversial 
one. CalweU bitterly attacked him and his government, for whom he had "nothing 
but contempt". In speeches made at demonstrations that he led, he charged Marshal 
Ky with being a "fascist", a "gangster quisling", and a "miserable Httle butcher". 
"His visit would shock every AustraHan except those who condoned and tolerated 
murder, brutality and injustice". Both the abuse and the demonstrations in Canberra 
and Brisbane reflected the strong emotionalism behind much of Labor's opposition 
to the Vietnamese war. They also reflected the divisions within the ALP; Whitlam 
took no part in the demonstrations but did not attend the reception for Ky." 
Public criticism of Australian and American policy in Vietnam increased as the 
military situation deteriorated and United States combat forces were rapidly increas-
ed. The 685 miHtary advisers of 1954 increased to 16,500 combat troops in 1964. 
After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, combat troops were increased to 140,000 by July 
1965 and ultimately to 549,000 by 1968. The departure from an "advise and assist" 
policy to full combat operations was justified by General Maxwell Taylor to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 17 February 1966: "It was qmte clear that 
the Vietnamese could not raise forces fast enough to keep pace with the growing 
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threat of the Viet Cong in time. It was this sobering conclusion that led to the 
dedsion to introduce American ground forces with their unique mobility and 
massive fire-power to compensate for the deficiency in Vietnamese strength."" Part 
of the same policy was the dedsion to use American aircraft to attack either Vietcong 
bases or North Vietnam itself. The first sporadic sorties were made in February 1966 
and then increased on a massive scale to lift South Vietnamese morale. A major objec-
tive was to "change the wiH of the enemy leadership". A thirty-seven-day pause in 
bombing from Christmas Eve 1965 to 31 January 1966 was followed by the exten-
sion of bombing operations to the North Vietnamese oil installations close to Hanoi 
and Haiphong. By August 1966 it was estimated that a larger tonnage of bombs was 
being dropped by American planes each week than had been dropped on Germany at 
the peak of the Second World War. 
The intensification and extension of United States bombing was supported by the 
Australian government cautiously, with Httle enthusiasm but with an appreciation of 
its pohtical and tactical advantages. No hint of the new policy had been given to the 
SEATO Council meeting in Canberra on 27-29 June, but the Australian govern-
ment gave its approval in the ANZUS Council communique two days later. Holt 
reiterated his full support for the policy in answering a question in the House on 20 
September." 
American bombing was much less precise than military communiques indicated, 
and dvilian casualties were considerable. Opposition to the new bombing policy was 
quickly expressed by the United Kingdom, by Lester Pearson of Canada, and by the 
secretary-general of the United Nations, U Thant. The Australian Labor Party, with 
the support of a wide cross-section of public opinion, opposed the bombing on 
grounds of humanity and morality as well as the beHef that the bombing would be 
counterproductive for peace negotiations. Whitlam quoted McNamara's admission 
— "I do not beHeve that the bombing up to the present has significantly reduced, 
nor any bombing that I could contemplate in the future would significantly reduce 
the actual flow of men and materials to the South." He also argued that it was "a 
barrier to negotiations and had failed to force the North Vietnamese to the 
conference table"." 
One of the issues causing bitter controversy in parliament was the accusation that 
the Austrahan government was adopting a hawkish poHcy on bombing and that it 
was trying to prevent President Johnson from slowing it down. Whitlam had urged 
the government to use its influence in Washington to stop the bombing but claimed 
that it was throwing its weight behind the president's military advisers. He quoted 
from the congressional briefing, "We cannot let up on the bombing at this stage; 
we would be letting down the only two allies in the world who have supported us 
— the King of Thailand and the Prime Minister of AustraHa." Holt flatly repudiated 
the leader of the opposition's charge but stiU supported the continuation of 
bombing." 
Whitlam's assumptions about the nature of Australian policy were right, but he 
grossly exaggerated Australian influence on the White House. Holt and Hasluck 
accepted bombing as a vital tactical part of American policy: "The intensity of the 
world-wide Communist campaign against bombing is evidence that bombing is 
hurting."'" It is highly improbable that a hard-line, hawkish Australian attitude 
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would have influenced the American chiefs of staff or President Johnson to reverse 
American policy. The United States was aware that Australia had reservations about 
bombing pauses and "wanted to use them militarily to have an independent, non-
Communist and non-neutral South Vietnam".*' When Johnson eventually announc-
ed in November 1968 that the air, land, and sea bombardment would cease, the en-
thusiastic international response to this announcement was not shared by AustraUa. 
John Gorton, who had by then succeeded Holt as prime minister, repeated Hasluck's 
statement that a bombing pause would be justified only if some corresponding reduc-
tion were forthcoming in response from North Vietnam but expressed the hope that 
the United States would be proved right.** 
American policy, however, was slowly being modified. On 24-25 October 1966 a 
summit conference was held in Manila at the invitation of the president of the Philip-
pines. Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, 
and the United States took part. Its purpose was to "consider the conflict in South 
Vietnam and to review the respective countries' wider purposes in Asia and the 
Pacific". It followed President Johnson's visit to Australia and discussions with 
Holt. The conference produced a Declaration of the Goals of Freedom and a Declara-
tion on Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific, as well as a lengthy communique 
on South Vietnam. 
The communique emphasized the need to halt aggression and the preservation of 
the territorial integrity of South Vietnam, supported reunification of Vietnam as a 
result of the "free choice of all Vietnamese", and pledged a withdrawal of all allied 
troops within six months on condition that "the other side withdraws its forces to 
the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides". South Viet-
nam reaffirmed its pledges "to forge a social revolution of hope and progress; to pro-
mote honest administration and economic stabilization as well as to estabUsh a 
representative national constitutional government and to hold elections before 
September 1967". No reference was made to the cessation of American bombing of 
North Vietnam despite a demand from Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and 
Presidents Tito and Nasser for an unconditional bombing halt on the day the con-
ference opened. Holt fully accepted the principles of "this historic conference", but 
CalweU, with a federal election impending, dismissed the conference as a "fiasco", 
declaring that it reached "a consensus on war" not peace.*' 
Differences between the government and the opposition developed not only over 
the bombing but also over the question of peace negotiations and a settlement of 
what was coming to be regarded in some American quarters as "the permanent 
war". In defining its objectives, the government had proposed "a return to the 
Geneva Agreement of 1954".** But a great deal of water had flowed under the 
bridge since 1954, and the Geneva Agreements were less relevant than they had been 
even in 1962. But neither the prime minister nor the leader of the opposition could 
translate high-sounding objectives into concrete peace terms to be discussed round 
the table. Both were high on rhetoric but low on pragmatic proposals. 
For several years the State Department had been cautiously taking up one of 
America's other options: mediation and a negotiated peace settlement in Vietnam. 
Informal contact had been made early in 1965 but broke down largely over the cessa-
tion or limitation of American bombing. With American casualties in 1966 reaching 
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an aU-time high, President Johnson announced his San Antonio formula in an address 
to the National Legislative Conference in Texas on 29 September: "The United 
States is wiUing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when 
this wHl lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while 
the discussions proceed. North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing 
cessation or limitation."" This rather vague and elastic American proposal was flatly 
rejected by Hanoi. The Australian government accepted the San Antonio formula 
and believed that its rejection by North Vietnam indicated that it was trying to 
impose a miHtary solution. This would include the setting up of a "coalition govern-
ment" which would merely be a tool of the National Liberation Front. Hasluck 
quoted from a captured People's Revolutionary Party document: "The coalition 
may include a non-revolutionary element as President. . . . the real power will be in 
our hands and we wiU foUow the Front's poHtical programme."" 
The American diplomatic posture was becoming more flexible. Shortly afterwards 
(11 November), President Johnson decHned to give General William C. 
Westmoreland all the additional troops he requested (206,756). Despite the defeat of 
the Tet offensive in January 1968, it was becoming clear that the American policy of 
attrition was not succeeding, and on 22 March Johnson recalled Westmoreland. 
Three days later he met his senior advisers to re-examine American policy. He was 
told that the reinforcing of American troops would not bring military victory, that 
the South Vietnamese would have to take the brunt of the fighting, and that the 
United States should begin talks to find a negotiated solution. Clark Clifford was the 
strongest influence on Johnson. He had written an important article for Foreign 
Affairs which, although not published until June 1969, had been seen by Johnson 
much earlier." He said "Saigon was in no hurry for the fighting to end and . . . the 
Saigon regime did not want us to reach an early settlement of military issues with 
Hanoi. . . . we cannot realistically expect to achieve anything more through our 
mihtary force and the time has come to begin to disengage. . . . There is, in fact, no 
magic and no specific miHtary rationale for the number of American troops presently 
in South Vietnam." He concluded: "We cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that 
this is a limited war, for Hmited arms and employing limited powers. The forces we 
now have deployed and the human and material costs we have incurred have become, 
in my opinion, out of all proportion to our purpose. The present scale of military 
effort can bring us no closer to meaningful victory." 
On 31 March, on the eve of the SEATO meeting. President Johnson offered to 
halt bombing — naval and air — north of the 20th parallel without any formal con-
ditions provided that talks began promptly. "We assume that during those talks 
Hanoi would not take advantage of our restraint.'' In cables sent to American envoys 
in Asia, it was suggested that this ' 'would to this extent foreshadow possibility of 
fuU bombing stoppage at a later point"." The proposal was warmly supported by 
Gorton. Peace talks began in Paris on 13 May 1968 but quickly bogged down over 
mutual recrimination and sterile discussion about procedural problems. Discussions 
of substance did not begin until 25 January 1969. 
On Sunday 1 November 1968, on the eve of the presidential elections, Johnson 
announced the total cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam and American 
agreement to the participation of the National Liberation Front in the Paris discus-
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sions. The sudden shift in American policy caught the Australian government by sur-
prise." It had won a Senate election a year earlier on a platform of continued bomb-
ing and non-recognition of the National Liberation Front. President Johnson was a 
hardened poker player who had little time for consultation and for some months 
gave America's allies little important information. On this occasion a cable was sent 
to the American Embassy in Canberra on the day of the announcement of the chang-
ed policy, only a few hours before the formal presidential announcement. Gorton 
had admitted at a press luncheon in Hobart in March: "If there were great changes in 
United States involvement in Vietnam, Australia would be forced to accept 
them. . . . If there were a complete change of policy I think we would have a ded-
sion forced on us not to try to do things ourselves."'" 
During the presidential campaign. Republican candidate Richard Nixon refused to 
commit himself further than hope that the Paris negotiations would succeed. Before 
his inauguration as president, he carried out an intensive review of the situation in 
Vietnam. The immediate task was to check the North Vietnamese-Vietcong offen-
sive at the beginning of the year. The options open to him as the incoming president 
did not change during his first year in office: a complete and precipitate withdrawal 
from Vietnam, a just negotiated peace, or a continued poHcy of Vietnamization with 
a withdrawal of all American forces on a schedule as the South Vietnamese became 
strong enough to defend their own freedom." 
Nixon had come to realize that the war in Vietnam was unwinnable and that the 
American people were tired of it and "wanted out". He then made secret overtures 
to the North Vietnamese and continued the discussions in Paris in an attempt to 
secure peace with honour. Over eight months, these discussions agreed to Httle more 
than the shape and size of the conference table. With Kissinger he worked out plans 
for a phased withdrawal of most American troops within a twelve-month period 
should North Vietnam agree to carry out a similar evacuation. This was the centre-
piece in his eight-point peace plan of 14 May 1969, his first major presidential speech 
on foreign policy. It was promptly rejected by the National Liberation Front. He 
made a direct approach to Ho Chi Minh in an attempt to break the deadlock in Paris. 
Ho's reply, a few days before his death, stuck to the ten-point National Liberation 
Front programme "as a logical and reasonable basis for the settlement of the Viet-
namese problem. The United States must cease the war of aggression and withdraw 
their troops from South Vietnam, respect the rights of the population of the South 
and of the Vietnamese nation to dispose of themselves, without foreign 
influence. . . . This is the path that will allow the United States to get out of the 
war with honour."'* Nixon had already announced the first American military 
disengagement: the withdrawal of twenty-five thousand troops by the end of 
August. 
The moves foi disengagement in Vietnam were made in the context of a changing 
global balance of power; the replacement of a two-superpower balance by an 
equilibrium involving China and Japan as well as the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The cold war was thawing, and the apparently monoHthic Communist 
worid began to disintegrate with the confrontation between Moscow and Peking. 
On 25 July 1969 Nixon sketched in outline the Guam or Nixon Doctrine, which 
he elaborated in his message to Congress in the following February His'"Neve 
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Strategy for Peace" represented a substantial shift in American policy and priorities 
as part of a major rethinking of assumptions and obligations. It was amplified in a 
series of further statements to Congress in the next three years. Its central thesis was: 
"The United States wiU partidpate in the defence and development of allies and 
friends, but that America cannot — and will not — conceive all the plans, design all 
the programmes, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the defence of the free 
nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered 
in our interest." It involved a reversal of priorities and the rejection of most of the 
DuUesian concepts. The main thrust of American policy was to be towards Europe 
rather than Asia. China and Japan, the north-west Pacific, replaced South-East Asia 
and the south-west Pacific as the focal point of interest. At the same time, there was 
a clear statement of American intention to keep up its treaty commitments. "We 
shaU provide a nuclear shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation 
whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a 
whole. In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and 
economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the 
nation threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower 
for its defence." There were to be no more Koreas or Vietnams with American 
forces playing the major miHtary role." 
The reduction in American troops in Vietnam was a logical consequence, and on 
20 April 1970 Nixon announced a further withdrawal of 150,000 American troops 
by April 1971. This involved a virtual halving of American troop strength, although 
a higher proportion of the remaining troops were combat rather than support 
troops. The withdrawals produced no modification in North Vietnamese policy or 
corresponding withdrawal of troops.'* 
Nixon's decisions were made with little consultation with Canberra; communica-
tions between Washington and Canberra were as difficult as they had been under 
President Johnson. AustraHa was not a party to the Paris negotiations, although its 
former ambassador to Saigon, H.D. Anderson, was an observer. It continued its 
military support for the United States and reiterated its view that the United States 
should not conclude a "fake peace". It also reaffirmed the central objective of 
Austrahan poHcy: the defence of South Vietnam against external aggression and its 
right to self-determination. 
With increasing Vietnamization as American troops were withdrawn, the govern-
ment had to decide whether Australian troops would also be withdrawn. Their 
build-up to eight thousand had been the result of American pressure over the years. 
Gorton at first declined to withdraw Australian troops in driblets to match the 
phased American withdrawal. The AustraHan Labor Party proposed as an election 
issue that aU Australian troops be withdrawn by June 1970. The issue aroused Httle 
interest. After being returned to office, Gorton announced on 17 December his in-
tention to withdraw some Australian troops should the American cutback continue, 
although there were tactical problems involved in the withdrawal of one of the three 
Australian battaHons in Phuoc Tuy province. He may weU have been influenced by 
the result of the Gallup poH of 4 October which showed that most Australians 
favoured a removal of Australian forces from South Vietnam: 50.9 per cent favoured 
the return of AustraHan forces, while only 39.4 per cent supported their retention in 
334 "AFTERNOON LIGHT": 1949-73 
Vietnam.^' On 22 April 1970 he decided that the Eight BattaUon would not be 
replaced when its tour of duty ended in November, but that Australian military 
advisers training South Vietnamese troops would be increased. He was left with 
some logical inconsistencies with his earlier argument of' 'one in, all in; one out, all 
out". But the hard fact was that politically and diplomatically there was no other 
option open to him when the massive American withdrawals were announced. 
When McMahon became prime minister in March 1970, he realized that the 
Americans intended to leave Vietnam in the near future. On 18 August he said that 
he hoped that the remaining Australian combat troops would be "home in Australia 
by Christmas". The first troops were withdrawn in April and, with the exception of 
a handful of instructors, the last by March 1972.^* 
Gough Whitlam had pointed out on 10 March 1966, "The Australian people are 
more divided on the issue of this war than on any in which they had ever been 
engaged."" The chief critics of government policy came from the churches, academics 
and students, and the trade unions. The patterns of dissent and the methods of op-
position were similar to those in the United States.^' There were teach-ins in almost 
every university as a forum for a critical examination of Vietnam. Academics were 
active in protest movements as participants and speakers. Criticism of government 
policy in Vietnam culminated in a series of massive but peaceful demonstrations on 
8-10 May 1970. It was planned to hold a general strike and to occupy the streets. 
The government was concerned at what it regarded as an "invitation to anarchy". 
The moratorium on 8-10 May produced a peaceful demonstration in which a 
hundred thousand people from all walks of life participated. A second moratorium 
was held in Australian capital and provincial cities on 18 September. In Melbourne, 
"a city at flashpoint", fifty thousand people occupied the main shopping area and sat 
down briefly; a thousand marshals controlled the marchers, and there was no 
violence. Smaller, peaceful demonstrations took place in Canberra, Perth, and 
Hobart. Small-scale clashes with police occurred in marches in Adelaide and Sydney. 
In all, some one hundred thousand people took part in this second, massive, and on the 
whole peaceful protest against the Vietnam war and Australian involvement in it. 
Many people who supported the moratorium in principle refused to march: they 
included the premier of South Australia and other prominent Labor leaders." 
Australian military assistance to Vietnam was decided upon because it was seen as a 
vital part of Australia's defence system. "This policy was developed independently of 
any outside pressure," Sir Howard Beale stated.'" The main object of Australia was 
still the post-1951 objective to commit the United States to the defence gap between 
Singapore and Manila and to put teeth into the ANZUS and SEATO treaties." 
Australian anxiety about its insurance policy made a succession of governments 
amenable to American suggestions and pressure for further support. The requests for 
aid came to Canberra through Washington rather than direct from Saigon. 
Australian influence on policy on South Vietnam was minimal throughout the war. 
Australian troops were accepted in South Vietnam for American domestic poUtical 
reasons rather than miUtary necessity. Australia's role was a very subordinate one, 
although Holt's opposition to a further increase of Australian troops in 1967 may 
well have been the turning point in Clifford's reassessment of the whole situation in 
Vietnam. 
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The rising public criticism of Australian involvement in the war through the 
moratoria seems to have had little effect on government policy in the 1960s. It did 
point the way to a partial reassessment of the American alliance. The war in Vietnam 
had sorely divided both the Australian people and the Australian Labor Party. Such a 
reassessment became possible when the ALP won its first federal election for twenty-
three years on 2 December 1972 and immediately formed an interim ministry of two: 
E.G. Whitlam, prime minister and minister for Foreign Affairs, and Lance Barnard, 
deputy leader and minister for Defence. 
On the day he was sworn in (5 December), Whitlam declared, "The change of 
Government provides a new opportunity for us to re-assess the whole range of 
AustraHan foreign polides and attitudes. . . . Our thinking is towards a more in-
dependent AustraHan stance in international affairs and towards an Australia which 
wiU be less miHtarily orientated and not open to suggestions of racism."'* The 
reassessment of Australian policy and especially of its relations with the United States 
was made by an urbane and sophisticated lawyer who was essentially a pragmatist. 
He was an exponent of the "new nationalism" but was much less impressed by 
ideology than were his colleagues. He did not share Senator Lionel Murphy's view 
that a series of errors in judgment over two decades had "in the last decade brought 
Austraha into discredit and disgrace and had made the Australian people ashamed of 
their foreign poHcy"." Whitlam reaHzed that, despite the vocal criticisms of the left 
wing of the ALP, there must be "continuity within change" and that there could 
not be an abrupt change in Australian foreign policy because that policy must be 
based on an assessment of Australian national interests, interests which had not 
changed. Those interests might be interpreted rather differently, and the means by 
which they could be achieved could be conceived differently, especially in "the world 
pattern of change within which the Australian Government is acting".'* 
The re-examination of Australian foreign and defence policy involved a fresh look 
at Australian interests and Australia's role in the region. Whitlam revived the con-
cept of Australia as an important middle power which could contribute to the easing 
of great-power tensions and confrontations and so to the promotion of regional and 
international stabiHty. This involved an acceptance of, and a return to, the Evatt and 
Barwick views of middle-powermanship. Senator D.R. Willessee, who succeeded 
Whitlam as foreign minister in 1974, pointed out on 19 January 1973 that Australia 
was "a middle power concerned about the security and welfare of the Asian Padfic 
region"." The theme was repeated almost ad nauseam in the next two years. 
An essential ingredient of Whitlam's foreign policy was a greater degree of in-
dependence from "our great and powerful friends". The American alliance had for 
long been a bipartisan poHcy. The war in Vietnam and Australian involvement in 
that war had led to increasingly bitter criticism by the Labor party in opposition. 
The view was widely held in ALP circles that Australia automatically endorsed 
American policies in the expectation of American military protection in the event of 
any serious threat to Australian security. 
The American dedsion to extricate itself from the Vietnam morass was quickly 
followed by the withdrawal of the remaining Australian troops. Whitlam's first 
major foreign policy speech on 27 January 1973 coincided with the cease-fire in 
Vietnam. This removed the most serious differences of policy between the two coun-
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tries. The recognition by Washington of the People's Republic of China was essen-
tially a pragmatic dedsion without ideological overtones. The appointment of a very 
senior career diplomat, MarshaU Green, as the United States ambassador to Australia 
contributed to the smoothing out of the AustraHan-American relations at a difficult 
time when election euphoria stiH influenced some Australian political judgments. 
The election of 2 December 1972 meant that "our mandate and duty to maintain 
the American aHiance was . . . clear". Whitlam told the National Press Club some 
seven months later that the American relationship was the "most important" of the 
older relationships. "This is symboHsed by the ANZUS Treaty," he said. "But 
ANZUS is not the be-all and end-aU of that relationship and never has been. . . . My 
Government wants to move away from the narrow view that the ANZUS Treaty is 
the only significant factor in our relations with the Uruted States and equally narrow 
view that our relations with the United States are the only significant factor in 
Australia's foreign relations." AustraHa "is not a satelHte of any country"." The 
reassessment of the relationship with ANZUS, stiU as a central part of that relation-
ship, meant an examination of cultural and economic problems as weU as a hard look 
at some of the military implications of the alliance. 
The major area of disagreement was the status of American bases in Australia. 
Ever since the North-West Cape agreement had been negotiated, the ALP had an-
nounced its intention of renegotiating it to ensure greater Australian control. The 
central points of criticism had been that the agreement involved a surrender of 
Australian sovereignty over part of its territory and that Australia had no control 
over the messages received by the station. There was a fear that the station might be 
used to send signals that could trigger off a nuclear war in which both the base itself 
and Australia could be targets. The agreement had been publicly justified primarily 
as a major Australian contribution, perhaps the only serious contribution, to 
ANZUS and so was essential to Australian security. Australian doubts were 
strengthened during the Middle East crisis of 6 October 1973 when a global alert was 
issued by Washington. Whitlam stated, "The Australian Government was not at 
the time informed officially by the United States Government about the alert nor 
was it informed that the alert applied to the North-West Cape installation."" 
The minister for Defence, Lance Barnard, was in a relatively strong position when 
he visited Washington on 5-12 January 1974 to renegotiate the 1963 agreement. The 
United States agreed that it would warn Australia in advance of any future alerts. It 
was also agreed that the base would be operated "as a joint facihty, enabling 
Australia to participate in its management, operarion and technical control". An 
Australian deputy commander was to be appointed, thirty-five Australians were to 
be appointed to "key supervisory posirions", and Australia would establish a 
separate communications centre to be operated exclusively by the Royal Australian 
Navy. 
The new agreement meant the scrapping of the letters exchanged on 7 May 1963 
and made substantial concessions on organizational matters as well as providing for 
closer and more frequent consultation at a variety of levels on "the role and opera-
tion of the station". But the United States communications buHding remained under 
exclusive American control and since "the station was a relay station proposals to 
monitor particular messages were not practicable"." The concessions over the 
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North-West Cape base were of structure rather than of real substance. The main 
concessions were made over other bases. The United States Air Force facility at 
Amberley and the joint geological and geophysical research station at Pine Gap were 
transferred to Australian control. Despite earlier political suspicions about the nature 
of their work, it was perfectly clear that they were concerned with the monitoring of 
nuclear tests and were valuable for the campaign for nuclear disarmament. The pro-
posed Omega stations were not covered by the new agreement." 
SEATO was always suspect to the ALP, especially after it was used to justify 
Australian miHtary intervention in Vietnam. It had been fabricated primarily to 
check Communist Chinese expansion into South-East Asia. Its economic and 
cultural objectives had always been subordinate to its military objectives. Whitlam 
dedded that Australia would withdraw from the SEATO naval exercises in October 
1973. While he appears to have shared the view of many of the members of the 
government and of the press that SEATO was moribund, he was not prepared to 
dismantle it or bury it quietly. Although most of its members have become inactive, 
Washington still regarded it as an important part of its defence arrangements with 
Thailand. Whitlam felt it useful to respect the American assessment of SEATO and 
so to play down its importance while quietly insisting that it be reformed. The 
American miHtary commitment to South-East Asia ended as the last US troops left 
Saigon on 29 April 1975 and began to leave Thailand a month later. SEATO was 
dead for all practical purposes.'" 
21 Perspective: 1900-1975 
Gough Whitlam's dedsive statement "Australia is not a satellite of any country" 
involved the categorical rejection of one major theory of the relationship between 
Australia and the United States, the rejection of the satellite straitjacket syndrome. 
But how far has Australia been able to preserve a considerable measure of in-
dependence of choice in its relationship with the United States, or earHer, Great 
Britain? 
The problem is an age-old one: the degree of independence of the smaHer states 
from Athens or Sparta in the Peloponnesian League, the extent of the power of the 
other members of the New England Confederation dominated by Massachusetts in 
the seventeenth century. The very act of seeking a "great and powerful friend", a 
protector, impHes a willingness to accept some Hmitations on complete autonomy. 
Australian Federation had been one of the major achievements of Australian na-
tionalism developing during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. A further 
result was the growing restlessness of Australian political leaders at Britain's control 
of foreign policy and of defence poHcy. The euphoria culminating in the 1897 Jubilee 
was evaporating. Despite discussions about imperial federation, the changing mood 
of colonial leaders was reflected in the rebaptism of the Colonial Conferences as 
Imperial Conferences and in the growing demand for closer consultation between the 
Colonial Office, the British cabinet, and colonial leaders on foreign poHcy issues 
which might involve them in a European war. Security was a crudal issue for all 
parts of the British Empire. 
Much of Deakin's criticism of British policy centred on the question of defence. 
His invitation to Theodore Roosevelt for the visit of the Great White Fleet in 1908 
reflected his impatience with British procedures and policy. The enthusiasm aroused 
by the visit strengthened his rather vague concepts of a great Anglo-Saxon alHance in 
which Australia, Great Britain, and the United States would be the main elements; 
the roles of Canada and New Zealand were hardly considered. 
After 1908, attention was focused more on the nature of imperial defence with a 
separate Australian navy as a component, and on fuller information about foreign 
policy. Grey's exposition at the Imperial conference of 1911 was a significant step in 
British willingness to consult more closely. But when war came in August 1914, the 
declaration was made by Downing Street and the dominions automatically accepted 
the British decision; there was no question of separate declarations of war by the 
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dominions. When the British Empire declared war on Germany, Australia was 
automatically involved. 
As the war progressed, the British government invited dominion leaders to 
London for occasional consultation. Hughes alone accepted and attended several 
cabinet meetings over a period: the Asquith government was reluctant to allow an 
act of courtesy to "crystalHse into an institution". He was invited to join a smaU 
British delegation to a Paris meeting on 14-17 June 1916 to discuss common 
economic problems. He accepted on the understanding that he would speak and vote 
as he saw fit. Australia thus made its debut at an international conference. 
This was the prelude to Australian representation at the Versailles peace con-
ference.' Lloyd George had decided for political reasons to invite the dominions and 
India to attend meetings of the newly formed five-member war cabinet. Apart from 
Borden, Hughes was probably the only dominion leader who had a notion of what 
they were to discuss. He took an active part and insisted that since "the Dominions 
were partidpants in the Councils of the Empire on a footing of equality . . . each 
sovereign Or quasi-sovereign in its own sphere", aU dominion prime ministers 
should be allowed to communicate directly with the British prime minister in 
London instead of through the governor-general and the Colonial Office. The im-
perial war cabinet accepted his view about channels of communication.* 
Hughes had clashed with Woodrow Wilson in an interview at the White House 
late in 1915, "a trying ordeal". He disagreed completely with WHson's proposed 
peace terms, advanced in 1918, and insisted that AustraHa and the other dominions 
have a voice in determining peace conditions as a basis for an armistice and in the 
peace conference itself. Hughes completely rejected the claim of Wilson "to dictate 
to the countries which had borne the brunt of the fighting" and his preoccupation 
with a League of Nations."The League of Nations should be the gilded ball on the 
dome of the cathedral and not the foundation stone," Hughes beHeved.' 
Two alternative proposals for dominion representation were advanced by Britain, 
France, and Italy: a British delegation which would be able to use dominion 
representatives in discussions directly affecting them (a variant on the proposal was 
to allow a panel of dominion leaders to occupy the fifth British place in rotation), or 
separate dominion representation as well as membership on a panel basis of the 
British delegation. Wilson finally agreed to the second proposal; the dominions 
would be on the same footing at the conference as Belgium and the smaller Allied 
states. It was a victory for Hughes, who took Australia into its first major interna-
tional conference in its own right. He told the AustraHan House of Representatives, 
"Great Britain could not, in the very nature of things, speak for us. Britain has very 
many interests to consider besides ours and some of those interests do not always 
coincide with ours. It was necessary . . . that we should be represented.' '* 
F.W. Eggleston, who may be regarded as one of the founding fathers of the 
Australian diplomatic service and the Department of Foreign Affairs, was a strong 
critic of Hughes, who, he felt, was "quite unfitted to diplomacy: his only idea is to 
fight, But in other respects he is wonderfully good."' Wilson was one of 
Eggleston's heroes. But his personal opinions did not intrude on his estimate of the 
Hughes' histrionics and his verbal clashes with Wilson and Lloyd George. His final 
summing up was that at this important international conference "we were but small 
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potatoes".' On the other hand, Eggleston felt it important to "develop the radal 
unity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples" and returned to the Deakin-Fisher view that 
there should be closer relations between Australia and the United States. "The real 
foundations of an aUiance exist. The United States will tend to assist AustraHa in her 
relations with a potential enemy. The essentials of an alliance or an entente thus exist 
between Australia and America. Australia cannot contribute much but she is essen-
tially interested in American policy and her attitude towards America should become 
one of friendship and co-operation."' 
The Versailles Conference marks the end of the "colonial" period in the evolution 
of Australian foreign policy and its relations with the United States. Australia had 
examined its relations with its first "great and powerful friend" and had insisted on 
close consultation and at least a partnership in poHcy dedsions. About this time 
(1920-24), the first glimmerings of a separate and independent Australian poHcy may 
be discerned; Australian historians are divided in their estimates of the events of those 
years.' But to American political leaders and to the State Department, the change 
and their awareness of it was much less evident. The evolving British Com-
monwealth of Nations was a closed mystery to most of them, and both the Balfour 
formula of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster of 1931 made an impact a little less 
than its effect on the conduct of Australian foreign policy. 
The Washington Conference of 1921-22 showed the first American recognition 
of the consequences of Versailles. The State Department agreed that AustraHa would 
have to be represented at the conference. It made it clear "not only that the 
Dominion Premiers would be welcome at the Conference but that the Administra-
tion felt that the conference would have Httle prospect of success if the Dominions 
were not represented".' But there were reservations about the size of delegations, 
and the danger of making the conference unworkable. 
The solution lay in inviting an Australian to become a member of the British 
delegation and thus avoid the American nightmare of a bloc of Commonwealth 
countries which might in theory outvote the American delegation. Lloyd George 
was very anxious that Hughes attend: "Your personal presence is, in my opinion, 
highly desirable and I urge you to go if by any means possible." But the AustraHan 
political scene was too unstable, and George Pearce, the minister for Defence, was 
selected as the Australian delegate. There were few opportunities during the 
conference for AustraHa to make any significant contribution. Pearce lacked the 
abrasive and melodramatic qualities of Hughes but made an important contribution 
to the committee rather than to the plenary sessions. Balfour was profoundly im-
pressed by his ability and told S.M. Bruce that he was "the greatest natural 
statesman that he had ever met". '" 
The Four Power Treaty in no way enhanced Australian security, although it 
created an illusion of security. The Nine Power Treaty was primarily important to 
Britain, although there were obvious implications from a long-term AustrJian view. 
An uneasy torpor settled over Australian-American relations for almost two 
decades with the world depression intervening. Pacific contacts developed slowly, 
and the main issues between the two countries were economic the dispute 
culminating in the trade diversion policy of 1936. In a letter to Bruce in London, 
Casey commented, "Our methods of giving consideration to matters of importance 
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would disgrace a girls' school. There was Httle study or research into problems, and 
dedsions were made on the voice."" One is reminded of the comment half a genera-
tion later that "the average AustraHan poHtician's attitude to foreign affairs is Hke 
the medieval attitude to hell. It is something he prefers not to think about, but when 
he does he thinks in simple, stark and essentially naive terms."'* 
Australian thinking over the trade diversion policy seems to have been done in the 
hips rather than the head. The United States consul-general. Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 
was astonished in his first interview with Pearce to find him explaining Australian 
policy largely in terms of the First World War. 
The visit of the American fleet in 1908 had been regarded as a demonstration of white 
solidarity against the yeUow races. This feeUng of comradeship and confidence had now 
ablest entirely disappeared. The first shocks were due to our delay in entering the war and 
refusal to join the League of Nations. The next and greater shock was our insistence in 
1922 on parity in the cruiser class with Great Britain and still more on a proportionate 
reduction of cruisers. . . . The third shock was America's increasing indifference to her 
Pacific obligations as evidenced by her withdrawal from the Philippines. This had led 
AustraUa at large to feel that she could not count on American help in case of Japanese 
attack." 
Moffat dealt politely with this catalogue of American errors and concentrated on 
the problem of trade relations. He negotiated with considerable skill and little im-
mediate success in securing the abandonment of this disastrous Australian policy. But 
it did make a deep impression on the State Department. Its demands on the 
AustraHan government were tantamount to a request that Prime Minister Lyons per-
form the impossible. Thomas M. Wilson, Moffat's successor in Sydney, reflected the 
State Department's view. Australian discrimination "was unprecedented and more 
drastic than action taken against American commerce by any other government, no 
matter how strong or dictatorially governed".'* It was a long battle to remove 
AustraHa from America's commercial black list: a great power had little time for 
smaU-power retahation which at best had a slight nuisance value. 
An important Australian step in this second phase of Australian-American rela-
tions was the decision to establish diplomatic relations with Washington instead of 
relying on a commercial representative in New York. Moffat had urged Lyons on 
many occasions to send a senior diplomat to reside in Washington and to carry out 
the negotiations between the two countries. R.G. Casey was appointed as the first 
AustraHan minister in 1940 and remained in Washington until 1942." The United 
States reciprocated by sending Clarence E. Gauss, an experienced China hand, to 
Canberra. Casey's appointment meant that Australia would have its own direct 
source of information about the United States and would be less dependent on 
British intelligence and communications. Although the British ambassador from 
time to time accompanied AustraHan ministers to the State Department, it was now 
crystal clear that Australia was independent of Britain in matters of foreign policy 
even although on a number of issues they might adopt parallel intermeshing policies. 
Casey's arrival in Washington almost coincided with the third phase of 
Australian-American relations, from 1941 to 1949, which began with the involun-
tary wartime alliance. Two obstacles to partnership had largely disappeared; there' 
was now a separate AustraHan diplomatic service, and Australia had been recognized 
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as a separate entity in international law through its membership of the League of 
Nations. Many members of the State Department and academics were unaware of the 
implications of the evolution of the British Commonwealth of Nations. On 15 
January 1942, the Organisation of Strategic Services drew up a report on the chang-
ing relationship between the dominions and Great Britain. It urged the United States 
to "help preserve the British Empire even although in future it may be organised on 
a different basis". Since it was theoretically possible for the dominions to have a 
deciding voice in imperial policy, the United States should study the implications of 
the changing concept of inter-imperial relations so that "we may be of the fiiUest 
assistance to our allies both in Britain and the Dominions"." 
For almost a decade — the "high noon" of diplomatic relations between Australia 
and the United States — AustraHan foreign policy was determined in theory and 
practice by H.V. Evatt. American impressions were at first unfavourable when one 
of Evatt's first requests was for a seat on a US naval plane to Washington for his 
wife. "Dr. Evatt said that the presence of his wife was necessary to the success of his 
mission, that her going with him was a condition of his going." Only when Prime 
Minister John Curtin sent messages to the secretary of the navy. President Roosevelt, 
and Secretary of State Cordell Hull did the navy finally allow Mrs -Evatt to accom-
pany her husband." 
The alHance between Australia and the United States in 1941 was, in one sense, a 
shotgun marriage. There had been a friendly and co-operative relationship for two 
years while Casey was minister in Washington. Evatt became minister for External 
Affairs in October 1941, barely two months before Pearl Harbor catapulted both 
Australia and the United States into the Padfic War, when the United States had 
suffered a major defeat and Australia felt the Japanese breath hot on her neck. 
Evatt came to External Affairs with virtually no experience in that field and with 
few overseas contacts (Felix Frankfurter of the US Supreme Court was one of the 
few). He had a tiny department with a handful of experts to support him. He 
brought to the task a keen legal mind but a somewhat abrasive personality. He also 
brought a left-wing approach to international affairs, a suspicion of imperialist 
colonial powers, and a determination to succeed. He had not visited the United 
States since his honeymoon in 1922 when he carried out some inquiries for W.M. 
Hughes. 
He also brought with him a conviction that international affairs were not the ex-
clusive preserve of the Great Powers. This led on to his insistence that the Big Three 
must consult the smaller allies on questions of strategy and tactics. Continual con-
sultation was essential, especially in war as weU as in peace. This was a lesson that he 
had inherited from Deakin, Fisher, and Hughes. It developed in its mature form into 
his view of the role of middle powers, expressed in his speech to the House of 
Representatives on 8 September 1944." 
His initial task as minister for External Affairs was to secure American military 
support for an Australia threatened by Japan. He had had little if any contact with 
MacArthur, whose appointment as commander of the South-West Pacific area was 
regarded by the US minister in Canberra, Nelson T. Johnson, as a "stroke of 
genius". His first mission to the United States in March 1942 as a new minister was 
partly to secure American defence support for Australia and partly to secure a strong 
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voice for Australia in allied policy in the Pacific; he told parliament before his depar-
ture that Australia had no direct contact "with any representative of the United 
States of America in any . . . body directly concerned in the controlling of the 
Alhed war against Japan". A Pacific War Council was set up partly as a result of 
AustraHan pressure; Roosevelt declared at its inception that it was a "consultative" 
body with purely advisory functions. Evatt speedily realized that this kind of con-
suhation was of Httle value. His first visit to Washington increased the pressure for 
reinforcements to the Padfic zone; however, the dedsions were taken before his 
plane touched down in the United States. 
The chief value of Evatt's first expedition to the United States was its educative 
effect on Evatt himself. Johnson commented that he was "a changed man, a brand 
new Evatt . . ., surprisingly urbane, affable, tolerant and even humorous"." The 
change was reflected in his second visit to the United States, what his irreverent 
departmental colleagues called the "second coming". But his success was Hmited to 
a promise of more planes and reinforcements. There was no change in American or 
British strategy to defeat Hitler first. 
Australian (or Evatt's) sense of frustration led to the calling of the Canberra Con-
ference in January 1944 and the conclusion of the Australia-New Zealand Agree-
ment, which produced shocked surprise both in the State Department and London. 
Prime Ministers Curtin and Eraser gave it cautious support in their interviews with 
Roosevelt and CordeH Hull. 
The high points of Australian influence in Washington came with the San Fran-
dsco Conference in 1945, where Evatt successfully opposed the United States on a 
number of important issues. It was a personal triumph for Evatt. Following quickly 
on the San Francisco Conference and his championing of the cause of these middle 
powers was Washington's reversal of policy about the Japanese surrender in 
September 1945. AustraHa was represented at the ceremony. This was followed by 
the American agreement that Macmahon Ball would represent the British Com-
monwealth on the four-power Allied Council and that an Australian would com-
mand the Commonwealth occupation forces in Japan. 
Between 1945 and 1949, Australian influence on the partnership/alliance declined. 
Japan and Indonesia provide two interesting case studies of Australian-American rela-
tions. The two governments have released the appropriate documents (or most of 
them), and it is possible to examine almost on a daily basis the measure of co-
operation. The AUied Council for Japan became deadlocked because of constant 
dashes between Ball and the American chairman, George Atcheson. Atcheson and 
the State Department constantly supported MacArthur, and Australian influence on 
policy became minimal. In July 1947 Evatt visited Japan and, despite his previous 
critical estimate of SCAP policy, became an overnight convert to MacArthur's 
polides. Macmahon Ball felt his position had become untenable and resigned. 
Australian-American co-operation had broken down in Japan. In Indonesia, 
Australia represented the RepubHc on the UN Good Offices Committee and then on 
the United Nations Commission on Indonesia. The United States was also a member 
of the three-nation committee which included Belgium as its third member. Kirby 
and Critchley worked harmoniously with Graham, Du Bois, and Cochran, despite 
mevitable disagreements on detail and sometimes on policy. Representatives of the 
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two countries, instructed by and reporting to their governments, succeeded in bring-
ing the Round Table Conference to a successful conclusion in November 1949. 
From time to time the State Department (and the Netherlands government) sug-
gested to Evatt that he recall Critchley, who appeared to be becoming the advocate 
of the Republicans rather than an impartial UN representative. James V. Forrestal, 
the American secretary of the navy and then defence, had declared that Evatt, as the 
president of the General Assembly, was "an active source of both irritation and 
uncertainty". He was critical of "the gratuitous interference of Dr. Evatt" in the 
Indonesian dispute in 1948 when Evatt addressed a communication to the Security 
Council about American policy. In an interview with the Australian ambassador to 
the United States (Makin) an American representative "expressed in the strongest 
terms our government's dissatisfaction with this unilateral action on the part of 
Evatt".*" But there was no crisis of the Allied Council type. There was Httle evidence 
in these two case studies of Australia succumbing to American pressure. 
The negotiations over the work of the Allied Coundl for Japan and Indonesian in-
dependence reflected an important difference in the priorities of Canberra and 
Washington. The United States was always consdous of the role of the Netherlands 
as part of NATO and so was reluctant to bring pressure to bear on the Hague to 
settle the Indonesian problem. The pressures were attempted by Canberra on 
Washington and not vice versa. The policies of SCAP were determined by the State 
Department, whose interests were regarded as paramount. In formulating policy, 
the United States was concerned primarily with the role of a new Japan in the 
balance of power against communism in Asia. American and AustraHan policies were 
often sharply in conflict. 
The conflict of interests was most clearly evident over the question of a peace 
treaty with Japan. Fearing aggression from a remiHtarized Japan, Evatt and Chifley 
both pressed for a draconic treaty, for a hard rather than a soft settlement. Apart 
from some modifications of SCAP policy on land reform and the role of trade 
unions, AustraHa had Httle alternative but to accept the new American policy of con-
verting Japan into a Far Eastern defence bastion against the spread of Soviet com-
munism. Evatt, of necessity, had to modify AustraHan policies centred on regional 
security to meet American security demands based on global rather than regional 
assessments. When a peace treaty was finally concluded providing for some measure 
of Japanese rearmament, Evatt and the Australian Labor Party (now in opposition) 
opposed its ratification despite the quid pro quo of the ANZUS pact. 
The years of Evatt's formulation of Australian foreign policy concided with what 1 
have called the "high noon" of co-operarion with the United States. It was in many 
ways a stormy period during which no formal alliance existed and AustraHa had 
adopted a middle-power stance and insisted on the right of a junior ally to be con-
sulted and to be represented when important decisions were taken. 
The friction during these years arose largely because of American uncertainty 
about, and often distrust of, Evatt's poHcies. The initial American uncertainty per-
sisted after his first visit to Washington and never entirely disappeared. His role in 
formulating Australian policy was clearly understood by both the American 
diplomats in Canberra and the State Department. Evatt was AustraHa's foreign 
policy. The State Department's estimate of him in 1944 (see chap. 8) reflected three 
PERSPECTIVE 1900-1975 345 
years' experience of working with him. The department recognized his intellectual 
competence and his egocentric manner: " H e has been accused of self-seeking and it is 
not always clear whether he is motivated by true patriotism or simply by egotism. 
He has a great self-confidence and determination, is anxious to have a finger in every 
pie, is slow in giving his confidence and insists on receiving full credit for his 
achievements." His blatant determination to secure nomination for the presidency of 
the General Assembly and the methods he adopted to obtain it did not escape the 
notice of the State Department. The Organisation of Strategic Services had drawn at-
tention to the increased importance of Australia after the San Frandsco Conference. 
"Australia emerged from the San Francisco Conference as a leader among the smaller 
powers in the international scene, as a nation with increasing influence in Pacific 
affairs relevant here and last but not least, as a vital member of the British Com-
monwealth with whom her bonds persist unshaken."*' 
But doubts remained about his reliability and purpose. The negotiations over 
Manus and Pacific island bases did not enhance his reputation with either the Navy 
Department or State Department. His sudden acceptance of MacArthur's policies in 
Japan in July 1947 was welcomed, but it did little to strengthen his acceptance as a 
reliable foreign statesman. Changes of attitude on many aspects of the Japanese peace 
treaty between 1947 and 1949 did not enhance his reputation in Washington. His in-
sistence on priority in access to the president and the secretary of state led to a polite 
but blunt reminder of his position in the diplomatic world. By 1949 he had become a 
liability to Australian relations with the United States. 
From time to time the State Department makes brief assessments of the impor-
tance of states with whom it has diplomatic relations. The 1950 report published in 
Foreign Relations of the United States puts Australia in perspective. 
The fundamental objectives of US poUcy toward AustraUa are: 
(1) to obtain support for the poUcies which we are pursuing in the furtherance of interna-
tional co-operation, in the development of a democratic order in Japan and Germany 
and on the protection of our own liberties and those of the rest of the free world from 
Russian aggression; 
(2) to discourage AustraUa from taking positions which hinder us in achieving these ob-
jectives particularly in the case of the Japanese occupation; 
(3) to encourage the economic development of Australia and the growth of its foreign 
trade in accordance with the principles of the ITO Charter, bearing in mind the con-
tribution which this development can make to the economic recovery of Great Britain 
and also the role in miUtary matters which Australia as a friendly power can play in 
the Pacific. 
In the long analysis that follows, there is no reference to the possibility of a 
military pact (ANZUS). The analysis concludes by saying, " O u r national interests 
are fiindamentally the same. Hence on many issues on which the Australians are fully 
acquainted with the facts and which involve a matter of prindple, their reactions are 
apt to be parallel with our o w n . " It notes that "free enterprise . . . does not enjoy 
the same veneration in Australia as in US. Suspicion of American financial and 
mihtary power has deep roots in Australia and can result in unfavourable reactions to 
ourpoHdes."** 
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The defeat of the Labor government in 1949 was welcomed in Washington as weU 
as in the American Embassy in Canberra. Percy Spender, the new minister for Exter-
nal Affairs, was a tough and experienced lawyer (often known in legal drcles as "the 
butcher bird") with a much more urbane and sophisticated approach to diplomacy 
and international relations. He took the initiative unerringly at the Colombo Con-
ference in January 1950 immediately after he took office. He became a very accep-
table alternative to Evatt so far as the State Department was concerned. He was able 
to succeed where Evatt had failed in negotiating with Dulles a security pact 
(ANZUS) in return for Australian support for a somewhat unpalatable peace treaty. 
Even Casey, his successor, gave a wry acceptance to a peace treaty to which there was 
no alternative. 
The ANZUS Treaty provided the first formal security link with the United States. 
It remained (with the SEATO agreement) the cornerstone of AustraHan-American 
relations for a generation, for the whole of the Menzies era and beyond. This was the 
period of "Afternoon Light", to use a Menzies phrase. The functioning of the 
alliance between a middle power and a superpower inevitably raised the question of 
the relative weight played by the two partners. Was it an alHance between equals 
(Evatt had claimed, and his successors never repudiated his claim, that AustraHa was 
a sovereign power, a fuH member of the United Nations, and theoretically the equal 
of the United States), or was it a one-sided arrangement with AustraHa very much 
the junior partner rather than the equal of the United States, a dependant or sateUite 
with little freedom of manoeuvre or action, tied to the chariot wheels of the 
American government? 
The conclusion of the ANZUS pact was a bilateral agreement which gave mutual 
advantages and obligations in the context of 1951. To Australia it meant the com-
mitment of the United States to a security system in South-East Asia, the formal 
substitution of the United States for Great Britain as the protector of the region, the 
new and powerful friend that had both the capacity and the willingness to ensure 
Australian security. The SEATO agreement was a further step in closing AustraHa's 
strategic gap between Singapore and Manila. From time to time AustraHa sought to 
extend the American umbrella or to redefine the geographical limits within which it 
would apply. Barwick's assumptions about the scope of American protection in 
Borneo and Malaysia were quickly repudiated by Washington. Malaysia's defence 
was a matter for ANZAM, and so too was Borneo. Primarily the alliance in 1951 
was a reinsurance against Japan, either a revived imperialist Japan or a Japan that had 
come under Communist control. 
To the United States the treaty was designed as part of a network of alHances to 
contain communism. Thomas Dewey went further than Dean Acheson or John 
Foster Dulles were prepared to go when he said, "We must either hold the whole 
Pacific or lose the whole Pacific. We cannot allow it to be chipped away piece by 
piece."*' "To me the most important single thing that the United States can do, and 
the thing which is indispensable to hold the free world position not only in Japan 
but in Korea, Formosa and Indo-China, is that we must adopt these positive poHdes 
and get away from the idea that this over-running of China by Soviet communism is 
a final last word as to what is going to happen to China."** At the first ANZUS 
conference at Honolulu in August 1952, Casey endorsed Acheson's view that the 
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purpose of the conference was to make a detailed survey of "our common interests 
and relationships in the light of Communist China's threats to the security of the 
Padfic area".*' 
The alliance from the beginning meant rather different things to the parties. The 
Korean War and the crisis in Indo-China leading to the Geneva Agreements 
significantly changed the context in which the alHance was framed. Australia from 
the beginning felt it was an insurance policy on which the premiums had to be paid: 
the swift offer of troops for Korea was the first premium and the committing of over 
eight thousand troops to Vietnam was a much later instalment. Australia was a 
valuable visible ally whose flag and troops were side by side with those of the United 
States. By 1954 the main threat to Pacific security was perceived by both the United 
States and AustraHa as coming from an expanding Chinese communism: the poten-
tial Japanese threat had completely receded. The SEATO pact recognized this, 
espedally in America's understanding. The United States at this stage was not 
prepared to make any continental commitments in Asia. At best she was prepared to 
hold a strategic perimeter running from the Aleutians through South Korea, 
Formosa, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. What AustraHa only realized 
vaguely was that South-East Asia and the South Pacific region lay, as Walter 
Lippmann pointed out, "a t the Hmits, not the centre, of vital American interests and 
effective miHtary power".*' These were areas of peripheral importance to the United 
States but of central importance to AustraHa. 
To Australia, one of the substantial benefits of the alliance was that through the 
ANZUS Council AustraHa had a forum giving access to " the thinking and planning 
of the American Administration at the highest poHtical and military level". Casey's 
argument was repeated on a number of occasions. It was perhaps wishful thinking 
that a two-day meeting could lead to a continuous influence on the framing of 
American poHcy. It did, however, lead to personal contacts which made informal 
discussion on other occasions easier. It was inevitable that there would be differing 
assessments of particular situations. As Casey said in 1958: 
In a great many of the situations in the world today, the United States is in fact playing the 
hand for the whole free world. This has meant that in some cases, once a poUcy has been 
decided on, the United States is entitled to expect its alUes to support it, and to refrain from 
public statements or other action which would impede it. There are distinct limits to the 
extent to which these arguments between governments can or should appear in public, 
though it is essential that there should be between friendly governments, full and frank 
private discussion. . . . These are the restraints on a responsible smaU power. AustraUa 
accepts them for herself But there are also responsibihties and restraints for a great power 
— the responsibihty of consulting its aUies and of respecting their wishes whenever it is 
possible to do so — the responsibihty of not using its power to take its allies for granted or 
to disregard their wishes.*' 
Both Casey and Menzies have argued that "Australia was not a 'yes man' to 
Britain and America, but was in fact notorious for having a mind of its own. But 
when you cannot Hve without your friends you do not argue with them or disagree 
with them in public." Menzies put his own view very sucdnctly and directly: " I t 
would be a very poor day when Australia won ' t be able to summon up its traditional 
impudence by looking at the big United States and saying, 'What do you mean, you 
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big stiff?' " Quiet diplomacy rather than "diplomacy by statements to newspapers" 
became the means by which the Australian government sought to resolve its dif 
ferences with the United States. "I prefer direct communication preferably face to 
face, which lacks the embarrassment of publicity and engenders confidence in the 
continuous quiet exchange of significant views," Casey said.*' While avoiding 
pubhc brawls, the method did conceal rather than reveal differences of attitude or 
policy. It did arouse suspidons in ALP ranks that Australia was becoming a satelHte 
of the United States with no independent poHcy of its own. The view was put in-
temperately by Clyde Cameron, that the "Minister for External Affairs or this 
government would no more think of deviating from the policy laid down by Mr. 
John Foster Dulles for the United States of America than the Minister would think 
of flying to the moon".*' 
While there were points of difference between the two political parties during the 
Menzies era, there was no difference about the need for and importance of the 
American alliance. It was not debatable in general terms but never became bipartisan 
in the fullest sense. Norman Makin, a former AustraHan ambassador to the United 
States, put Labor's view: "We acknowledge the part played by the United States in 
world leadership, but that acknowledgement does not require that we should accept 
the American attitude to every situation as consistent with our beliefs. . . . To 
whom should we speak more frankly than to those who undertake missions that 
must inevitably involve us in their consequences?"'" The differences between the 
government and the opposition were largely differences of emphasis and of timing, 
and the area of agreement was fairly considerable. The Hobart programme of the 
ALP resembled in many respects Casey's working rules. Ideological differences 
between the parties led to sharp critidsm of MacArthur's policy in Korea and of the 
Casey-Dulles handhng of Peking. The increasing American hostiHty towards com-
munism during the McCarthy era and subsequently led to ALP criticism of SEATO 
methods of deaHng with Communist infiltration in South-East Asia. 
The Labor party preferred on the whole to deal with foreign poHcy questions by 
public debate and not infrequently gave the benefit of the doubt against the United 
States. Menzies and Casey and Barwick preferred "not to argue [with their friends] 
or disagree with them in public". It was better to argue in private with allies upon 
whom in the last resort one's security depended and to give the United States the 
benefit of the doubt in as many cases as possible. The Suez crisis split the government 
because of Menzies' strong emotional attachment to Britain as the old powerhil 
friend. It ahgned Evatt and the ALP with the United States because of their attach-
ment to the United Narions and its role as a keeper of the peace. This was combined 
with an intense dislike of what Evatt called British "gunboat diplomacy", which 
was a hangover from the nineteenth century. The ALP, largely under CalweU's in-
fluence, strongly supported the American alliance until the Vietnam War created a 
new crisis. "We want the American presence, strong and powerful, in Asia and the 
Pacific," CalweU said. "We want it because Australia needs it untU aU nations are 
prepared to disarm."" 
After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, Calwell told a leading left-
wing member of the party, Tom Uren, "Whatever you say, Tom, I'm not going to 
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let you bastards destroy the American alliance."'* Attitudes began to change shortly 
afterwards, and Calwell was defeated at the 1966 election. 
As Casey had recognized, an alliance between a great power and a relatively small 
one necessitates mutual responsibilities and mutual restraints. After pointing out how 
such an alHance hedges about the initiatives of a smaller power, he went on to sug-
gest that "there are also responsibihties and restraints for a great power". Suez was 
outside the regional scope of the ANZUS area, but Australia remained an ally of the 
United States. There was some consultation between Dulles and Menzies, and it was 
Dulles who was responsible for sending Menzies on the Cairo mission, a mission 
that he was reluctant to undertake himself. Consultation after Suez was very limited 
between Washington, London, and Canberra. The conflict was one in which the 
Great Powers were involved and Australia was a reluctant spectator supporting Great 
Britain for emotional reasons. The incident showed the limitations of small power 
influence and the inability of Canberra to build bridges between London and 
Washington. There was no mediatory role for Australia. 
After fences had been mended with Washington in 1956-57, there were several 
Padfic issues on which Australia was directly involved. The most immediate of these 
was a complex of problems related to China (see chap. 18). To the United States, 
Taiwan was one of America's Pacific allies. The dispute over the offshore islands was 
really a highly important matter oiface: "Communism had to be held and contained 
at every point at which they were trying to inch forward." AustraHa had opposed 
the inclusion of Formosa in the SEATO treaty area in 1954 and felt that it lay outside 
the rather vaguely defined Pacific region covered by the ANZUS pact. Australia 
adopted a low posture and declined to be involved. This was a clear case for private 
representations rather than public argument; whether they had any effect is not 
known, but DuUes did avoid confrontation. 
So far as China was concerned, Casey and Menzies adopted the Washington rather 
than the London stance: a refusal to recognize the People's Republic and continued 
support for the American policy of refusing to seat the Republic in the United 
Nations. But AustraHa declined to accept American proposals for a trade embargo: 
the wheat market was too important to Australian farmers for that. Australia gave 
quahfied support to a "strategic arms" embargo which affected Australian exports 
very Httle. As the "two Chinas" solution was bruited for dedding the status of 
Taiwan, Canberra supported the American attitude by opening an embassy in 
Taipei. 
AustraHa followed to the end America's poHcy of refusing to seat Peking in the 
United Nations at the expense of Formosa. Public opinion in Australia, as reflected 
in Gallup poUs, was opposed to both recognition and the seating of Peking in the 
United Nations. These were twin problems that had "to be faced in consultation 
with our allies," as Barwick said. The United States did not reaHze the strength of 
the ground swell to seat Peking unril the so-caUed Albanian resolution in 1970 was 
adopted by a simple majority." The following year the UN General Assembly voted 
to "restore aU its rights to the People's Republic of China" and "to expel the 
representative of the Republic of China". Both Australia and the United States op-
posed the resolution. The trade embargo was soon abandoned. Casey summed up 
Australian policy sucdnctly in declaring, "The United States has, in effect, said to 
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us, 'If anyone attacks you, we wiH consider it an attack on us.' We must not en-
danger our future, our interest or our security on this question."'* There was Httle 
room for an independent policy given this approach. 
Of greater importance to AustraHa were its relations with Indonesia (see chap. 19) 
and the question of West New Guinea. Belatedly recognizing its importance, 
Australia had persuaded the Round Table Conference in 1949 to defer a dedsion 
about its future. AustraHa had come to the conclusion that New Guinea was "an 
essential link in the chain of Australian defence" and viewed Indonesian claims to 
West Irian with hostility. It also began to argue in favour of self-determination for 
the indigenous people of West New Guinea. 
Remembering American sympathies for and concern about the role of the 
Netherlands in Indonesia during 1947-49, Australia hoped for American support in 
deciding the future of West Irian. Casey was gratified at American support at the 
1957 ANZUS Council meeting when Dulles reaffirmed that the United States would 
regard the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia in the foreseeable future as 
definitely against the security interests of the United States. But the "foreseeable 
future" quickly changed as Dulles refused a year later to commit the United States to 
the defence of West Irian." Australian expectations for American support in what it 
regarded as a crucial regional issue were further shattered by the build-up of Indone-
sian military strength with Moscow support. It became evident in 1962 that the 
United States would not intervene to support Australia; Ambassador Jones had con-
vinced Washington that an Indonesian takeover would not endanger Australian 
security and that it was important to prevent either the drift of Indonesia into the 
Communist camp or its disintegration. Australia lacked the numbers in the United 
Nations to block an Indonesian takeover and the military power to prevent it. Great 
Britain was powerless, and the United States felt that the checking of Communist 
expansion was more important than continued and unqualified Australian support. 
Its decision was not unrelated to its knowledge that Australian military power was 
extremely limited. It was aware that AustraHan defence spending had declined 
relatively as it had come to rely on automatic assistance from the United States. The 
result was the Bunker plan, which led to the peaceful transfer of West New Guinea 
to Indonesia after a short period of nominal UN supervision and plebiscite by the 
indigenous people of West Irian. 
This was a major diplomatic defeat for AustraHa, only partly offset by the dedsion 
of the ANZUS Council in 1962 to reaffirm treaty obHgations and by Rusk's 
assurance: "You can expect complete solidarity from the United States for Australia 
and New Zealand's responsibHity in the Pacific." AveriU Harriman repeated the 
undertaking a year later that the United States would fight to defend East New 
Guinea: "The three parties would be in it together."" Barwick's attempt to extend 
the ANZUS umbrella to Australian troops in Borneo failed. Barwick had already 
reaHzed that the United States was changing its poHcy, that "the United States had 
on the whole been more interested in keeping Indonesia happy (and non-communist) 
than in safeguarding legality or the rights of other parties in the New Guinea 
dispute". He reminded AustraHans they "must not lose sight of our major interest 
in reducing the spread of communism"." 
Australian foreign policy was being reassessed with the appointment of Barwick as 
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the new minister for External Affairs in 1961. The results of that departmental 
reassessment became evident by crudally important decisions taken early in 1962. On 
6 March the United States gave a formal guarantee of their security in the Rusk-
Khoman joint statement, reaffirming the reinterpretation of the SEATO pact that 
unilateral rather than multilateral assistance could be given. Australia immediately 
endorsed the new interpretation. During the ANZUS Coundl meeting on 8 May, 
AustraHa agreed to send a token force of thirty military instructors to South 
Vietnam. Two days later, Menzies told parliament that the United States would 
establish a naval communications centre at North-West Cape in Western Australia. 
The agreement was incorporated in a bill passed by the House of Representatives on 
9 May 1963. 
During a period of six to eight weeks, Australia had taken vitally important steps 
that aligned her foreign policy much more closely with that of the United States. 
How far this was the result of quiet discussion rather than open diplomacy can only 
be determined when the archives are opened under the operation of the thirty-year 
rule. It is a not unfair assumption to make that Australia was paying further 
premiums on the insurance policy taken out in 1951. It is perhaps significant that 
AustraHa soon became more frequently accused of being a satellite of the United 
States. Deeper involvement in the Vietnam morass followed. 
The decision to commit military advisers to Vietnam followed the American ap-
proach in mid-November to the Australian ambassador in Washington suggesting 
that Australia provide equipment and advisers rather than combat troops. The 
Australian decision on 8 May was taken at the request of the American rather than 
the Vietnamese government: Saigon was informed after the dedsion was taken. 
Subsequent decisions followed a somewhat similar pattern: increasing military dif-
ficulties in Vietnam led to the increase of American instructors and then combat 
troops and further suggestions that additional Australian assistance would be 
welcome. The AustraHan government acceded to the American requests as a form of 
insurance. "Our objective should be to achieve such an habitual closeness of relations 
with the United States and sense of mutual alliance that in our time of need (the 
possibility of a crisis in relations with Indonesia) the United States would have little 
option but to respond as we would want ."" On 29 April 1965 Australia committed 
an infantry battaHon to Vietnam. Pressure from Washington increased over the years 
and culminated in Holt's decision to increase the size of the Australian force in 
Vietnam to eight thousand. But in 1967, the Australian government firmly declined 
to commit further Australian troops. 
At no stage did the Australian government publicly admit American pressure: it 
came at the informal diplomatic level. Hasluck and Holt justified Australian dedsions 
on the ground that they were the result of independent analysis and assessment of the 
situation in Vietnam by its own intelligence officers. There were obviously close 
unks between American and AustraHan intelligence forces in South Vietnam. It was 
significant that with the expansion of the AustraHan diplomatic service and the 
dispatch of troops to Vietnam it was possible to make independent assessments. 
Until there can be full access to the Vietnam documents, there is no way of knowing 
how extensive the AustraHan analysis was or how independent. On many spedfic 
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issues, Australia had to rely upon American eyes and estimates because AustraHans 
were too sparsely spread. 
The explanations given for involving more Australian troops were very similar to 
American explanations to Congress. The countries started from similar or common 
assumptions (e.g., about the danger of Communist aggression in South-East Asia 
and the domino theory) and almost inevitably arrived at similar conclusions. ParaUel 
poHcies were being followed in theory, but in practice Australian polides tended to 
become indistinguishable from American polides. It was easy for critics to conclude 
that Australia had no mind or policy of its own and that it was Httle more than a 
satellite. 
One of the important advantages seeming to flow from the ANZUS alHance was 
privileged AustraHan access to American policy and thinking. Top American offidals 
visited Australia more frequently after the beginning of the Vietnam War, but there 
is naturally Httle evidence about the content of the discussions. Consultation con-
tinued after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and a closer personal friendship developed 
between President Johnson and Prime Minister Holt. But Johnson played things 
close to his chest, and there was little consultation or exchange of information after 
1967. The decision to cease the bombing of North Vietnam, announced on the eve of 
the American presidential election, was communicated to Australia only a few hours 
before the public presidential announcement. Australia was not consulted about the 
inclusion of the National Liberation Front in the Paris discussions for a settlement. 
The exchange of information between Washington and Canberra virtually dried up 
in Johnson's later months and after Nixon's election in 1968." There was little 
privileged access, and Australia appears to have been no better informed than other 
allies of American policy decisions. Gorton wryly admitted after the cessation of 
bombing that "if there were great changes in United States involvement in Vietnam, 
Australia would be forced to accept them. . . . If there were a complete change of 
policy I think we would have a decision forced on us not to try to do things 
ourselves" (see chap. 19). 
There was, therefore, little independence in Australian policy over Vietnam, 
perhaps from the beginning, certainly after 1967. The AustraHan decisions were 
taken as part of Australia's policy to commit the United States to firm miHtary 
defence in South-East Asia. ANZUS was the key to the present and hopefuUy the 
future. The uneasy aHiance survived the traumas of the Vietnam conflict and the 
rethinking of American priorities under Nixon's Guam doctrine. No hint had been 
given to Canberra of a reappraisal of American defence priorities, of the shift away 
from Asia to Europe. On the other hand, there was no revision of the terms (or 
ostensibly the interpretation) of the ANZUS Treaty. Like other American alhes, 
Australia was warned of the need to maintain strong local defences: Canberra was 
aware of the not infrequent American congressional criticism that she was dragging 
her military feet. Independence is relative, not absolute, and partial loss of it can be 
interpreted as leading to dependence and even satellite status. Many ALP voters in 
Australia saw it that way when Whitlam won the 1972 election and proceeded to 
give a new look to an alliance which he felt was tending to become a relationship. 
In addressing American newspaper editors, Henry Kissinger once drew a distinc-
tion between America's "commitments" and its "interests". "If the only argument 
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for American partidpation in an area is the fact that the United States happens to 
have made a treaty some 15 years ago, that would be a very precarious situation for 
the area and for us." Nixon felt that the commitments inherited from the Democrats 
were now less relevant to a changing situation and should be examined in the Hght of 
America's interests as a global, nuclear power. Kissinger pointed out that there were 
a number of "grey areas" where American interests were less clear than they were 
with Japan and NATO.*" As I have written earHer, "the United States h?,d not 
become neo-isolationist but rather that Sir Galahad had been pensioned off, that 
Samuel Smiles was now in the ascendant". 
Australian relations with the United States go back a long time before a formal 
alHance was concluded. This is barely a generation old. During the colonial period 
there was no question of AustraHan subordination to the United States. Before Pearl 
Harbor, dedsions on foreign policy and defence were normally taken by the United 
Kingdom. Australia's lack of real interest in the formulation of policy is reflected in 
her delayed ratification of the Statute of Westminster and the slow growth of the 
infant Department of External Affairs. Pearl Harbor saw the entry of Australia into a 
new field and the formulation of the concept of a middle power. During the difficult 
and sometimes stormy decade when Evatt was at once minister for External Affairs 
and attorney-general, Australia acquired a new status. What both Evatt and the 
AustraHan government failed to realize was that without power, status was of little 
real value. "High noon" brought expectations but also frustration. 
The signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951 marked the beginning of a new era in 
the relations between the two countries. The relationship had now been formalized 
and there were mutual restraints and obligations, restraints and obHgations inter-
preted rather differently by the three parries: Australia attached considerable impor-
tance to what Harry G. Gelber has called the ' 'Lafayette syndrome'': the belief that 
the Americans never forgot the help given to George Washington by the French 
under the young Lafayette during the War of Independence. The assistance given to 
MacArthur, particularly during the early stages of the Pacific war, was the starting 
point. An immediate and gut reaction to the Korean crisis and support for SEATO 
in 1954 and beyond were seen as part of Australia's premiums for the insurance 
promised by the ANZUS pact. 
This involved a somewhat simpHstic approach to relations between the two coun-
tries. Politidans have notoriously short memories, and the Lafayette syndrome was 
perhaps more relevant at the grass-roots level. The hard fact was that the United 
States had global interests and priorities which cut across the regional and more 
limited interests of small or middle powers. Both the Netherlands and Taiwan, for 
example, were as acutely aware of this as Australia should have been. Perspectives 
differ, leading to different priorities, and so too does the context within which 
agreements are made. Menzies reaHzed the importance of power and the limitations 
of status more readily than Evatt: "True, AustraHa is an independent nation and has 
a perfect right to express its views, whatever the result. This is a grand conception, 
and would be even more admirable if we possessed such population and strength as 
made us a truly great power, able to defend ourselves in our own right. But the fact 
is that we are not truly independent except in legal terms."*' 
So far as the United States was concerned, dependence and the straitjacket concept 
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were, of course, irrelevant before 1941, partly so between 1941 and 1949, and 
perhaps sometimes during the alHance period 1951-75. Dependence is not weighed 
during a war, and sharp differences of tactics, strategy, and poHtical poHcy inevitably 
develop in wartime and in post-war crises. Between the surrender in Tokyo Bay in 
1945 and the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan, there were major points of 
agreement and disagreement. The Manus base discussions led to an Australian defeat. 
Macmahon BaH's experiences in Tokyo illustrate this starkly. Direct AustraHan in-
fluence on the Japanese peace treaty was minimal. Kirby and Critchley in Batavia 
were able to overcome differences of policy with Du Bois and Cochran more suc-
cessfully and with a greater mutual accommodation despite occasional black 
moments. Spender overcame the very strong objections of Washington to the con-
clusion of a security treaty in 1951. Evatt's successes in San Frandsco in 1945 were 
partly drafting successes, but they did involve major American concessions on a 
number of issues. 
During the fifties there were few occasions when Australia was compelled to give 
way to pressure from the United States. The Suez episode was in a sense an aberra-
tion. Korea, despite operational differences in the field, the Geneva conferences of 
1954 and later in 1962, the offshore and Indonesian crises of 1958, all showed the 
possibilities of co-operation and restraint. There were disputes but no enmity or 
subordination. Basic assumptions were, on the whole, strikingly similar, as were the 
internal lines of difference: the anti-Communist crusade and the fears of anti-red 
witch hunts. The Korean war also illustrated in one respect the relative importance 
of Australia in official American eyes. Robert O'Neill's history of the AustraHan 
part in the Korean War occupies 548 pages. The American documents for 1950-51 
(FRUS) devotes some four thousand pages to Korea: AustraHa is rarely mentioned. 
The context, the "framework of facts", writhin which Australian policy was for-
mulated had been changing dramatically between 1951 and 1975. The ANZUS 
Treaty had been drafted with Japan regarded as the main poHtical threat to 
Australian security and with communism seen as the main danger in Asia. The spHt 
between Moscow and Peking had shattered the old view that the basic threat to 
world peace came from a monoHthic communism. The old bipolar concept of a 
balance between two superpowers which had preoccupied Casey, Barwick, Hasluck, 
and their successors, had ceased to be relevant by 1970. The policies of AustraHa's 
two "great and powerful friends" were changing. The British miHtary presence east 
of Suez had virtually disappeared. The Nixon doctrine involved a contraction of 
American military involvement in South-East Asia as weU as the north-west Pacific. 
The contraction of American and British influence in Asia was accompanied by the 
appearance of a small Soviet naval force in the Indian Ocean and a shift in the balance 
of naval power. By 1975 the balance between the two nuclear powers was being 
replaced by a four-power global balance. 
To deal with this increasingly complex world, the Australian Department of 
External (Foreign) Affairs greatly expanded in size and increased in maturity. 
The change of government in 1949 coincided with a number of changes in the 
structure and size of the Department of External Affairs. It had been separated from 
the Prime Minister's Department in 1935, four years before the Second World War 
broke out. Attempts were made immediately to recruit university graduates with 
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overseas experience. A small handful of men served Evatt and carried out poHdes 
determined primarily by Evatt and his young departmental secretary, John Burton, 
from 1946 to 1949. In June 1950 Alan Watt was appointed as secretary. His contact 
with Evatt over the immediate post-war years led him "to believe that the Minister 
did not want a Department organised to formulate under his direction and control a 
broad poHcy for submission to him to approve, modify or reject but rather a Depart-
ment organised to carry out his own pre-determined poHcy".** Watt reorganized 
the department along more normal administrative lines and quickly built up an effi-
dent organization capable of coping with the immense increase in business in the 
early fifties. Closer working relationships were built up with the Defence Depart-
ment and Treasury. 
The quiet department of some ten officers (who could bring their dogs to work to 
sit at their feet) changed rapidly with the recruitment of men who had served in the 
armed forces and various other government departments during the war. The staff in 
the United States of six in 1945 increased to ten in 1951 and to forty-one in 1975. 
The Washington staff in 1975 included eight diplomats. Washington and New 
York were the two major posts in the United States, but consulates were opened in 
San Frandsco and Los Angeles.*' The rapid expansion meant that there was less need 
to rely upon British or American sources for information and intelligence. 
The expansion of the Department of External Affairs concided with a clearer ap-
predation of AustraHa's geographical proximity to Asia and her historic ties with an 
Atlantic community, which had been enlarged by the addition of the United States. 
The pre-war emphasis on closer relations with the United States was becoming 
"vital to our own security". But this emphasis on military power obscured two 
other traditional elements in that relationship: the economic dependence of Australia 
on British markets and the intellectual pull to British universities and of British 
culture. 
These intellectual pulls were weakened in the generation after 1950. The signing 
of the Fulbright Agreement between Australia and the United States on 26 
November 1949 meant a steady flow of young Australian graduates to American 
rather than British universities for advanced studies. Harvard and Wisconsin, Yale, 
Chicago, and Princeton began to rival Oxford and Cambridge and London. The 
operation of the Smith-Mundt Act accelerated the flow of graduates and senior 
university teachers across the Pacific rather than through Suez. Between 1950 and 
1975, Australians visited the United States with Fulbright assistance and Americans 
came to Australia under one or other category of Fulbright or Foundation grant. 
The State Department was increasingly willing to sponsor visits to Australia of 
senior historians, poHtical scientists, and international relations experts. This cross-
fertilization of cultures was of immense importance to Australian understanding and 
discussion of Australian-American relations. 
With this reorientation of academic contacts went an important change in the 
news media: the publication of a Pacific edition of Time, the printing in Melbourne 
of the international edition of the weekly review section of the New York Times, and 
the publication of an easily accessible Tokyo edition of Newsweek have done much to 
balance the influence of the airmail editions of the Guardian Weekly, The Times, and 
the New Statesman. A new world had been called into existence to redress the cultural 
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attraction of the old. The trend was strengthened by development of United States 
information centres in Melbourne, Sydney, and Canberra and the appointment of a 
cultural affairs officer in the American Embassy in Canberra. Australia gradually 
followed suit. These gave new opportunities for a growing segment of the popula-
tion to broaden its knowledge of American politics and international relations. The 
impact of parliamentary debates on relations with the United States was quite 
marked. 
A corollary of these changes was the development at many levels of an interest in 
the United States. One of the most important was the AustraHan-American Assoda-
tion, which grew out of the British and American co-operation movement estab-
lished in 1936. It was designed to provide a forum for the discussion of economic and 
political problems and after 1941 became involved in providing hospitality for 
American troops stationed in or passing through Australia. A focal point in the ac-
tivities of the association was the celebration in 1946 of the Coral Sea Battle, a turn-
ing point in the war against Japan. In 1950 the AustraHan and American govern-
ments actively participated: Admiral P.W. Radford, commander-in-chief of the US 
Pacific Fleet, became the first distinguished Coral Sea guest. One of the important 
functions of the Australian-American Assodation was its sponsorship in AustraHa of 
the American Field Service International Scholarships. These provided for the selec-
tion of teenage students to spend a year in the United States or Australia. By 1968 a 
grand total of 632 Australian students and 131 American students had taken advan-
tage of the programme. This programme meant that a different segment of the 
Australian and American people were subjected to new cultural influences. Between 
1950, when the Fulbright programme began in Australia, and 1981, a total of 3,131 
grants had been made by the Australian-American Foundation to Australians and 
Americans to cross the Pacific. Of these, 114 were in the field of history and 109 in 
political science.** 
These cultural developments meant that there was a much better informed 
Australian people to look at the foreign relations between Australia and the United 
States (or at least there were the opportunities for a clearly informed discussion). The 
freer flow of information often meant a deeper and more bitter discussion of poHtical 
problems and relationships. The Australian revolt over Vietnam owed a great deal to 
these cultural changes and the development of media contacts. It also reflected a 
growing critical examination of Australian and American policies: not quite a 
satelHte relationship. 
When Admiral Sperry visited AustraHa at Deakin's invitation in 1908, he hoped 
that his boys would help to create a new image of the United States. Image-making 
is a tricky and often fruitless pursuit. As Sir George Pearce told Jay Pierrepont Moffat 
in 1935 (see chap. 5), the favourable AustraHan image of the United States had disap-
peared because of 1917.*' With hundreds of thousands of American troops in 
AustraHa 1942-45, senriment about the American visitors reached a new peak despite 
the occasional army clashes and the civil friction between troops of the two coun-
tries. Over-Sexed, Over-Paid, and Over Here is an indictment of that relationship by an 
American academic who visited Australia.*' Yet there were many who recalled their 
pleasant sojourns and contacts with Australians and AustraHans who reciprocated. 
The media contacts between the two countries had increased Australian awareness 
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of many features of American Hfe; they Hfted the level of consciousness above the 
floor of 1908. The American consul-general in Sydney in 1931, Roger C. Treadwell, 
reported: 
The press in Sydney and throughout AustraUa generaUy have foUowed their usual custom 
of emphasising and giving prominence to every cable item of news from America which 
reflects upon the character of its government and people. It is unfortunate that only the 
worst part of American Ufe is cabled abroad by correspondents of the AustraUan press in the 
United States. This not only makes for a great deal of iU-wiU but increases misunderstan-
dings, and . . . leads a large number of people to the conclusion that Americans are the 
most wicked and worst people in the world.*' 
Levels of press reporting had greatly improved by the late sixties. Bruce Grant and 
Creighton Burns made very significant contributions to the process. The first fuH-
time AustraHan newspaper correspondent in Washington as distinct from New York 
was not appointed untH 1964. 
Bruce Grant, invited in 1966 to analyse the American image in Australia, found it 
difficult to find a single image. "America [in the 1930s] seemed an undisdpHned, 
polygot, violent and peculiar place, where the buildings were taller than anywhere 
else and the people more desperately in transit between wealth and poverty." A 
generation later "there was much more understanding of the complexity and 
richness of American life, the substance behind the oratorical tribute to life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness. . . . The popular image of America in Australia as a 
land of opportunity is being gradually replaced by the image of a society on trial. The 
quality of American Hfe is increasingly seen, not as entertainment but as a lesson in 
twentieth century survival. So while AustraHans take America more seriously, they 
also look at it more critically." American and Australian polides in Vietnam increas-
ed this re-examination of those policies. "American influence in Australia has run 
against the desire of a growing number of Australians to become more self-reliant, 
and those Australians in expressing reservations about the alliance with America are 
really engaging in self criticism.' '*' 
The American image of AustraHa presents similar problems. In 1936 Jay Pierre-
pont Moffat felt impelled because "there is so little knowledge in America of 
AustraHa and the Australians" to put on paper, primarily for the benefit of the 
Department of State, a few generalizations, in the hope that they might serve as a back-
ground against which current developments might be gauged in their proper relief. In 
a very penetrating analysis, he pointed to the American tendency to regard Australia as 
"merely a satellite of the central sun of Great Britain. . . . Australia wants and 
claims all the advantages accruing from being merely a part of the British Empire, 
and at the same time desires to surrender none of the advantages to be derived from 
being a self-governing dominion. The country wants to have its cake and eat it ." He 
concluded: "The Australian has really little understanding of American psychology 
and there is too little intercourse between the two, either official or through an 
exchange of travellers, to bring about a better understanding of the other's character 
and mentality."*' 
The opportunity for a better understanding came with the influx of thousands of 
American troops to AustraHa in 1942 and the following years. Dixon Wecter, a 
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forty-year old academic historian, visited Australia in 1945-46 and examined the 
relations between the "Aussie and the Yank" in an article in the Atlantic Monthly in 
May 1946. He began it with the comment (very accurate) that '^before the invasion 
of Australia by nearly a million GIs, the average American seldom thought of that 
land save as a large blank continent with a zoological sense of humour. Thanks to his 
press, which maintains a battery of New York and Hollywood columnists, with an 
eye to the more lurid and lunatic aspect in America — and to our movies, magazines 
and canned music, the Australian reacts constantly to the vibrations of American 
life.'"" 
Frank Snowden Hopkins, an experienced American diplomat who was consul-
general in Melbourne from 1958 to 1963, attempted to define the American image of 
AustraHa almost a generation later than Dixon Wecter and immediately posed the 
question, "Is there such a thing as an American image of AustraHa? Surely there is, 
and yet it is not a single clear picture but rather a composite of many overlapping 
impressions, some of them extremely vague. Searching for the American image is a 
little like trying to find the kernel of an onion: one has to keep peeling off layers of 
outer tissue in order to penetrate to the heart of the matter." His peeling the onion 
led him to conclude that there are a variety of levels at which Americans picture 
Australia: there are vast differences between those of Uncle George who married one 
of the fifteen thousand war brides, the recent tourist visitor to Australia, and the 
American businessman or diplomat who has resided in Australia. It is accordingly 
difficult to obtain the correct image. Is AustraHa a strong, vital country fully on top 
of her own problems and able to render valuable support as America's Pacific ally, or 
is she a weak and dependent country which is greatly in need of American assistance? 
The truth undoubtedly lies somewhere between these two extremes, but it is surely 
understandable if many individual Americans have difficulty at times in determining 
just what they should think."" There are many areas of sodal and cultural overlap, 
as Robin Boyd commented, the result partly of a one-way flow of the products of 
our mass media. The generally favourable image was often vague. 
Images are perhaps deceptive and misleading so far as foreign poHcy is concerned. 
Favourable images may make the conduct of foreign and economic poHcy easier, 
smoother. Few Americans would regard Australian leaders as people who had not 
yet come out of the trees, as an indiscreet American diplomat said of some of the 
Asian leaders with whom he had worked. Greater knowledge at all levels makes the 
conduct of diplomatic relations much easier. But Vietnam and the Coral Sea Battle 
have been important in forming public opinion. Knowledge measured by public 
opinion polls reflects the level of general sentiment but rarely goes deeper. It is the 
professional diplomat, the businessman, and perhaps the intellectual who help 
influence Australian policy. 
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With a long coastline and small population, Australia could not 
hope to defend itself against external attack. It has therefore 
always felt the need for the protection of a "great and powerful 
f r iend". 
The United Kingdom traditionally filled that role. Shortly after 
Federation, however, Australian prime ministers began to look 
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Pacific powers to check Japanese expansion. When Japan enter-
ed the Second World War, John Curtin bypassed Britain and 
appealed directly to the United States for help. 
Attempts to strengthen ties between Canberra and Washington 
culminated in 1 9 51 In the ANZUS Treaty, which became the focal 
point in relations between the two countries. But closer collabo-
ration raised the problem of the relationship between junior and 
senior partners in the alliance. Could Australia conduct an inde-
pendent foreign policy and not become a satellite of the United 
States? 
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provided interesting case studies, and access to other previously 
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